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ADVICE *M<sup>r</sup> Marox:*  
*Linc. Coll.*

TO A

YOUNG REVIEWER,

*Rev. Daniel Ace, D.D. F.R.S.*

WITH A

SPECIMEN OF THE ART.

---

OXFORD,

SOLD BY J. PARKER, AND J. COOKE;

AND BY

F. C. AND J. RIVINGTON, ST. PAUL'S CHURCH YARD, LONDON.

1807.



# ADVICE

TO A

YOUNG REVIEWER, &c.

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YOU are now about to enter on a profession which has the means of doing much good to society, and scarcely any temptation to do harm. You may encourage genius, you may chastise superficial arrogance, expose falsehood, correct error, and guide the taste and opinions of the age in no small degree by the books you praise and recommend. All this too may be done without running the risk of making any enemies, or subjecting yourself to be called to account for your criticism, however severe. While your name is unknown, your person is invulnerable: at the same time your own aim is sure; for you may take it at your leisure; and your blows fall heavier than those of any writer whose name is given, or who is simply anonymous. There is a mysterious authority in the plural *we*, which no single name, whatever may be its reputation, can acquire; and, under the sanction of this imposing style, your strictures, your praises, and your dogmas, will command universal attention, and be received as the fruit of united talents, acting on one common principle—as the judgments of a tribunal who decide only on mature deliberation, and who protect the interests of literature with unceasing vigilance.

Such being the high importance of that office, and such its opportunities, I cannot bestow a few hours of leisure better than in furnishing you with some hints for the

more easy and effectual discharge of it : hints which are, I confess, loosely thrown together, but which are the result of long experience, and of frequent reflection and comparison. And if any thing should strike you at first sight as rather equivocal in point of morality, or deficient in liberality and feeling ; I beg you will suppress all such scruples, and consider them as the offspring of a contracted education and narrow way of thinking, which a little intercourse with the world and sober reasoning will speedily overcome.

Now as in the conduct of life nothing is more to be desired than some governing principle of action, to which all other principles and motives must be made subservient ; so in the art of Reviewing I would lay down as a fundamental position, which you must never lose sight of, and which must be the main spring of all your criticisms—*Write what will sell.* To this golden rule every minor canon must be subordinate, and must be either immediately deducible from it, or at least be made consistent with it. Be not staggered at the sound of a precept, which upon examination will be found as honest and virtuous as it is discreet. I have already sketched out the great services which it is in your power to render mankind ; but all your efforts will be unavailing if men did not read what you write. Your utility therefore, it is plain, depends upon your popularity ; and popularity cannot be attained without humouring the taste and inclinations of men.

Be assured that by a similar train of sound and judicious reasoning the consciences of thousands in public life are daily quieted. It is better for the state that their party should govern than any other : the good which they can effect by the exercise of power is infinitely greater than any which could arise from a rigid adherence to certain subordinate moral precepts, which therefore should be violated without scruple whenever they stand in the way of their leading purpose. He who

sticks at these can never act a great part in the world, and is not fit to act it if he could. Such maxims may be very useful in ordinary affairs, and for the guidance of ordinary men ; but when we mount into the sphere of public utility, we must adopt more enlarged principles, and not suffer ourselves to be cramped and fettered by petty notions of right, and moral duty.

When you have reconciled yourself to this liberal way of thinking, you will find many inferior advantages resulting from it, which at first did not enter into your consideration. In particular, it will greatly lighten your labours to *follow* the public taste, instead of taking upon you to *direct* it. The task of pleasing is at all times easier than that of instructing : at least it does not stand in need of painful research and preparation ; and may be effected in general by a little vivacity of manner, and a dexterous morigeration (as Lord Bacon calls it) to the humours and frailties of men. Your responsibility too is thereby much lessened. Justice and candour can only be required of you so far as they coincide with this main principle ; and a little experience will convince you, that these are not the happiest means of accomplishing your purpose.

It has been idly said, that a Reviewer acts in a judicial capacity, and that his conduct should be regulated by the same rules by which the Judge of a civil court is governed : that he should rid himself of every bias ; be patient, cautious, sedate, and rigidly impartial ; that he should not seek to shew off himself, and should check every disposition to enter into the case as a partizan.

Such is the language of superficial thinkers ; but in reality there is no analogy between the two cases. A Judge is promoted to that office by the authority of the state ; a Reviewer by his own. The former is independent of controul, and may therefore freely follow the dictates of his own conscience : the latter depends for his very bread upon the breath of public opinion : the great law

of self-preservation therefore points out to him a different line of action. Besides, as we have already observed, if he ceases to please, he is no longer read, and consequently is no longer useful. In a court of justice, too, the part of amusing the bystanders rests with the counsel: in the case of criticism, if the Reviewer himself does not undertake it, who will? Instead of vainly aspiring therefore to the gravity of a magistrate, I would advise him, when he sits down to write, to place himself in the imaginary situation of a cross-examining pleader. He may comment, in a vein of agreeable irony, upon the profession, the manner of life, the look, dress, or even the name of the witness he is examining: when he has raised a contemptuous opinion of him in the minds of the court, he may proceed to draw answers from him capable of a ludicrous turn, and he may carve and garble these to his own liking. This mode of proceeding you will find most practicable in Poetry, where the boldness of the image, or the delicacy of thought, for which the reader's mind was prepared in the original, will easily be made to appear extravagant or affected, if judiciously singled out, and detached from the group to which it belongs. Again, since much depends upon the rhythm and the terseness of expression, both of which are sometimes destroyed by dropping a single word, or transposing a phrase, I have known much advantage arise from not quoting in the form of a literal extract, but giving a brief summary in prose of the contents of a poetical passage; and interlarding your own language with occasional phrases of the Poem, marked with inverted commas. These, and a thousand other little expedients, by which the arts of quizzing and banter flourish, practice will soon teach you. If it should be necessary to transcribe a dull passage, not very fertile in topics of humour and raillery, you may introduce it as a "favourable specimen of the Author's manner."

Few people are aware of the powerful effects of what

is philosophically termed Association. Without any positive violation of truth, the whole dignity of a passage may be undermined by contriving to raise some vulgar and ridiculous notions in the mind of the reader : and language teems with examples of words by which the same idea is expressed, with the difference only that one excites a feeling of respect, the other of contempt. Thus you may call a fit of melancholy “ the sulks,” resentment “ a pet,” a steed “ a nag,” a feast “ a junketing,” sorrow and affliction “ whining and blubbering.” By transferring the terms peculiar to one state of society, to analogous situations and characters in another, the same object is attained ; a drill-serjeant or a cat and nine tails in the Trojan war—a Lesbos smack put in to the Piræus—the penny-post of Jerusalem, and other combinations of the like nature, which, when you have a little indulged that vein of thought, will readily suggest themselves, never fail to raise a smile, if not immediately at the expence of the Author, yet entirely destructive of that frame of mind which his Poem requires in order to be relished.

I have dwelt the longer on this branch of literature, because you are chiefly to look here for materials of fun and irony. Voyages and Travels indeed are no barren ground, and you must seldom let a number of your Review go abroad without an article of this description. The charm of this species of writing, so universally felt, arises chiefly from its uniting narrative with information. The interest we take in the Story can only be kept alive by minute incident and occasional detail, which puts us in possession of the traveller’s feelings, his hopes, his fears, his disappointments, and his pleasures. At the same time the thirst for knowledge and love of novelty is gratified, by continual information respecting the people and countries he visits. If you wish therefore to run down the book, you have only to play off these two parts against each other : when the writer’s object is to satisfy the first inclination, you are to thank him for communi-

cating to the world such valuable facts—as whether he lost his way in the night—or sprained his ankle—or had no appetite to his dinner. If he is busied about describing the mineralogy, natural history, agriculture, trade, &c. of a country, you may mention a hundred books from whence the same information may be obtained, and deprecate the practice of emptying old musty folios into new quartos, to gratify that sickly taste for a smattering about every thing, which distinguishes the present age.

In works of science and recondite learning, the task you have undertaken will not be so difficult as you may imagine. Tables of Contents and Indexes are blessed helps in the hands of a Reviewer; but, more than all, the Preface is the field from which his richest harvest is to be gathered. In the Preface the Author usually gives a summary of what has been written on the same subject before; he acknowledges the assistance he has received from different sources, and the reasons of his dissent from former writers; he confesses that certain parts have been less attentively considered than others, and that information has come to his hands too late to be made use of; he points out many things in the composition of his work which he thinks may provoke animadversion, and endeavours to defend or to palliate his own practice. Here then is a fund of wealth for the Reviewer, lying upon the very surface; if he knows any thing of his business, he will turn all these materials against the Author; carefully suppressing the source of his information, and as if drawing from the stores of his own mind, long ago laid up for this very purpose. If the Author's references are correct, a great point is gained; for by consulting a few passages of the original works, it will be easy to discuss the subject with the air of having a previous knowledge of the whole. Your chief vantage-ground is, that you may fasten upon any position in the book you are reviewing, and treat it as principal and essential, when perhaps it is of little weight in the



main argument ; but, by allotting a large share of your criticism to it, the reader will naturally be led to give it a proportionate importance, and to consider the merit of the treatise at issue upon that single question. If any body complains that the greater and more valuable parts remain unnoticed, your answer is, that it is impossible to pay attention to all, and that your duty is rather to prevent the propagation of error, than to lavish praises upon that which, if really excellent, will work its way in the world without your help. Indeed, if the plan of your Review admits of selection, you had better not meddle with works of deep research and original speculation, such as have already attracted much notice, and cannot be treated superficially without fear of being found out. The time required for making yourself thoroughly master of the subject is so great, that you may depend upon it they will never pay for the reviewing. They are generally the fruit of long study, and of talents concentrated in the steady pursuit of one object ; it is not likely therefore that you can throw much new light on a question of this nature, or even plausibly combat the Author's positions in the course of a few hours, which is all you can well afford to devote to them. And, without accomplishing one or other of these points, your Review will gain no celebrity, and of course no good will be done.

Enough has been said to give you some insight into the facilities with which your new employment abounds : I will only mention one more, because of its extensive and almost universal application to all branches of literature ; the topic, I mean, which by the old Rhetoricians was called *ἡ ἐναντίωσις*. That is, when a work excels in one quality, you may blame it for not having the opposite. For instance, if the biographical sketch of a literary character is minute and full of anecdote, you may enlarge on the advantages of philosophical reflection, and the superior mind required to give a judicious ana-

lysis of the opinions and works of deceased authors : on the contrary, if the latter method is pursued by the biographer, you can with equal ease extol the lively colouring, and truth, and interest, of exact delineation and detail. This topic, you will perceive, enters into style as well as matter ; where many virtues might be named which are incompatible : and whichever the Author has preferred, it will be the signal for you to launch forth on the praises of its opposite, and continually to hold up that to your reader as the model of excellence in this species of writing.

You will perhaps wonder why all my instructions are pointed towards the censure, and not the praise of books ; but many reasons might be given why it should be so. The chief are, that this part is both easier, and will sell better. Let us hear the words of Mr. Burke on a subject not very dissimilar ; “ In such cases,” says he, “ the writer “ has a certain fire and alacrity inspired into him by “ a consciousness, that, let it fare how it will with the “ subject, his ingenuity will be sure of applause ; and “ this alacrity becomes much greater, if he acts upon the “ offensive, by the impetuosity that always accompanies “ an attack, and the unfortunate propensity which mankind have to the finding and exaggerating faults.” Pref. *Vindic. Nat. Soc.* p. 6. You will perceive that I have on no occasion sanctioned the baser motives of private pique, envy, revenge, and love of detraction ; at least I have not recommended harsh treatment upon any of these grounds ; I have argued simply on the abstract moral principle which a Reviewer should ever have present to his mind : but if any of these motives insinuate themselves as secondary springs of action, I would not condemn them : they may come in aid of the grand leading principle, and powerfully second its operation.

But it is time to close these tedious precepts, and to furnish you with what speaks plainer than any precept, a specimen of the art itself, in which several of them are

embodied. It is hastily done, but it exemplifies well enough what I have said of the poetical department, and exhibits most of those qualities, which disappointed authors are fond of railing at, under the names of flippancy, arrogance, conceit, misrepresentation, and malevolence : reproaches, which you will only regard as so many acknowledgments of success in your undertaking, and infallible tests of an established fame and rapidly increasing circulation.

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*L'Allegro, a Poem. By John Milton. No Printer's name.*

IT has become a practice of late with a certain description of people, who have no visible means of subsistence, to string together a few trite images of rural scenery, interspersed with vulgarisms in dialect, and traits of vulgar manners ; to dress up these materials in a sing-song jingle, and to offer them for sale as a Poem. According to the most approved recipes, something about the heathen gods and goddesses, and the schoolboy topics of Styx and Cerberus, and Elysium, is occasionally thrown in, and the composition is complete. The stock in trade of these adventurers is in general scanty enough, and their art therefore consists in disposing it to the best advantage. But if such be the aim of the writer, it is the Critic's business to detect and defeat the imposture ; to warn the public against the purchase of shop-worn goods, and tinsel wares ; to protect the fair trader, by exposing the tricks of needy quacks and mountebanks ; and to chastise that forward and noisy importunity, with which they present themselves to the public notice.

How far Mr. Milton is amenable to this discipline, will best appear from a brief analysis of the Poem before us. In the very opening he assumes a tone of authority, which might better suit some veteran bard than a raw

candidate for the Delphic bays : for, before he proceeds to the regular process of Invocation, he clears the way by driving from his presence, with sundry hard names and bitter reproaches on her father, mother, and all the family, a venerable personage, whose age at least, and staid matron-like appearance, might have entitled her to more civil language.

Hence, loathed Melancholy ;  
Of Cerberus and blackest midnight born,  
In Stygian cave forlorn, &c.

There is no giving rules, however, in these matters, without a knowledge of the case. Perhaps the old lady had been frequently warned off before, and provoked this violence by continuing still to lurk about the Poet's dwelling. And, to say the truth, the reader will have but too good reason to remark, before he gets through the Poem, that it is one thing to tell the spirit of dulness to depart, and another to get rid of her in reality. Like Glendower's spirits, any one may order them away, "but will they go, when you do order them?"

But let us suppose for a moment that the Parnassian decree is obeyed, and according to the letter of the *order*, which is as precise and wordy as if Justice Shallow himself had drawn it, that the obnoxious female is sent back to the place of her birth,

"'Mongst horrid shapes, shrieks, sights," &c.

at which we beg our fair readers not to be alarmed, for we can assure them they are only words of course in all poetical instruments of this nature, and mean no more than the "force and arms," and "instigation of the Devil" in a common indictment. This nuisance then being abated, we are left at liberty to contemplate a character of a different complexion, "buxom, blithe, and debonair," one, who although evidently a great favourite of the Poet's, and therefore to be received with all due courtesy, is notwithstanding introduced under the suspicious description of an *alias*.

In heaven yelep'd Euphrosyne,  
And by men, heart-easing Mirth.

Judging indeed from the light and easy deportment of this gay nymph, one might guess there were good reasons for a change of name, as she changed her residence.

But of all vices there is none we abhor more than that of slanderous insinuation ; we shall therefore confine our moral strictures to the nymph's mother, in whose defence the Poet has little to say himself. Here too, as in the case of the *name*, there is some doubt : for the uncertainty of descent on the father's side having become trite to a proverb, the Author, scorning that beaten track, has left us to choose between two mothers for his favourite : and without much to guide our choice ; for, whichever we fix upon, it is plain she was no better than she should be. As he seems, however, himself inclined to the latter of the two, we will even suppose it so to be.—

Or whether (as some sager sing)  
The frolic *wind that breathes the spring*,  
Zephyr with Aurora playing,  
*As he met her once a Maying* ;  
There on beds of violets blue,  
And fresh-blown roses wash'd in dew, &c.

Some dull people might imagine, that the wind was more like the breath of spring, than spring the breath of the wind ; but we are more disposed to question the Author's Ethics than his Physics, and accordingly cannot dismiss these May gambols without some observations.

In the first place, Mr. M. seems to have higher notions of the antiquity of the May-pole than we have been accustomed to attach to it. Or perhaps he thought to shelter the equivocal nature of this affair under that sanction. To us however, who can hardly subscribe to the doctrine that “ vice loses half its evil by losing all its grossness,” neither the remoteness of time, nor the gaiety of the season, furnishes a sufficient palliation. “ Violets blue,” and “ fresh-blown roses,” are to be sure more agreeable ob-

jects of the imagination than a gin-shop in Wapping, or a booth in Bartholomew Fair; but in point of morality, these are distinctions without a difference: or, it may be, the cultivation of mind, which teaches us to reject and nauseate these latter objects, aggravates the case, if our improvement in taste be not accompanied by a proportionate improvement of morals.

If the reader can reconcile himself to this latitude of principle, the anachronism will not long stand in his way. Much indeed may be said in favour of this union of ancient mythology with modern notions and manners. It is a sort of chronological metaphor—an artificial analogy, by which ideas, widely remote and heterogeneous, are brought into contact, and the mind is delighted by this unexpected assemblage, as it is by the combinations of figurative language.

Thus in that elegant interlude, which the pen of Ben Johnson has transmitted to us, of the loves of Hero and Leander :—

Gentles, that no longer your expectations may wander,  
Behold our chief actor, amorous Leander,  
With a great deal of cloth, lapp'd about him like a scarf,  
For he yet serves his father, a dyer in Puddle-Wharf;  
Which place we'll make bold with, to call it our Abydus,  
As the bank-side is our Sestos, and *let it not be denied us.*

And far be it from us to deny the use of so reasonable a liberty; especially if the request be backed (as it is in the case of Mr. M.) by the craving and imperious necessities of rhyme. What man who has ever bestrode Pegasus but for an hour, will be insensible to such a claim?

*Haud ignara mali miseris succurrere disco.*

We are next favoured with an enumeration of the attendants of this “debonair” nymph, in all the minuteness of a German dramatis personæ, or a rope-dancer’s hand-bill:

Haste thee, nymph, and bring with thee  
Jest, and youthful Jollity;  
Quips, and cranks, and wanton wiles,  
Nods, and becks, and wreathed smiles,

Such as hang on Hebe's cheek,  
 And love to live in dimple sleek ;  
 Sport that wrinkled Care derides,  
 And Laughter, holding both his sides.

The Author, to prove himself worthy of being admitted of the crew, skips and capers about upon "the light fantastic toe," that there is no following him. He scam-pers through all the categories, in search of his imaginary beings, from Substance to Quality, and back again ; from thence to Action, Passion, Habit, &c. with incredible celerity. Who, for instance, would have expected *cranks, nods, becks, and wreathed smiles*, as part of a group, in which Jest, Jollity, Sport, and Laughter figure away as full-formed entire personages ? The family likeness is certainly very strong in the two last, and if we had not been told, we should perhaps have thought the act of *deriding* as appropriate to Laughter as to Sport.

But how are we to understand the stage directions ?

*Come, and trip it as you go.*

Are the words used synonymously ? Or is it meant that this airy gentry shall come in at a minuet step, and go off in a jig ? The phenomenon of a *tripping crank* is indeed novel, and would doubtless attract numerous spectators. But it is difficult to guess to whom among this jolly company the Poet addresses himself, for immediately after the plural appellative [you], he proceeds,

And in *thy* right hand lead with *thee*  
 The mountain nymph, sweet Liberty.

No sooner is this fair damsel introduced, but Mr. M. with most unbecoming levity, falls in love with her, and makes a request of her companion, which is rather greedy, that he may live with both of them :

To live with her, and live with thee.

Even the gay libertine who sung, "How happy could I "be with either," did not go so far as this. But we have already had occasion to remark on the laxity of Mr. M.'s amatory notions.

The Poet, intoxicated with the charms of his mistress, now rapidly runs over the pleasures which he proposes to himself in the enjoyment of her society. But though he has the advantage of being his own eaterer, either his palate is of a peculiar structure, or he has not made the most judicious selection. To begin the day well, he will have the *sky-lark*

——to come in *spite of sorrow*,  
And at his window bid good morrow.

The sky-lark, if we know any thing of the nature of that bird, must come in spite of something else as well as of sorrow, to the performance of this office. In his next image the natural history is better preserved, and as the thoughts are appropriate to the time of the day, we will venture to transcribe the passage, as a favourable specimen of the author's manner :

While the Cock with lively din  
Seatters the rear of darkness thin,  
And to the stack, or the barn-door,  
Stoutly struts his dames before ;  
Oft listening how the hounds and horn  
Cheerly rouse the slumbering morn,  
From the side of some hoar hill,  
Through the high wood echoing shrill.

Is it not lamentable that, after all, whether it is the Cock or the Poet that listens, should be left entirely to the reader's conjecture? Perhaps also his embarrassment may be increased by a slight resemblance of character in these two illustrious personages, at least as far as relates to the extent and numbers of their seraglio.

After a *flaming* description of sunrise, on which occasion the clouds attend in their very best liveries, the bill of fare for the day proceeds in the usual manner. Whistling ploughmen, singing milkmaids, and sentimental shepherds are always to be had at a moment's notice, and, if well grouped, serve to fill up the landscape agreeably enough. On this part of the Poem we have only to re-



mark, that if Mr. John Milton proposeth to make himself merry with

Russet lawns, and fallows grey,  
Where the nibbling flocks *do* stray;  
Mountains on whose barren breast  
The labouring clouds *do* often rest,  
Meadows trim with daisies pied,  
Shallow brooks, and rivers wide,  
Towers and battlements, &c. &c. &c.

he will either find himself egregiously disappointed, or he must possess a disposition to merriment, which even Democritus himself might envy. To such a pitch indeed does this solemn indication of joy sometimes rise, that we are inclined to give him credit for a literal adherence to the Apostolic precept, "Is any merry, let him sing psalms."

At length however he hies away at the sound of bell-ringing, and seems for some time to enjoy the tippling and fiddling and dancing of a village wake: but his fancy is soon haunted again by spectres and goblins, a set of beings not in general esteemed the companions or inspirers of mirth.

With stories told of many a feat,  
How fairy Mab the junkets eat;  
She was pinch'd, and pull'd, she said;  
And he, by friar's lantern led,  
Tells how the drudging goblin sweat  
To earn his cream-bowl duly set;  
When in one night, ere glimpse of morn,  
His shadowy flail hath thresh'd the corn,  
That ten day-labourers could not end;  
Then lies him down the lubbar fiend,  
And, stretch'd out all the chimney's length,  
Basks at the fire his hairy strength;  
And crop-full out of door he flings,  
Ere the first cock his matin rings.

Mr. M. seems indeed to have a turn for this species of nursery tales and prattling lullabies; and if he will studiously cultivate his talent, he need not despair of figuring in a conspicuous corner of Mr. Newbury's shop-window; unless indeed Mrs. Trimmer should think fit to

proscribe those empty levities and idle superstitions, by which the world has been too long abused.

From these rustic fictions we are transported to another species of *hum*.

Tower'd cities please us then,  
And the busy hum of men,  
Where throngs of knights and barons bold  
In weeds of peace high triumphs hold,  
With *store of ladies*, whose bright eyes  
*Rain influence*, and judge the prize  
Of wit or arms, while both contend  
To win her grace, whom all commend.

To talk of the bright eyes of ladies judging the prize of wit is indeed with the poets a legitimate species of humming: but would not, we may ask, the *rain* from these ladies' bright eyes rather tend to dim their lustre? Or is there any quality in a shower of *influence*, which, instead of deadening, serves only to brighten and exhilarate? Whatever the case may be, we would advise Mr. M. by all means to keep out of the way of these knights and barons bold; for, if he has nothing but his wit to trust to, we will venture to predict, that without a large share of most undue *influence*, he must be content to see the prize adjudged to his competitors.

Of the latter part of the Poem little need be said. The Author does seem somewhat more at home when he gets among the actors and musicians, though his head is still running upon Orpheus and Eurydice, and Pluto, and other sombre gentry, who are ever thrusting themselves in where we least expect them, and who chill every rising emotion of mirth and gaiety.

He appears however to be so ravished with this sketch of festive pleasures, or perhaps with himself for having sketched them so well, that he closes with a couplet, which would not have disgraced a Sternhold:

These delights if thou canst give,  
Mirth, with thee I *mean* to live,

Of Mr. M.'s good *intentions* there can be no doubt; but

we beg leave to remind him, that in every compact of this nature there are two opinions to be consulted. He presumes perhaps upon the poetical powers he has displayed, and considers them as irresistible;—for every one must observe in how different a strain he avows his attachment now and at the opening of the Poem. Then it was,

If I give thee honour due,  
Mirth, admit me of thy crew.

But having, it should seem, established his pretensions, he now thinks it sufficient to give notice, that he means to live with her, because he likes her.

Upon the whole, Mr. Milton seems to be possessed of some fancy and talent for rhyming; two most dangerous endowments, which often unfit men for acting an useful part in life, without qualifying them for that which is great and brilliant. If it be true, as we have heard, that he has declined advantageous prospects in business, for the sake of indulging his poetical humour, we hope it is not yet too late to prevail upon him to retract his resolution. With the help of Cocker and common industry he may become a respectable scrivener; but it is not all the Zephyrs, and Auroras, and Corydons, and Thyrsis's, aye, nor his junketing Queen Mab, and drudging Goblins, that will ever make him a Poet.



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OR

LOGIC VINDICATED.

ADDRESSED TO THE

JUNIOR STUDENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.

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BY A GRADUATE.

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\* N. B. The words [p. 15. l. 28.] "which is impossible" are introduced, because by *proprium* is always meant *specific proprium*, unless *generic* is expressly added. In giving examples of the Predicables, which is what Mr. K. is upon, p. 23. it is always so understood.

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## ERRATUM.

P. 15. l. 18. *for* p. 25. *read* p. 23.



MY FRIENDS AND FELLOW STUDENTS,

**ANXIETY** for your good, and for the credit of our University, which is now assailed on every side, and by every poisoned weapon the press can discharge, are the sole motives which lead me to call your attention by this address. It may be thought presumption in me, who have no titles or trophies of former exploits to display, to enter the lists with an antagonist, whose whole life seems to have been spent among you—who has served some of the most efficient offices in the place—whose works are so numerous, that the bare catalogue of them fatigues the reader; and so much esteemed, that every year produces its harvest, perhaps its double harvest, of new editions.

The motives above assigned might, I confess, have called forth some one superior in rank, and age, and reputation to myself; or they might, perhaps, have justified the exercise of **AUTHORITY** in the case now before us. But as I do not hear that any such champion is preparing for the field, or that any such interposition is intended, and as the case is urgent, I scruple not to advance, in the confidence which truth inspires; and if what I say is tried by the test of truth, I have no fears for the event. I will not be content with Laocoön, to hurl a single javelin at the monster which is thus insidiously brought within our walls—I will not merely raise a sounding echo from his hollow sides—the whole mass of lurking mischief shall be dragged from its hiding-place, and exposed in the face of day. I only entreat of you patient and impartial attention. Take the book I am examining, and compare it with my book, page by page. If

I accuse the writer falsely in a single instance, read no farther, but cast my book into the fire, and condemn it to eternal infamy. If I make good my accusations, do not let false pity, and that mawkish plea, of age and services and good intentions, shield the accused from justice, or even mitigate his sentence.

When first I saw the advertisement of *Logic made easy*, it was accompanied by a long list of books from the same author. Of these books I have certainly read but few. What I have read appeared to me to contain nothing sound or useful in them. If any thing was true, it was a feeble expansion of what had been better said elsewhere. In general, the conceptions were indistinct and confused; the information scanty and unconnected; the remarks superficial; the errors, beyond all bearing, abundant and disgraceful; the language turgid, frothy, and impotent. Over all of them indeed was thrown a dress, in the very worst taste of modern millinery: not the gorgeous embroidery of Parr—not the stout buckram of Johnson—not the whalebone and point-lace of Gibbon—but a cheap, thin, tawdry, second-hand, threadbare cloak, in cut and colour just what schoolboys call *shabby genteel*, and so flimsy withal in its texture, that it would not bear the handling. Indeed, I am persuaded that there is not a single page in those works, which, in point of style, will stand the test of rigid criticism. Still, if the world liked them, it was no concern of mine, nor of any one else in this place. Provided they did not affect our character, nor tend to corrupt our studies, he was welcome to pocket his profits, and to laugh, if he pleased, at the credulity of his customers. There was one indeed of these works, which could not be forgiven so easily. An intimation was thrown out in the preface, that it would be serviceable in the course of study recommended here for our degrees. Many people, as well as myself, were astonished at the

effrontery of this pretension. As for myself, I was too young when it first came out, to think of warning the world against it; and since that, the folly and inanity of the book have been exposed by a critic, whose only fault is, that he has passed over too lightly the offence of sporting with the credit of the University for the sake of private gain.

The author ought to have been thankful for this lenity: he ought to have felt the kind forbearance, which many others in this place, whose indignation was deep and well known, practised towards him. But, instead of taking this moderate correction and indulgence in good part, he has become hardened in folly—he has not ceased to weary the press with fresh absurdity, till there is no hope of silencing him by gentle means. Our patience has been tried to the uttermost already: the cup has been long full; and let him not wonder if this last drop has made the waters of bitterness to overflow.

If indeed he had confined himself to that class of writings, with which Oxford, as a place of education, is not concerned, we might have suffered them to pass in silence. I, at least, for one, should not have interrupted him in the enchanting occupation of rearing an accomplished female from the nursery, as I do not pretend to any knowledge or experience in those matters. I might perhaps have pitied the poor motherless Emily, who, without any fault of hers, and believing firmly her gallant father that the *Porte* was so called from its convenient harbour, should go and seek for Constantinople in the *broad and azure Hellespont*; who should expect to find Geneva and Lausanne on different lakes, and to see *Glaciers* towering over her head. All these mistakes might be inconvenient to a traveller; but as most well-educated females remain at home, no great harm would have been done to the world. But when an elementary book of in-

struction is studiously recommended to the young and unwary, containing errors

Thick as autumnal leaves that strew the vales  
In Vallombrosa—

when every art of book-making chicanery is tried, by advertisement, by title-page and preface, to gain a lodgment for this fabric of imposture within our walls, can we be too loud or too forward in resisting such a design? At the captivating sound of things *made easy*, a crowd of half-witted, half-educated parents hail the welcome guest, and receive him to their bosoms. These we may despise, for they ought to know and have the means of knowing better; but the unsuspecting innocence of youth it is painful to see running eagerly to its own ruin; those

Pueri innuptæque puellæ,  
who naturally flock around, and join the cry,  
gaudentque manu contingere funem.

Can we then be blamed for endeavouring to weaken the authority, or to chastise the insolence of this false guide? Can we be wrong in hurling back upon himself that ignominy, in which he meant us all to be partakers? If he has done what he could to degrade us, can he complain if in our turn we make him an object of derision? For my own part, I feel more prone to anger than to laughter when employed in this task: but ridicule, though a weapon for the use of which man is deeply responsible, (and if ever I employ it against truth, or reason, or humanity, or religion, may my right hand forget her cunning,) yet is sometimes necessary in serious affairs, to keep alive the attention of the reader, and to refresh his spirits. We have a rough road to travel over, and I am afraid some of my younger comrades will lag behind, and drop off on the march, unless a merry

tune is now and then played ; which, heaven knows, I shall play, if ever I do play, with a heavy heart, and that for the sake of my followers, not of myself.

The part indeed which merits the keenest severity will be dispatched first, although the justice of that treatment will depend upon what I establish in the sequel. Let us hear his own words in what he calls his Advertisement, a piece of base *charlatanerie*, deserving of a chastisement far beyond, both in kind and in degree, what it is in my power to inflict.

“ The author of the following work was, during two  
“ years, one of the Public Examiners in the University  
“ of Oxford. He has endeavoured to derive from his  
“ practice at that time, and from his previous and subse-  
“ quent studies, whatever may be conducive to the eluci-  
“ dation of that system of Logic, which he now submits  
“ to the notice of the public.”

What the wisdom of this appointment was it is now too late to enquire. The evil that arose from it is certainly incurable. But when one considers the serious hurt in his feelings, in his reputation, in his substantial interests, which a candidate may suffer who is rejected at his examination, one cannot but deeply lament that this power was ever vested in the hands of ignorance. There is indeed a fortunate security in the number of Examiners, which can never be less than three : for I am convinced, and am certain, as far as attendance on those occasions can make me certain, that no other Examiner was ever liable to the same objection ; and therefore we may venture to hope that no such painful consequence ever followed from this appointment. But if the candidate had answered as he is taught in this book, I would not hesitate to affirm that he *ought* to have been rejected. How humiliating then, how pitiable the condition of a student under those circumstances !—questioned and teased, and liable to be reproved, for having thoroughly learnt that

of which his Examiner was shamefully ignorant. Let us however dismiss the mortifying consideration. Only I trust it will be granted me, that, if the severe sentence of rejection be ever due to a candidate *compelled* to give an account of his studies, no severity can be too great for him who ought from his situation to be best informed, and who *voluntarily* challenges the notice of the public, provided I make good my charge against him.

That charge is, that in the book, which he calls *Logic made easy*, he betrays his ignorance in all the parts into which Logic is commonly divided.

First, Of the Logical distinctions of words.

Of the Predicables.

Of Subaltern Genera and Species.

Secondly, Of the component parts of a Proposition.

Of the meaning of the technical term *Distributed*.

Of the Opposition of Propositions.

Thirdly, Of the true meaning of *Syllogism*.

Of *Major* Term.

Of *Minor* Term.

Of Middle Term.

Of some fundamental rules of the Syllogism.

Of Perfect and Imperfect Moods.

Of Reduction.

Of Hypothetical Reasoning.

And besides this, that he has omitted many important rules; that he has omitted nearly all the reasons for the rules he delivers; that he frequently does not understand the reasons assigned by Aldrich; that he has repeatedly mistranslated him; that he has committed gross incidental blunders; that his language is often loose, confused, and incorrect, where it ought most to have been precise, clear, and exact; that the meaning of it is often obscure, and often that it has no meaning at all.

He confesses indeed that one of his chief difficulties

in acquiring Logic was, that the treatise he studied was written in *Latin*; a difficulty which it is evident still perplexes him. For (notwithstanding the subjoined list, from which he has the *sang froid* to say "he has extracted the *essence* of all that is practically useful to the "general student") his book, I affirm, is almost wholly taken from Aldrich, whose treatise he affects to call a *popular* compendium. If by *popular* is meant a close *condensation of all the leading principles of an art*, accompanied by a concise demonstration of them in an elliptical style, Aldrich's certainly is a *popular* treatise. But if by *popular* is meant the opposite of all this, then we can only acquit his veracity at the expence of his understanding, or his understanding at the expence of his veracity.

Whoever has digested well this *compendium* of Aldrich, whose chief characteristic is *pregnant brevity*, must have conceived some gratitude for his labours; and must, I should think, feel something of indignation at seeing this deceased author insulted by a kick from so unworthy a successor. That useful and plodding class of men too, college tutors, have no reason to thank him for insinuating that they are incompetent to the task of explaining the little technical difficulties, with which the art of Logic, like every other art, is accompanied. He might, I should conceive, (and it would have been no great sacrifice of his ambition,) have left this humble occupation to men who are content to do their duty in private, without telling the world all they do; who toil on in their plain working-dress, and envy not his flaunting finery, which ravishes the eyes and hearts of the good citizens of London. But so it was in Horace's time, and so it too often is now.

Optat ephippia bos piger, optat arare caballus.

Men will not know when they are well off. He might

have had the whole field of the metropolis to range at large in, and nobody here would, I believe, have attempted to spoil his feeding. But he shall not, if I can help it, fatten upon our disgrace: he shall not, if I can help it, with the British Critic for his mountebank, continue to vend his noxious salves and balsams, as if they were genuine *authorised* medicines. Let him have done with us, and we will have done with him.

One word more upon the list of books which have been consulted for *Logic made easy*, eighteen in number. If he had read and could understand the first of these, he need have gone no farther. The seventh would have been useful to him, as the best full compendium strictly Aristotelian, for from this Aldrich is principally abridged. It might have helped him also, as being Latin instead of Greek. The tenth, *Watts*, might have been of use, as being English instead of Latin. It has much valuable matter: but it is not advisable to enter upon it till the foundation has been well laid in Aristotle. As to the rest, except perhaps the thirteenth, it is all sheer *quackery*. I do not mean that the books are useless; but it is not the way to enrich or perfect Logic, by reading *several treatises of Logic*. The principles being once well settled, whoever seeks to explain and recommend them, must draw his materials from the whole range of art, of science, of literature, and philosophy. By the help of that commanding faculty, that *one-making* power, as Plato calls it, of the soul, men of genius may from time to time improve the best established systems; and no one surely would wish to check or to disparage this species of improvement. But I must be allowed to doubt whether the writer of *Logic made easy* was formed for carrying on this, one of the noblest processes of nature—whether his stomach is furnished with that *pancreatic juice*, which is able to reduce the heterogeneous mixture



gathered into it to one character, and extract from its various parts wholesome aliment, and new life for the body.

It is now time to enter upon a more particular enquiry. I will only premise, that personal hostility has no share in the present undertaking; that the author is attacked simply as an author; *and that this pamphlet does not contain a single phrase or word, from beginning to end, which would not have been applicable to any other man, who, under the same circumstances, had written the same works.* There will, I doubt not, be found reviewers enough to charge me with malice, and pique, and envy, and a long list of sins: but I firmly believe there will not be found even a British Critic hardy enough to say, that Mr. Kett is now attacked for having, in an *eminently useful book*, committed a *few mistakes* \*.

#### INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. SECT. 1.

I have so much to do in the body of the work, that I shall not stop long here. It is a puerile declamation on the use of Logic, containing some nonsense, and some falsehood. E. g. p. 3. "By studying the *distinctions that pre-*  
*tail* with respect to propositions, he is *enabled to qua-*  
*lify his assertions*, and to measure them by the stand-  
 ard of consistency." Nonsense. Again: "When he  
 advances to that part of Logic which relates to syllo-  
 gistic reasoning, he *learns the agreement and disagree-*  
*ment of ideas* with each other." Ib. Falsehood. Other mistakes there are of little moment. For instance, that Logic puts us *on our guard against the language of error*; that "all Cicero's most celebrated Orations are *charac-*  
*terized* by the *copiousness* of his expressions, for the  
 sake of conveying his ideas with *exactness*, and by the  
 variety and *conclusiveness of his arguments.*" P. 5.

\* Vid. Brit. Crit. on Kett's Elements and Davison's Remarks.

Towards the end are four lines from a noble passage in Horace, Ep. ii. 2. 120. suitable, as Mr. Kett tells us, to those to whom they are suitable.

I know somebody, to whom two lines not far off are suitable.

Prætulerim scriptor delirus inersque videri,  
Dum mea delectent mala me, vel denique fallant.

But enough of this. In

## SECTION 2.

we have the History of Logic, in which Mr. K. abuses the Schoolmen very liberally: but for what? because, forsooth, they made “subtle and useless distinctions between one word and another,” and that too as “fancy suggested.” Poor Bonaventura!

But there was a worse fault behind. “Their *bulky volumes* filled every library, and exercised, or rather “fettered, the understanding of every student who aspired “to distinction in the universities, or preferment in the “church.” At this passage is a reference in the margin to *Elements of General Knowledge*. Query. Was this finger-post put there by design, or accident?

## PART I. CHAP. I.

“The operations of the mind are three: 1. Simple “Apprehension; 2. Judgment; 3. Reasoning. The “first is *applied to the first part of Logic*.” What, does Mr. K. seriously think that this operation of the *mind was made*, that he might have an opportunity of writing a treatise on Logic? I have heard of a projector, who thought the only use of rivers was to feed canals: but the narrowness of conception, in the present case, goes far beyond that celebrated example.

In p. 15. is a Pattern Syllogism, to illustrate the third operation of the mind. It is framed, I presume, on pur-

pose for the *Jubilee*, instead of a fire-work. I wish it had been stuffed with stronger powder—it would have gone off better. We will however take it as it is.

*All good kings are beloved by their subjects:*  
*George the Third is a good king; therefore*  
*George the Third is beloved by his subjects.*

Which does he mean to prove? the *fact* that he is beloved, or the reason *why*? *An sit?* or *Cur sit?* If the former, it reminds me of a parallel instance, recorded in the following story.

A student, having been accidentally left by the Librarians of the Bodleian, when they shut up the Library, some time after discovered the condition he was in. Starting from his seat, he flew to the window, and called aloud for help. The only person near was the Keeper of the Schools, who answered him from below, proved to his satisfaction, in *Celarent*, that he was not there, and so left him. His argument was this:

*No man is in the Bodleian Library after three o'clock:*  
*You are a man; therefore*  
*You are not in the Bodleian Library.*

Just so Mr. K.'s syllogism. If unfortunately the *fact* should ever be questioned, he must be a very good-natured disputant, who admits it upon the credit of this Middle Term.

But perhaps he meant only to assign the reason *why* he is beloved, supposing the *fact* to be acknowledged. In that case it is not a Syllogism at all, (which he certainly meant it to be,) as any Tiro may perceive. For the Conclusion in a Syllogism is that which *was* the Question. But here, "that George the Third is beloved by his subjects," is not the Question. It is assumed as a fact, and an enquiry is instituted into the cause. *Why* George the Third is beloved by his subjects, is the Ques-

tion. This is not *sylogizing*, but *investigating*; a totally distinct process; and belongs not properly to Logic, but to the art or science in which the subject matter lies. The syllogistic form is not adapted to a proceeding, *where one term of the question is unknown*. This is one of the complaints which Lord Bacon makes against School Logic; and there is no answering it, except by saying, that an art must not be blamed for not teaching more than it professes to teach. The proper business of Logic is to make the agreement or the disagreement of two *given terms* more evident than it was before.

*This purpose* is not answered by Mr. K.'s Pattern Syllogism. I do not wonder at it. For I see clearly, that these speculations never passed through his mind; and that he has only been stringing together words and rules, of the force of which he had very confused notions. *His own purpose*, however, is answered too well: for, I take it, his arguments (like Peter Pindar's razors) are made not to cut, but to sell.

If this passage, long and dry as it is, serves to give the Student any firmer footing than he felt before, I may well be pardoned the digression. It will, I hope, be read with attention, notwithstanding the levity that introduced it.

In the mean time we must admire Mr. K. for his loyalty, whatever we may think of his Logic. And, considering the occasion for which this pseudo-syllogism seems to have been framed, and the hard doubling and tying with which its nonsense was fastened in, I think we may, after the example of some celebrated sophisms of old, as the *Achilles* of Zeno, the *Mentians* of Chrysippus, not unaptly call this, the *Cracker* of Mr. Kett.

A remark immediately follows, to which the reader of *Logic made easy* has, I dare say, already given his firm assent—"Each of the operations of the mind is subject to its respective defect."

Some few absurdities crown this chapter, of no great importance to the art or form of Logic. E. g. "Reflection is the *source of such acts* of the mind as *thinking, hoping, &c.* It consists in the action of the mind upon itself, &c." As an example of a *connate sentiment*, we have, I believe, for the first time, "Children ought to honour their parents."

## CHAP. II.

P. 18. We are told, and told truly, that different words in different languages express the same idea: and, the writer remarks, it is evident from hence, that "for *that* *reason* words are said to be substituted for things." As a detached sentence, he adds, that "words are said to be *established by custom, because* the use of words is arbitrary;" that is, for the very convincing reason, because they are established by custom.

This, however, is the inference which ought to have been drawn from the first remark. He should have said, Different words in different languages express the same idea; from which it is evident, that they have no affinity in nature to *that* idea, but that they are established by custom to represent it. The general proposition, that *words are substituted* for things, or the ideas of things, needs no proof: it is an admitted fact. The whole passage is a muddy exposition of Aldrich. "*Vox est signum rei vel conceptûs ex instituto vicarium.*" To proceed.

"A univocal word has only one meaning, *agreeing equally with many ideas.*" No learner would understand this. It is a word which applies with equal propriety, and in the same sense, to many things: as *man*, to the several individuals of the species; *animal*, to the several individuals or species included under it.

"An *analogous* word is a word taken in *different senses, and one of them has some resemblance to another.*" This is proposed as an improvement upon the precise and cle-

gant definition of Aldrich. “*Analogum est cujus una significatio inæqualiter convenit multis.*” Inæqualiter—with unequal propriety—one use being primary, the other secondary—one proper, the other borrowed or metaphorical. This, which is the chief characteristic of analogous words, is wholly omitted by Mr. Kett. Because *analogy* is often used in common conversation where *resemblance* would do as well, he has run away with the notion, that they are the same thing. Analogy is not resemblance, but the *sameness or resemblance of relation*.

This topic is one of the richest which Logic contains. Mr. K. little suspects how much hidden treasure lies under it. But we must go on.

P. 20. Mæcenas, Alexander, and Cæsar, are given as examples of *Metaphor*.

“A concrete word signifies a word connected with its subject.” Absolute nonsense. Could he possibly mean to render this passage of Aldrich? “*Concretum, quod rem [spectat] quasi suâ naturâ liberam, sed jam implicitam subjecto, ut Justus.*”

Take the following sentence as an explanation of *Relative Words*. It is the whole of his doctrine upon that subject.

“With respect to relative words, he may be a man, who is neither the father nor the son, the master nor the servant, of any particular man.”

Lastly; as an example of *vox secundæ intentionis*, he gives “organ, when used to signify an instrument in general.” What sort of organ does he deserve?

### CHAP. III.

Hold up! I had nearly stumbled at the very threshold here: but surely it would not have been my fault, for I never could have expected Categories or Predicables side by side. An everlasting plague on our scavengers, if

they suffer these nuisances to remain undisturbed in the public road !

“ Every Category or Predicable is a common term, “ which may be asserted or predicated of things of *different kinds*.” Why only of *different* kinds? Is not *man* a predicable?

Let me observe here, for the sake of mere Tirones, that the ordinary way of speaking is not strictly accurate, when we say there are *five Predicables*. Aldrich’s term is better, *Predicabilium capita*. Every word (except proper names, particles, and conjunctions) is a *Predicable* of one or other of the *five sorts*, *Genus*, *Species*, *Differentia*, *Proprium*, *Accidens*. So much to avoid being misunderstood: for I may often speak in the common way, and say there are but *five Predicables*, instead of *five sorts of Predicables*.

Mr. K. is very confused in what he says about the difference between a man and a horse, p. 25. Speaking of two characters of antiquity, Socrates and Bucephalus, he says, “ This particular, in which *they* disagree, is called “ the *differentia*. If *they* agree in any thing necessarily “ connected with their essence, that is called the *proprium*. “ *um*.” If the first *they* and the last *they* stand for the same subject, this explanation is false. If the man and horse disagree in a part of their essence, that particular in which each disagrees from the other is well called its *differentia*. If the man and the horse agree in any thing necessarily connected with their essence, [which is impossible,] that particular is common to both, and therefore not the *proprium* of either. I suspect, that by the first *they* he meant man and horse—by the second *they*, *men only*, or *horses only*. Logic is a dry study, but you must bear with me. If I cannot make it *easy*, I try to make it entertaining. But if the above passage about the *proprium* stands, I may, for aught I know, be expected to provide entertainment both for man and horse.

P. 25. The example from Linnæus undoes all that had been said before about *Subaltern Genera and Species*. Both words are applicable to the same things, according as they relate to *cognate* classes more or less comprehensive than themselves. But what says this Logician?

“ In Linnæus’s arrangement, the animal kingdom is the Summum Genus. The Six Classes are the Subaltern Genera. The 354 kinds are the Subaltern Species. The 6000 known species are the lowest species.” I leave any Undergraduate who has passed the Responsiones to correct him. The same blunder is repeated in the same page, when speaking of the vegetable kingdom.

#### CHAP. IV.

##### *Definition.*

The word *subaltern* genus is ignorantly used again, where he ought to have said the *proximum* genus, p. 28. As for the rules of Definition, they are tolerably translated from Aldrich, only that *justo numero* is rendered *exact number*, which is nonsense. It is a loose expression, and may be rendered *suitable, moderate*. It means in this passage neither too few nor too many.

But what shall we say of the Definitions themselves, proposed as patterns for young logicians?

“ A Parallelogram is a four-sided figure, whose opposite sides are equal, and all its angles right angles.” This a definition!

Perhaps he will quote in support of it *The Elements of General Knowledge*; in which case I must knock under, as I have only the authority of Euclid to oppose to him.

Let us take one more, as a specimen of English. “ Geography is the science which describes the globe as consisting of land and water, and their various inhabitants and productions.” Try it how you will, I defy you to construe it.



## CHAP. V.

The Predicaments I pass hastily over, only observing, that there is not the slightest use in treating of them thus superficially. It will not do to go through *them* at a hand-gallop—they may be as well omitted altogether. In casting my eye over p. 33, I perceive, under the predicament of *Quantity*, that “triangles, squares, &c. are *affections* “of lines, surfaces, &c.” Wallis would have told him, Mathematical figures *non sunt hujus loci*. As figures they belong to *Quality*, not to *Quantity*. They are *qualities*, because they answer to the question *Quales*, but not *affections*: he might as well have said “moral tales.”

## CHAP. VI.

The chapter on Division gives as a 3d rule, what is only an exemplification of the 2d. A pretty commentary this upon the art of Division!

## PART II.

## CHAP. I.

The second part opens with a declaration of two awful truths:

*Man is a rational animal.*

*A horse is not a rational animal.*

The horse is a truly noble animal, and, considering the great services he renders mankind, I can hardly think it generous in us to be continually upbraiding him with that want of reason, to which he never put up any pretensions. Examples to be sure must be had somewhere; and my own tutor (who was a very dull man, but who was honest enough to learn what he took money to teach) always made his pupils scour the country in quest of them. To be sure, he kept the horse ready saddled in

the stable, for his own riding; but then it was only in case of need. If he had time, he used to put something before us a little more indicative of the faculty of reason in himself.

Still the propositions are both unquestionably *true*. The force of nature, however, could go no farther. The next is decidedly false.

“A Proposition consists of three parts or terms.”  
Three terms in a Proposition!

“The subject and predicate of a Proposition *taken together* are called the extremes.” Why must they be *taken together*? Each of them is by itself called a *Term* or an *Extreme*, both names meaning the same thing.

“The subject is the term concerning which something “is affirmed, denied, or *doubted*.” OR DOUBTED! What have we to do here with doubting? Doubting is a state of the mind *previous to* any decision or judgment. A Proposition expresses an act of judgment *already performed*, or it is no proposition at all. You a teacher of Logic! You an Examiner! O shame! O shame!

Again. “The Copula is the *term* which connects the “subject with the predicate.” In the first lecture of the course which I attended, every fresh-man learnt enough to teach you better than this.

In the same page he turns *scribo* into *ego sum scribens*, and this he calls resolving a *word* into the ideas it contains. Any Student who has read Aldrich knows that it is merely resolving a *verb* into its component parts, the *Copula* and the *Participle*.

“From such examples it appears, that we are *not so much* to regard the number of words in a sentence, as “the ideas they stand for.” p. 42. Who, I should like to know, ever did? I beg pardon: I think the purchasers of Mr. K.’s works must be an exception from the general rule.

## CHAP. II.

“A *particular* proposition denotes a *limited* number, “and the signs prefixed are *some, many*.” *Some* and *many* limited numbers! Perhaps this was only a slip of the pen. *Denotes*, however, is wrong. A proposition does not *denote*. A term denotes. He should have said, A *particular* proposition has for its subject a common term, but predicates only of a part of it; which part is expressed by *some, many, &c.*

But now comes the most extraordinary way I ever saw of making Logic easy. “An indefinite proposition in “*necessary matter* is equal to a universal, *for* [instead of “i. e.] it is understood to comprehend the whole subject: it is equal to a particular proposition in *contingent matter, for* [instead of i. e.] it is understood to relate “only to a part.” p. 45. What *necessary matter* is, and what *contingent matter* is, the learner may wonder and examine, but he will never find till he comes to p. 51, where the explanation is translated from Aldrich. I say *for* is put instead of *i. e.* because *for* introduces a reason, and there is *no reason* given there. The reason for what is said does not come till p. 51.

Nothing is more necessary to a learner than a precise notion of what is meant by the technical term *Distributed*. What is Mr. Kett’s definition?

“A term standing for the whole of a thing or subject, “as it necessarily *includes all the parts* into which it can “be divided, for that reason is said to be *distributed*.” Very confused and vague indeed. A term is said to be *distributed* in a proposition, when in that proposition it represents not any portion merely, but every individual of the things properly denoted by it.

Then follow the rules respecting the distribution of terms in the four Propositions, A. E. I. O. But these rules are to be taken upon trust, and learnt merely by

rote, according to Mr. K. for he does not offer a single demonstration of them, although he had only to translate one of the easiest pages, in point of Latin, of that *popular* compendium, to which he owes so much. There is certainly close reasoning in the page; which, I fear, is just as troublesome now, as Latin formerly was to the Examiner.

#### CHAP. IV.

The same method is pursued in treating of the Conversion of Proposition. The rules are all taken from Aldrich, but the reasons of those rules are omitted; that being a *popular* treatise, and this, I suppose, truly esoteric.

The chapter, however, is very clumsily, not to say ignorantly, done. He says, there are *two sorts* of Conversion, and he gives us *three*. The last, viz. by contraposition, is omitted in Aldrich, as of little use. It is worthy of remark, however, as being the only method of converting a particular negative. Mr. K. has indeed given us the barbarous line,

ast O per contra, sic fit conversio tota,

in which he has betrayed, as usual, his ignorance of its meaning. It ought to have been either *A, O per contra*, &c. or, as it commonly runs, *fAxO per contra*, &c. to shew that A and O are capable of this sort of conversion. He has left out A in his line, and yet the only examples he gives are of that proposition; not one of O. This comes from what has been heretofore aptly called “the unhappiness of compilation.”

For my own part, I like old Wallis’s English lines best.

E, I are *simply* turned: E, A by Acc.

A, O are *counter-put*, in going back.

The last paragraph of this chapter, treating of *convertible terms*, has no business here. Its substance is taken from Wallis, who expressly says, that the doctrine of *convertible terms* is quite foreign to this part, [*non est hujus loci*,] but belongs (as must be obvious to any reflecting mind) to the first part of Logic. This also comes from the "unhappiness of compilation." We shall soon see that Mr. K. uses even the words TERM and PROPOSITION as *convertible terms*.

## CHAP. V.

### *Opposition of Propositions.*

Opposition, he says, takes place "when two propositions having the same extremes differ *either in quantity, or in quality, or in both.*" And yet in the same page he tells us, that disagreement in *quality* is essential to Opposition, properly so called.

"In subaltern propositions, a false particular follows a false universal." p. 51. Thus for example:

"*All men are generous,*" is certainly a false universal; therefore, according to Mr. K. "*Some men are generous,*" is false likewise. Well done Examiner!

In his examples of impossible matter, that is, where the extremes essentially disagree, he cleverly pronounces their agreement, as, *All men are angels.*

## PART III.

### CHAP. I.

### *Argument and Syllogism.*

"Reasoning is that kind of evidence, by which one truth is inferred from others by JUST METHODS OF ARGUMENT." p. 57. Then follow two specimens of REASONING, both of them *Petitiones principii*; i. e. proving a question *per æque ignotum*, or rather *per ignotius*. Here is the first of them. The other is just like it.

*All houses are built by men :*  
*All cottages are houses ; therefore*  
*All cottages are built by men.*

His own account of *Petitio principii*, p. 84. is not a bad one. "This takes place when an *attempt* is made to prove " a Proposition by the same Proposition in other words, " or by some reason that is equally uncertain and disputed." He seems, however, to think it a *commendable and ingenious attempt*, for he is perpetually at it, when he would give examples of Reasoning. Otherwise, how unaccountable this infatuation, with the sentence just quoted staring him in the face! But truly doth Fuller inform us, A wink is as good as a nod to some people. There is a dulness which can see nothing, which can be taught nothing. *Query.* Can it be made to feel? I almost despair even of that, since the ill success of Mr. Davison's Remarks.

THEREFORE, *All cottages are built by men!*

Mr. K. after having used this proposition in the preceding paragraph as an example of one which stands in no need of proof, is not ashamed to print this trash, and call it a Syllogism. How much better are the general signs, A, B, C, than such examples!

"The *Major term* [of a syllogism] is the Predicate." The predicate of what? "The *Minor term* is the *Subject*." Again I must ask, but ask in vain, The subject of what?

The *Major term* is afterwards used to explain the *Major premiss*, and the *Minor term* to explain the *Minor premiss*, although neither *Major* nor *Minor* term have been explained themselves. Presently, however, he tells us, "The " *Major term* of a Syllogism is *therefore* the predicate of the conclusion." Therefore! For what? The whole is inextricable confusion. It may do Mr. K. no

harm. But if a candidate were to give this account of things in the Schools, he would infallibly be *plucked*.

Five out of the six principles, upon which syllogistic reasoning is founded, are translated from Aldrich; but why not the sixth? Was it because he could not? It is just as necessary to be mentioned as the fifth, being applicable to *Negatives*, as that is to *Affirmatives*.

Then follows a part, which I know not how to describe by its proper title. It strikes me as the most impudent and scandalous pretence of *making Logic easy*, that ever was put forth since the art of puffing was invented. Aldrich gives twelve fundamental rules for the structure of the syllogism, with accurate demonstrations of them, by help of principles previously established. His whole section is a beautiful specimen of brevity, perspicuity, and correctness. Mr. K. also gives twelve rules. The first, second, third, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth, are taken from Aldrich; omitting all the reasons on which they rest: just as if one were to string together the forty-eight Propositions of the first book of Euclid without the Demonstrations, and then call it making *Mathematics easy*. The fourth rule is not from Aldrich: nor, indeed, should I ever have suspected it of coming from a rational animal. It runs thus:

“That syllogism is faulty, in which the Middle term “is not distributed in the premisses, but is distributed “in the conclusion.” The Middle term in the conclusion!!! How very easy Logic is now made! Oh! Mr. Kett! Mr. Kett! does not the phantom of some rejected candidate haunt your midnight dreams, and cry aloud for vengeance! That *you* should be sitting with your cap on as an Examiner, while *he* stood trembling before you, and awaiting your sentence! Oh! the blindness, the wanton cruelty of Fortune!

The eleventh rule is one of his own too. “If either

“of the premisses be false, so will be the conclusion.”  
Thus, to use the favourite example,

cAm. *Every horse is an animal:*

Es. *No man is an animal;* therefore

trEs. *No man is a horse.*

I suppose Mr. Kett will allow the Minor premiss to be false. But then, according to his own rule, the Conclusion must be false likewise. Therefore its Contradictory must be true. Therefore “*Some man is a horse.*” How degrading are his rules to his own species!

The twelfth rule is no rule. It tells us nothing. Perhaps he meant by it to express the sixth of Aldrich, a very important one; and therefore, as was natural, omitted, in order to make Logic easy.

## CHAP. II.

“The *various manners*, in which the terms of *any* three “propositions may be stated, in order to make syllogisms, *are determined by the different figures.*” I leave this to speak for itself.

P. 63. “It is evident from the rules of syllogistic reasoning before stated, that no other forms are conclusive, except such as are marked out by the following “ternaries, &c.” *It is evident!* If it is, you have done all you could to make it *not evident*. For you have not given the *demonstration* of a single rule; you have not given the *application* of a single rule; you have not shewn why some legitimate Moods are excluded from each figure; and, by omitting Aldrich’s sixth rule, you have left the list open to fifteen additional Moods, which are excluded only by the operation of that rule. So much for your knowledge of *Mood* and *Figure*.

Disdaining the A, B, C of Aldrich, Mr. K. will give us syllogisms of his own invention. But they are mostly



of the CRACKER kind : i. e. the Conclusion is a proof of the Minor premiss, not the Minor premiss of the Conclusion. In other words, the connection between the Middle term and one of the Extremes is less evident than the connection between the Extremes themselves.

*No passionate man is judicious :*

*Every philosopher is judicious ; therefore*

*No philosopher is a passionate man.*

Again :

*All frauds are forbidden by law :*

*Some trades are not forbidden by law ; therefore*

*Some trades are not frauds.*

Would not a rational animal rather infer, that a philosopher was judicious, because he was not passionate ; and that some trades were not forbidden by law, because they are not frauds ?

### CHAP. III.

#### *The Reduction of Syllogisms.*

“ The first figure is *therefore called direct or perfect*, because *all kinds of syllogisms may be proved in it.*” Most of you to whom I address myself know this sentence, like many others, to be made up of *falsehood and nonsense*. First, The Moods of the first figure are not called direct or perfect for the reason here assigned, but because they are demonstrable by the *Dictum de omni et nullo*. Secondly, To talk of *syllogisms proved* in a certain Mood is to talk *nonsense*. *Propositions* may be proved.

He continues : “ In its four Modes *the conclusions necessarily follow from the premisses* ; but the Modes in all the other figures are *deficient in some particulars* ; there-

“fore they are called indirect, or imperfect.” This is not nonsense, but it is wholly false. The conclusions in *all* the Moods necessarily follow from the premisses: the only inferiority in the Moods of the second and third figure is, that their conclusiveness is *less evident*: it is not capable of being demonstrated by the *Dictum de omni et nullo*. For that purpose, and for no other, Reduction is of use.

No wonder that a writer, who knows not the *use* of Reduction, should be unable to explain its process. The two paragraphs about *Reductio ad Impossibile* are admirable specimens, in the way of Quintilian’s declaiming master, *σκότισον, σκότισον*. The latter is deeply charged with nonsense. I would advise the young student not to venture near it.

In p. 69. *Cesare* is said to be reduced to *Celarent* “by the simple conversion of the Major term.” Some time ago he used *Syllogism*, where he ought to have used *Proposition*; now, in the place of *Proposition*, he uses *Term*. Is it possible that such an one can know the meaning of either? But I am sick of all this. Reduction is the most useless part of School Logic: and, I presume, it is only made, if ever it is made, the subject of enquiry at our Examination, as the most expeditious method of ascertaining that the candidate has really studied a treatise of Logic in the regular manner.

#### CHAP. IV.

##### *Hypothetical Syllogisms.*

Crackers again!

*If the king be wise, the people are well governed:  
But the king is wise; therefore  
The people are well governed.*

Most loyal and convincing! I hope the people are as much satisfied of the Consequent, as I am of the Antecedent. My only means, however, as I am not a courtier, of judging this Antecedent to be true, are by deducing it from the Consequent: a proceeding with which all Mr. Kett's readers are, I believe, by this time perfectly familiar.

N. B. An admirable example of this same kind may be seen, p. 71. which I omitted in its proper place:

*All believers in Christ will be saved:*

*Some Jews will not be saved; THEREFORE*

*Some Jews are not believers in Christ.*

P. 73. I must copy the whole of this paragraph. "To remove the Antecedent or Consequent in such cases, [i. e. Destructive Hypothetical reasoning,] does not merely signify the denial, but the contradiction of it; for the denial of it, by a contrary Proposition, *will not make a true Syllogism*; as for example,

*"If every man be good, then every gamester is good:*

*"But no gamester is good; therefore*

*"No man is good."*

Who but Mr. K. would have *attempted* to draw that inference? I affirm, notwithstanding his high authority, that we may remove the Antecedent by *denying* the Consequent, as much as by contradicting it. Indeed, I do not know any writer who uses these words as different in meaning. To adduce a Contrary Proposition is to do more than to *deny*; it is to disallow the statement of the adversary, and to advance one of your own. E. g.

All writers on Logic will be read with profit.

I *deny* that.

Some writers on Logic will not be read with profit.

But if I say,

*No writer on Logic will be read with profit,*

I enter upon a new question. This, however, may be thought trifling—too obvious to require explanation. For every one surely sees, that the regular inference may be drawn in Mr. K.'s example from the premisses there stated, viz. "*Every man is not good:*" which is equivalent to "*Some men are not good.*" I have proved the falsehood of the Antecedent by deducing its Contradictory.

#### CHAP. V.

##### *Of Compound and Defective Syllogisms.*

Speaking of an Enthymem, he is bold enough to give the following example :

*Rashness is a vice; therefore*

*Rashness is to be avoided.*

and then adds, "If we supply, *Every vice is to be avoided*, as a Major term, the syllogism will be complete." He is nearly come to the end of his treatise, and has not yet learned the difference between *term* and *proposition*.

I have only to repeat to him, in the language of good Sir Hugh Evans, "That divers philosophers hold the *term* to be parcel of the *proposition*," not one and the self-same thing.

It is indeed unlucky for Mr. K. that, besides having "all the operations of the mind liable to their respective defects," he has not what Sir Hugh would call "a good sprag memory," he can "remember nothing in his prain." I would be content to let him off all the three operations, if he minded what was told him a little better, or minded only what he had said himself. Without one or other of these faculties, however, the writing of books does seem to me a species of *rashness*, and

therefore, according to his own irresistible enthymem, *to be avoided*. It was but a few pages back, p. 41. that he told us a Proposition consisted of *three terms*, whereas now he allows it only *one*! But I have learned something by this puzzle. I never knew, till now, the exact meaning of a TERM-TROTTER—a species of animal, which had of late become so scarce, as to be considered almost extinct. We used to fancy him, *animal bipes implume*, *νῦ καὶ ἐπισήμης δικτακόν*, otherwise he would not have travelled so far for what he could not carry home. But in future, I believe, he must resign his title to most of these properties: of one I am sure I am at this moment depriving him; for whatever may be thought hereafter of his science and his *νῦ*, his *Logic made easy* will certainly never cease to be *a feather in his cap*.

A truce, however, to this trifling. The honest Cambrian above mentioned was an Examiner as well as Mr. Kett; and I once had a design of sketching out a scene, compiled from *Logic made easy*, and a few other documents of equal authority, by which the University might have brought the two rivals into comparison, each in their respective line; Sir Hugh in Grammar, and Mr. K. in Logic. But my remarks have run out to such length already, that I must abandon this project, and leave it to the hands of some saucy Undergraduate, who, I doubt not, will catch the hint, and dress it up with much better seasoning than I could prepare myself.

I will only observe of this simple-hearted devourer of toasted cheese, that, however meanly he might execute the task of educating his hopeful pupil, he does not make a parade of his services, and call upon the world to admire him: and when desired to inflict a little discipline on a vain-boaster and a bully, he seems to think with reason, that “it is admirable pleasures, and fery  
“honest kuaveries.”

But we have not quite done with the Enthymem yet. For an enthymematic sentence, he lets out the old hack.

Ἀθάνατον ὀργὴν μὴ φυλάττει θνητὸς ὤν.

But his translation omits the only word which makes it enthymematic, ὤν.

O mortal, cherish not immortal rage.

Why was he above following that popular book, which translates it for him, "*Mortalis cum sis?*"

Then follow some remarks, which every one will allow to be acute and original.

"If an Enthymem be false, it is so because one of the premisses is false, or because the *conclusion is not correct*: as if any one should argue thus:

"*Man is an animal*; therefore

"*A man can fly*.

"Here the Consequent cannot follow from the Antecedent, unless it was granted that *all animals can fly*.

"The Enthymem forms the most common kind of argument both in writing and in conversation; therefore attention to *correctness in the application of it* is highly necessary." p. 78.

Does he mean to say, that there are two distinct causes for the falsehood of Enthymems? If so, he has given no example of the latter, which most required it. But what is meant by a *false Enthymem*? By a *false Syllogism*, we mean an inconclusive one; not one which contains a *false premiss*. The same, one would think, would hold of a *false Enthymem*. But there is in fact no such thing as an *inconclusive* Enthymem: because one premiss being suppressed, it may always be considered as that proposition which is necessary to warrant the conclusion. Therefore I cannot well see what a *false Enthymem*

*mem* means. Mr. K. however talks of the *conclusion not being correct*, as a cause why an *Enthymem* is false. He seems to have no distinct idea annexed to any one word of the sentence. Yet he tells us, that Logic serves to “dissipate the clouds of confusion, and to introduce the “light of order into the mind: it teaches men to make “just distinctions between the various kinds of words “and ideas,” &c. &c. I wish he would accompany his advertisements with an authentic list of cures. For my own part, I generally feel more confusion, more uncertainty and embarrassment, after reading his attempt to explain a thing, than I did before. Thus, in the sentence above quoted, I suppose his meaning, if any, is this: If the *Enthymem* is not correct, the *conclusion* is false; not, that the *Enthymem* is false because the *conclusion* is not correct; which seems to me to be either saying what is not true, or what has no meaning. For *true* and *false* belong properly to single *Propositions*. Combinations of *Propositions* are *correct* or *not correct*.

Now I am upon this subject, let me notice another passage in a different part of his book, where the same confusion prevails; pardonable indeed in a boy, but disgraceful in a man, who professes to dissipate the clouds of confusion by the aid of Logic. He is speaking of Mathematicians. “They state *Postulates*, the *truth* of “which, when once admitted, cannot afterwards be disputed.” p. 91. And in the same page again he speaks of “*Propositions deduced from Postulates*.”

Now this shews that he is ignorant what a *Proposition* is. A *Proposition* *affirms* or *denies*. A *Postulate* *begs*, *asks*, *requires*. A *Proposition* *must be* either true or false. A *Postulate* *can never be* either. The one is addressed to our *understanding*, the other to our *will*. We *assent* to the one, we *consent* to the other. Yet, because some colloquial words are applied equally to each, such as *granting*, *admitting*, *rejecting*, *denying*, *fair*, *just*, *reasonable*,

&c. people are apt to confound the matter still more, and transfer to the one, words which denote ideas proper *only* to the other.

The importance of fixing these elementary notions steadily and distinctly in the mind is incalculable. Mr. Kett (whom I eagerly quote when he happens to be right) truly says, "it is the first step to accurate knowledge." How unlucky then that he should think of teaching Logic before he had taken that step himself! The importance, I say, is incalculable. For these ideas being clearly discerned, serve as standards, by which a whole army is marshalled and arrayed; and, if ever the thoughts are thrown into confusion, become rallying points, round which the scattered forces collect gradually, and fall into their proper places. Thousands of secondary and compound ideas, each with their corresponding terms, depend upon one common primary idea, to which they all bear a certain affinity or relation. In some, this primary idea is the base of their composition; in others it is a principal; in others a subordinate ingredient. Still it is a central point of action to all, and the movements of these subordinate parties must be regulated by the situation of their superior. Those most essentially connected with it should be most rigidly confined. In proportion as they recede from the centre, more freedom is allowed, till at length the light troops, upon whom no stress is laid, may be allowed to range loosely about, to intermix with one another, and to scour the distant country.

During a period of peace, indeed, a certain laxity of discipline is allowed to all. But at the sound of the trumpet, at the sight of an enemy, the moment close reasoning and argument are intended, we must call in these stragglers, and employ them in their peculiar office and duty.

Thus, in the instance before mentioned, we talk of *true*



*men, true syllogisms, true lines, true appearance, true representation*; to all of which cases, of course, *false* may be opposed: but if we consider attentively, the word denotes different ideas in each instance; e. g. *honest men, legitimate syllogisms, perfect lines, real appearance, exact representation*, the genuine idea of *truth* not belonging properly to any. And language, having a natural tendency towards this rambling, how necessary is it, to prevent surprise, that we should know beforehand both the right quarters of our men, and the favourite haunts into which they are apt to stray! The first of these points of information Logic gives, especially in the part called the Categories, or Predicaments, and the Post-predicaments; a very valuable part of the Organon, where the most fundamental and continually recurring ideas, vaguely as they are conceived in common life, have their exact limits marked out, and the latitude of action, which must be allowed even in the strictest service, carefully prescribed.

The doctrine is so important and so interesting, that I may be allowed perhaps to illustrate it by another image. It is with *words* as with *money*. Those who know the value of it best, are not therefore the least liberal. We may *lend* readily and largely; and although this be done quietly, and without ostentation, yet there is no harm in keeping an exact account in our private memorandum-book of the sums, the persons, and the occasions on which they were lent. It may be, we shall want them again for our own use; or they may be employed by the borrower for a wrong purpose; or they may have been so long in his possession, that he begins to look upon them as his own. In either of which cases it is allowable, and even right, to call them in. This can be understood, however, only of considerable sums, such as may draw after them some weighty consequences, according as they

are well or ill applied. Our loose cash we may dispose of, as others do, without calling ourselves or others to a serious account; though even here, perhaps, a little discretion will not be found amiss.

If the analogy is perceived and allowed, no one will wonder why I recommend the study of the Categories (including the Post-predicaments) as a most salutary discipline of the mind. Indeed, I am persuaded, that a thorough acquaintance with the meaning of ten words of the kind there discussed will inform and improve its faculties more than ten volumes upon General Knowledge, after the manner of Mr. Kett, even putting the errors of every sort out of the question.

Neither should this study be considered as extinguishing, or even restraining, the power of the imagination. On the contrary, I am convinced, it will tend to invigorate its flights, and will enable it in its wildest excursions to grasp its prey more firmly: while to the more calm and methodical enquirer it will serve to unlock some of the golden stores of taste; and to the gifted few, who are content to toil up the arduous steep, it will point the way towards that proud eminence, those *sapientium templa serena*, from whence will burst upon their view delightful and glowing visions of philosophy.

The subject is too captivating. I must now break from it, and resume a drudgery of which I am almost weary.

Before we quit the passage last produced from p. 78, let me observe, that the word *Conclusion* is used by Mr. K. in the sense of *consequens*, not *consequentia*, as may be seen by a reference to p. 77. so that he cannot escape any part of my remarks by accusing me of having put a wrong sense upon the word. Indeed, if it were meant to bear the sense of *consequentia*, his doctrine would only

amount to this, "that the Enthymem is incorrect when its reasoning is incorrect;" by which explanation he would not gain much.

Once for all of Enthymems of three terms. They are then only faulty when the *premiss understood* is more questionable than the *premiss expressed*, or than the *conclusion*. As if I should say,

*All believers in Christ will be saved: therefore  
Some Jews are not believers in Christ.*

The absurdity of the reasoning is made manifest by putting forward the latent premiss, which will not bear the light. Nobody, at least, but Mr. Kett would be hardy enough to advance the following as a process of reasoning:

All believers in Christ will be saved :  
*Some Jews will not be saved; therefore*  
Some Jews are not believers in Christ.

Vid. *Logic made easy*, p. 71.

### INDUCTION.

INDUCTION is a process which required particular explanation: for a vulgar opinion prevails, that Lord Bacon first introduced this method of reasoning, and that it supersedes the use of the Aristotelic Syllogism. Induction is certainly the method by which Principles are to be acquired, which Aristotle knew, and said as distinctly as Lord Bacon. Aristotle's fault is, that he assumed his principles too hastily; and the folly of the Schoolmen was their supposing, that what he *assumed* as principles, they must implicitly receive. Hence, in Physics especially, the progress of science was hindered, if not altogether stopped. The professed object of enquirers in that study was to reconcile the phænomena of nature with some previously received dogma, the truth of which it was a kind of philosophical heresy to question. And

thus the speculations of the most ingenious men served rather to bind the error, if it was an error, faster upon mankind, and to wind it round with more subtle and intricate threads of perplexed reasoning. Just as when a physician, having mistaken a case, brings to the treatment of it some false preconceived notion, and endeavours to twist every thing into a conformity with his own first opinion, matters go on much worse than if the patient had been left alone to the suggestions of common sense and of his own feelings. Sometimes, indeed, nature would break through these bandages of ignorance, and do her own work. Of this we have some noble examples, in the first Bacon, in Copernicus, and a few others.

No one, however, till the immortal author of the *Novum Organon*, ventured to renounce his allegiance altogether to this unconstitutional and usurped authority. He planned an entire revolution in the whole fabric and economy of the state. He may be regarded as the inheritor of some antiquated mansion, upon which, from its first building, its successive owners had neither made nor attempted any improvement; but had only sought, by temporary expedients, to keep it weather-tight, and hand it down as little altered as they could to their next descendants. Despising the ignoble work of patching, propping, and plaistering over, He determined upon a vigorous and decisive measure. He was unwilling to trust the interested and prejudiced surveyors of the old school; and accordingly he made a thorough inspection of the state of the building, from top to bottom, himself: when, finding the foundation unsound, the main beams ill laid, the timbers rotten, the roof falling in, the apartments and passages awkwardly contrived and inconvenient, he made up his mind at once to pull the whole to pieces, and to begin, as well as he was able, a

new edifice from the ground. He had laid in a large stock of materials himself, before he made known his chief design. He then redoubled his diligence, and, pointing out the likeliest places, and the best way of searching, he called upon his friends to help him in bringing together what he wanted.

Still, for a time, the family were worse lodged than before. Temporary sheds were run up, which did not stand the first winter. Many people made heavy complaints of his want of reverence for antiquity, and for the judgment of those who had gone before him. "The old house was good enough for his ancestors; and " why could not he remain contented with it?" Some laughed at his temerity, and exulted in any little failure of his new undertaking; others shook their heads, and predicted that no good would come of it to the neighbourhood round. Many were seen, especially the pensioners and hangers-on of the old family, raking still among the ruins for little scraps and fragments of worn-out materials, which they fancied must be better than any that could be made now-a-days. Some were even so infatuated, that they preferred boarding up for themselves, among the tottering ruins, a frail, leaky outhouse to lodge in, that they might shew their contempt of the new-fangled habitations he was preparing for their use.

This state of things, however, did not last long. The new materials were found in general so much superior to the old, that common sense forced people into an approbation and preference of them. The builders employed grew every day more expert in their business: hands came in fast; and the work went on briskly. In the mean time the illustrious owner and master-workman died, leaving his unfinished work a legacy to his friends and countrymen. They were not insensible to its value, and in general acted upon the plan he had

sketched out for them. Nevertheless, it was not till the time of the great Newton that we could be said to have a house to live in. It was then that all the main parts of the building might be considered as put out of hand; though much remains now to be done, inside and out, upstairs and down, and we are still *in mortar*.

Now, lest any of you should suppose that I have forgotten what I was about, (and in truth this building has been a longer job than I intended or expected myself,) let us consider whether the view thus taken may not help to correct some vulgar prejudices. Those among you who are at all acquainted with Lord Bacon's works, and with the progress of philosophy in this country during the seventeenth century, will not be at a loss to find some meaning in every sentence of my prolix story.

The principal meaning, however, is this. That both Aristotle and Bacon laboured in the same cause; and mankind make the same use now of the labours of the latter, which they heretofore did of the former. They reason *from* the principles which he, and those who followed in his school, established. If any dispute occurs in physics, it is considered at once settled, when either party traces his doctrine to one of these first principles. The law of Gravitation, the laws of Optics and of Hydrostatics, are as much the *dogmas* of the modern school, as any of the most exploded errors of the ancients were of theirs. *That nature, for instance, abhors a vacuum. That nothing is heavy in its own place.* And although we boast of our emancipation from all arbitrary authority; yet, I believe, in practice it would be found, that no man's reasoning would now be listened to, which was inconsistent with those principles. He would be laughed at as a simpleton, or shunned as a heretic. Do not, however, mistake me. The new system is undoubtedly, in every respect, a better built edifice; and it would

be folly to compare it in grandeur, in solidity, in convenience, with that which it has superseded. It will bear looking into in all its parts. It is, moreover, so contrived, as to be capable of boundless enlargement and improvement. And the inhabitants feel it worth their while to employ all their capital in completing, in supporting, in furnishing, and adorning it.

So much for the **INDUCTION** of Modern Philosophy, as contrasted with that of Aristotle. I do not hesitate to join with those who call the one hasty, scanty, and unsatisfactory; the other cautious, full, and convincing. The merit of sagacity, however, I cannot confine to the moderns. Considering the means he had, Aristotle seems to me to have outdone them.

And so much also for the confused notion, that *Induction* has superseded the use of *Syllogism*, or that they at all enter into competition with each other. (Vid. p. 12. of this Pamphlet.)

The method, indeed, of *Induction* itself may be considered as a syllogistic act of the mind, in which the general principle elicited forms the *Conclusion*. The *Minor premiss* states, that a certain property belongs to a number of individuals, which have been examined; and the *Major premiss* (which is latent, and always the same, whatever subject we may be employed about) declares, that whatever property belongs to these individuals, belongs to the whole class of which they are members. Nothing can be more terse or perspicuous than Aldrich's account of it. "In quâ ponitur quantum opus est de singulis, et deindè assumitur de universis." I do not like his mode of resolving it into a Syllogism. I think the mode above stated much simpler and clearer.

Now the jut of the question, in *reasoning* by Induction, always lies in the Major premiss. And the imperfection of this method is, that no rule can be given *how many*

individuals we must examine, before we are authorized to consider them as equivalent to the whole class. *Quantum opus est* is vague and indefinite. Hence the Conclusions in Experimental Philosophy are never absolutely certain; at least no line can be drawn, within which we can say the number of experiments is not sufficient, and beyond which the number is sufficient to warrant the Conclusion. A process of that kind may be considered, however, as a sound *Topical Syllogism*; the Conclusion always possessing the same degree of probability which the Major premiss had. Further investigation may lead us to discover the falsehood of that Major premiss, and then, of course, the Conclusion must be abandoned.

There is, however, a species of Induction, which is called *Perfect*, in opposition to the other, which is called *Imperfect*. In *Perfect* Induction the Minor premiss enumerates *every individnal* of the class under consideration. Of course the Major premiss cannot be disputed, and the Conclusion is not *probable* only, but *certain*. The Syllogism, in that case, is *Demonstrative*, and is treated of accurately in his latter *Analytics*. This method, however, can rarely be employed. If the class of which we are speaking is a natural species, it is impossible, for their number is unlimited. It may be practised with classes whose numbers are limited, as the planets, the quarters of the globe, the seasons, &c. It is then tedious in form. For if the Minor premiss be established, to state the Major premiss and the Conclusion would be superfluous.

What INDUCTION is in all other subjects of reasoning, that EXAMPLE is in human conduct. It is common to treat the two heads as distinct. They are, in fact, the same process; but the Example is less conclusive, because human conduct is less subject than other things to fixed



laws. Hence the Major premiss is more questionable, but the form of reasoning is the same. As good a specimen as any is given Arist. Rhet. i. c. ii. §. 7.

*All who demand a body-guard meditate tyranny;  
Dionysius demands a body-guard; therefore  
Dionysius meditates tyranny.*

If the Major premiss is disputed, we must support it by \**Induction of particulars*; as, Pisistratus, Theagenes, &c.

Thus diffuse have I been, in order that you may judge how stupidly and confusedly Mr. K. has managed this part. He says, "Induction pursues two different methods; 1. by advancing from particular instances to a general conclusion; 2. from parts to the whole." They are, in fact, both the same. The only differences that can be established in the methods of Induction are those above pointed out, viz. *Perfect* or *Imperfect*, according to the number of parts specified; *Induction* or *Example*, according to the subject-matter of the reasoning.

Hence too may be perceived why reasoning by Induction is sometimes called reasoning by Analogy. For Analogy is the resemblance or the sameness of *ratios*. Thus,

$$A : B :: C : D$$

If that proportion be allowed, whatever Relation can be shewn to subsist between A and B, the same may be concluded of C and D. The same Relation may also be concluded of the equal multiples or the equal parts of these quantities. But if we depart from the Category of Quantity, the application of this reasoning becomes less con-

\* Such is the proper meaning of the word Induction. Mr. K. I see uses it incorrectly; e. g. "Induction *from* particular instances to a general conclusion." This error is pardonable, for it is of no great importance, and he has many to keep him in countenance.

clusive; at least the establishment of the *Proportion*, which is the *Major premiss*, is more difficult. For there may be *one point or several points of Relation* between A and B, the same *with one or several* between C and D. But this will not authorize us to infer that *all* their points of Relation are the same.

Let us try the case above given under EXAMPLE.

Pisistratus : Athens : : Dionysius : Syracuse

The Relation in which they are *known* to agree is, that they each demand of their citizens a body-guard. From this Relation is inferred the *unknown term*, that each does it with the same motive, to establish a tyranny.

No one, when reasoning in morals, is supposed to lay down his Major premiss as strictly universal; or to affirm, that the Proportion is absolute, extending to a similarity in all possible Relations between the respective terms. But we do affirm, when reasoning by Analogy, that the similarity of one or several Relations being known to exist, is a *presumption* or *proof* of the similarity of others yet unknown. And hence, as in the case of Induction, if our Major premiss is disputed, we must support it by enumeration of particulars; that is, by shewing several instances in which the *known Relation* and the *unknown Relation co-exist*; whence we infer the probability, that they are united always.

But I must be cautious how I enter upon this wide field—a field in which I could long expatiate with pleasure, were it suitable to my present purpose, and not likely to repel instead of attracting readers. Let me conclude, therefore, this part with observing, that the writer of *Logic made easy* has omitted to state that which constitutes the chief boast of Aristotelian Logic, namely, that all these methods of reasoning, by whatever name they go,

*Enthymem, Sorites, Induction, Analogy, Example*, or under whatever disguise of language they may pass, *Hypothetical, Disjunctive, Causal, &c.* are resolvable into the form of the PURE CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM. When reduced to this form, their validity is tried by the rules already laid down for MOOD and FIGURE. In one or other of these *Moods* the reasoning, if sound, must find a place. If it be in any of the IMPERFECT MOODS, it may be *reduced* to a PERFECT MOOD. And the validity of the *Perfect Moods* is demonstrable by the immediate application of the “*DICTUM DE OMNI ET NULO*,” which *Dictum*, therefore, is the *Nucleus* of the whole system.

## CHAP. VI.

### *Sophisms or Fallacies.*

Before the time of Aristotle, there was no complete system of Formal Logic, by which the vanities of the Sophists might be convicted and exposed in a summary way. The irregular modes of speaking, continually practised in common conversation, served as a thicket and cover, to which they could easily betake themselves, and baffle all the sagacity of their pursuers. The phraseology in which they expressed their meaning, was sanctioned by the idiom of their language and by general use. Why then, they might say, should they be driven from that mode of speaking, and be made to adopt one comparatively dry, formal, and jejune?

Thus, while they kept to their own way of stating things, the silly were captivated, the stupid were confounded, the wise were often obliged to retire, incapable of exposing them to the contempt they deserved, and to rest satisfied with the consciousness that they possessed

the truth themselves, although they could not succeed in detecting and exterminating the falsehood of others.

It is to Aristotle we owe that *system of arranging words*, by which all possible assertions may be made, and yet made in such a way, that, if any flaw exist in the connection of those assertions, it must become apparent to common sense. *The Pure Categorical Syllogism is that test which no false reasoning can stand.*

And yet this very form is sometimes employed for the purpose of concealing that fraud which it was meant to render impracticable. And truly it *does* render it impracticable, if the laws of the Syllogism be well understood, and rigidly enforced.

The fundamental rule, against which all fallacies of language offend, is, that *the Syllogism must invariably consist of three Terms only, and of three Propositions only.* If any ambiguity exist in one of the Terms, or in the construction of one of the Propositions, that Term is really not *one* Term, but *two* Terms; that Proposition is really not *one* Proposition, but *two* Propositions: and, consequently, the Syllogism having four Terms or four Propositions is *apparent* only, and not *real*.

Mr. Kett gives no such view of this matter. He tells his reader, after the example of all old treatises, that there are six *Fallaciæ Dictionis*, and seven *Fallaciæ extra Dictionem*, giving a formal list of each. I wish my reader would refer to this chapter, and he will perceive what it is to make Logic easy. Mr. K. sherks the second, fifth, and sixth of the first sort; he gives no notice when he enters upon the second sort, of which he omits the fifth and seventh, and throws the others out of their order, treating the two first, last. The absurdities and mistakes are besides numerous.

Under *Fallacia Æquivocationis*, he has this inexplicable nonsense.

“ To this *cause* may be attributed many syllogisms that  
 “ are faulty, [syllogisms attributed to a cause!] *because*  
 “ they have an *anceps medium* ; *either because* the Middle  
 “ term is taken twice particularly . . . . *or because* the  
 “ terms of the conclusion are not taken in the same sense  
 “ both in the premisses and in the conclusion.” p. 81.

Old Menedemus exclaimed upon a much slighter occasion,

Quæ sunt dicta in stultum, caudex, stipes, asinus, plumbeus,  
 In illum nihil potest : exsuperat ejus stultitia hæc omnia.

The true doctrine is plain enough. The Middle term is ambiguous if it be not *once distributed*, just as much as if it be an equivocal word.

Now take an example of *Fallacia Compositionis*. “ Be-  
 “ cause the Scripture says, that as there was a decree  
 “ from Augustus, that *all the world* should be taxed,  
 “ therefore America was included.” The dulness that could lead him to produce this for an example of *Fallacia Compositionis* is inconceivable, after having himself placed a similar fallacy under *Equivocation*. The term *world* is *equivocal* ; it is not used in a *divided sense* first, and then in a *compounded sense*.

Now for *Fallacia Divisionis*. This, he says, takes place when “ that which is *expressed* in a compound sense “ is *inferred* in a divided one.” His own example will run thus :

*The Planets are seven :*

*Jupiter and Saturn are Planets ; therefore*

*Jupiter and Saturn are seven.*

Surely every one must see that *Planets*, the *Middle term*, is the word in which the fallacy lies ; and yet its second meaning is *inferred*, is it, Mr. Kett ? What an unfortunate propensity you labour under, to put the Middle term into the Conclusion ! Vid. p. 23. Something perhaps

is owing to Aldrich's Latin: "*Quando datum in sensu composito sumitur in diviso;*" *datum*, expressed, *sumitur*, inferred! How hard that *popular* treatise is to construe!

Now for *Non causâ pro causâ*. Having given the example in Aldrich about Astrology, he says in the next paragraph, "A *branch* of this sophism . . . . may be exemplified by the credulity of persons of former times, who maintained, that comets and eclipses were the causes, or necessary forerunners . . . . of disasters," &c. The very example already produced. What *does* this mean? Is it absolute infatuation?

Towards the close of this precious chapter, he says, in substance, p. 87, The best method of avoiding sophistry, is to *consider* whether or not we are disputing with a sophist; and (what is strangest of all) "to consider whether he be *competent* to conduct us to the truth he professes to *investigate*." I do not wonder at his not knowing the difference between *investigating* and *sylogizing*; but as to *competency* being any criterion of a sophist, Aristotle, if he ever read him, would have taught him better; Σοφιστὴς μὲν, κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, διαλεκτικὸς δὲ, οὐ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δύνάμιν. Rhet. i. i. 4.

The last paragraph is perhaps taken from his Emily. It has nothing whatever to do with Logic. It is a touch of the *sentimental*.

"The fallacies that have been explained are not those only against which we ought diligently to be upon our guard. There are others that may be more likely to seduce us from truth; such as self-love, unreasonable prejudice, party spirit, pride, indolence, and the various passions of the heart. It is of little use for the student to be a proficient in the rules of Logic, if he submit himself a prey to those enemies to sound judgment," &c. &c. &c. p. 87.

, Let us only suppose a Professor of Geometry to address his class, at the close of a course of lectures, in a similar strain.

“ And now, gentlemen, let me observe to you, that the  
 “ lines and angles you have been considering are not  
 “ those always which you will have to meet with in the  
 “ superficies of life. Let me advise you to avoid those  
 “ curves and spiral windings, in which the ablest Mathe-  
 “ maticians have been lost; especially that osculating  
 “ circle, which may seduce even the wisest among you,  
 “ and bring after it incalculable mischief. Gentlemen,  
 “ keep to the rectangle. It will be in vain even that you  
 “ aspire after the parabola, the hyperbola, or the ellipse,  
 “ if you suffer yourselves to be tickled by the tangents  
 “ of low desire. The vertex of the cone, be assured, will  
 “ be unsteady, unless its base be firm. It will be of lit-  
 “ tle use, &c. &c. &c.”

After this manner, how many pages might be filled! But let me not be thought to insinuate, that the author himself supposed this to be a part of Logic. No. It is a part of the trade. Many a fond mother is captivated by this miserable cant.

Before I quit this subject of fallacies, let me observe, that the ordinary examples are seldom of much use to the learner. The fallacy is too obvious: it is detected already, by being thrown into the form of a syllogism. The real fallacy is such an ingenious mixture of falsehood and truth, so entangled, so intimately blended, that the falsehood is, to use a chemical phrase, *held in solution*. One drop of sound Logic is that test, which instantly disunites them, makes the foreign substance visible, and precipitates it to the bottom. If any one would see a beautiful course of experiments of this sort, let him read Chillingworth against Knot.

Mr. Kett is but a sorry Chemist in this way. He calls the following a *concealed fallacy*. p. 79.

“ *Water freezes in Russia, in Germany, in France, and in England; therefore, water freezes in all parts of the world.*”

## CHAP. VII.

### *Method, and its Application.*

From this chapter I shall quote three paragraphs, leaving them to the consideration of those whom they most concern. The first is for the Professor of Botany.

“ We may know superficially what plants are; but it is by the information which the study of Botany gives, that we become instructed in the component parts of any one, and distinguish *its respective pointals, stamens, and class.*”

The next is for the Reader in Mineralogy.

“ We may likewise have a *vague notion* of a mineral; but it is by the study of Mineralogy we become acquainted with the fourfold division of minerals into earths and stones, which form one class; and salts, inflammables, and metallic substances, which form the remaining three classes. This is analytic method, and is called the method of invention.”

The last is for the Professor of Poetry. It may serve to dissipate the clouds of confusion from his lectures.

“ In Poetry, some regard to the order of ideas is necessary: even in an ode, the most desultory of all its species, *the poet must conform to that arrangement of ideas, which the description of each object requires*: without *such* regard to method, his description will have neither force to strike, nor beauty to charm his readers.”

These are given as brief specimens how easy other things, as well as Logic, may be made by a man of true



genius. It is a species of writing, however, which is seldom understood, till we have thoroughly learnt in some other way that subject which is thus facilitated. You will not therefore take it amiss if I advise you to put off the easy method till you have learnt the hard one. I have had some experience in books myself, and I have uniformly met with disappointment from such books as these, whenever I have been desirous of easing my *mind*. On some other occasions I admit their use is great, and the want of them may be truly embarrassing. It is the only consolation which I can offer to the purchasers of the works I have been just considering, and happy may they think themselves that they have this alternative; more especially in the case of treatises on Logic, where nothing but instruction to the understanding is expected. For if they fail in this one object, they have nothing left that can redeem them; and I see no reason why they should not be tried by a law taken from the stern code of Parnassus,

Si paullum *summo* decessit, vergit ad *imum*.

## PART IV.

### CHAP. I.

#### *The Application of Logic to Literature and Science.*

I do not mean to say much of Mr. Kett in this part. We differ *toto cælo* in our primary notion of Logic. *He* says, "Logic has Reason for its guide." p. 96. *I*, on the contrary, have always looked upon Logic as *the guide for Reason*. His notion, however, is perfectly consistent with what he observed of the *first operation* of the mind. [Vid. p. 10, of *this pamphlet*, where the reader will see as curious a specimen of Simple Apprehension as he ever met with.] As that was made for the sake of the first part of his Logic, so *Reason* was naturally enough intended for the whole treatise.

Another point of difference between us is this. *He* says, "The descriptive, the figurative, and the sublime, "are regulated by *its* laws," i. e. the laws of Logic. Now all these matters, according to my notion, are quite out of its jurisdiction\*.

Let me now proceed to explain very briefly some of the notions concerning Logic, which have been long familiar to my mind.

In the first place, Logic, as it is generally taught, is rather an Art of Language than an Art of Reason. Its

\* As I take my leave here of *Logic made easy*, I may as well give a short account of the rest of that treatise.

In Chap. II. Mr. K. praises Paley highly and deservedly; but I should hardly have expected to hear that it was a rare combination of faculties to be *acute without precipitation, or argumentative without frivolousness*. Such, however, was Paley. His Evidences, Mr. K. observes, exhibit *that harmony of parts, in which consists the essence of truth*. He proceeds; "*It is this harmony of many parts, all conspiring to form a grand whole, which stamp the Christian religion with the seal of indisputable and perfect veracity, evinces its divine origin, and entitles it to the homage of mankind.*" I cannot agree with him, but I am still a Christian.

The Chapter on Locke is the best in the book. He seems really to have read Locke's Essay, although to have read it more from a desire to write about it than to think about it. One ground of his respect for it is, that "it has been published in numerous editions." In p. 104, I fancy I hear some other person's voice, not Mr. Kett's; but I cannot tell whose. That part is plain and sensible. When it is said, [p. 169.] "that the Essay forms "a system of sublime philosophy relative to one of the most *curious subjects* "that can occupy the attention of the logical student," I am sure I hear him again.

As for the rest, I would advise the reader to stop here. If he is bent upon going on, as I have been the road myself, I can give some directions.

There is a tolerable piece of smooth turf, over which you may canter agreeably enough, from p. 111. to p. 116, done at little expence to the author, as the materials were wheeled in chiefly from the Life of Bacon. After that it grows much worse, till at length you get into very bad galloping ground indeed—a dark, narrow, winding, stony, Devonshire lane, of the author's own mending, with large humps, such as Metaphysics, Ontology, Psychology, lying in the middle of the way, without any attempt to break them, and the hedges on each side so high and luxuriant, that you know not where you are going. Presently, however, through the boughs, you see some capital letters, which, upon coming nearer, are found to be the sign of the Parish Clerk's house, close to the church-yard gate, where you may dismount. There is an Advertisement at the church-door, which you may read or not, as you please.

business is to make words subservient to the purpose of communicating our opinions and reasonings to one another. In this character alone Logic considers language. It *excludes* all that is addressed to the fancy or the feelings; all that constitutes the grace, the beauty, the variety, the harmony, the elegance of composition. It confines itself strictly to the Understanding. Even those expedients, which the closest reasoners must adopt in practice, in order to gain attention, and to make impression on their hearers, are foreign to pure Logic. It never seeks to please, its sole aim is to instruct.

An argument then, framed according to the strict rules of Logic, would be firm and solid, but if nothing else were added, it would be unfit for use. It is the shell merely, the strong-jointed frame-work, upon which the ornamental, and many even of the useful parts, will be surmounted afterwards, according to the design of the edifice, and the taste or fancy of the architect. Let us not then turn from this necessary though elementary part of literature. If we are too squeamish to handle this cheerless and meagre skeleton, we may talk indeed of the beautiful contrivance of lacteals and absorbents, of nerves, veins, arteries, and muscles; we may admire, and even examine, the texture of that membrane with which the whole body is enveloped; but it will be all *talk*, the prattling of a superficial sciolist, who is for ever liable to place his arteries where his veins should be, his vessels where they have nothing to carry off, his nerves where they can have no sensation, and his muscles where they can have no play. It will be time enough to hide the bare ribs with their decent clothing, when the purpose for which they were exposed to the eye is fully answered: when we shall have acquired so perfect and familiar a knowledge of their situation and use, that the swell and action of the muscles, and the graceful covering of the

skin, shall not hide them from our mind, although the view of them may be intercepted from the eye. To act otherwise is to begin entirely at the wrong end. To attempt to rig the vessel before he sees that her main timbers are sound, is a sort of ship-building of which an Englishman should be ashamed.

Of the various purposes then which Language may be made to serve, the first in order and in utility is that which Logic regulates. This may be placed at one extremity of the series. At the other extremity is Poetry, where language, as well as thought, is made subservient to the production of a refined pleasure. The several gradations of the scale between these extreme points are occupied by the various branches of Rhetoric, taking Rhetoric in its most extensive signification as the art of good writing. To demonstrate the reason of those principles which conduce to the end of good writing, to shew how they depart, and why they depart, from the rigid laws of Logic, is one of the most grateful services which philosophy can render to polite literature. When we measure these anomalies, as they may be called, by that standard, we better know how to estimate their propriety, their congruity, their relative force, and their utility. The doing of this, I admit, belongs to the province of Rhetoric, but without Logic it cannot be done.

There is, moreover, an advantage in this study, more plain, indeed, and homely, but which I mention with a sincere and serious conviction of its use, that it will keep you from writing *nonsense*. Considering how much of the literature of this age, and of every age, is tinctured with that ingredient, I cannot think it a purpose foreign to education, to discipline a young mind in such a way as shall give it a quick perception of so disgraceful a fault: and I am not afraid even of contradiction, when I affirm, that the practice of analysing argumentative passages

into the syllogistic elements of which they are composed, will breed a habit of attention to the solid contents of every thing which is heard or read. Would any man, for instance, who had learnt Logic in the plain way in which it is now taught in Colleges, have committed to paper such a sentence as this? “By *considering* the peculiarities of language, the various kinds of words and ideas, the generalization *and* abstraction of ideas, the nature of definition, division, and method, they [Lord Bacon and Mr. Locke] *have shewn* that these topics are essential to the *consideration of* Logic; and that Aristotle, *by analysing them with precision, and discussing them at large, formed the most accurate conception* of the operations of the human mind, and built his system upon the solid ground of right reason.” (*Logic made easy*, p. 10.) There are a hundred such passages in the works of the same author; it is the general character of his style. The extracts made by Mr. Davison are chiefly selected by him for the erroneous statements which they contain. If he had extended his criticism to this part, his work must have been more than double its present size.

I will produce one more from the popular novel, entitled *Emily*. A father is recommending to his daughter the habit of self-command; and dates his letter, I believe, *Lorton House*.

“*Self-command exercises its noblest office*, when it enables us to maintain the dignity of our nature as intelligent beings, by *establishing the empire of reason over the passions*. It renders a person the *master of himself* under all the various circumstances of life. . . . It gives an effectual *check to all the vicious propensities* of envy, malice, and anger.” (*Emily*, vol. ii. p. 60.) The poor colonel has so little command of *himself*, that he tries the patience of his daughter by this sort of advice, through a letter of *thirteen pages*.

I cannot afford room for much more. But the critical examination of such works is a useful exercise. Mr. Davison has made the Elements of General Knowledge much more valuable to the world than I ever imagined they could become. He has used them, as the Spartans used a drunken Helot, to shew their rising youth the contemptible nature of that folly. If any thing I have said entitles me to act the part of a serious adviser, let me earnestly recommend you to read that criticism with attention. I am sure you will be repaid. Not only will the different action of the two minds upon the same subject exhibit in the strongest light, by the aid of contrast, the right use of reason, and the perversion or the want of it, but the solid information contained is worth much more than the time you will be required to bestow upon it.

The form of the Syllogism, the varieties of Mood and Figure, every one knows, must be kept out of sight, when he brings his reasoning to bear on the occasions of real life. But is it not thus with every art? Has not a poet embodied the principle in a line so hacknied, that I might have expected it even in *Logic made easy*?

As those move easiest who have learned to dance.

And where is the harm of practising a few minuet-steps of reasoning in a tutor's room, before the student goes forth into the throng of life; especially, since, by a law of Convocation, which I cannot think a very wise one, all our public balls and rehearsals in that way are now suppressed\*? After all, we pay no honours to this accomplishment, although we lay great stress upon it.

\* I have seen a very elegant poem, written by a Lady, on the occasion of Minuets being stopped at Court, by order of the Lord Chamberlain. It was entitled, "The Death of the Minuet." Might not the Death of the Syllogism give play to some chaste academical wit?

The most expert proficient in the *Form* of Logic has no right to say more than this.

——— Vitavi denique culpam,  
Non laudem merui.

As to the *Matter* of Logic, I cannot bring myself in this *σχίσμα*, to submit to you my present thoughts. On that subject I may, perhaps, one day address you again, when my speculations shall be more settled, and nothing will occur to prevent me from discussing it with that uniform seriousness of manner which belongs to such a subject.

In the present undertaking, next to saving the inexperienced among you from errors which might be deeply injurious, I have been guided chiefly by a desire to take out, if possible, that offensive canker, which corrodes and disfigures us in the sight of the world. For this purpose I have not scrupled to employ all the implements, the most keen and the most caustic, which the school of criticism could furnish. The operation is a severe one; but no other could be of use. I have strong confidence that this will succeed.

My object, I repeat it, is not to starve the author's trade. If he must still continue to extract his *essences* and *cordials*, if he must keep his *distillery* going, let him at least remove it to some place where it will be felt as a less nuisance to the neighbourhood, and in all probability he will thrive. The voice of criticism will be faintly heard at Tunbridge or at Birmingham, or will be drowned amidst the discordant cries of London. But let him not defile and poison *us* with his fumes. Let him not insult us, by driving his disreputable traffic on, under the very nose of authority. Let him not seek to smuggle his illicit wares through the Clarendon Press, before the eyes of those, whose especial duty it is regularly to administer





A  
REPLY  
TO  
THE CALUMNIES  
OF  
THE EDINBURGH REVIEW  
AGAINST  
OXFORD.  
CONTAINING  
AN ACCOUNT OF STUDIES  
PURSUED IN THAT UNIVERSITY.

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Χαλεπὸν τὸ μετρίως εἰπεῖν, ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα καὶ ἡ δόκησις τῆς  
ἀληθείας βεβαιοῦται.

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OXFORD,

Printed for the Author; and sold by J. COOKE, and J. PARKER;  
and J. MACKINLAY, London.

1810.



## ADVERTISEMENT.

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IT will detract very much from the authority of these pages, but to prevent all possible misrepresentation it is right, to state, that a single individual is responsible for every fact, opinion, sentiment, and criticism, advanced in them. The undertaking was suggested by his own feelings, without communication or advice, and finished entirely by his own hand. Many things perhaps are contained in it, which would not be sanctioned by the general voice of this place. For the correctness of the statements, however, the Author has no fears : and for this he will not refuse to account in person, if it should ever be called in question by any respectable name. In the mean time he will defend himself against the variety of judgments that will probably be passed on his work, by a sentiment which is explanatory

tory of the motto he has assumed, and which the wisest historian has placed in the mouth of the greatest statesman of Greece.

“Ο τε γὰρ ξυνειδὼς καὶ εὖνους ἀκροατῆς τάχ’ ἂν τι ἐνδεεστέρως πρὸς αὐτὸν βέλεται τε καὶ ἐπίσταται νομίσσειε δηλᾶσθαι· ὅ τε ἄπειρος, ἔστιν αὐτῷ καὶ πλεονάζεσθαι, διὰ φθόνον, εἴτε ὑπὲρ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ἀκρόοι. Thuc. ii. 35.

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## INTRODUCTION.

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IN a late endeavour which I made to hold up to general contempt a work professedly designed for the Students of this University, a work teeming with faults, and presenting a view of its subject totally mistaken and confused, my only scruple then was, and my only source of regret now is, lest it should lead any to imagine that criticism of that sort is a thing which I admire for its own sake, or would myself willingly engage in. If no share of the disgrace, which such a publication must incur, had belonged to us, if no practical evil were likely to arise from it, evil of a kind which it is our especial duty to cure and to suppress, the work, however deceitful its name and its composition, might perhaps have been allowed to pass along unnoticed. But what might be conceded to the common practitioners in this faculty of authorship, cannot be claimed by him who boasts of his offices and employments in a seat of learning, in order to give weight and currency to his opinions—by him who had already spurned the rod which *gently* corrected him, and had

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given

given full proof, that none but the most rigorous and unrelenting discipline could have any avail. In such a case, it was well known, that no tender feelings would be harassed and tormented: and the ordinary smart, which literary disgrace brings with it, cannot by any manly reasoner be opposed to the exercise of an important public duty. When the author, not content with weaving his tissue of cobweb errors in obscurity, presumes to hang them on one of the proudest columns of our national temple, who is the sickly *sentimentalist* that would stay the arm of criticism, or feel a pang at seeing the whole unsightly cluster swept away<sup>a</sup>? Swept away, I trust, they now are, and added to that heap of useless rubbish which is for ever accumulating from the offal of the press: and I shall be well content if the criticism itself, as well as the folly which provoked it, be doomed to the same end. If there be any bits of finer temperament and harder substance found in it, they may be sorted

<sup>a</sup> It is said that the author laughs at this criticism, as feeble and inefficient. If it fails of effecting its purpose, he may be sure another attempt of the same kind will be made. Of the province of taste, wit, fancy, and female education, I leave him in undisturbed possession. But if he again comes forward in the capacity of instructor to the Students of this University, or commits the credit of the University in any way upon his works, the solidity of his pretensions will be examined with the same freedom as heretofore.

from the mass, and worked up hereafter into some goodlier and more enduring form: but the rest, if it have done the service for which it was intended, may go with my free pleasure, where the hasty effusions of the hour naturally go, and be forgotten.

If, however, I shall have acquired the character of one who looks with a keen and malicious eye into the doings of his neighbour, or who is rather prone to discover what is amiss, than to praise and to be thankful for what is truly valuable, I shall have made a greater sacrifice than my wish or meaning was, to what I esteemed a public service. On this subject my opinions and my feelings will have been utterly mistaken. The disgust indeed, which I have felt at witnessing the misapplication of literary torture, far exceeds the satisfaction I have ever derived from the most just and salutary employment of it. And the present age has surely furnished abundant proof, how a cruel and unjust judge may defeat the purpose for which he was invested with his brief authority; and make us hesitate whether it be not better to live without laws and without magistrates, than to suffer the prejudices and passions of an individual to acquire an almost resistless sway, from the sanction of a regular and apparently constitutional tribunal.

The tribunal of which I speak every one will

understand. It is one of the ablest of our literary journals ; and, with the power of doing much good, seems to delight (shall I say it ?) in doing evil. It glories in abusing the privilege which public admiration at one time, and public fear since, has conferred upon it. But it is time to raise the voice of injured freedom and insulted honour. It is time to convince the world, that bitter invective and loud reproach do not always flow from the abhorrence of what is wrong, but often from the dislike only of what is different, or the envy of what is prosperous. If we had formerly to complain of mean and mercenary judges, we may perhaps have gained little by changing them for those that are capricious, prejudiced, or vindictive. The indulgence of malignant passion, if not so contemptible as the love of gain, is certainly more odious—and the stain of selfishness is as deeply ingrained in him, who, for the sake of serving his own partial interests and contracted relations in the community, undermines the reputation of his neighbour, or who laughs in secret at the mischief which his dark slander propagates, as in him who hoards the wages of his servility, and broods in silence at home over his ill-gotten treasures.

The vice indeed which first sprouted forth from this green oligarchy, and whose rank growth first required pruning and correction, was one  
which



which is the natural offspring of unresisted power. After having installed themselves with a little harmless pageantry, in a court degraded by the corruption of its former magistrates, and having displayed to the gaping multitude, with some decent ceremony, though with some vanity, their new robes of office, they soon began to make them feel the full rigour of their jurisdiction. It was a rigour however which fell indiscriminately on flagrant and on venial offences, on young and timid culprits, as well as on the most practised and incorrigible offenders: till at length the exercise of severity seemed to have blunted, and in some instances brutalized, the feelings of the judges. They respected not the smothered but yet unextinguished spark of virtue which shame indicates; and, for one act of temerity or indiscretion, dealt out the full measure of punishment without mercy: thus leaving to the generous mind, once stung by the consciousness of disgrace, no hope of retrieving its honour, and confirming the habitual delinquent in his bad courses, by making no difference between him and lesser criminals. The punishments themselves were accompanied by new and exquisite tortures, deserved indeed in some cases, but frequently employed only because the subject was likely to feel more tenderly, not because his crime was greater, or his audacity more offensive. And over too many of spotless life

life and character, they wielded, in wanton defiance of all our feelings, the sceptre of tyranny, instead of the sword of justice.

But what are the fruits of this harsh discipline, even supposing it to be impartial? Among the most industrious husbandmen in that vineyard are those, who are not impelled by want or the lure of high wages, but who *love their work*, and who think they cannot better or more honestly employ the time which God has given them, than in this task. These men, if treated with plain and homely fare, are well satisfied; but they turn with disgust and shrink back with fear from a service which exposes them to the headstrong and boisterous humours of some insolent taskmaster: and, rather than endure his railings and impertinence, they will eat their bread in private, and shun all communion, except with their nearest neighbours.

Why then should we permit a few forward and loud talkers to confound and silence such men as these? men, who though not fitted to guide the conversation in the great society of the world, are yet well qualified to sustain their part in it, to enliven, to diversify, and occasionally to enrich it? Why should we spare from the face of day that useful and laborious mediocrity, which is not ambitious of fame, although it may be tender of its reputation; which intrudes not into our uppermost seats, but demands only a civil and not unfriendly

unfriendly reception ? This surely is neither consistent with justice, nor humanity, nor sound policy. It is dangerous to check the current of free commerce. By so doing we either in time divert it wholly from ourselves, or idly pond back the wealth which ought to circulate through a thousand ducts and channels, for the public good.

Literature, as well as Science, if it does not go forward, is apt to perish where it stands, or even to lose ground rapidly. But let us not imagine that he who sits aloft guiding her car, or that the fiery steeds which bear it along, are alone entitled to our admiration. How many unseen hands are at this moment employed in shaping the various and complicated parts of that divine machinery ! How many in drawing together the fit materials for its structure, scattered as they are over the whole surface of the universe ! How many in exploring distant regions, for those gems and brilliant dyes, which glitter in the sunshine of peace, and captivate for a time our roving fancy ! How many faithful and diligent pioneers are now clearing thickets, fencing out precipices, and removing the obstructions with which time and neglect and prejudice and ignorance have contributed to impede our progress ! How many skilful engineers are planning new lines of direction for our road, smoothing ascents, cutting off angles and useless windings, uniting the yawning  
fides

sides of valleys, round which we formerly toiled in tedious circuit, and providing across the hitherto untrodden gulph a firm and safe passage! How many of livelier imagination, and more buoyant spirits, are adorning the road-side with flowers, dressing out the country, right and left, in all the fair varieties of nature, opening the landscape to our view, and giving us at intervals a prospect of those happy fabled regions, light up by the gleams of hope and of memory, which please even at a distance, and charm away the tedium of human life!

We are all engaged in one service, although our powers may be unequal, and our departments various. And whoever heartily and honestly lends himself to any of these duties, deserves not our contempt and derision, but our favour and encouragement. Let him even fail of satisfying the expectation he has raised, still if his labours have not been wholly barren, the most moderate services may be allowed to save him from the keen edge of scorn and ridicule and strong invective. Dulness must indeed be made to understand its proper level; arrogance must be humbled, forward ignorance abashed, error reprimanded, and prejudice condemned. But that powerful enginery should be reserved for offences of deeper guilt and more serious mischief, for the grovelling reptiles of quackery and obscenity, for the foul deformed monsters of malice

malice, sedition, and impiety. Against these let the indignant Spirit of criticism bare his red right arm, and hurl his thunders; against these let him send forth the fierce ministers of his vengeance, with their viper hair and sounding lash.

And to the immortal honour of the Editor of that Journal be it spoken, he *has* employed *his own* unrivalled talents, if rumour says true, most frequently in that service<sup>b</sup>. And by these manly efforts in the cause of virtue, he has raised to himself a monument, that will outlive the memory of those occasions which awakened them, and will continue to command our admiration long after the clamours of his enemies have been hushed, and even the well-grounded complaints of injured men have been forgotten. The boundless extent, however, of his wealth appears to me to have betrayed him into some wasteful and some injurious expenditure. There is a respect due to Genius even in its failings. When the predominant character is bright and pure, while blemishes here and there tarnish its lustre, I do not say these

<sup>b</sup> It is commonly reported that, among many other masterly Essays, the following have proceeded from his pen. On Ritson's Abstinence from Animal Food, No. 3. Moore's Poems, No. 16. Willan on Vaccination, No. 17. Cobbett's Political Register, No. 20.

blemishes should be palliated or unnoticed, but the tone of animadversion ought certainly to be lowered. Who is not offended at seeing **THE FIRST POET OF THE AGE** chastised, even when he errs, like a truant Schoolboy ?

This severity, however, although a prominent vice in the conduct of that Review, is not the grievance which has called forth the present complaint. A remedy, indeed, for that evil in some measure adequate, may be found in the justice and candour of other critics, who possess the confidence of the public. But when the examination of works in almost every branch of science and literature is made the vehicle for covert insinuation and open railing against the English Universities, and especially against Oxford ; when sarcastic sneers and allusions in one number are followed up by keen reproaches and bold accusations in the next ; when the public are taught with unwearied and malicious industry to look upon us either as gloomy bigots, or lazy monks, or ignorant pretenders to learning and science ; although the falsehood and malevolence of such charges may be visible to many, yet it must happen that such continual droppings will in time make an impression on the public mind, and, if not seasonably counteracted, will probably alienate that respect and confidence which we have heretofore

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enjoyed, and which it is the nation's interest, as well as our own, that we should never lose.

With persons accustomed to the press such attacks lose much of their force, or rather are altogether harmless. The malevolence is so evident, that they possess no weight or authority in themselves: and when the grounds upon which they rest are examined, it is usually found that they arise not from any positive misdemeanors, which are alleged against us, and which admit of distinct evidence and discussion; but that they are loose charges tacked on to some indictment, preferred against an individual perhaps, with whom we are quite unconnected, and glancing obliquely only at the University. It is not that we jostle them, or stop up the way; but they step aside, and leave their own business on purpose to insult and pick a quarrel with us. Nothing can more clearly mark a settled purpose and design than this practice. Hardly a book is noticed, (for I will not call their ordinary method *reviewing*,) which does not furnish an opportunity for this sort of calumny. And latterly the rankling humour has burst out in such exorbitant quantity, and with such a malignant aspect, as to call for immediate and strong remedy.

Of the Editor himself I do not think so meanly as to impute the wilful falsehoods and misrepresentations, with which his journal abounds, to his own

choice. Most probably he thinks the charges well-founded. For I believe many of them proceed from the vile serpent-brood which have been hatched in our own bosom—that hireling tribe of turncoats, who, disappointed of honours or rewards here adequate to their own fancied merits, have carried over to the enemy, as the most acceptable passport, some local information, and have courted the favour of their new employers, by mean detraction and extravagant abuse of their former friends. If any such there be, they will feel the justice of this rebuke without any more particular designation of their persons; and I wish them no severer punishment than that infamy, which, when their work is done, is the common lot of traitors with all parties.

In the mean time, one cannot forbear to reprobate the low spirit of jealousy, with which the Review has been long conducted; and which must have been well known to exist before those servile devotees presented their rank offerings. Long before these loathsome masses were introduced, a sprinkling of the same ill-flavoured substance had been a regular ingredient; and the palate of the public, thus gradually vitiated, was thought perhaps now duly prepared for that gross meal, which has sickened or poisoned all whose natural taste was not previously corrupted. My present purpose, however, is not to notice particularly



larly these petty cavils, but to hasten to the consideration of more solid and direct charges, having first disposed of one, which, as it proceeds from a writer of profound science and great ability, is the more deserving of our attention.

## CHAP. I.

*Of the Study of Aristotle, and neglect of the Mathematics.*


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IN the 22d Number of the Edinburgh Review is a masterly analysis of La Place's *Traité de Méchanique Céleste*; which no one, I will venture to say, has read without feeling respect and admiration for the writer of the article, and gratitude for the distinctness with which he has brought home to his mind reasonings of the most abstract nature, upon the grandest and most sublime of all subjects. It is impossible to praise it too highly. But, in proportion to the homage we feel disposed to pay to uncommon talents, is our vexation at finding a powerful and enlightened mind, equally with the rest of his brethren, debased by a mean and unmanly prejudice. To no other cause can I attribute the following passage, which is preceded by reflections on the inferiority of the later Mathematicians of this country to those of the Continent.

“ We believe, however, that it is chiefly in  
 “ the public institutions of England, that we are  
 “ to seek for the cause of the deficiency here re-  
 “ ferred

“ferred to, and particularly in the two great  
 “centres, from which knowledge is supposed to  
 “radiate over all the rest of the island. In one of  
 “these, *where the dictates of Aristotle are still*  
 “*listened to as infallible decrees, and where the*  
 “*infancy of science is mistaken for its maturity,*  
 “the mathematical sciences have never flourish-  
 “ed; and the scholar has *no means of advancing beyond the mere elements of Geometry* <sup>a</sup>.”

The far-spread fame of Cambridge for Mathematical studies fixes this description to Oxford: and if the charge were true in the only sense in which the words can be understood, there is no ridicule or invective so keen, which that University would not deserve. The only parts of Aristotle's writings, which can interfere with the Student's progress in natural philosophy, are his *Physics*; the doctrines of which, it is well known, were formerly made the basis of instruction in that department of science through all the Universities of Europe. Early in the 17th century they received their rudest shock from the writings of Bacon. Before the end of that century, the new method had succeeded in dislodging the Aristotelian philosophy from its strong holds; and, as usually happens in revolutions of that magnitude, after a short interval of confusion among contending fac-

<sup>a</sup> Page 282.

tions, of which the Cartesian was for a time predominant, the old dynasty was by universal consent superseded, and the Newtonian quietly established on the throne. Under this comprehensive title I include, for the sake of convenience, the whole modern system of Natural Philosophy, which derives its origin from the works of Bacon.

Oxford, although the place where this new fledged philosophy tried her earliest<sup>c</sup> flights, and first plumed her feathers, was, I believe, one of the last fortresses, of which she took a formal possession. For the Aristotelian Physics were interwoven with the whole course of our studies and exercises; and it was not easy to reconcile the abandonment of them with the language of the Statutes, which public officers were bound to enforce. And thus, as in courts of Judicature, and other bodies of ancient standing, many forms and practices continued to subsist, which had lost their original force and meaning. Even after the new doctrines were received and taught, formal exercises continued to be performed according to the ancient regimen. How long this anomalous state of things lasted, I cannot exactly say; but it may safely be asserted, that, *for more than a century*, the Physics of Aristotle have been set aside,

<sup>c</sup> See the History of the Royal Society, which began at Oxford.

and, except for the sake of satisfying liberal curiosity, and of tracing the progress of science, they are never even consulted.

What then must we think of the author of this calumny? Did he know that he was advancing a falsehood? This I will by no means affirm; and I am unwilling to suspect it. But he has at least shewn more eagerness to indulge a prejudice common, I am afraid, among his countrymen, than to acquaint himself with the truth of the case, as in justice he ought to have done, before he became a gratuitous accuser. The motive which dictated this accusation is too obvious to be mistaken. The sordid inner coating appears too plainly through the specious garb of candour and zeal for science, which is thrown about it: and when that is once discovered, no credit, it is hoped, will be given to opinions and insinuations, which rest more on the *authority* of the writer than the evidence of facts. On this account I think it needless to say much here upon the impudent, unsupported declaration, that, in Oxford, “the infancy of Science is mistaken for its “maturity.” If it relate merely to the charge of teaching the Physics of the Peripatetic School, in preference to modern systems, it has been refuted already. If it regard the rest of our studies, it can at present only receive a flat contradiction; and, as I may be thought an interested party, my opi-

nions will carry but little weight. I trust, however, soon to convince the reader, by a plain unadorned exposition of the course of studies here pursued, that no calumny was ever more unfounded. And although I cannot claim any deference to my opinions unsupported by proof, yet I may surely expect, that the opinions of him will be disregarded, who is proved to be grossly ignorant of the circumstances about which he is speaking.

The latter part indeed of the accusation is expressed in a more distinct and tangible form, relating to a matter of fact.

“The Scholar has no means of advancing beyond  
“the mere elements of Geometry.”

What are the mere elements of Geometry? Are Plane and Spherical Trigonometry, are the properties of Conic Sections, of Conchoids, Cycloids, the Quadratrix, Spirals, &c. &c. the mere elements of Geometry? Is the method of Fluxions included under the same appellation? On all these subjects, lectures both public and private are given. Natural Philosophy in all its branches, and Astronomy, are taught, perhaps by one of those *two persons* whom the Reviewer<sup>d</sup> modestly allows to

<sup>d</sup> See Edinburgh Review, Number 22, p. 81. He complains, that even in the Cambridge method the spirit of discovery, the *δυσκαμία ευστητική*, as he calls it, is not awakened. A genuine Edinburgh Reviewer ought to be careful how he meddles

Oxford, as equally capable with himself of understanding La Place. And that the Scholar *has* the means of advancing to Newton's Principia, is tolerably proved by the public examination of Candidates for the Degree of B. A. twice every year, in that work.

Here again I beg the writer will not think I am impeaching his veracity. In all probability he thought he was speaking truth. But his assertion is grossly false. There is some difference perhaps between asserting what one knows to be false, and asserting as a thing known what one really knows not: I willingly leave the Reviewer this loop-hole for his conscience and his character; only assuring him, that, notwithstanding our scholastic jargon, such subtleties have been long ago exploded at Oxford from our doctrine, and few things would be more despised and condemned amongst us in our practice.

Throughout this examination I have taken it for granted, that the Physics of Aristotle were the *infallible decrees* intended by the Reviewer.

dles with Greek. If he quotes two words, one of them in all likelihood is wrong. I say a *genuine* Edinburgh Reviewer, because the Greek criticisms in that Journal, some of which are learned and ingenious, have, I believe, been *all* furnished from English Universities. In *many instances* I know they have. Such phrases as *δυναμὶς εὐρητική*, and *tribrach periods*, for sentences of three members, [vid. Number 18, p. 398.] betray their Northern origin.

Both the subject on which he is writing, and the whole tenor of his argument, require that interpretation. It was not necessary therefore in this part to defend the study of other treatises by the same Philosopher, which have no connexion with these pursuits. Some account will be given of these under the head of Studies pursued in this University. Let me be permitted however to say a few words in this place of the venerable Sage, whose revilers have perhaps exceeded in ignorance the bigotry and folly of his most devoted admirers.

It has been a current charge against Aristotle, that he meditated the same thralldom over the minds of men, which his pupil Alexander endeavoured to effect over their bodies and fortunes. A charge which, from its flippancy, one might suspect to be of French growth, but which had its origin with no less a name than Bacon. Now if ever a writer laboured more than another, in an age of sophistry and dogmatism, to establish the empire of Common Sense and Reason, it was Aristotle. He was thoroughly versed in all the doctrines of the Schools of Greece. He subscribed implicitly to none. He even incurred the obloquy of deserting and undermining his master Plato, because he rejected the visionary speculations of that philosopher, however fascinating to the fancy, as delusive and irreconcilable with reason.



reason. He is most generally known as the author of the Syllogistic form of Reasoning, in which his aim has been commonly misunderstood, and misrepresented even by those who should have pointed out and corrected the vulgar error. This is one of the least of his works : but it is a noble specimen of that inflexible unwearied perseverance, which the love of truth only, mixed perhaps with the honest love of fame, is able to sustain. His chief characteristic is a resolute endeavour to get to the bottom of his subject, whatever it may be. In this resolution his firmness and intrepidity are beyond example. It resembles that unextinguishable ardour, that insatiable desire, of finishing their enterprize, attributed to the heroes of romance. He never rests satisfied with partial glimpses and imperfect demonstration, where the subject seems capable of closer handling. And however thorny and desert the tracts through which he pursues his prey, however far he may be led from the cultivated and elegant walks of life, the fear of losing admiration, or of disheartening his companions, never bends him from his purpose.

These virtues, conspicuous as they are in all his writings, are most observable in what is now called the *Organon* ; because, from the dry and repulsive nature of the subject, it possesses hardly any other attraction. Much of this work is at present

sent useless, as being applicable merely to the Greek language, and to errors and practices now seldom observable. Much of it has been judiciously compressed and *re-cast*, with increased perspicuity and no loss of matter: and some of the modern compendiums, more especially that of Aldrich, contain the substance of the original, relieved of its tedious explanations and subtleties, and totally free from the barbarous jargon with which the later Schoolmen had overloaded and corrupted it. It is in this reformed shape that his system is now studied in the University. And besides the incidental benefit derived from the rigorous accuracy, with which every argument is analysed, much good is supposed to arise from enabling a young Student to state his reasoning, *whenever it may be necessary*, in its most bare and elementary form, and to examine any suspected reasoning of another by the same rule.

These were the leading objects, which the Author of the Organon himself had in view when he unfolded the system. He has been absurdly supposed to have forged this weapon for the purpose of endless wrangling. Nothing is more opposite to the truth. Its principal use and advantage is to *cut short* wrangling, by marking out precisely the real object of dispute, and by confining the disputant to correct reasoning. Before the method of the Syllogism was invented, an ingenious Sophist

Sophist could set at defiance the soundest and the most acute reasoner : but the laws of the Syllogism, if well enforced, cannot by any art be long evaded, and if the contending parties be of equal power, (which is the only way of trying the utility of any method,) *truth must prevail*. The practice of wrangling [*ἐριστική*, as it was anciently called,] or supporting an argument for the sake of victory, is adopted merely as an exercise to try the powers and dexterity of the disputant, to give him the free use of his limbs, and the command of his weapons : just like the practice of a fencing school<sup>e</sup>, or the drill of a light-horseman. And as this was one of the favourite exercises in the leisurely schools of Athens, it is no wonder that its author should have pointed out the assistance, which might be derived to it from his own system. But never, no never, does he by his advice, his sentiments, or his example, encourage that perversion of the noblest faculty of man, in serious discussion : on the contrary, he always speaks of it with contempt ; and he has done what he could,

<sup>e</sup> It is related as a threwd saying of a Nobleman, who, upon being shewn the College of the Sorbonne at Paris, and being told that regular disputations had been held in their hall for six centuries, asked, what they had *settled* in all that time. To me the wit appears no better, than if a man should ask in a fencing-school, how many quarrels had been ended, or how many men slain there.

by exposing all the trick and mystery of false reasoning, to suppress and defeat the imposture. In all his writings he spurns the use of such artifice : he never evades the difficulties of his subject : he never seeks to disguise or gloss over the imperfections of his reasonings ; maintaining, that it is better to get near to truth, even if we cannot reach her, than always to stand contentedly at a distance.

Some allowance will, I hope, be made for the length of these remarks. It arises from a conviction, that the world are greatly misled, on this subject, by writers of high authority, and from an earnest desire to vindicate an illustrious name from the unjust aspersions, with which ignorance and frivolity delight to insult it.

Even the candid and sagacious Locke is not proof against the blind propensity mankind feel to mark their disgust of the abuse of a thing by denying its use. How else can we account for his continual reflections on the folly and uselessness of Logic, when in his *Thoughts on Education* he recommends that his friend's son should be made to read Chillingworth? Read Chillingworth! Not a page of Chillingworth is intelligible without Logic. All the distinctions of Logic, the maxims, the rules, the technical names and phrases, are employed in the course of his controversy, not only without scruple, but in a way which

which would now be called pedantry and ostentation. The same advice is repeated by Dr. Reid, in his Analysis of the Organon, inserted in Lord Kaimes's Sketches of the History of Man, joined with many just reflections on the utility of Logic ; and yet he manifestly under-rates the system of Aristotle ; and one may collect from some of his remarks, that he has no value for it whatever, and thinks the study of it a waste of time.

In reading through that Analysis, I confess I have been struck with the inconsistency of Dr. Reid, as well as with the erroneous positions and interpretations he now and then advances. It is difficult to reconcile the tone of levity and disrespect sometimes assumed, with the acknowledged acuteness, accuracy, and ingenuity, of the system he is examining. That Aristotle has purposely darkened his demonstrations, by using A, B, C, instead of words, is so futile a charge, that one wonders how it ever appeared there<sup>f</sup>. The contempt expressed for the *Dicſum de Omni et Nullo*, and the remark at the end of Sect. 5. on the frivolity of the whole system which is resolvable into this principle, argue either an inadequate view, or a forgetfulness, of its true nature and design<sup>g</sup>. The same thing may be said of the

<sup>f</sup> Chap. iii. sect. 3.

<sup>g</sup> It is the very beauty of science, to resolve the most intricate theorems into some simple elementary truth ; and that

enquiry how far the Syllogism is an engine of Science. As an engine of Science it is not, and never was, proposed.

Lord Kaimes's own remark<sup>h</sup>, that "Aristotle himself never attempts to apply his syllogistic mode of reasoning to any subject handled by him"—that "on Ethics, on Rhetoric, and on Poetry, he argues like a rational being, without once putting in practice any of his own rules," is, like many other remarks of the same writer, flippant and false: the treatises he mentions are the most copious source of examples in every part of Logic, and the resolution of argumentative passages in those works, into their syllogistic elements, is a common and easy exercise for young students.

It is unfortunate for the fame of Aristotle, that he should be known chiefly as the Author of the Logical Treatises. The Treatise on Rhetoric is a magazine of intellectual riches. Under an arrangement the most accurate perhaps and the most luminous ever marked out, the diversified elements of thought, of feeling, and of taste, are presented in due order to the reader's mind. Nothing is arbitrary, nothing gratuitous. Long ex-

which provokes Dr. Reid's contemptuous exclamation is really the great and well-grounded boast of Logic.

<sup>h</sup> Page 166. 4<sup>th</sup>. edit.

perience with mankind, attentive observation of human nature in public and in private life, the political history of past times, and the occurrences of his own age, furnished him with the materials of this great work. In the course of the enquiry, nothing is left untouched, on which Rhetoric, in all its branches, has any bearing. His principles are the result of extensive original induction. He sought them, if ever man did seek them, in the living pattern of the human heart. All the recesses and windings of that hidden region he has explored : all its caprices and affections, whatever tends to excite, to ruffle, to amuse, to gratify, or to offend it, have been carefully examined. The reason of these phænomena is demonstrated, the method of creating them is explained. The third Book contains a body of rules for good writing, traced to those natural principles, out of which they all grow, and illustrated by examples, which his own intimate acquaintance with the best poets and orators of Greece readily supplied. The whole is a text-book of human feeling ; a store-house of taste ; an exemplar of condensed and accurate, but uniformly clear and candid, reasoning.

It would lead me too far, if I were to do justice to my own feelings on this subject. These works will perhaps be mentioned again, when I come to treat particularly of our plan of Study. In the

mean time let it be observed, that the writings of this great Philosopher on Logic, Rhetoric, Poetry, Ethics, and Politics, were not merely dissertations and essays, such as procure fame to the writers, if they contain but some valuable hints and opinions diffusely argued: they are not merely critical *diatribes* and ingenious detached arguments, improvements upon former theories. But they are, what is the highest and most laborious effort of human intellect, entire *systems* moulded into a full and perfect shape; they are buildings planned and raised from their foundation by the same hand, and carefully finished in all their parts. Nothing seems to have been too vast for his comprehensive mind; nothing too minute or intricate for his sagacity.

He is accused indeed of severe judgment of those who went before him, of a dictatorial spirit, of jealousy against his contemporaries, of pride and arrogance. As these charges are unsupported by proof, it is enough to say that I have met with no proof of them in his writings. And they may in general be refuted by that sentiment of his own, that noble characteristic, which often raises the clamours of little minds, an uniform zeal in the cause of truth—a settled devotion, which suffers no other passion to interfere with it. A sentiment, which I cannot but recommend to the attention of this Reviewer,



viewer, if ever he should feel himself wavering between his prejudice and his conscience.

Ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοι, ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

Let me dismiss this section then with a translation of that honest and manly conclusion to his *Organon*, in which he asserts his claim to originality, with fearlessness indeed and freedom, but without arrogance. The substance of the passage has been well given by Dr. Reid<sup>i</sup>, although he has mistaken the meaning of the text in two or three places, especially in the last sentence. I shall follow his method in rendering it, correcting him only where he is evidently wrong.

“ Of those things which may be called inventions, some have been begun only in a former age, and have grown up to perfection by means of successive improvements; some are the work of the first inventor, but remain in a rude state till enlarged and improved by other hands. The chief merit however is due to the beginner. For the beginning, though small, is the most difficult; to add to it by degrees, and complete it, is comparatively easy.

“ Now with regard to the Dialectic art, there was not something done, and something remaining to be done: there was absolutely nothing done. For those who professed the art of

<sup>i</sup> Page 227, Lord Kaimes.

“disputation resembled the Rhetoricians of Gor-  
 “gias’s school. As these composed orations, so  
 “the other framed arguments, which might suit,  
 “as they imagined, most occasions. These their  
 “scholars soon learned. But they were in this  
 “manner only furnished with the materials pro-  
 “duced by the art: the art itself they did not  
 “learn. It was just as if a man, professing to teach  
 “you how to protect the feet from injury, should  
 “bring you shoes of all sorts and sizes. He does  
 “perhaps by so doing answer your present pur-  
 “pose; but he does not, as he professes to do,  
 “teach you the art of providing for yourself.

“Upon Rhetoric indeed much has been al-  
 “ready written; but on the art of reasoning, no-  
 “thing: the whole of what I have composed on  
 “that subject is from myself; and it has cost me  
 “much pains. And should you find upon ex-  
 “amination that my system, though deriving no  
 “benefit from former labours, is yet not unwor-  
 “thy of comparison with others, which have by  
 “slow degrees been brought to perfection, I have  
 “only to express my hope, that you will forgive  
 “what may be left undone<sup>k</sup>, and that what  
 “has been done will meet with a favourable ac-  
 “ceptance.”

<sup>k</sup> It should be observed, that the Hypothetical Syllogism,  
 of which he promises, in the first book of the First Analytics,  
 to treat more fully afterwards, is altogether omitted.

CHAP.

## CHAP. II.

*Examination of a Criticism, in the 28th Number of the Edinburgh Review, on Falconer's Edition of Strabo.*

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BEFORE I proceed to examine the justice of the Reviewer's criticisms, and the truth of his assertions, it may be as well to correct what was perhaps only a mistaken opinion, concerning the responsibility of the University for works printed with the approbation and assistance of the Delegates of the Press.

The Clarendon Press has been liberally endowed, and the management of its concerns is entrusted by the University to a board of Eleven Members, called Delegates of the Press, who derive no emolument from their office. They have the entire disposal of its funds: they direct what books shall be printed; and to what extent the Authors or the Editors shall be favoured with their aid. A constant and regular supply issues from this press of Bibles, Common Prayer Books, and reprinted editions of the most useful works. Persons who project improved editions often submit their proposals to the Board, which are always attentively

attentively considered, and encouraged in proportion to the opinion entertained of the competency of the person, and the general merits of his plan. If the plan be adopted, the money for carrying it on is supplied, and the whole risk is thrown upon the public fund. It is also common for undertakings of this kind to originate with the Delegates themselves; and in that case individuals are sought out, who are thought well qualified for conducting them, and who have given, either in public or private, some proof of their fitness.

In none of these proceedings do the Delegates take on them that kind of responsibility which belongs to the Editor of a work, except as far as the printing is concerned. For the general plan, and the general competency of the person employed, they *are* responsible, but not for the detail of the execution. Mistakes both in matter and in language may be made, for which an Editor may be blamed: but the disgrace attached to these mistakes cannot in any fairness be imputed to the Delegates; especially if the work contain valuable materials procured by their means, and openly communicated to the world.

With these general remarks premised, let us proceed to examine the charge brought against the University by this Reviewer. The introductory reflections I leave untouched: they are intended only to heighten the effect of what follows: and  
if

if I can shew that what follows is *false, unjust, and ignorant*, the efficacy of this rhetorical flourish will not be great.

The writer clearly does not pretend to be a Logician; or to understand when two propositions are opposed to each other. For instance, he says, "the most confident hopes are excited, that *every new impression* of a classic volume from the Clarendon Press will exhibit it with every *remaining obscurity or ambiguity* explained." But this hope, he adds, is constantly disappointed: and why? "because, although this learned body have occasionally availed themselves of the sagacity and erudition of Ruhnken, Wyttenbach, Heyné, and other *foreign* professors, they have, of late, added nothing of their own." Where insult and abuse are uppermost in a writer's mind, it is no wonder that he forgets his reason. The absurdity of saying that editions issuing from the Oxford Press are inferior to expectation, *because* they incorporate the labours of foreign critics of the first eminence, instead of British, is too gross to require a comment.

The reader is next reminded of an "unhappy attempt at an improved edition of Apollonius Rhodius," by which the critic supposes "the *Graduates* of Oxford were satisfied that *degrees* neither implied nor *conferred science*, but that a man might become a *Master of Arts* without

F

"possessing

“ possessing any knowledge or skill whatsoever in  
 “ that particular art which he professed, and  
 “ which he was chosen and appointed to practise  
 “ for the benefit of the community.”

If the edition be a bad one, where is the need of exaggeration? At any rate it has no business here. I do not call it a good edition: but it is a useful one; and, notwithstanding the wrong readings which it has, I will undertake to match the latinity of the Editor against that of this Critic, if ever he shall favour the world with a similar attempt.

The quotation above is somewhat abridged. The following I give entire.

“ Certain it is, that no such attempt has been made  
 “ since, except in the single and minute, but very  
 “ successful instance of Aristotle’s *Poetics*; which was  
 “ produced by an *auxiliary volunteer*, residing in the  
 “ metropolis, *engaged in business*, and never secluded  
 “ from the avocations of society. *By not enjoying the*  
 “ *leisure*, perhaps, he never contracted the indolence  
 “ or apathy of a Monk; but preserved the activity,  
 “ even by the distraction of his faculties. His name  
 “ stands in the title-page plain Thomas Tyrwhitt—  
 “ without any decorative adjunct or title of degree,—  
 “ though it would have done honour to the proudest  
 “ which the most exalted seat of learning could be-  
 “ flow.”

Left it should be imagined that there is any  
 truth

truth in what the Reviewer intimates, that Tyrwhitt *took no degree at Oxford, and was not even a member of the University*, I will add a very brief summary of facts and dates concerning that illustrious critic.

He was born in 1730; came from Eton to Queen's College, Oxford, 1747; took the Degree of B. A. in 1750; was elected Fellow of Merton in 1755; took the Degree of M. A. in 1756; and remained Fellow of that College seven years; i. e. till 1762; when he was made Clerk of the House of Commons, and resigned his Fellowship. *He quitted all public employment in 1768*; from which time till his death in 1786, he occupied himself chiefly in critical and other literary studies, to which the greater part of his former life had been devoted. His Poetics is a posthumous publication from unfinished notes, and the title page of course arranged by another hand.

The next preliminary charge relates to the edition commonly called the Grenville Homer.

“The editors, he says, have *religiously retained all*  
 “*the errors of Clarke's edition*, even those intro-  
 “duced on the authority of mere conjecture, and in  
 “instances where the true reading had been twice be-  
 “fore published on the authority of the Venetian Ma-  
 “nuscript. One of these *so appalled us*, in the 20th  
 “line of the first Iliad, as to deter us from all further

“ critical examination : for, when a gross violation of  
 “ idiom in the use of the moods and voices, *introduced*  
 “ *arbitrarily* to supply a defect in the metre, neither  
 “ excited suspicion, nor suggested inquiry, no one who  
 “ values his time can think it worth while to go far-  
 “ ther<sup>1</sup>.

To this I answer, that the Editors *have not religiously retained all the errors of Clarke's edition*—that although Clarke's text was the basis, many readings were corrected during its progress through the press, on the authority of MSS. collations in the editions of Ernesti and Villoison, and of a MS. in New College Library. Of these new readings there are *twenty-five* in the two first books of the Iliad, and *near three hundred* in the whole Poem. In the Odyssæy there are *above one hundred and fifty*; and the collations of the Harleian MS. by Porson, some of which are incorporated with the text, are given entire at the end of the volume.

Now, with regard to the 20th line of the first Iliad, which so appalled the Reviewer, it may be proper first to state, that the *plan* of the edition was simply to give the text. No critical remarks or discussions were to be introduced. No reading therefore was to be received which required discussion to support it.

<sup>1</sup> Page 431.



The 20th line in Clarke runs thus,

Παῖδα δέ μοι λύσαιτε φίλην, τὰ δ' ἄποινα δέχεσθαι.

In the editions of Wolfius<sup>m</sup> and Heyné it is,

Παῖδα δ' ἐμοὶ λῦσαί τε φίλην, τὰ δ' ἄποινα δέχεσθαι.

Clarke has a note of some length, giving reasons for rejecting λύσαιτε, which had been a common reading, and λύσασθε, which Barnes had adopted, and ending with a conjecture that λύσοιτε is the true reading: but as λύσαιτε *had the authority of the Vatican and Florentine MSS.* he prefers it. δ' ἐμοὶ he himself prefers to δέ μοι, as being more emphatic, but he does not alter the text. He objects to the reading,

Παῖδα δέ μοι ΛΥΣΑΙ τε φίλην, τὰ δ' ἄποινα ΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ,

as not agreeing in construction with what follows, Ἀζόμενοι. To this objection Ernesti has since replied, by pointing out similar cases of construction; but he expresses no disapprobation of λύσαιτε, and no preference of the other. The reading is also confirmed by the Venice and other MSS. which have δέχεσθαι, although with λύσαιτε instead of λῦσαί τε. Bentley conjectured λύσαντε, which would certainly accord with the sense and construction; but it is not necessary to have recourse to that remedy.

<sup>m</sup> Wolfius indeed reads, without assigning his authority, τὰ τ' ἄποινα δέχεσθαι.

After

After this view of the case, I will leave it to the reader to determine whether he ever met with a more despicable instance of conceited pedantry, than the exclamation of the Reviewer, that he *was appalled* at this reading, and could go no farther; a reading which Clarke preferred to that since adopted by Heyné and others: and whether an edition which took Clarke's text as a basis could have made the proposed alteration, against Clarke's deliberate judgment, without assigning a reason; to do which was not compatible with the plan laid down. Thus too there are, besides that already noticed, two other positive untruths in this single sentence of the Review. For *λύσαιτε* is *not* a reading introduced arbitrarily: and *λῦσαιτε* has *not* the authority of the Venetian MS. which, as published by Villoison, reads *λυσαιτε*.

All this however is by way of prelude to the main attack. He goes on to say, with admirable consistency, that having observed this degeneracy and ignorance in Oxford Editions, he now "*confidently expected*" a most complete edition of Strabo: and adds,

"We therefore learned, with much satisfaction, that  
 "no pains nor expense had been spared in obtaining  
 "collations of manuscripts from the libraries on the  
 "Continent, as well as from those at home: *but* that  
 "the materials would be *worthy of the artists*, and the  
 "solidity

“solidity of the *substructions* correspond with the  
“weight and extent of the edifice.”

In the same page, after alledging that the student has a right to claim the Editor’s judgment of preference among the various readings, he proceeds;

“This claim becomes stronger when the *office of*  
“*editor is undertaken by a learned body*, whose business is public instruction, or *is delegated by them to*  
“*such of their members* as are deemed most competent  
“to express the judgment, and exercise the authority  
“of the whole . . . . from such a *synod of critics*,  
“the republic of letters have a right to expect a *work—*  
“not merely the raw materials of one, &c.”

To this the best answer will be a reference to the statement already given respecting the Delegates of the Press. The passage admits of no other, and deserves no other, at least no other of a literary kind. The clause, “*is delegated by them to such of their members &c.*” will be considered immediately.

For the sake of convenience, then, it may be better first to dispatch some assertions of an extraordinary kind, although they do not lie in exact order, and then to examine more at large the philological criticisms. These assertions, as they are not commonly met with in good society, it is difficult to describe by any proper title. In-

deed, so numerous are they, that I am persuaded, if the writer had only resided a fortnight among the Houyhnhnms, he would have compelled that nation to enrich their language. The first of them is, when criticising a note of the Editor's, he calls it,

“ A passage from the University press, and the pen  
“ of a distinguished Graduate, selected from the whole  
“ body, at an advanced period of life, to conduct the  
“ greatest work that it had undertaken for more than  
“ a century preceding<sup>o</sup>.” *Splendidè mendax* !

The *truth* is, the Editor *never was a Graduate*, he *was not a member of the University*, when he undertook this work : he *was not then at an advanced period of life* : he resided here a little more than a twelvemonth during the progress of it, chiefly that he might enjoy the society of literary men, and the use of the libraries : he was *not* “ *selected therefore from the whole body*,” nor indeed was he *selected* by the University at all. All this, however, the Reviewer asserts, that he may have an opportunity of calling the Latin, Oxonian Latin ; a phrase which he repeats with a degree of assurance, not undeserving of a coarser epithet.

<sup>o</sup> Page 437.

<sup>p</sup> *Splendidè*, of the first magnitude. If the reader is not familiar with Horace, he will find a learned commentary on this expression, in Congreve ; Love for Love, Act II. Sc. 5.

Pindar gave good advice to a Prince, which may not be unfuitable to a Reviewer.

ΑΦΕΥΔΕΙ δὲ πρὸς ἄκρονι ΧΑΛ-

ΚΕΤΕ γλῶσσαν.

Εἴ τι καὶ φλαῦρον παραιθύσ-

σει, μέγα τοι φέρεται

Πὰρ σέθεν· πολλῶν ταμίας

Ἑσσί.

Χάλκευε brings up a familiar image, by which a certain moral quality is sometimes indicated, not of the most amiable kind. If the Reviewer meant to comply with this precept when he wrote, he should have taken care to follow it throughout: but he has been as unhappy in the choice of an anvil, as any gentleman of his profession ever was. Let us now examine some more work from the same forge.

“ We have nevertheless *perused the whole attentively*,  
 “ and can again assert, that the printers have done their  
 “ duty in rendering very accurately that which was  
 “ put before them. The accuracy is, however, that of  
 “ the Chinese tailor, who, in making a new coat from  
 “ an old one, copied all the darns, patches and blemishes,  
 “ which he found in the pattern. In the same manner  
 “ here, *every error of the press*, and usual inaccuracy of  
 “ spelling that had crept into the Amsterdam text, is  
 “ *religiously retained*.”

Again :

¶ Page 440.

G

“ The

“The text, which has been so fervilely copied, is  
 “merely a repetition of Casaubon’s; who does not  
 “appear to have superintended the printing, or to have  
 “corrected it at all himself; whence errors have ac-  
 “cumulated on errors : *which are all carefully embalm-*  
 “*ed and preserved in the splendid edition before us.*”  
 Ibid.

The best answer that can be given to these charges has already appeared in the Gentleman’s Magazine for September 1809. A long list of readings in the Oxford edition, together with those of the Amsterdam edition of which they are corrections, is there inserted. It is needless to repeat the particulars here : but I cannot do better than copy the remarks with which the writer of that article follows up his list.

“You have here, Mr. Editor, more than *Fifty Cor-*  
 “*rections* of the Amsterdam edition, within the compass  
 “of *fewer than one hundred successive pages* of the Ox-  
 “ford edition. This list does not include any which  
 “are merely accidental ; and it is confined to the text,  
 “though the version and notes would have supplied a  
 “still larger number. I have also examined more than  
 “300 of the subsequent pages, and they bear the same  
 “testimony to the *attentive perusal* of which the Re-  
 “viewer boasts, and afford the same ground for an  
 “unqualified reliance on his candour, and his scrupulous  
 “love of truth <sup>1</sup>.”

<sup>1</sup> Gent. Mag. Sept. 1809, page 351.

Equally undeserving of respect with his assertions are the doctrines and opinions of this unhappy critic. In the first display indeed of these, may be observed the same disingenuous spirit as in the former part. He treats the Preface and the Notes, as if they proceeded from the same pen; whereas the writer of the Preface informs him in the first paragraph, that the Editor was his Uncle, and that (he having been dead many years) regard for his memory was one motive which impelled him to this undertaking. The Preface goes on to say, that the Editor never designed a revisal of the Text of Strabo; and that *he was supplied with the new Collations, procured at great expence, by the liberality of the University of Oxford.* This Preface is dated *Bathonix*, which being prefixed too to a Book on Geography, one would hardly have expected to see interpreted as it is by this Gentleman, “written “in the University of Oxford<sup>s</sup>.”

Assuming that this stain belongs to it, he proceeds to handle it very roughly; but, not content with noticing errors, he ventures upon some critical dissertation. The passage of the Preface on which he remarks is this.

Cæterum agam uti potero, et, si nihil aliud afferam, saltem ea recensabo, quæ rationem operis te edoceant,

\* Page 433, l. 22.

quibus subsidiiis instructa est hæc Strabonis editio, vel quæ aliqua ex parte incrementa eam sumpsisse contigerit.

The phrase, "*edoceant quibus instructa est*," he says, would not be admitted in any place, "where ignorance is not privileged by degrees of science;" and that to make it Latin we must either write *subsidia quibus* or *est*, instead of *fit*.

I do not defend the phrase; but the fault is common: and this critic has not pointed out what principle it violates: he only says generally, that although the proper and discriminative use of the Indicative and Subjunctive moods be often a point of extreme nicety, yet in this case the error is gross and obvious—a remark, which is of no benefit to the reader. Indeed, he calls it, when referring to the same passage<sup>†</sup>, the use of the Indicative *with the relative pronoun*, subordinate to another verb. Before many pages are read, it will probably be made evident, that this remark proceeded from entire ignorance of the true nature of *quibus*: and the point is one of such frequent occurrence in Latin, that I hope to be excused for treating it at some length.

The difficulty then of determining the proper mood in such cases arises chiefly from the ambiguity of the Latin oblique cases *cujus*, *cui*, *quem*,

<sup>†</sup> Page 436, l. 16.



&c. in the singular number, and all the cases *qui*, *quibus*, *quæ*, &c. in the plural: and this ambiguity is caused, by their belonging to different nominatives, *QUIS* and *QUI*. These words are derived, as Perizonius has well shewn<sup>u</sup>, from the different Greek roots, *Τίς* and *Κός*, and in the old Latin preserved a distinction in their oblique cases, till in process of time the Relative *Qui* in most of those cases became substituted for the interrogative *τίς*<sup>x</sup>. In some instances, indeed, the cases peculiar to *Quis* were incorporated with the declension of *Qui*: as *Quem*, *Quid*, *Quî* and *Quibus*, for which the original cases of *Qui* were *Quum*, *Quod*, *Quo*, and *Queis*. *Cujus* and *Cui* were common perhaps to both from the first: still the main fact is clear, that the distinction in every case but the Nominative was lost, and sometimes even there, as Plaut. *Curcul.* I. 2. 51.

Now it is a common rule, that where the subject of a sentence is known and definite<sup>y</sup>, the *indicative* mood is to be used: where it is un-

<sup>u</sup> Not. ad Sanct. lib. iii. c. 14.

<sup>x</sup> Ceterum in obliquis casibus, etiam ad interrogationem, adhibuerunt illa, quæ ab Relativo *Qui* descendunt. Nam in obliquis hic rursus in unam voculam confuderunt Latini simul *relationis* et *interrogationis* vim. Not. ad Sanct. iii. 14.

<sup>y</sup> Unless the sentence be conditional or dependent, or imply some contingency; of which cases we shall soon speak more particularly.

known and indefinite, the *subjunctive*. This, however, does not hold with *pure Interrogatives*: in them the same mood is used as in the case of assertion; and the reason perhaps is, that the tone of voice, the direct application to another person, sufficiently proves that we are not asserting any thing. But wherever any doubt or indefinite description is intended, which character is denoted by *the pronouns and nouns called indefinite*, the subjunctive is employed. This Indefinite, however, if attentively considered, will be found to correspond very closely with the Interrogative. It is in fact the same word. *Τις* in Greek, and *Quis* in Latin, have both senses. And the reason is manifest: for there is the same state of mind, the *same uncertainty* in each case.

*Quid existimas de hac quæstione?*

indicates the same state of mind as,

*Quid existimet de hac quæstione, incertum est.*

And in all cases where a question is asked by *Quis*, the same thing might be expressed with *Quis* and the *subjunctive mood*, in the form of a proposition about which we are doubting. The same holds of *Cur*, which in the interrogative form requires an Indicative; in the form of a sentence denoting uncertainty, a Subjunctive. And thus the Reviewer's objection to the sentence in note pag. 48, is valid: "*Cur omisit Strabo expe-*  
ditionem

“ ditionem maritimam regnante Necho factam, “ nescio.” If it were a *question*, ending at *factam*, *omiserit* would be right: but being an assertion with *nescio*, it required *omiserit*; just as in the example above given, where *Quid existimas* is resolved into *Quid existimet, incertum est*. But though he is right in his objection, he is plainly ignorant of every principle on which it rests: as will further appear presently.

It is then by confounding the Indefinite with the Relative, that mistakes are continually made in the use of moods. The Relative, as a Relative, requires no particular mood after it. It refers to some antecedent; and if that antecedent be certain and definite, or if it introduce a fact or independent assertion, it will naturally have the Indicative mood: Thus,

Nihil faciam insolenter, neque te tali vel scientia vel natura præditum hortabor, ut ad eas te referas artes, *quibus* a primis temporibus ætatis studium tuum *dedisti*; tantum dicam, quod te spero approbaturum, me, posteaquam illi arti, *cui studueram*, nihil esse loci, neque in curia, neque in foro viderem, omnem meam curam atque operam ad Philosophiam contulisse <sup>z</sup>.

Ex quo ego veni ad ea, *quæ fueramus* ego et tu inter nos de forore in Tusculano locuti <sup>a</sup>.

<sup>z</sup> Cic. Ep. Fam. iv. 3.

<sup>a</sup> Ep. ad Att. v. 1.

Hortemur liberos nostros, cæterosque *quorum* gloria nobis et dignitas chara *est*, ut animo rei magnitudinem complectantur, neque iis aut præceptis, aut magistris, aut exercitationibus, *quibus utuntur* omnes, sed aliis quibusdam, se id, *quod expetunt*, consequi posse confident<sup>b</sup>.

When the Antecedent is less certain and definite, or when the assertion is vague and diffident, the indicative is not used.

Hic *quæ agantur*, *quæque acta sint*, ea te et literis multorum et nuntiis cognoscere arbitror : *quæ autem posita sunt* in conjectura, *quæque mihi videntur* fore, ea Puto tibi a me scribi oportere<sup>c</sup>.

Here, although the latter things are called *conjectural* and *probable*, yet the assertion that they are so is *absolute*; which assertion the writer intending to convey, naturally uses the Indicative mood.

The most frequent cases of error however are where, as in the passage quoted from the Preface, the Relative is supposed to be used, although it is in fact the Indefinite, and an Indicative is made to follow it. In Greek the writer is not liable to this error, because the relative and indefinite are expressed by different words; and perhaps the best *practical* rule for a student acquainted

<sup>b</sup> De Orat. i. §. 19. See also other examples, *ibid.* §. 23. 49. 53.

<sup>c</sup> Ep. Fam. i. 5.

with both languages, is to consider what word would be employed in Greek. If *τις, ποῖος, οἷος, ὅστις, ὅσπερ*, would have presented themselves, instead of the pure relative *ὅς*, most probably he will decide at once for the Subjunctive. In the Preface, *ποίοις* perhaps, rather than *τισὶ*, would have been used where *quibus* stands; certainly not *οἷς*. Thus:

Cujus mihi videbar et fidelitatem erga te perspexisse, et nôsse locum *quem* apud te is teneret <sup>d</sup>.

*Ἦντινα* would have been used in Greek (not *ἦν*) *after*, or perhaps *τινα*, or *οἷαν*, *before* *τάξιν*.

The full doctrine is of such extent, that I must be cautious how I venture upon it here <sup>e</sup>.

<sup>d</sup> Cic. Ep. Fam. iii. 6.

\* There is indeed no question in grammar more subtle and intricate than the doctrine of the Subjunctive Mood. It would require a much longer discussion than these pages will admit to sift it thoroughly: but as it is a kind of *moet point* among grammarians, a few hints from one who has often considered the subject may not be unacceptable. I am far from proposing this as a complete theory, or as one which is very satisfactory even to myself: and I am aware that the principles do not rest upon a sufficiently broad basis of Induction.

To me then it has appeared, that the use of the Subjunctive Mood may be referred to *three general heads*, which I cannot precisely describe without the aid of Logical terms.

1st. *When the SUBJECT of the sentence is uncertain, vague, or indefinite.*

2dly. *When the PREDICATE is of that kind.*

3dly. *When the PREDICATION or Sentence itself is not direct, but dependent upon something else.*

There are numerous principles of a subordinate kind, with exceptions to all of them, and many

*Of the first kind*, are all those sentences where the verb is connected with *Quis*, or any of its cases, which are more numerous than are commonly imagined; or where the *relative* is resolvable into *Quinam*, *Qualis*, *Quicumque*; or where, after the relative *Qui*, we can suppose a parenthesis of this sort, “*whoever he may be.*” E. g.

*Quæ de me populi sit opinio, nescio.* Clar. Orat. c. 51.

*Neque is sum qui disputem.*

*Erant tamen, quibus videretur.* Clar. Orat. 58.

*Qui ita dicat, ut a multis probaretur.* Ib. 50.

*Atque ego præclare intelligo, me in eorum commemoratione vertari, qui nec habiti sint oratores, nec fuerint.* Ib. 49.

In the first of these, *Quæ* comes from the Indefinite *Quis*. In all the others, *Qui* means a *sort*, a *class*, a *description* of people. In the same chapter from which the last example is taken, when the writer speaks of *definite persons*, he uses the *Indicative Mood*.

*De iis autem, quos ipsi vidimus, neminem fere prætermittimus eorum, quos aliquando dicentes vidimus.* Clar. Orat. 49.

*Of the second kind* are those sentences in which the *Predicate* is meant to be taken with some latitude: not in its strictest and most definite sense; and when no stress is laid upon that part of the proposition; as,

*Omnium, quos quidem ego audiverim.* Clar. Orat. 55.

*Epistolæ . . . . tum videlicet datæ, cum ego me non belle haberem.* Cic. Att. 5. 11.

In Cumano cum *essẽm*, venit ad me, quod mihi pergratum fuit, Hortensius. Cic. Att. 5. 2.

*When I was not quite well; During my stay in the neighbourhood of Cumæ.* Where observe, “*quod mihi pergratum fuit,*” has the Indicative.

Nos Tarenti quos cum Pompeio dialogos de Republica habuerimus, ad te perscribemus. Cic. Att. 5. 5.

But

mixed cases. But the single principle just laid down will be found to simplify the matter greatly, which

But when something more distinct is intended by the Predicate, the Indicative Mood is preferred.

Ex quo ego veni ad ea, *quæ fueramus* ego et tu inter nos locuti. Cic. Att. 5. 1.

Me posteaquam illi arti, *cui studueram*, nihil esse loci . . . viderem. Ep. Fam. 4. 3.

*Quatenus* de religione dicebat, *cuique* rei jam obfisti non poterat, Bibulo assensum est. Ep. Fam. 1. 2.

Illud quod est, *qualecumque* est, probat. Clar. Orat. 52.

Omnes causæ maximæ *quæcumque* erant. Ib. 63.

A remarkable instance of this distinction of Moods founded in the nature of the Predicate occurs in the same passage of Livy;

Senatorum omnium, *quique* magistratus Capuæ, Atellæ, Cataliæ *gessissent*, bona venire Capuæ iusserunt: libera corpora *quæ* venundari placuerat, Romam mitti, et Romæ venire. Liv. 26. 34. See also a passage from Cic. Ep. Fam. 1. 5. quoted above in page 48.

It is not always easy to distinguish accurately this case from the third; that is, where the whole sentence is dependent upon some word or sentence going before, to which therefore it is said to be *subjoined*. Nothing however is more frequent than a sentence with the subjunctive mood, in which both the Subject and the Predicate are perfectly defined, because there is a dependency of the whole *predication* on something else.

Cui quidem ego, *me cum* rogaret, ut adesseni in Senatu, eadem omnia . . . ostendi me esse dicturum. Ep. Fam. 4. 1.

*Cum* means, "upon his asking me," not simply *when*, or "at the time when, he asked me." If the point of time merely is to be noted, the Indicative will serve; as

*Cum* de tuis rebus gestis agebatur, inserviebam honori tuo. Ep. Fam. 3. 13.

it is hoped may be admitted as some excuse for this long digression. It is however in such points as these,

If the preceding clause be in the potential mood, all the subordinate clauses, *although merely descriptive*, (unless intended to introduce some independent fact,) must be in the Subjunctive: and this is what is commonly meant by consecutive moods. Thus,

*Iusserunt . . . ne quis eorum, qui Capuæ fuissent, dum portæ clausæ essent, in urbe . . . . maneret.* Liv. 26. 34.

*Ne*, which governs the principal clause, extends its power to all the subordinate ones. So, *Ut saltatio quædam nasceretur, cui saltationi Titius nomen esset.* Clar. Orat. 62.

But if the preceding clause be in the indicative, the subordinate descriptive clause is also indicative.

*M. Atilius Regulus, cujus, ex iis qui ad Capuam fuerant, maxima auctoritas erat in consilio, inquit, &c.* Liv. 26. 33.

In the speeches of Livy indeed, or of any Latin historian, may be seen a very striking illustration of the nature of this mood. When the speeches are given in the third person, every sentence proceeds in the Subjunctive mood; because the tenses depend on *divit*, or some such word preceding. Let any one turn a speech of this kind into the first person, and he will change all the Subjunctive tenses into Indicatives; with the exception of those which, according to the first and second principle, would still be subjunctive.

The same holds of messages, instructions, decrees, &c.

*Supplicatio omnibus deis, quorum pulvinaria Romæ essent, indicta est.* Liv. 24. 10.

If he had been simply relating a *fact*, he would have said *erant*; but he is giving the substance of a decree. And this brings us very near to that character of the Subjunctive, in which it is said to resemble the future tense.

*Nuntium misit, qui diceret.*

*\*Επεμψεν ἄγγελον λέγοντα.*

Perizonius indeed reasons against this doctrine, and says all the



that criticism ought to be diffuse; and the study of them is worth much time and labour: for they

the *futurity* implied in such sentences resides in some words understood. *Mitto qui dicat*, he would resolve into *Mitto aliquem qui erit ut dicat*. But I do not know how he would resolve the sentence above in this manner, *Misit qui diceret*. And the Latin phrase corresponds so continually with the Greek future participle, that it bears strong testimony to the soundness of Sanctius's doctrine, that all the tenses of the Subjunctive Mood [a Grammatical term which he rejects] are but disguised futures. After *si* most of them evidently have that force.

It must however be observed, that the force of *qui* in such cases is often called *causal*; and when this force is perceived, every one would expect the Subjunctive to follow it.

Antonium . . . nisi ad te, *cui* [i. e. ut ei] si tibi videretur, cohortes traderes. Cic. Ep. Fam. 3. 6.

In Siciliam duo Prætores profecti: P. Cornelius ad exercitum; Otacilius, *qui* maritimæ oræ præesset. Liv. 24. 12.

In Greek this use of the relative is not so frequent; because, besides the future participles, there are a great variety of causal particles in that language, ὅπως, ἵνα, ὥστε, ὅτι, as well as the pronoun οὗτινες, all of whose places are occasionally supplied in Latin by the inflexions of *qui*.

It would be well therefore, if, when doubting what mood should follow *qui*, we were to consider whether *qui* be simply *relative* or not: for if it be resolved into any thing more than a mere link uniting the clause it governs to some antecedent—if it denote *the manner* in which the clause stands related to that antecedent—if it declare that it springs from it, is caused by it, or is dependent upon it in any way, the Subjunctive, and not the Indicative, ought to follow.

Mr. Harris supposes the Latin relative to be merely *que is*: but it frequently has the force of *quia is*, *quum is*, *ut is*; in all which cases it contains an element that calls for the Subjunctive Mood.

Such

are the very joints and ligatures of the language; and to have the right use and play of these, im-

Such are the remarks which an observation, desultory perhaps, but not superficial, of the best Latin writers, have led me to make. They are offered with much diffidence, on a subject, where each man almost has a right to offer what occurs to himself. For the question has never been pursued through all its windings. There is, I doubt not, a clue to this, as to every other mazy dance of human thought, which we trace in the texture of language. When once unravelled, it appears simple enough: and the more simple it is, the greater is the merit of the discovery. And yet in such matters the world are apt to shew ingratitude and contempt, when they ought most to admire, and to be thankful. Of which injustice we have the strongest proof in that immortal Stagyrice, who has by a most laborious analysis resolved all the methods of argumentation into one simple principle, only to draw forth this reflection from a modern Philosopher upon his labours:

*O curas hominum! O quantum est in rebus inane!*

Such injustice will not, I trust, deter a philosophical critic from attempting to solve the intricate phænomena of language which still remain unexplained. To perform the task well requires, not only extensive erudition, a strong memory, an acute and penetrating mind, but an acquaintance also, either self-taught or methodically acquired, with that true Logic which enables us to sort, to discriminate, and to abstract ideas, to know them again under all the changes of dress and posture, and to keep a steady eye upon them, as they mingle with the confused and shifting crowd. This combination of qualities is indeed rare: but there have been men so variously gifted, though few; and some perhaps there still are: ONE I know there is, who could not render a more acceptable service to the lovers of ancient learning, than by guiding their footsteps through this perplexing labyrinth.

parts

parts more of a native air and grace, is really a more desirable accomplishment, than an extensive acquaintance with the vocabulary, or a knowledge of singular and rare senses, in which certain words are used.

The critic, whose cavils I am examining, seems possessed of no principle to guide him. The examples he gives of an indicative with *quis*, or *quibus*, are wrongly explained. V. g.

“ Dic quibus in terris inscripti nomina regum

“ *Nascuntur flores.*”

Here if the line be understood as a question, the indicative will do; and so perhaps it was understood by those copyists who kept the reading. But the Subjunctive *nascantur*, with *quibus*, as an Indefinite, is preferable, which in Greek would have been  $\tau\iota\sigma\iota$ , not  $\alpha\tilde{\iota}\varsigma$ . In the next example,

“ Nescio quis teneros oculus mihi fascinat agnos,”

*Nescio quis* is simply parenthetical. “ Some one, “ I know not who.” And again,

“ Nescio quid majus nascitur Iliade.”

“ Some poem (I know not exactly what) is coming forth, which will surpass the Iliad.” Every one knows that this was a compliment paid by Propertius to Virgil, when he was writing the *Æneid*. But from the resolution of the line given in the Review, one is led to suspect that  
the

the writer understood it as said in honour of Homer. He says, *Nescio quid* (*sit quod*) *nascitur* “*majus Iliade.*” By this mode of resolving it, the *assertion* is lost, “that *something* is really “coming forth,” which is what the Poet meant to express. And so with the other example, to say as the Reviewer does, “*Nescio quis* [*sit qui*] “*teneros oculus mihi fascinat agnos,*” reduces it to this; that Menalcas *does not know* who has bewitched his lambs: whereas he insists that witchcraft is the cause of their leanness.

His certe neque amor causa est; vix ossibus hærent.

*Nescio quis teneros oculus mihi fascinat agnos.*

Some *evil eye*, I know not whose, is the cause. *That* is the proposition: *Nescio quis* is merely an adjunct.

It would but ill express the impatience of Horace in that line,

*Certe nescio quid secreto velle loqui te*

*Aiebas mecum.*

Serm. I. ix. 67.

to translate it,

“*I certainly do not know* what it was you wished to “say to me.”

Again, how would the Reviewer explain such passages as these, where the relative is in an oblique case?

*Nescio*

*Nescio qua* præter solitum dulcedine læti

Inter se foliis strepitant. Georg. i. 412.

Terraque *nescio quo* non placet ipsa modo.

Ov. iii. Trist. iii. 8.

Nisi forte me Paeonii *nescio cujus*, hominis ne Græci quidem, ut Myſii, aut Phrygis potius, querelis moveri putes. Cic. Ep. ad Quint. Frat. i. 6.

Another decisive objection to his method of resolving such passages is, that he supposes an ellipsis of the *relative*; which I believe one may venture to affirm is against the idiom both of the Greek and Latin languages. In English it is common. E. g.

The messenger you sent did not arrive.

But neither in Greek or Latin could this be allowed. We might say, ἐκ ἀφίκετο ὃν ἐπέμψας, or, *Quem misisti non advenit*. We may leave out the Antecedent, especially when it is a demonstrative pronoun, but never the Relative. In English we may leave out the Relative, but never the Antecedent<sup>f</sup>. This contrast is one of the most striking peculiarities which runs through the ancient languages, as compared with our own<sup>g</sup>.

<sup>f</sup> In poetry indeed it is sometimes done: but then the design is to *elevate* the expression, by introducing something *ξενικόν*, something which is out of the common way, and is therefore not the idiom.

<sup>g</sup> Mr. Jones, whose opinions are always entitled to respect,  
1 does,

The phrase, *eam sumpsisse contigerit*, is perhaps wrong; but it would not be right as the Reviewer mends it, merely by reading *ei* instead of *eam*. The fault is in *sumpsisse*, which is superfluous: *ei contigerint* would have been enough. *Contingit* certainly requires a Dative, expressed or understood; and there is no saying why *nobis* might not be understood here. It requires a case after it, both because *tango* is a transitive, and because of the preposition *con*. *Accidit* also, for the last reason, requires a case after it; and so it will be found that the purest writers use it; although afterwards it took the place of the neutral *cecidit*, which word Plautus, Terence, and Cicero prefer, when the event specified is not related to some other event, or to some one particularly affected by it.

Of the Latinity of this Preface, let me be per-

does, I see, in his Latin Grammar, admit of an ellipsis of the Relative, as in this example;

*Urbs antiqua fuit, Tyrîi tenuère coloni:*

which he explains by *quam* understood, p. 106. Lat. Gram. To me it seems better to consider the latter clause as a parenthesis, which is an expedient we must at times have recourse to, or no one rule of syntax would be unshaken. Examples of this kind are extremely rare; and they may, I believe, when they do occur, always be explained most simply by a parenthesis. I have much to say, but this place will not bear it, upon the peculiarity of the English in omitting the Relative where the Latin and Greek languages omit the Antecedent. It affects all the causal particles.

mitted

mitted to observe, that, although not faultless, it is as good as most of what is now written in England, and much better than what usually comes from Germany. If the Reviewer himself ever means to challenge the notice of the public in that way, I would advise him to be very cautious: the most prudent plan will be, not to let his lucubrations pass beyond the circle of his private friends, or the secret orgies of some *Dilettanti* society, where they will be praised, no doubt, and admired, and embalmed perhaps among the most precious of their curiosities.

Before I notice his general strictures on the value of the notes, it may be as well to dispatch the remainder of his criticisms upon Oxonian Latin, which, he says, differs most essentially from the old Roman Latin. But in doing this, I must be forgiven, if a desire to clear up notions which are often indistinct and confused, leads me into some lengthened dissertation. His whole paragraph must be copied.

“ In this *Roman* Latin, the relative conjunction  
 “ QUOD usually governs an indicative, when it answers  
 “ to the English conjunction BECAUSE, unless the sen-  
 “ tence be potential or oblique; and a subjunctive,  
 “ when it stands for UT, and answers to the English  
 “ THAT. But in Oxonian Latin this is completely  
 “ reversed;

“reversed; and we have repeatedly such sentences as ‘*quod vires sint exiguae, sæpe insidiis circumvenire hostem tentant*’; pag. 210. and ‘*susplicor quod Strabo Byzantii latitudinem a Massiliensi jumpfit*’; pag. 172. ‘also, ‘*hæc relata digna censui, quod Strabo non satis clarè de hoc bello scripserit*’; pag. 1088. and ‘*scribit quod cloacæ—subiêre tecta*’; pag. 336.’<sup>h</sup>

The right use of the conjunction *Quod* is a knotty point, which has much exercised the Grammarians.

In this place it is sufficient to observe, that the conjunction *quod* never stands in good writers for *ut*, answering to the English word *that*. It *always* has, more or less, the force of *because*<sup>i</sup>. *The substitution of it for ut, and for the accusative case with the infinitive mood, is a barbarism.*

Since then it always refers to some cause, if that cause be fixed and certain, or if the assertion be absolute, the Indicative mood will be joined with it; if vague and uncertain, or if the assertion

<sup>h</sup> Rev. p. 435.

<sup>i</sup> *Ut* also is *causal*, but it denotes the *final cause*, or something which *is to follow*. *Quod, because*, denotes the *efficient cause*, or something which *has gone before*. This distinction is very necessary. It is the key to the right use of these particles in a thousand cases: and the neglect of it may account for many anomalies in the use of the English particles, which have much perplexed Grammarians.



be not absolute, the Subjunctive. In the instance quoted from the note, it ought to have been “*quod vires sunt exiguæ*,” but the Reviewer has not given the reason why it ought. The whole passage is this: *Parvulæ respublicæ sunt bellicosæ, et quod vires sint exiguæ, sæpe insidiis circumvenire hostes tentant*. Here, because he is speaking only of *parvulæ respublicæ*, the fact assigned as a cause is not doubtful, but certain: “*vires sunt exiguæ*.” But in the same note, when the commentator says, “*Artes negliguntur quod inutiles sint*,” *sint* is right, because the assertion is not an absolute acknowledged truth. So Cicero,

*Ad te minus multa doleo, quod et mœrore impediō, et quid expectem magis habeo, quam &c.* Att. iii. 10.

*Hic tu me accusas, quod me afflictem.* Att. iii. 12.

*Suspīcor quod Strabo . . . sumpsit*, is bad Latin, not for the reason assigned by the Reviewer, but for one which requires even here a little detail. And if I can at all clear up a matter which has puzzled so many acute and learned men, my prolixity will, I am sure, be forgiven. It involves the old disputed point between Sanctius, who condemns the phrases *dico quod*, *credo quod*, *scio quod*, and his commentator Perizonius, who defends them all. The elder Gronovius espoused the doctrine of Sanctius, and upon that ground  
altered

altered a line in Plautus, which was almost the only palpable authority in their way.

Scio jam filius quod amet meus. Afín. I. i. 3.

He proposes to read *quum* or *quam* instead of *quod*; and adopts a similar remedy for one passage in Livy, where the same construction is used.

On the side of Perizonius are Manutius, Henry Stephens, Vossius, and Scioppius. Some of these parties are very warm in the argument, especially Scioppius, who has betrayed, as people are apt to do, the weakness of his cause, by disingenuous attempts to support it. The sum of their doctrine is this; that *dico quod*, *credo quod*, *scio quod*, are just as good Latin as *miror quod*, *gaudeo quod*, *gratulor quod*, &c. and they exclaim, that it is against all reason to admit the one and reject the other, as Sanctius does.

After a fair statement of the case, Gesner, whose good sense and candour, as well as his learning, every one must admire, points out some mistakes, into which all these disputants had fallen, and gives a perspicuous division of the several senses of this particle, which they seem to have confounded. What he says however of the point more immediately before us is remarkable. He rightly observes, if *quod* can be changed into *quia*, *cum*, or *propterea quod*, it is at our option to express our meaning, either by the Accusative case and the Infinitive mood, or by *quod* and the

the Indicative, or Subjunctive. And he proposes this as a good practical test in all doubtful cases. Hence, he says, after *miror*, *doleo*, *queror*, *indignor*, *gaudeo*, *glorior*, and *perhaps* after all verbs denoting *similar* affections of the mind, *quod* may be used; but he will not go so far as to say it may be used after verbs denoting *every* affection of the mind; for after *spero*, *confido*, *vereor*, he thinks it improper; “*such is the tyranny of custom* <sup>k</sup>.”

But a little reflection on the reason assigned for the use of *quod* after *miror*, *doleo*, &c. will teach us that it is not *the tyranny of custom*, but sound sense and consistent principle, which requires this distinction. *Quod* in those cases, as all Grammarians admit, is *causal*; it denotes the *cause* of the thing asserted: and, as the *cause* must needs be prior to the effect, it will be proper only in cases where that priority exists. All the affections of *wonder*, *grief*, *joy*, *anger*, *exultation*, are excited by something which *has* existed. *Hope*, *fear*, *confidence*, *suspicion*, relate to something prospective, something that will perhaps exist,

<sup>k</sup> Gesner's own words are, Ita que post *miror*, *doleo*, *queror*, *indignor*, *gaudeo*, *glorior*, et similia forte affectuum, quæ vocant, verba (de omnibus non ausim confirmare, neque enim dici posse puto, *spero*, *confido quod*, neque dici ignoro, *vereor ut vel ne*: *adco usus tyrannus est*) dubium non est, quin *quod* sequi possit: sequi tamen et potest, et solet Accusativus cum Infinitivo. Thesaur. in voc. QUOD.

but which we do not *know* will or does exist. If this principle had been kept steadily in view, it would have solved all the cases about which these acute Grammarians are wrangling. It was the gradual loss of this principle which led to the confusion in later writers, who at length employ *quod* equally for things *prospective*, as *retrospective*, and for things which are stated merely *to be* or to have *happened*, although they are not alledged as the *cause* of any thing.

It may indeed happen that *quod* should be joined with *timeo* or *metuo*; but it does not then denote the *object* of the fear, but the *cause* which has excited it; an omen perhaps, or some symptom of a coming evil. I cannot recollect at present an example in point. And in such words as *quod* Indexes give us no help. But this would be correct Latin: *Quod rex irasceretur, metuebat ne quid sibi mali eveniret. Quod lævum intromissæt, speravit &c.*

A curious illustration of the proper use of *quod* occurs when it is joined to the word *adde*. Many passages are quoted from good writers, beginning with *adde quod*; but in all these cases, the thing introduced may be considered as a *cause* or *reason* for something before alledged. The author has been *reasoning*, and the new circumstance is brought in to *support his argument*. E. g.

*Adde*

*Adde quod*, ut cupias constans in amore manere

Non potes.

Ov. Ep. 17. 199.

*Adde quod* arcana fieri novus ignis in æde

Dicitur.

Fast. iii. 143.

So again, Fast iii. 245. and in many other places. The poet is *arguing* a point, or expostulating, and giving *reasons* for the complaint. Of the same kind is this passage of Cicero :

Videndumque illud est, *quod*, si opulentum fortunatumque defenderis, in illo uno, aut forte in liberis ejus, *manet* gratia. Cic. Off. ii. 20.

*Videndum quod* has just the same force as *adde quod*, and brings in some reason for what has been before advanced. But in later writers it often serves like the Greek *ὅτι*, in a simple narrative, when the accusative case and infinitive mood ought to have been used.

Perizonius, who speaks sharply of the inconsistency of Sanctius, says, among other things, “ nay, he has himself used this very phrase, *Adde quod multi Græce scripserunt*.” I doubt whether Sanctius would have been ready with an answer ; for he certainly has not taken hold of the thing by the right handle. The proper answer is that principle which has been just laid down. He has been *arguing* a point, and *adde quod* introduces a

new reason. The point in question was this: The word *Quod*, it seems, occurs frequently in this barbarous sense in the Pandects; the latinity of which is in general very pure. Sanctius answers this objection at length: he says, that the book has been much interpolated; that the Lawyers, in whose hands it has been, are not the purest writers: and *Addē quod multi illorum Græce scripserunt, whence, or from which cause*, it was natural that *quod* should be substituted by them for the Greek *ὅτι*. To have said, *multos illorum Græce scripsisse* would not have answered his purpose so well as *quod* does.

A single difficulty still remains; and that is about the word *scio*. *Spero quod, credo quod, dico quod, cupio quod, volo quod*, are easily exploded: but *scio quod* seems to have some authority, and the passages which Gronovius alters in order to reconcile them with his doctrine contain this word. The truth perhaps is, that such authorities are genuine<sup>a</sup>: for *scio* is something of an inter-

<sup>a</sup> Upon a closer examination of this passage in Plautus, I have reason to believe it genuine. If the reader thinks it worth while to turn to the original, he will find that Demænetus, wishing to supply his son with money for his amours through the medium of a slave, Libanus, says, for the sake of encouraging his confidant,

Aut cur miniter tibi,  
Propterea quod me non scientem feceris?  
Aut cur postremo filio succenscam

Patres

mediate kind between the retrospective and the prospective class. It may partake of the nature of each. The thing must *have happened*, in order to be *known* in the strict sense of the word : as in that line of Martial quoted by Sanctius ;

Hoc scio, quod scribat nulla puella. ii. 65.

But it is common to say, we *know* many things that *will happen*; and in such cases *quod* would be undoubtedly wrong. In the example from Martial, Sanctius understands *quod* as if it were

Patres ut faciunt cæteri ? LIB. Quid istuc novi est ?

DE. Equidem scio jam, filius quod amet meus

Istanc meretricem e proximo Philenium. Afri. I. i. 33.

The words of Libanus are evidently meant to be said *afide*. *Equidem scio jam*, may be considered as parenthetical, referring to *non scientem feceris*, and in that case *filius quod amet meus*, will relate to *succenseam*, which is a legitimate construction. I am confident indeed that this is the true construction. *Cur miniter* has *quod non feceris* after it : and *cur succenseam* would naturally require a similar clause subjoined explanatory of *succenseam*, as *non scientem feceris* is explanatory of *miniter*. But the course of the sentence is interrupted by *Quid istuc novi est ? Equidem jam scio* : and then, as is very common after a parenthesis, the word which preceded it is repeated after it ; as here, *filius* is repeated in *filius*.

The line, *Equidem jam scio*, &c. is repeated v. 70. where Gronovius justly condemns it as spurious. The doctrine which I have maintained about *quod* is a further reason for condemning it : for in that place *quod amet* must depend upon *scio* : there is no such word as *succenseam* going before, with which it can unite.

*propter quod*, or *cur*. Very likely some *équivoque* was intended; in which case the use of words is apt to be a little strained. And indeed the passages are so few in which *scio quod* is found, compared with the thousands of occasions in which that idea occurs, that we may well consider it offensive to the genius of the language.

Hence it will be seen that *suspīcor quod* Strabo . . . *sumpsit*, is barbarous, not because *quod* is used with *sumpsit*, but because it is used with *suspīcor*. So *scribit<sup>b</sup> quod*, is wrong: *quod* . . . *subicere* is not wrong. *Hæc relatu digna censui, quod Strabo non satis clare de hoc bello scripsisset*, si defensible, because the assertion implies some diffidence; it is not quite absolute: so in Plautus;

Cur miniter tibi,

Propterea quod me non scientem feceris?

Afin. I. i. 34.

and in a hundred other places.

The two first examples of the wrong use of *ut* are correctly quoted; although in the latter the meaning of *ut* probably is, *as, according as*; in which case there is no fault. Of the other I can only say, that in the eye of every candid

<sup>b</sup> After *scribo* should be the Accusative case and Infinitive mood. Thus Livy, xxiv. 31. *Scriptum erat recte eum fecisse . . . quod nulli pepercisset*; not *scriptum erat quod recte fecisset*.



reader it *must* be deemed an oversight, and not a mark of ignorance. It is impossible that such a mistake could have been deliberately made. The Reviewer indeed says, "this kind of error is systematic<sup>c</sup>." He does not however refer to a single example of the kind besides, although he has evidently perused the notes *solely* with a view to detect the false Latin; and from what I have read of them, I do not believe he could produce another. That the error is *systematic*, is an assertion which will shine conspicuous in that galaxy of falsehood which has nearly dazzled us already. The passage p. 220, where *ut* is said to be omitted, he does not understand. To place *ut* where he proposes, would make nonsense. The meaning of *videatur* is, *may seem*. "To the eye" *it may seem* at first not to rise: but, in reality, "by degrees it swells into the mountains of Molina," &c<sup>d</sup>.

"Of the Oxonian use of the indicative with the *relative* pronoun subordinate to another verb we have already treated in our observations on the Preface<sup>e</sup>."

*We* also have treated of this matter pretty largely, and have shewn how the Indefinite

<sup>c</sup> Page 436, l. 13.

<sup>d</sup> Paulo infra Caunum ex Idubeda emissus Orospeda molibus initio jugis vix affurgere videatur; sensim tamen sese efferens Molinæ primum montes erigit, &c. p. 220.

<sup>e</sup> Rev. p. 436.

is often confounded with the Relative. But we do not often expect to find such a confusion as the Reviewer is here guilty of. For example; of this fault he gives three specimens, selected from the whole body of notes. In the first and third, what he calls the Relative is in fact the Indefinite. In the second, “*cum sentirent quantum optimates a divitiis potuerunt,*” he calls *quantum* a Relative. In the next example there is something worse than blundering about a Relative. In order to make room for a pitiful joke, he wilfully perverts the meaning of the passage;

‘*Observandum est, quo violentior est Solis ardor, eo citius fieri pluvias.*’ “*Citius*, says he, we presume “stands for *crebrius*; for though ‘it rains faster’ he “a common vulgarism in English, we do not believe “that it had even that humble station in any idiom of “the Latin, that existed prior to the Oxonian.”

Who could have believed that in this passage *citius* merely means *sooner*? The rainy season sets in *SOONER*, the hotter the climate is. Even supposing the Editor had meant *faster*, *crebrius*, which the Reviewer recommends, is the last word he should have used. It conveys an idea totally different, *more frequently*: *vehementius*, *effusus*, *gravius*, would have been the proper words for *faster*<sup>f</sup>.

<sup>f</sup> This criticism is very ably refuted in the Gent. Mag.  
for

The next complaint is of the Oxonian use of tenses. Of this fault he produces eight specimens. One of these runs thus ;

“Neque hoc memoriæ lapsu Strabo scripsit ; sed cum de Cyri rebus gestis vix aliquid certe constat, eam famam sequitur, &c.”

He seems to mean, that the change of tense from *scripsit* to *constat* and *sequitur*, is utterly barbarous. He therefore brings in a Roman, altering *constat* into *constaret*, and *sequitur* into *sequebatur*. The Roman must have been more nice than many of his countrymen to think this necessary : such changes of tense in the same sentence are not unusual in the best writers.

Primo antesignani Pœnorum, deinde signa perturbata, postremo tota impulsa acies ; inde haud dubie terga data, ruuntque fugientes in castra ; adeo pavidî trepidique . . . . ut ne . . . . quisquam *resisterit*, ac prope . . . . *ediderint*. Liv. xxiv. 16.

for Oct. 1809. by Mr. Falconer, the writer of the Preface. His passage from Servius proves that *citius* will bear the meaning of *sooner* ; but the positive authority of Horace and Virgil, both of whom use it in that sense, is still better. The Poets however are not the best guides. Cicero would have said *maturius*.

The whole of Mr. Falconer's letter is well worth reading. I am obliged to touch upon the same points, some of which I shall treat more fully than he has done.

Itaque

Itaque Nolam ad Collegam *mittit* . . . . opus esse, qui *opponatur*: vel ipse relicto Nolæ præsidio modico *veniret*: vel si eum Nola *teneret*, et res *essent*, &c. Liv. xxiv. 19.

Consules, Marcellus retro, Nolam *redit*; Fabius in Samnium . . . . *processit*. Liv. xxiv. 20.

Ad me *adire* quosdam memini qui *dicerent*. Cic. Div. iii. 10. 19.

*Pronuntiat* Gracchus esse nihil quod de libertate *sperarent*, nisi eo die fusi fugatique hostes essent. Liv. xxiv. 15.

Quoad primus ille fermo *haberetur*, *adeft* in disputando fenex. Cic. Att. iv. 16.

Antiochus Magnus, ut tributa Romanis *solveret*, nocte templum Elymæi Jovis *aggressus est*, qua re prodita, coneurfu incolarum cum exercitu toto *interficitur*. Justin. lib. xxxii. c. 2.

It is needless to multiply examples, for these are enough to shew that a fault of this kind in a modern, especially in one whose mind was wholly intent on his matter, and quite regardless of his style, is not very disgraceful. The alteration of *supponeret* into *supposuerit*, has no reason for it, and to my ears makes the sentence less Roman than it was before. Either *supponeret* is used for *supponat*, or *habet* for *haberet*. In Plautus such inaccuracies are very common. If the Reviewer means to say that the expression “*cum de Cyri rebus vix aliquid certe constat*” is faulty, and

and that it ought to be *confit*, he takes more upon himself than he has any right to do. The best writers have used *cum* in this sense with the Indicative mood.

Tibi maximas gratias ago, *cum* tantum meæ literæ potuerunt. Cic. Fam. xiii. 24.

*Cum* medio excessit, unde hæc suscepta est tibi.

Ter. Phorm. V. vii. 77.

Gratulor tibi, *cum* tantum vales apud Dolabellam, quantum &c. Cic. Att. 226. b. ap. Nizol. voc. Cum. et Cic. de Orat. 122. b. ibid.

*Cum* isthæc res male evenit tibi, Gripe, gratulor.

Plaut. Rud. IV. iv. 134.

Tu *cum* eo tempore mecum esse non potuisti, quo operam desideravi tuam, cave festines &c.

Cic. Fam. xvi. 12. Facciol.

Quam quidem, *cum* difficillimo reip. tempore secuti sunt, eos nunquam oportebit &c. Cic. Phil. xiv. 11.

The Subjunctive is certainly most frequent with *cum*, when used for *quandoquidem* or *quoniam*; and writers of Latin should be cautioned against this practice: but as it has the function of Cicero, however sparingly, it is to be treated with respect. It cannot be a downright barbarism.

The next critical lash falls upon the following sentence.

“Strabo duodecim civitates in Etruria principes  
“antea dixit: sed harum tantum octo memoravit, scilicet  
“Tarquinii, Cære, Volaterra, Arretium, Parusia,  
“Volsinii, Falerii, Clusium. p. 322.”

Upon this the Reviewer observes, that “although  
“ in *Homeric Greek* there is a figure of speech  
“ somewhat like this,” yet “it was unknown to  
“ every period of *Latinity*—prior to the Oxonian,  
“ which it has thus so happily enriched.”

Why in Homeric Greek only? Did he ever  
read this passage in Xenophon? Ἐφ’ οἷς γε μὴν  
ἔργοις κεῖται θάνατος ἢ ζημία, ἱεροσυλῖαι, τοιχω-  
ρυχίαι, ἀνδραποδίσις, πόλεως προδοσίαι, εἰδ’ αὐτοὶ οἱ  
ἀντίδικοι τῶν πρᾶξαι τι κατ’ ἐμὲ φασίν. *Apol.*  
*Soc.* §. 25.

The same construction occurs often in Hero-  
dotus and Thucydides; and I perceive an instance  
in Strabo, p. 299. l. 25. And as to the facetious  
remark about *Latinity*, it may be edifying to quote  
the following passage from the *Edinburgh Review*,  
when examining an edition of a *Latin classic*.

“There is no form of construction more common,  
“ than this resuming the Nominative case after the  
“ sentence appears to be proceeding to something else.  
“ Nay, there are many instances, in which an object is  
“ first introduced, in some of the oblique cases, in the  
“ course of construction; and then the Nominative is  
“ resumed, without regard to that construction, for the  
“ purpose of stating or expounding some circumstance  
“ attending it. Thus in the tenth book of the *Æneid* we  
“ have

—“rapiens innumera pondera baltei,  
Impressumque nefas”

“all

“all in the accusative; but the farther description of  
 “the *nefas* is given, without any interval, in the  
 “Nominative.

—una sub nocte jugali

*Cæsa manus juvenum fœda, thalamique cruenti.”*

Edinb. Rev. No. V. p. 63.

I will not go so far with this ingenious critic, as to say, “*nothing is more common than this construction;*” but I may at least consign over to him the controversy with his brother critic, who says, “*it is unknown to every period of Latinity.*”

The passage however in the note is manifestly an oversight: it never could have arisen from ignorance, and it never could mislead or embarrass any reader.

The Reviewer proceeds;

“Upon the same principle, the baldness and poverty  
 “of the ancient Roman tongue have been embellished  
 “in this new modification of it with the *exquisite and RE-*  
 “CONDITE *phrases of stretching out a sentence or opinion*  
 “geographically by the mile, from one gate of a great  
 “city to another,—‘Donati tamen *sententiam* intelligo  
 “esse a porta Esquilina versus Labicanam’—and *ex-*  
 “hibiting Faith or Belief in a tangible or visible form,  
 “ascertained *by cubical or superficial measure.*—‘Ma-  
 “jor auctori nostro ac Justino adhibenda *fides* est.’”

This is meant (si Dîs placet) for wit and  
 pleasantry! O! si sic omnia dixisset! Little should  
 I dread the mischievous effects of this northern

libeller. Or if I could believe this to be the tone of farcaïn we are likely to hear from that journal in future ; instead of complaining and refuting, I should sing in a note of triumph,

Audivere, Lyce, Dì mea vota ; Dì  
 Audivere, Lyce. *Fis anus, et tamen*  
*Vis formosa videri :*  
 Ludisque, et bibis impudens.

There is indeed a tottering and toothless decrepitude in this passage, which almost disarms criticism, and, as it affects to be frisky, provokes only laughter. The egregious silliness of mistaking a *gate* for a *road*, and of translating “ *versus* Labicanam,” “ *to the Labican,*” as if *versus* denoted the *limit* instead of the *direction* of any movement, has been so well exposed by Mr. Falconer<sup>c</sup>, that it would be useless for me to say more on that subject. “ *Major fides*” is objected to, as “ exhibiting faith in a tangible or visible “ form, ascertained by cubical or superficial “ measure.” Cicero is guilty of the same error, with the words *spes, virtus, indoles, vox, alacritas, admiratio, auctoritas*, all of which he absurdly joins with the epithet *major*, for want of this learned Reviewer’s advice : and as to this very word *fides*, his ignorance of his own language is inexcusable.

\* Gent. Magazine, Oct. 1809.



“ Si *honor* is fuit, *majorem* tibi habere non potui : si  
 “ *fides*, *majorem* pene habui, quam mihi ipsi.

Ep. Fam. v. 20.

In the same strain of superannuated tittering he proceeds,

“ which [sc. *fidem*] this learned body is so generous  
 “ as to *give gratuitously* (for they cannot mean it in the  
 “ Roman sense, of either rendering credible or pledging)  
 “ to an old Jewish historian, who has been dead seventeen  
 “ centuries—‘ *Josepho fidem damus*,’—and make a faith-  
 “ less usurper give to history, what he never had to give  
 “ to any one—‘ *Augustus fidem historiæ dedit*.’”

Rev. p. 437.

The wisdom of all this is just as small as the wit. Does he mean to say, that the Roman sense of “ *Josepho fidem damus*,” is “ *we render Josephus credible?*” If so, he is quite in the dark. *Dare fidem*, after a *thing*, a *circumstance*, an *argument*, may mean to *add weight and credit* to any statement. Thus,

Nunc quoque dant verbo *plurima signa fidem*.

Ov. Fast. ii. 20.

*Commemoratio antiquitatis* . . . et auctoritatem orationi affert et *fidem*. Cic. Orat. 34.

But after a *person*, “ *dare fidem*” means to *promise*, to *certify*, to *give one's word*. There is a marked distinction in its use according as it follows a *person*, or a *thing*. *Homo dat fidem*, he promises : *Homo habet fidem*, he believes : *Res dat*

*dat fidem*, it adds credit: *Res habet fidem*, it is credible. How absurd therefore is his remark about Augustus! We may say of a *faithless* man, as well as of an *upright* man, "*dedit fidem*." It is not in *giving* their word, but in *keeping* it, that they differ.

But we have not done with this unlucky *fidem* yet. He goes on to say,

"The English phrase, indeed, may suggest another meaning, and make us Britons suspect, that, in this new dialect, '*fidem dare*' signifies what '*fidem habere*' did in the old: but no such suspicion will arise on the Continent, where no such indigenous expression exists." Rev. p. 437.

"O! I had lost a sheep, an' he had not bleated."

Why will a man force us to expose his vanity and ignorance? The thing, to be sure, is in itself quite indifferent; but it may serve to shew what stuff this Reviewer is made of, who would fain have us to think he understands German.

But let us hear the words of Nolenius.

Sed quæ est occasio, quod *Germani mei* locutione *fidem dare* etiam tunc utuntur, quum utendum esset locutione *fidem habere*, aut verbo singulo, *credere* vel *accredere*? Hæc nimirum, quod in vernaculâ linguâ habemus locutionem *Glauben geben*, *beymessen*, *zustellen*, putamusque, quomodo Latinum *dare* nostro *Geben* alias

alias respondet, ita respondere eidem et heic posse, di-  
cique adeo *fidem dare*. Nolten. Antibarb. Wichmanni,  
p. 1421.

Few of my readers will be disposed to hesitate between this authority and that of the Reviewer. Many of them also may have heard the French phrase *ajouter foi* not used as the Roman *adjungere fidem*, but in the sense of *credere*. From a Spanish Dictionary by Gattel, I learn that *Dar fe'* means *croire*; from a Castilian Dictionary, that *Dar credito, dar fe'*, is the same as *alicui fidem habere*; and from Baretti's Italian Dictionary, that the English of *Dare fede* is *to believe*. And yet no such indigenous phrase exists on the Continent! Well did Cicero observe;

Qui semel verecundiæ fines transierit, eum bene et naviter oportet esse impudentem.

Let it be remembered too, (for indeed it is a thing never to be lost sight of,) that these mistakes of the Reviewer are not picked and culled out of two folio volumes; but he is himself acting the rigid censor, challenging public notice, and of course is upon his guard, and does his best; and yet he scarcely utters a sentence in Latin without committing some palpable blunder against the idiom of the language.

Some other little matters of this sort must now  
be

be dispatched, and then we shall come to the *flos et medulla*, the pink and cream of criticism, the DEUS LUNUS.

He is pleased to say, "there are some of these "Oxonianisms so profound or so refined, that "our northern understandings, condensed as they "are with Mathematics and Metaphysics, can "scarcely comprehend them at all." The reader, I hope, will take notice in future that what is *condensed* cannot *comprehend* what is *profound*. The Reviewer indeed advises the University of Oxford to shake off the "*benumbing influence of Port "wine*;" (pag. 441.) whereas his own faculties have been *condensed* by more subtle diet. It is to be hoped he does not always treat his genius as he does his readers; and, on those rare occasions, the liquor he condemns may at least vie with a certain northern beverage, for which he perhaps imagines the encomium of Horace to be intended.

Tu lene tormentum ingenio admoves  
*Plerumque duro:*

It certainly cannot be a *benumbing* port, which the Poet means by

Narratur et prisce Catonis  
*Sæpe mero caluisse* virtus.

With all its faults there is something generous about it; and if the old Latin proverb says  
right,

right, it is at least no enemy to *truth*. If he has himself hitherto abstained from its use, under the hope of subduing prejudice, invigorating his faculties, or quickening his perceptions, never was an experiment attended with a more unfortunate result.

The scurrility and meanness of this abuse must be allowed to screen it from a grave and formal answer; neither will any such reply be wanted by those who are accustomed to the enjoyment of good society, and who know how easily the most innocent and the most indifferent habits of life may be made the object of vulgar and malignant satire. Let us return then to his Latin criticisms.

“Tigranes post reges subditos rex regum appellatur.” Strabo, p. 772.

Upon this he exclaims,

“Is it possible that the writer could mean ‘*Tigranes, postquam reges supradictos imperio subjecerat, rex regum appellatus est*?’

Here he supposes the construction *post reges subditos* to be wrong: whereas it is much more correct and elegant than his own. E. g.

Paucis annis post reges exactos. Clar. Orat. xiv.

And again :

Sexennio post Veios captos. Cic. Div. i. 44.

Such modes of construction abound in Livy. *Subditos*, though not the right word, has a sort of authority even in Ovid. The Reviewer's own word, *supradictos*, never saw the light till long after the Augustan age. *Supradictis*, which occurs two or three times in Quintilian, ought to be divided, as it is in Horace; *Adde supra dictis*, Sermon. II. vii. 78. In these places it always means *the things which have been before said*. As an adjective prefixed to a substantive, like the ὁ προειρημένος ἀνὴρ of Polybius, it was never employed till a much later age. There is no need of saying *appellatus est*, because of the past time *subditos*: nothing is more common than this irregularity in the narrative style. Indeed *appellatur* is the right tense, if a *practice* or *habit* is meant to be expressed.

The next paragraph of the Review contains a gross fabrication. A passage from the notes is produced to this effect.

“Platæenses noster author affirmat esse olim prope  
 “paludem sitos; remotis tamen incolis ad meliorem  
 “locum a palude distantem, urbs nova nomen priscum  
 “fervavit, quod nomen non eorum situi ab aquis re-  
 “moto proprie competeret.” To which, says the Reviewer, *the writer adds with self-complacent confidence*,  
 “nihil absurdi in his, ut mihi videtur, apparet. p. 590.”  
 And, to prove that *there is absurdity*, he proceeds to correct the *Editor's Latin*.

By

By this method of quoting, an Author may be made to say any thing. The truth is this. Palmerius had objected to the etymology of Plataea given by Strabo. He cannot reconcile it with the *inland* situation of that city, that its name should be derived from a word signifying an *oar*; he says, “*Quid absurdius hoc etymo?*” The object of Falconer’s note is to account for this paradox; which having done, he vindicates Strabo from the reproach of Palmerius, alledging “*nihil absurdum* in his, ut mihi videtur, apparet.”

Now for the Latinity, which this Reviewer, forsooth, thinks proper to correct. I hope the reader will have patience to examine it carefully, and he will find that, for one fault he mends, he makes two. The Editor of Strabo he somewhere compares to a Chinese tailor. But there is a homely English proverb, according to which, it seems, he would not rank very high himself in the scale of handicraft employments. Thus then he would correct the note.

“Plataenses ad paludem olim habitasse, noster affirmat: in locum autem meliorem translatos novæ urbi nomen priscum continuasse, *situi* licet, ab aquis remoto, *haud diutius competisset.*”

Will he tell us where he ever met with the word *situi*, and from what author he borrowed the phrase *haud diutius*? *Haud diutius! no longer.*

Is this the critic who has no mercy for bald Latin? and who thinks it not beneath the business of a scholar to hunt for mistakes in the posthumous works of one long since dead? of one who never aspired to the credit of a pure writer, and whose habit it was to pour forth the various information, with which his mind was stored, in the language that first presented itself to his pen. Oh miserable misuse of time, even when learning is so employed! The concluding part of the Editor's note might have been better expressed thus; *Urbem novam priscum nomen servasse, quanquam ei, situ ab aquis remoto, jam id non competeret. Competeret* is right, not *competisset*: the idea requires continued time, or the imperfect tense, not the preterperfect, much less the preterpluperfect. *Conveniret* would be better still.

One step more, and then we are out of the mire. The following he proposes as a piece of faultless Latin, not without his accustomed sneer at Oxonian Latin.

“Nonne vult Pausanias Melanthum Andropompi filium e Nelei progenie *primum* fuisse, *qui* in Attica sedem *habuisset*; atque ideo *eundem qui* Xanthum *occidisset*.” Rev. p. 488.

In this sentence there are no less than four faults; two of them rank barbarisms—*primum*  
*qui*—



*qui—eundem qui.* The two other faults are, *habuisset—occidisset.*

First then of *primum qui*. Any reader of Cicero, one would think, must have observed that he invariably avoids this phrase, although he has a hundred occasions for using it, if it were Latin. In the treatise de Claris Oratoribus, this idea occurs continually; and the phrase employed is either *primus* alone, or *qui primus*, or the adverb *primo*. E. g.

Cum cætera melius, quam superiores, tum *primus* intellexit. c. viii.

Hic *primus inflexit* orationem, et eam mollem, tene-ramque reddidit. c. ix.

Sed tum fere Pericles . . . . *primus* adhibuit doctrinam. c. xi.

Et eum *primum* ob eam ipsam causam Maximum esse appellatum. c. xiv.

Æsculapius, *qui primus* vulnus obligavisse dicitur. Cic. De Nat. 71. a. Nizol. voc. Primus.

Peripatetici *primi* ex omnibus philosophis docuerunt. Cic. Fin. 110. a. Nizol. voc. Primus.

So Horace :

Illi robur et æs triplex

Circa pectus erat, *qui* fragilem truci

Commisit pelago ratem

*Primus.*

Od. i. 3.

Such a phrase as *primus fuit qui habuit*, would  
have

have grated in the ears of any Roman. The reason is manifest. *Qui* being a relative refers properly to a *person* or *thing*, or a *quality in the abstract*, not (if one may be allowed to use a logical term) to a *quality in concreto*. Now *primus* is an adjective in the superlative degree: but who would think of saying, *pulcherrimus qui venit ad Trojam*, for *pulcherrimus eorum qui venerunt*? The Relative might refer to *pulchritudo* in the abstract, but not to *pulchritudo* implied in *pulcherrimus*. The same principle holds in Greek. There we say, ὃς πρῶτος, ὃς κάλλιστος, not πρῶτος ὃς, κάλλιστος ὃς.

The other barbarism is *eundem qui*; which will require a little more discussion, because it appears to derive more countenance from the practice of good writers, and neither Vossius nor Turcellinus seem aware of the true principle. Is it however credible, that if this mode of speaking were correct, it should not be met with ten times in all the purest writers? The idea is so common, and enters inadvertently into so many sentences, that we must pursue a very different rule of criticism, when examining this, from what is usually adopted when the genuineness of a single word is suspected. In the present case I should not admit three or four instances, out of the whole body of Latin authors, to justify the use of it: but the fact, I believe, is, that in the way here employed it

it does not occur *once*. Cicero's ordinary way of speaking is, *eum qui, is qui*, when he wishes to identify a person with some fact or story. Vid. Clar. Orat. c. xix. and twice c. xxi. c. xlvii.

A thousand other passages of the same sort might be produced from him and Livy, in which a modern would say *the same who*. Vid. Liv. xxi. 40.

On looking over the examples in Gefner and Facciolati, I do not find one which supports the Reviewer's phrase. There are none where *qui* is used after *idem*, when *idem* means a *person*, or *substance*.

The reason for this may be, that *is qui* identifies an individual as well as *idem qui*. If it be *he* at all, it must be *the same he*: for *substance* does not admit of *more* and *less*<sup>a</sup>. But when *idem qui* is used with reference to a *quality*, it denotes the *same degree*, and *idem* may generally be converted into *par*.

And not only does *quality* vary in degree in the *same thing*, but the *same quality* may be in *different things*. And again, one thing may have the *same relation* to many others. Hence, both in denoting *quality* and *relation*, *idem qui* is a common mode of speaking.

<sup>a</sup> Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ εἰς μὴ ἐπιδέχασθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον . . . οἷον εἰ ἔσιν ἡ αὐτὴ οὐσία ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἔσαι μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον ἄνθρωπος, οὔτε αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ, ὅτε ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ. Aristot. Categor. περὶ Οὐσίας. Ἐπιδέχεται δὲ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον τὰ ποῖα. Ibid. περὶ Ποιότητος.

The examples in Vossius and Turfellinus of *idem qui*, so far from opposing, really support the principle I am maintaining.

Verres *idem est, qui fuit semper*. Cic. Verr. i. ap. Turfell.

Here *idem* means *character*, not *person*. The same may be said of these :

Est *idem qui semper in republica fuit*. Cic. Att. ix. 11. Gesn.

Nihil commutantur animo, et *iidem* abeunt, *qui venerant*. Cic. Fin. iv. 3.

Peripateticis vestris, *qui quondam iidem erant, qui Academici*. Cic. Off. iii. 4.

If the phrase is never used, as I believe it never is, of *persons* but in this figurative way, when by person is meant *character* or *quality*, there cannot be a stronger proof that it is improper in any other. For it should be observed, that *absolute sameness* or *identity* is then predicated: which *sameness* is the proper antecedent to *qui*.

In the New Testament, what is translated *the same who*, is seldom, if ever,  $\delta \alphaὐτὸς \acute{\omicron}\varsigma$ . In Luk. vi. 38.  $\tau\tilde{\omega} \alphaὐτ\tilde{\omega}$  means *quality*. In 1 Cor. xii. 6.  $\delta \alphaὐτὸς$  signifies *one*; and in other places, *relation*. When a reference is made to  $\delta \alphaὐτὸς$ , it is generally by a word denoting *quality*: as,

TON ΑΥΤΟΝ ἀγῶνα ἔχοντες ΟΙΟΝ ἴδετε ἐν ἐμοί. Phil.  
i. 30. 'Having the same conflict which ye saw in me.'

When the *relative* is used in Greek, the antecedent is not ὁ αὐτός, but ὁ αὐτός.

Another fault in the Reviewer's phrase *eundem qui* is, that the relative is not in the same case with the antecedent, which it ought to be, as, I hope, the following analysis will prove. The argument requires a little steady attention; and it seems to me deserving of it.

When *idem* is in the *nominative* case with *qui* following it, mere *identity* is predicated. *Idem est qui fecit*, as we have already shewn, is barbarous: *idem est qui fuit* is Latin. The rules of grammar may indeed require an *accusative* case, but *identity* is the idea that is expressed: nothing is predicated of the thing mentioned but that it is the same. Thus,

Apud bonos *iidem* sumus quos reliquisti. Cic. Att.  
i. 13. Turfelin.

Here *quos reliquisti* means no more than 'qui fuimus cum nos reliquisti.' So,

*Eosdem* esse oratorios numeros, qui sunt poetici. Cic.  
in Orat. c. lvi.

The variation of *case* does not affect the meaning of the proposition: *identity* is all that is predicated.

But when *idem* in any of its *oblique cases* is followed by *qui*, the meaning of the passage is, not that the thing which *idem* denoted is *the same* with any thing else, but that it *bears the same relation* to two other things. Now the inflexions or *cases* of nouns are expressive of *relation*. The case of *idem* denotes the relation it bears to one of the two things, and the case of *qui* denotes the relation it bears to the other. Hence the case of *idem* and the case of *qui* ought to be the same, otherwise they do not mark the *same relation*. And thus, I believe, it will be found, that the best writers invariably use the words. *Eadem ratione qua, eodem pacto quo, eandem potestatem quam, eodem loco quo*, are among the most ordinary phrases. The last phrase is from Livy, xlii. 37. where *loco* means *rank, estimation*, which is a *quality* or *abstract idea*: if it had meant simply *place*, *ipso* probably, and not *eodem*, would have been the word: as in this passage of Cicero;

Castra paucos dies habuimus, ea ipsi, quæ contra Darium habuerat apud Issum Alexander. Ep. Att. v. 20.

There are various ways indeed of expressing the *same relation*, and sometimes this happens with *idem qui*. As, “Vovit in eadem verba Consul, quibus antea quinquennialia vota suscipi solita erant.” Liv. xxxi. 9. Where the change of expression is easily accounted for, by the use of

of *fufcipi* inftead of repeating the *verb* voveo : but the *relation* is not changed.

A remarkable instance of the obfervance of the rule above mentioned juft occurs to me in Livy, xxvi. 33.

Cæterorum omnium Campanorum *eundem* erga nos animum, *quem* Carthaginienfibus, fuiſſe—not ‘ *qui* Carthaginienfibus.’

And thus too we may uſe all words denoting *relation*, although they include a *perſon* under them. *Eodem rege quo, eodem duce quo, &c.* But to ſay *eodem duce, qui*, or, as this writer ſays, *eundem eſſe qui occidiſſet*, is againſt the genius of the language, and argues an ignorance of the principle which governs this phraſeology.

But to return from this digreſſion to the Reviewer’s Latin. Both the tenſes *habuiſſet* and *oc-  
cidiſſet* are wrong. *Haberet* might do, as relating to continued time ; but *habuerit* is the more uſual form. Inſtead of *occidiſſet*, he ſhould have ſaid *occiderit* : for *occiderit* has nothing ſubordinate to it, or connected with it, whoſe time cannot begin, till the time of *occiderit* is paſt ; *which is the proper teſt for the uſe of the preterpluperfect ſubjunctive.*

I will produce an exact parallel, in point of tenſes, from Cicero.

Publium etiam Scipionem Naſicam . . . . habitum  
eloquentem

eloquentem aiunt, illius qui sacra acceperit, filium.  
Clar. Orat. c. xx.

Which this Reviewer might have expressed thus,

Publium etiam Scipionem Nasicam fuisse aiunt qui eloquens habitus fuisset, ejusque patrem eundem esse, qui sacra accepisset.

Such is the advantage of not having one's Latin style spoilt at Oxford. His own sentence I shall beg leave to cast quite in a new mould.

Nonne vult Pausanias, primum ex Nelei nepotibus Melanthum in Attica sedem habuisse, ac proinde eum esse qui Xanthum occiderit?

When preparing to introduce the DEUS LUNUS, he clothes the Editor's remark in a new Roman dress, which he fancies is perfectly *in costume*.  
“Romanis enim Græcisque juxta ignorantibus  
“quisnam deorum esset iste Menes, pro alio quam  
“Luna, *sub deæ persona*<sup>a</sup> ab iis culta, *Straboni*  
“*vix haberi potuerit.*” *Straboni vix haberi*, is one of those faults which may grace the fourth form at Eton, but seldom, I imagine, rises higher in the school. What *potuerit* has to do here

<sup>a</sup> *Sub deæ persona*—This is as bald a phrase as he could have used: and I doubt its purity. He might have said, *tanquam Dea, tanquam fœmina, fœminæ forma*—any thing better than ‘*sub deæ persona*.’ For the strict meaning of the phrase is, *under the assumed appearance, or character, of a Goddess.*

I will



I will not attempt to explain. We will however suppose it to be *potuit*. And what then? “*Is it possible, he exclaims, that even the pressmen at Oxford should be ignorant that there was at Rome a Deus Lunus, as well as a Dea Luna?*”

This is one of those scraps of nauseous pedantry which bring a reproach upon the study of ancient learning—exalting an insignificant trifle into an affair of importance—a solitary and obscure fact, of which every one may well be ignorant, into a *criterion* of sound erudition. This too I should say, if his mythology were correct. But the ignorance is as palpable as the affectation is disgusting. In order to expose it, it is impossible to avoid a longer detail than the God and all his worshippers together are worth. But so it is with puny cavils: they generally take more trouble and more time in refuting, than strong objections.

The first thing then that strikes us is, the uniform silence on the subject of this deity in all popular compendiums of Roman antiquities. Cicero, Ovid, Livy, and other writers about that time, from whom we collect incidentally most of what we know respecting the Roman religion, never mention him. And in fact the earliest writer, who speaks of him as connected with that religion, is Tertullian. In his *Apologeticus*, written in the third century, he boldly attacks the pagan  
supersti-

superstitions and follies. Having spoken of the disgraceful stories which the best poets relate of their own deities, he proceeds to notice low and vulgar farces, in which they are exposed to the derision of the populace. “*Mæchum Anubim, et masculum Lunam, et Dianam flagellatam, et Jovis mortui testamentum recitatum, et tres Hercules famelicos irrisos.*” c. 15. The epithets to the other deities are *mæchum, flagellatam, mortui, famelicos*, all denoting something absurd or ludicrous; from whence we must in reason infer that the epithet *masculus* was of the same kind. If so, could it even at that time be a part of the religion of Rome, when Tertullian himself produces it as a burlesque of their religion?

There is no arguing from the capricious manner in which the poets and artists diversified the form, the sex, and the office of their deities. At this rate, we shall have a *Female Bacchus*, a *Venus Masculus*, a *Fortuna Barbata*, and every other preposterous absurdity. Even Jupiter would hardly know himself in the Orphic verse,

Ζεὺς ἄρσιν γένετο, Ζεὺς ἀμβροτος ἔπλετο ΝΥΜΦΗ.

And as, according to Spon, there were many who held all the deities to be of both sexes, so the philosophers held them to be of none. Vid. Spon in Polen. Supplem. vol. iv. p. 678.

A little before the time of Tertullian indeed we are told by Spartianus, that Caracalla, when in the East,

East, visited Carræ in Mesopotamia for the sake of the God Lunus, *Luni Dei gratia*. Vit. Caracall. p. 87. fol. ed. And immediately he tells of a foolish superstition prevalent among the Greeks and Egyptians respecting this deity, in a way that shews he thought him unknown to the Romans.

The following are the words of Spon upon the subject. “Deus iste Lunus, seu Luna, habitu “virili sæpe in nummis *Græcorum* exprimitur.” Polen. Supplem. vol. iv. p. 678. But in all these coins he is represented with the Phrygian tiara.

The disgusting story of Elagabalus, who assumed that name from the Syrian deity the Sun, and introduced his worship into Rome, is well known; but even this story affords no foundation for a *Deus Lunus at Rome*.

As far as it goes, it makes against it. The new deity brought in by him, to match with the Syrian Elagabalus, was a female called Οὐρανία, from Carthage, the same with the Phœnician Astarte or Luna; and, as the foolish story goes, it was the *feminine character of this deity* which directed his choice; for he took it into his head that his Syrian God was not pleased with the bride he had before given him, Pallas, because of *her warlike character*. All this trash may be seen in Herodian, lib. v. c. 15. Now the votive tablet at Palmyra exhibits the Lunar Deity as a  
male

*male in armour*; and if any inference is to be drawn from these data, it is that *he* never found his way to Rome. The Syrian worship even of the Sun was, we know, expelled from Rome, after the death of the monster who introduced it. And it is worth remarking, that Sperlingius, in one of his letters published by Polenus, says, “all the  
 “Northern and Eastern nations worshipped the  
 “moon as a male—the Greeks and Romans only  
 “(with those nations who wished to imitate  
 “them) esteemed that deity a female.” Polen. Supplem. vol. iv. p. 294.

Now Strabo, as Casaubon well observes<sup>a</sup>, when giving this Asiatic deity a Greek name, instead of coining a new word, Σεληνος, prefers Μῆν, which is masculine, and is properly expressive of his character: and, as far as appears, even the *Latin name* LUNUS was not coined till long after Strabo's time.

But such inquiries, instead of indicating a classical taste and ardour, are pretty sure tests of a depraved appetite, which is incapable of relishing wholesome native flavours, and seeks its gratification in every thing that is fetid and disagreeable to an uncorrupted palate. Never can I believe this writer to have imbibed the generous love of ancient learning. His delight is not to launch

<sup>a</sup> Ad Spartiani Caracall. p. 88. Ed. Par. 1620.

his vessel on the broad current, and spread his sails to the wind; but to dabble in some muddy back-water, and fish up with ignoble pains a few filthy shreds and remnants, which might well have been allowed to perish where they sunk, in the dark silent pool of oblivion.

“The seventeen maps, with which the seventeen books are illustrated and adorned, are said, in the preface, *to have been formed on the best authorities*, and carefully adapted to the geography of Strabo. We have examined only that of the central states of Greece; and in that we find neither Erythræ in Bœotia, nor Ægæ, Histiaæ, or Orabiæ in Eubœa—though they are all described as cities of importance in the text of the author—are duly placed in the map of M. D’Anville—and the three first, moreover, distinguished as independent states by their coins still extant.” Rev. p. 440.

In this single paragraph there are three false propositions, one misrepresentation, and one blunder. The blunder is Orabiæ for Orobiæ. The misrepresentation is, that *Histiæa is not in the map*. *Oreus*, which in Strabo’s time was the name of Istiaæ, *is in the map*; and it is difficult to conceive that he did not know it, because in D’Anville’s map it is called *Oreus, prius Istiæa*. As for the three false propositions<sup>a</sup>: Erythræ in Bœotia *had*

<sup>a</sup> For the two first of these points I have again to acknowledge

*no coinage* of its own: *Ægæ* in Eubœa *had none* of its own: and the maps are *not said* in the Preface to have been formed on the best authorities. All that is said of them is, that *care was taken to adapt the last fourteen to the text of Strabo as closely as the three first*. The adoption of the name *Oreus* instead of *Isiæa* is one proof of this.

Having now nearly disposed of the long string of *false assertions, misrepresentations, and blunders*, which go to the composition of this article, it only remains to say a few words concerning the Edition itself of Strabo, which has been made the vehicle of so much coarse invective. In the account given of it, the public are as much wronged as we are abused: for no view whatever is laid before them of its nature or its merits. Neither can I afford much room for that purpose; it being my design not to vindicate the book, but to vindicate the University from false aspersions.

It contains, however, collations of almost all the known manuscripts. It has every thing that was valuable in Casaubon's edition, besides having corrected numberless typographical errors. The excellence of Tyrwhitt's conjectural emendations

ledge the assistance of Mr. Falconer's letter, [Gent. Mag. Oct. 1809.] as well as in what relates to Philip King of Macedon.

is acknowledged by the Reviewer ; although he is studious to deprive Oxford of all share of the credit. Even here his evil genius of ignorance haunts him every step he takes. He asks, why they were not published in one small supplementary volume. The answer is, they have been printed in a small volume, as every pretender to exact Greek criticism ought to know, twice already : once at London in 1783, which edition is quoted by Schweighæuser in his notes to Polybius, and once by Harles in 1788, from which the French translators have taken his conjectures, as far as they have gone, and in general adopted them with acknowledgments of their ingenuity.

The Reviewer praises these emendations highly, and, out of near two hundred, selects six, as being particularly ingenious, and as *having been confirmed by manuscripts* collated since his death. The first and the last of these six *have had no confirmation whatever* from manuscripts ; the first is not so much a *conjecture*, as an adoption of the sense given in the old Latin translation : the third is only *partially confirmed* : and the second and fourth have no pretensions to superior sagacity, as I will leave it to any one conversant in these matters to determine. How unaccountable all this ! when, in the imperfect reading which I have myself given to the notes, I have found

*above twelve* very ingenious ones positively confirmed, *as many* partially confirmed, and at least *twenty*, far exceeding those selected by him in acuteness and ingenuity, not yet confirmed, but bearing the strongest marks of probability<sup>a</sup>.

He goes on to say,

“Almost the whole of the Editor’s own notes are *historical* and *geographical* commentaries ; which may be of use to the reader, in saving him the trouble of reference.”

And yet all this is called *alloy*, p. 449. l. 32. Besides, what is meant by *saving him the trouble of reference* ? Many of them, nay, most of them, will *give* him the trouble of reference, if he has an inquisitive turn : for they point out the passages in ancient and modern books, which tend to throw any light upon the text, or which contain matter intimately connected with it. In many of them disputed points of chronology and geo-

<sup>a</sup> It may not be unacceptable to those who take an interest in this department of criticism, if I specify some of these out of a much longer list of each kind. The first number denotes the page, the second the line. 166, 4. 235, 37. 330, 20. 357, 5. 401, 19. 682, 21. 696, 32. 700, 10. 874, 19. 1054, 17. 1179, 22. entirely confirmed. 287, 10. 353, 31. 384, 15. 408, 22. 430, 33. 677, 43. 686, 1. 690, 31. 799, 35. partially confirmed. 166, 34. 290, 20. 308, 22. 354, 29. 378, 25. 425, 6. 459, 6. 493, 14. 602, 8. 732, 7. 733, 10. with a multitude besides, ingenious, although not confirmed.



graphy are discussed, and frequently explained by diagrams—incidental elucidations of other authors are given—the ancient and modern names appropriated, often beyond what D’Anville and other geographers have done—the etymology of many traced to Oriental words—a concise history of remarkable towns is given—the productions, natural history, trade, population &c. are compared with the accounts of the best modern travellers—a vast variety of curious information is scattered through them, of a rambling and miscellaneous kind, but always connected with the text—and, notwithstanding the faulty Latin, sound sense and considerable force of reasoning are always perceptible.

The Reviewer indeed says, that,

“In *History* and *Geography* the Editor displays the “same sort of accuracy as in *Grammar* :” and he supports his charge by ONE specimen. “Philip the son of “Demetrius, and father of Perseus, is called *repeatedly* “Philip the Second, though he was the fourth regularly acknowledged King of Macedonia of that “name.” Rev. p. 441.

This calumny has been completely refuted by Mr. Falconer. There is but *one* place in which the word *secundus* is applied to the son of Demetrius: and in that place it possibly meant not the *second Philip*, but the *next* person who de-

destroyed the cities Sciathus and Peparethus, after the war between Philip and the Athenians. I am myself inclined to think it a mistake of the Editor's: nor do I fear that this concession will raise any other feeling but that of contempt or indignation against the critic, who founds a sweeping charge of historical inaccuracy in the whole two folio volumes upon this single mistake.

Of him then it is time that we now take a long farewell. Degraded as he must be in the opinion of every candid and liberal mind, it is impossible he can again find vent for his malice through any respectable channel. There is a blot in his escutcheon, which must for ever exclude him from the lists of honourable combat: and he must be sent, like some uncourteous and *recreant* knight, bereft of his habiliments, to atone for his offence by a life of austere and solitary penance.

Victus abit, longeque ignotis exulat oris,  
Multa gemens ignominiam plagasque—

I cannot proceed with the passage, for it is impossible that any glory can be gained against such a combatant, or any pride felt at such a victory. If indeed he would qualify himself for a renewal of the fight, he must practise *many a hardy adventure in a foreign land*—he must, in the language of that First of Critics, seek for distinction

tion “by harder study and a humbler mind,” and then perhaps, after a due probation, he may be reckoned worthy of engaging in classical warfare with an English University.

After all the experience we have had of the strength of his prejudices, I still was surprised that the Editor should permit this article to disgrace his pages. The *scurrility* of the attack must surely have made him hesitate. Its *unfairness*, I fear, was no obstacle; and its *virulence* the chief recommendation. But I do believe, that if he had been aware of its containing half the *ignorance*, or one tenth part of the *falsehood* which has been pointed out, he would have rejected it with disdain. In his own writings (if I can trust to rumour, and to that feature, no unseemly one, which runs through them all) I discover a tone of mind far superior to such baseness—a vigour of intellect indeed, which should make him cautious how he measures others by his own standard—and a correctness and dignity of moral sentiment, which I respect even in an enemy.

## CHAP. III.

CLASSICAL EDUCATION—*Remarks on an Article in the Edinburgh Review, upon Edgeworth's Professional Education.*

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MUCH has been said, and well said, on this subject: but I have not yet seen the question argued exactly on its right grounds. Neither do I propose in the present treatise to supply all the deficiencies which I speak of in its advocates, but rather to point out two or three leading principles, which have not been made sufficiently prominent in these discussions, if they have been noticed at all.

Some, who dispute the utility of Classical learning, have joined issue on this ground: What remuneration does a boy receive for the time and money expended in this pursuit? For what employment does it fit him? or how does it enable him to improve his fortunes?

To this I answer, that the object of Classical education is not to fit him for any *specific* employment, or to increase his fortune. Such, I admit, is the object of most parents when educating their

their children; but it is an object not only different from that of true philosophy or enlightened policy, but even frequently at variance with it. The peculiar interest of the individual is not always the same, is seldom precisely the same, with the interest of the public. And he who serves the one most faithfully, always forgets, and often injures, the other. The true principles of educating a gentleman cannot be better sketched than they are by Locke, although his language already sounds rather quaintly.

“ The great work of a Governor is to fashion  
 “ the carriage and form the mind; to settle in  
 “ his pupil good habits, and the principles of  
 “ virtue and wisdom; to give him, by little and  
 “ little, a view of mankind; and work him into a  
 “ love and imitation of what is excellent and  
 “ praise-worthy; and, in the prosecution of it,  
 “ to give him vigour, activity, and industry. The  
 “ studies which he sets him upon are but, as it  
 “ were, the exercise of his faculties, and employ-  
 “ ment of his time, to keep him from fauntering  
 “ and idleness, to teach him application, and ac-  
 “ custom him to take pains, and to give him  
 “ some little taste of what his own industry must  
 “ perfect. For who expects that, under a tutor,  
 “ a young gentleman should be an accomplished  
 “ critic, orator, or logician; go to the bottom of

“ metaphysics, natural philosophy, or mathematics ; or be a master in history or chronology ?  
 “ Though something of each of these is to be  
 “ taught him: but it is only to open the door,  
 “ that he may look in, and, as it were, begin an  
 “ acquaintance, but not to dwell there.” Vol. iii.  
 p. 39.

It is remarkable, however, that Locke, like most other writers on education, occasionally confounds two things which ought to be kept perfectly distinct, viz. that mode of education which would be most beneficial, as a system, to society at large, with that which would contribute most to the advantage and prosperity of an individual. These things are often at variance with each other. The former is that alone which deserves the attention of a philosopher ; the latter is narrow, selfish, and mercenary. It is this last indeed, on which the world are most eager to inform themselves : but the persons who instruct them, however they may deserve the thanks and esteem of those whom they benefit, do no service to mankind. There are but so many good places in the theatre of life ; and he who puts us in the way of procuring one of them, does to *us* indeed a great favour, but none to the whole assembly.

It is again sometimes asked, with an air of triumph, what is the *utility* of these studies ? and  
*utility*

*utility* is vauntingly pronounced to be the sole standard, by which all systems of education must be tried.

If in our turn we were to ask what *utility* is, we should, I believe, have many answers not quite consistent with each other. And the best of them perhaps would only give us other words equally loose and indefinite; such as *wiser, better, happier*; none of which can serve to untie a knotty question, and all of which lead us into a wider field of doubt and enquiry, than the subject which originally produced them. Before I attempt to shew what the utility of Classical learning is, in my own sense of the word, let it be permitted me to explain what it is not; and to take up the enquiry a little farther back than writers on this subject commonly go.

It is an undisputed maxim in political economy, that the separation of professions, and the division of labour, tend to the perfection of every art—to the wealth of nations—to the general comfort and well-being of the community. This principle of division is in some instances pursued so far, as to excite the wonder of people, to whose notice it is for the first time pointed out. There is no saying to what extent it may not be carried; and the more the powers of each individual are concentrated in one employment, the greater skill and quickness will he naturally display

play in performing it. But while he thus contributes more effectually to the accumulation of national wealth, he becomes himself more and more degraded as a rational being. In proportion as his sphere of action is narrowed, his mental powers and habits become contracted; and he resembles a subordinate part of some powerful machinery, useful in its place, but insignificant and worthless out of it.

So sensible is the great and enlightened Adam Smith of the force of this objection, that he endeavours to meet it by suggesting, that the means of intellectual improvement multiply rapidly with the increasing wealth of society; that the facility therefore of acquiring these means may increase in the same ratio with the injurious tendency of that system we have been just considering; and thus counteract or compensate all its evil. An answer, which affords a much stronger proof of the candour of the philosopher, than it is a satisfactory defence of his system against the supposed objection. The evil of that system is certain, and almost demonstrable; the remedy suggested is doubtful, and even conjectural. It would have been better to alter the shape of the whole question, and remove at once the ground-work of the objection, by guarding his theory against that extreme in which it takes its rise.

If indeed national wealth were the sole object  
of



of national institutions, there can be no doubt but that the method demonstrated by Dr. Smith, being the surest means of attaining that end, would be the great leading principle of political philosophy. In his own work *it is* the great and sole end of his enquiry : and no one can blame him for confining himself to that single consideration. His undertaking required no more, and he has performed his part well. But, in truth, national wealth is not the ultimatum of human society ; and although we must forbear entering on the boundless enquiry, *what is the chief good*, yet all reflecting minds will admit that it is not wealth. If it be necessary, as it is beyond all question necessary, that society should be split into divisions and subdivisions, in order that its several duties may be well performed, yet we must be careful not to yield up ourselves wholly and exclusively to the guidance of this system : we must observe what its evils are, and we should modify and restrain it, by bringing into action other principles, which may serve as a check and counterpoise to the main force.

One of the greatest faults in all moral and political reasoning is an excessive and immoderate application of one principle, to the exclusion of others, with which it ought in reason to be combined ; and whose relative force should always vary with the circumstances of the case.

There

There can be no doubt that every art is improved by confining the professor of it to that single study. There are emergencies, which call for his *whole mind and faculties* to be absorbed in it, which require him to forget every other relation of life, however sacred or natural, except that artificial one in which he is then placed. Times will occur when a Surgeon or a General must dismis the common feelings of human nature, and, in order to do his task well, must look upon himself as engaged in working out one problem, and upon all around him as instruments subservient merely to the acquisition of some one distinct purpose, without regard to their bearings on any thing besides.

But although the Art itself is advanced, by this concentration of mind in its service, the individual who is confined to it goes back. The advantage of the community is nearly in an inverse ratio with his own. Reason and common sense require that neither object should be exclusively regarded. And if, as in the cases above mentioned, an *entire* sacrifice of the individual is demanded, in all other cases that sacrifice can be required only in proportion as they approximate to this extreme. And thus a wide space is left to the discretion of the individual, where the claims of the community are either not pressing, or are wholly silent.

Of course it will be understood, that in this statement I consider the intellectual enjoyment of the individual merely, when speaking of his *advantage*, and that I do not lose sight of that enjoyment, which even the most confined exercise of the intellect imparts: I consider it as abridged only in proportion to the contracted sphere of action in which he is doomed to move.

Indeed, when the emergency is past, society itself requires some other contribution from each individual, besides the particular duties of his profession. And if no such liberal intercourse be established, it is the common failing of human nature, to be engrossed with petty views and interests, to under-rate the importance of all in which we are not concerned, to carry our partial notions into cases where they are inapplicable, to act, in short, as so many unconnected units, displacing and repelling one another.

In the cultivation of literature is found that common link, which, among the higher and middling departments of life, unites the jarring sects and subdivisions in one interest, which supplies common topics, and kindles common feelings, unmixed with those narrow prejudices with which all professions are more or less infected. The knowledge too, which is thus acquired, expands and enlarges the mind, excites its faculties, and  
calls

calls those limbs and muscles into freer exercise, which, by too constant use in one direction, not only acquire an illiberal air, but are apt also to lose somewhat of their native play and energy. And thus, without directly qualifying a man for any of the employments of life, it enriches and ennobles all. Without teaching him the peculiar business of any one office or calling, it enables him to act his part in each of them with better grace and more elevated carriage; and, if happily planned and conducted, is a main ingredient in that complete and generous education, which fits a man “to perform justly, skilfully, and magnanimously, all the offices, both private and public, of peace and war.”

Thus far then we have considered the utility of those liberal pursuits, which in a refined state of society engage the attention of the higher orders, and which, by common consent, impart a dignity to the several professions of life, and to mercantile adventure.

It still remains to prove, that what is called *Classical literature* answers this purpose most effectually.

And here, if the question is to be compendiously treated, it must be allowed me to take for granted many points, which a captious adversary might dispute, but which the authority of the  
the

the greatest names, and the general experience of educated men concur in establishing. That the relics of Grecian and Roman literature contain some of the choicest fruits of human genius ; that the poets, the historians, the orators, and the philosophers, of Greece especially, have each in their several lines brought home, and laid at our feet, the richest treasures of invention ; that the history of those early times presents us with a view of things “ nobly done and worthily spoken ;” that the mind and spirit which breathed then, lives still, and will for ever live in the writings which remain to us ; that, according as taste, and genius, and learning, have been valued among men, those precious remains have been held still dearer and more sacred ; are all positions which it is better to assume as indisputable, than to embarrass the present argument with any new attempt to prove them.

Neither is it necessary to say much in order to silence the feeble and querulous cry, that all the good which those works contain may be had through the medium of *translation*. To demonstrate, indeed, how, from the very nature of language, translation cannot adequately perform this office, would require an extended argument. I would rather appeal to the reflection and experience of every man who is acquainted with more than one language, whether he has not

a

often

often felt a translated thought, even when best executed, to be rather a cold inanimate bust, than a living counterpart of the original: whether he has not been affected by sentiments or descriptions in one language, in a degree which no power or skill can equal in another. Even the rudest languages have in some words and phrases, or some peculiarity of construction, their characteristic advantage; and the more copious and perfect a language is, the more must these advantages be multiplied. A bare chronicle of facts indeed, or a rigid demonstration in science, may perhaps be transferred from one to the other without loss or injury. For where the ideas are few, simple, and determinate, they readily find in all languages an adequate expression. But how shall the inspirations of genius and fancy be packed up, lettered, and consigned over, from hand to hand, in this literary traffic? How shall even the ordinary phraseology of moral reasoning, of sentiment, of opinion, preserve its native colouring, and exact features? How shall the language of varied passion, of tender feeling, of glowing description, find, in the distant region to which it is transported, the precise measure of its value? How, after this change of place and manners, where all is so new and so different, how shall it suit itself with the commodities adapted to its former wants and habits? Mere subsistence, it is  
true,

true, the bread of life may be obtained every where. The great truths of religion, the bare theorems of science, whatever is addressed to the understanding strictly, may perhaps pass unimpaired. But all that constitutes the grace, the beauty, the charm, the dignity of composition, all that tends to awaken the fancy, or to affect the heart, like the finer and more volatile parts of substances, is lost during the experiment; or if these qualities be partially retained, they are in a manner the invention of the translator; and serve rather to tell us, that the original was excellent, than to present us with a view of that excellence itself.

The writer of an Article in the Edinburgh Review, on “Edgeworth’s Professional Education,” whose petulant sarcasms alternately provoke our spleen and our laughter, endeavours to convince the world, that, notwithstanding the advantage of Classical learning, the ascendancy it has acquired in English Education is preposterous, and the mode of teaching it in English Schools, and Universities, utterly absurd. I confess it was the reading of that article, which drew forth the present remarks, and I had designed a formal discussion of the false opinions and accusations contained in it. The bulk of this volume, however, swelling imperceptibly far beyond my first intention, induces me to contract the plan; and the truly meagre and flimsy texture of the article

itself is hardly deserving of any solid criticism. There is a sprightliness, however, and vivacity, which takes with the world at first reading, and raises a transient admiration, which perhaps was the sole ambition of the writer: for, upon comparing one page with another, he seems wholly regardless of the dull virtue of consistency, and, like some popular divines, thinks only how he may keep up the requisite smartness for his fifteen minutes to amuse his audience.

He may think it injustice to compress his airy satire; but there is really not time for quoting him always in his own words. I could wish the reader of this chapter first to give an attentive perusal to the Reviewer, while I endeavour to exhibit his impeachment in distinct charges.

1st. That Classical learning forms the *sole* business of English Education.

2dly. That hence the taste and imagination only of the student are cultivated.

3dly. That the instruction of public schools and universities, even in Classical literature, is of a limited and mistaken kind.

4thly. That in Oxford particularly, every manly exercise of the reasoning powers is discouraged.

The first charge, besides being spun and twisted into the materials of every page, is also distinctly laid before us in the following terms.

“A young



“ A young Englishman goes to school at six or seven years old : and he remains in a course of education till twenty-three or twenty-four years of age. In all that time, his sole and exclusive occupation is learning Latin and Greek.” No. 29. p. 45.

From the manner in which the phrase *learning Latin and Greek* is used, one might be led to suppose that the Grammar and the Lexicon were the sole companions of the Student ; that Latin and Greek were a sort of *black art*, something wholly unconnected with the system of nature and of human affairs ; that the languages were learnt for the sake of the sound or form of the letters, not for the stores of taste and knowledge which they contain. What else is the Reviewer's notion of learning Greek ? Can we be said to learn Greek, without making ourselves acquainted with the authors who wrote in Greek ? A modern language may perhaps be learned without much of its literature : but how is it possible to separate the study of an ancient language from the study of those works in which it has been preserved ? Of all known languages, the Greek perhaps is the most copious and extensive ; and no one can pretend to call himself a master of it, who has not studied the several classes of authors in which its compass and variety is displayed. The language of Aristotle is as different from that of Homer, Sophocles,

Sophocles, or Pindar, as these again are from Thucydides, Xenophon, or Demosthenes. It would be useless to pursue the topic through all its branches. Those who are acquainted with the subject will admit the statement as soon as it is made : and those who are not, will hardly, I presume, apply to the Edinburgh Review for information about the Classics.

How idle then, how perfectly senseless, all this declamation about Latin and Greek ! unless the study of Bacon, of Locke, of Milton, of Addison, and all our greatest moralists, historians, and poets, be rightly called *learning English*. What is to hinder the student from deriving all the benefit which the reading of valuable authors is supposed to impart ? or rather, if these works are studied, how can he avoid deriving it ?

Yet even Mr. Edgeworth, the author of the book which gives occasion to the Review, (although a writer not of the same empty class with the Reviewer, but one who to great ingenuity and vivacity adds much good sense, and gives many proofs of a good heart,) even he is weak enough to say, “that young men intended for  
“ Clergymen should not go to any University,  
“ till they are *thoroughly masters of the learned*  
“ *languages, particularly of Greek.*” p. 95. I am at a loss to conceive what so intelligent a writer could mean by this passage. The absurdity

furdity of teaching Greek, without teaching the best authors who have written in that language, appears to me so striking, that no words can make it more evident; and to suppose that these authors can be *thoroughly studied* before a young man goes to the University, or even during the whole time he stays there, is equally against reason and common sense.

The first charge then of this Reviewer, as far as it implies a study of language merely, is already answered. For a contradiction of the assertion itself, which I hope will be found satisfactory, the reader is referred to the Chapter on The Course of Studies pursued at Oxford.

The second charge also requires no separate notice. If the Poets alone were selected by us out of the great mass of ancient learning, some ground might appear to exist for this complaint. But the fact is far otherwise: and facts are stubborn things.

The third charge is worked up with all the smirking pleasantry and pert playfulness peculiar to a certain school, whether consisting of Divines, or Lecturers, or Letter-writers, or Reviewers, whose main object seems to be, to have their laugh out, whatever truth or justice or decency or right reason may say to the contrary. And perhaps the wisest way is to let them have their laugh out. It is a miserable ambition, and its success

success need not be envied ; provided the world are disposed to listen afterwards to plain sense and unvarnished truth. The whole system is ridiculed, by which the Classics are usually taught. It is not merely insinuated, but asserted, that the knowledge of minute points of Grammar and the mechanism of Latin verse are deemed the highest accomplishments of a Scholar—and that “ his object is not to reason, *to imagine*, and to invent ; but to conjugate, decline, and derive.”

“ The great system of facts with which he is most perfectly acquainted, are the intrigues of the Heathen Gods : with whom Pan slept ?—with whom Jupiter ?—whom Apollo ravished ? These facts the English youth get by heart the moment they quit the nursery ; and are most sedulously and industriously instructed in them till the best and most active part of life is passed away.” Rev. p. 45.

I have copied the very words of this filthy ribaldry, in order that the reader may judge of the pure virtuous indignation which glowed in the breast of the satirist who wrote it. The description is applied to the whole course of English Education, even to the advanced period of twenty-four. Now it is difficult to say how such an adversary is to be treated. To contradict him flatly, might be thought unmannerly ; and yet that is the only treatment he properly deserves,  
 who

who with wanton levity perverts the truth. If the passage had occurred in a farce, or burlesque comedy, we should forgive the falsehood for the sake of the humour; and because the writer himself does not expect to be believed. But this we are told by a person who affects in other passages the grave censor and indignant moralist, and who with a magisterial air, forsooth, after his play is over, vouchsafes his serious advice on the subject of Education. As to the childish prattle which follows, about “the Æolic Reduplication,” “Sylburgius his method of arranging defectives in  $\omega$  and  $\mu$ ,” “the restoration of a dative case, which Cranzius had passed over,” which he says are the highest feats of glory in the estimation of a young Englishman, the whole is a tissue of ignorance and nonsense, of which a man of liberal education should be ashamed.

The entire passage is given at the bottom of the page<sup>a</sup>: it is hardly deserving even of that

<sup>a</sup> “The distinguishing abstract term, the epithet of Scholar, is reserved for him who writes on the Æolic reduplication, and is familiar with Sylburgius his method of arranging defectives in  $\omega$  and  $\mu$ . The picture which a young Englishman, addicted to the pursuit of knowledge, draws—his *beau idéal* of human nature—his top and consummation of man’s powers—is a knowledge of the Greek language. His object is not to reason, to imagine, or to invent; but to conjugate, decline, and derive. The *situations* of imaginary glory which he draws for himself, are the *detection* of an Anapæst in the

notice: but it may be as well to clear the ground of these light bush-fighters, before we advance into the heart of the enemy's country, and beat up his close quarters.

First then of "him who writes on the *Æolic* "Reduplication." No man ever wrote on it; for this plain reason, that there is no such thing. The *Dorians* are said to have been fond of forming verbs in *μι* out of verbs in *ω*, which process was usually completed by prefixing the reduplication: as *θέω*, *θήμι*, *τίθημι*; and this mutation of verbs, but not the reduplication consequent upon it, may be distinguished by the name of their Dialect; which dialect is sometimes confounded with the *Æolic*; and indeed by Maittaire they are treated as one. But there is no peculiar *Æolic* or *Doric* reduplication<sup>b</sup>. There

"wrong place, or the restoration of a dative case, which Cranzius had passed over, and the never dying Ernesti failed to observe." *Edin. Rev.* No. 29. p. 46.

<sup>b</sup> I cannot avoid subjoining a note upon this *Æolic* Reduplication, which may contain some matter interesting to a few of my readers, and which will prove to all of them the ignorance of this Reviewer upon a subject, with which he affects to be quite familiar.

So far from practising reduplication, it was common with the *Æolians* as well as the *Ionians* even to reject the augment. "Nam *Æoles*, ab eo quod est *χαλῆναι*, non apponunt incrementa præteritis, sed dicunt *χαλόν*." *Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat.* c. 52. It is generally said that the Latin language is descended from the *Æolic* Greek. I am inclined to think with Heyné, after Foster and Burges, [*Excurs. II. ad Il.* 19.] that

is an *Ionic* reduplication, by  $\epsilon$  instead of  $\iota$ , which was perhaps what the Reviewer meant, if he meant any thing. [Vid. Eustath. ad Odyss. x. p. 1654. 29. et ibid. 32.] There was also an *Attic* reduplication, much practised by the Poets, as ἐρήρῃκα from ἐρίζω, and in the present tense, as ἀλάλημι from ἄλημι; and the Poets were apt to extend the reduplication of the preterperfect to other tenses. [Vid. Clenard. ed. Sylb. 144. 10. et 103. 43.] Clenardus mentions also a *Bæotic* re-

that the distinction of dialects did not then subsist: and that in later times, when learned men were led to investigate these matters, they found a greater affinity between the Latin and Æolic than between the Latin and any other dialect, only because the Æolians retained most of the ancient language.

It is remarkable, says Heyné, that the only documents from whence Grammarians deduce their canons of Æolism, are the fragments of Lyric poets, and he seems to approve of Maittaire's method, who merges that dialect in the Doric.

There is a passage in a scarce book, *Hortus Adonidis*, p. 49; from which we learn that the *Sicilians* were fond of forming new verbs out of the preterperfect tense, as πεπρωήκω from πεπρωήκα, κεκλήγω from κέκληγα. Now the Sicilian was a subdivision of the Doric. It was a *species* prevailing in the Peloponnesian colonies, which went chiefly westward, as the Æolian did in the earlier colonies of Asia. They have many points in common, but that which is *peculiar* to the Sicilian is *opposite* to the Æolian.

After all, I believe the origin of the Reviewer's blunder is to be found in page 66. of the *Winchester Grammar*; where *Æoles* occurs in the same paragraph with an example of *Bæotic reduplication*.

duplication, p. 103. 20. but no such phrase occurs as *Æolic* reduplication, except once (and, I am pretty confident, only once) by Sylburgius in his notes on that Greek Grammar, p. 456. where it is probably put by mistake for *Attic*.

Now 2dly. of the memorable exploits of Sylburgius. Sylburgius never arranged any defectives in  $\omega$  and  $\mu$ . He leaves Clenardus's arrangement as it was; and corrects only some occasional blunders, into which he and his commentator Antesignanus had fallen.

3dly. What the Reviewer could mean by "a dative case, which Cranzius had passed over," I cannot even guess. Perhaps there is some mistake in the name: for there is no Commentator or Critic so called. At least he was not known to Fabricius or Saxius; and the small treatise on Grammar which Cranzius the Theologian and Jurist published in 1506, is not mentioned by them in the list of his works, so insignificant and useless was it become, after the labours of other scholars.

Lastly, Ernesti is introduced as a champion of verbal criticism, when the facetious Reviewer would play off his pleasantry on the abuse of that species of learning. Most unfortunate of men! What ill-star could have led him to venture thus on the mention of particulars? *Dohus latet in universalibus* is indeed a sound maxim. If he had



had kept to general buffoonery, he might have concealed his ignorance. But by specifying facts and names he has spoilt all, and only exposed himself. Every student knows that among all the foreign Editors Ernesti stands conspicuous for his *practical* editions—that his notes are few and short—and that he despised curious philological dissertations which had no direct tendency to elucidate the author, or to assist the reader.

Let us now proceed to more important matters.

Upon the subject of school exercises scarcely any thing can be said, which has not been said long ago by writers of great authority. The opinions of *this* writer are of no value. In fact, it may be said of him, as of some late publishers of Sermons, that he has no opinions. One while he tells us, that the “imagination is too much “cultivated,” p. 48; at another, that the student’s great object is not to *imagine*, but to learn the technical rules of grammar. In one page he objects to the study of ancient Metaphysics, Morals, and Politics, ‘*that the Greek alone is study enough ‘without them;*’ and in the next, that ‘*all the ‘solid and masculine parts of the understanding ‘are left wholly without cultivation.*’

It may be curious however to see the real opinions of two illustrious writers on this point of school compositions. Milton rejects the practice

tice altogether, and calls it “ forcing the empty  
 “ wits of children to compose themes, verses, and  
 “ orations, which are the acts of ripeſt judgment,  
 “ and the final work of a head filled, by long  
 “ reading and obſerving, with elegant maxims  
 “ and copious inventions. Theſe are not matters,  
 “ he continues, to be wrung from poor ſchollings,  
 “ like blood out of the noſe, or the plucking of  
 “ untimely fruit <sup>a</sup>.” He makes no difference be-  
 tween compositions, in Latin and Engliſh, in  
 verſe and proſe: he equally proſcribes them all.

Locke is juſt as adverſe to the practice, and  
 much more diffuſe in his reaſoning againſt it.  
 “ By all means, ſays he, obtain, if you can, that  
 “ your ſon be not employed in making Latin  
 “ themes and declamations, and, leaſt of all,  
 “ verſes of any kind <sup>b</sup>.” He then proceeds to in-  
 veigh againſt all ſuch exerciſes, eſpecially in Latin;  
 and condemns verſes of every kind, chiefly for this  
 reaſon. “ If he has no genius to poetry, it is the  
 “ moſt unreaſonable thing in the world to tor-  
 “ ment a child, and waſte his time about that  
 “ which can never ſucceed; and if he have a  
 “ poetic vein, it is to me the ſtrangeſt thing in  
 “ the world, that the father ſhould deſire or  
 “ ſuffer it to be cheriſhed or improved;” adding, in  
 ſubſtance, “ that it is not likely to promote his

<sup>a</sup> Tractate of Education, vol. i. p. 275. 8vo.

<sup>b</sup> Vol. iii. p. 76. fol. ed.

“ fortunes,

“fortunes, but rather to make him poor and  
“idle.”

The sketch of “a complete and generous education,” drawn by the first of these great masters, is magnificent indeed and imposing, but has never been thought reducible to practice even by his fondest admirers. It is read, and will continue to be read, for its bold and large conceptions, and the majestic eloquence of its style—for that heavenly fancy, and that mighty soul which breathes through all his works, and which makes even his prejudices and his errors awful.

For the memory of the other I also feel sincere reverence, although his own opinions would have been entitled to greater respect, if he had himself treated with more deference the opinions of others who had gone before him, and the practice of sensible men of his own time, whose judgment was worth more, in proportion as it was confirmed by experience. The light freedom indeed, and the confidence with which this philosopher attacks all established notions, is one of the principal blemishes in his character. Intrepid and sagacious he certainly is; but these are not the only qualities requisite in a discoverer of truth; especially if the enquiry be of such a nature as to draw after it important practical consequences. Caution and respect for the opinions of others, in all cases, but more particularly in  
matters

matters incapable of demonstration, are virtues not of the lowest order.

To these authorities, as in a matter of judgment and experience, we may surely oppose that of Cicero and Quintilian. Locke pronounces, that writing does not help towards good speaking, p. 77. Cicero says, it is the best and most efficient preparation for it. *De Orat.* i. 33. Quintilian recommends it as a main part of the education of an Orator; and describes, with his usual candour and good sense, his own method in examining the compositions of his pupils. *Inst.* ii. 4. So much for authority in this matter. The thing itself strikes every one at first sight as reasonable: and the experience of most persons concerned in education bears testimony to its use. Without some exercise in composition, the student, who has read even the best authors, feels a difficulty and embarrassinent in arranging his thoughts on any given subject, in connecting, illustrating, and adorning them. Just as in the conduct of life, if he has never been accustomed to think or act for himself, although he may have lived among the purest examples, yet when called upon to act or reason, he is apt to be disconcerted, diffident, and confused. In fact, the utility, and almost necessity, of *practice* is so received a maxim, that we may fairly demand the strongest proof against it, before we give way. Milton's reason does not  
meet

meet the question. It is not for the value *to us* of what the boy writes, that we impose the task, but for the benefit of the exercise to himself.

To write well is, as he justly calls it, “the act of ripest judgment;” it is the last best fruit, the *τελευταῖον ἐπιγένημα* of an educated mind: but without previous effort and training, it is idle to expect that these manly virtues will ever arrive at maturity. That finished offspring of genius starts not, like Minerva from the head of Jupiter, perfect at once in stature, and clad in complete armour: but is the produce of slow birth, and often of a hard delivery; the tender nursling of many an infant year—the pupil of a severe school, formed and chastened by a persevering discipline.

The same reply may be made to the objection against verses. It is not that we seek to stock the world with new poems, but to give play in the most effectual manner to the *poetic faculty*, which exists to a certain degree in all minds, and which, like every other faculty, ought to lie wholly uncultivated in none. At least it is an irreparable injury to young minds, if it be entirely neglected. They may still be useful members in the mechanism of society, if the powers of reasoning and calculation only be encouraged: but they lose that intellectual charm, from which life borrows its loveliest graces; they lose, in a re-

finest age, the means of recommending Virtue herself, if taste and elegance be not found in her train. The reasoning of Locke on this subject does, I confess, appear to me sordid and illiberal. He says, indeed, in a phrase not very intelligible, that we must be careful how we “make anything “a boy’s business but downright virtue.” p. 76. But the improvement of the faculties which God has implanted in us, is surely itself a virtue. Our attention may be given in undue measure to one, and may violate that just harmony, without which nothing is virtuous, nothing lovely. But the faculty itself, which he condemns, was one of the kindest gifts of heaven. And why then should man be niggardly where Providence has been bountiful? Why should he think scorn of that pleasant land, and undervalue those fair possessions, which were not thought beneath the care even of the Almighty? In the garden of Eden, we read, was made to grow, not only what was good for food, but every tree also that was pleasant to the sight: and in that garden man was placed, to keep it, and to dress it.

That in some schools too much stress is laid upon this accomplishment, I will not take upon me to deny. Let the excess, where it is an excess, be blamed and corrected. The reproach of the Reviewer, however, extends equally to the Universities:

Universities : and here I can undertake to affirm, the charge is false. If any thing, the fault lies on the other side. Verses, especially Latin verses, are looked upon as a boyish exercise; and although it is the practice not to call for this exercise, except from those who are known to excel in it, yet even this limited demand is seldom satisfied. So prevalent is the conviction, that the highest excellence alone can give it dignity ; and that other roads to distinction are open, in which every degree of merit will command respect. Its utility, however, even in the lower department of elegiac verse, is not generally understood. It imparts a habit of compression without obscurity ; a habit of selecting the fittest materials, and of setting them in the nicest order ; and a command of pure, terse, and polished diction, which cannot long be practised without imparting a salutary tincture to all other kinds of composition. Still, I admit, it is not a principal, but a subordinate feature, in every sound plan of education ; and the farther we advance in life, the more urgently do other claims press upon us.

It is time however to notice the fourth charge of the Reviewer, the substance of which is, “ that in Oxford particularly, every manly exercise of the reasoning powers is discouraged.”

The best answer to this will be given in the

account of our studies ; and something, I trust, has been already said in refutation of it, when the false estimate made of the nature of Classical learning was exposed. The student undergoes a close examination in the *subject matter* of all he reads, and some of the works most read are no light exercise of the understanding. Strict Logic, Divinity, and Mathematical theorems, whether pure or mixed, cannot fail to discipline the reasoning powers ; and these form a part of the studies in every College. There are lectures read in Experimental Philosophy, in Astronomy, in Chemistry, in Mineralogy, and in Botany : how far these pursuits *exercise* the student's mind, can only be collected from the general tendency of such studies. They do not enter (except the two first, and these at the option of the candidate) into the examination for degrees ; and as they are taught not by Tutors, but by public Professors, it cannot well be ascertained what impression they make on each individual.

In reply however to the frivolous impertinence about checking the progress of science, and keeping us back to the measure of the ancients, let it suffice to state, that a rank fallacy runs through the whole argument. The writer confounds the *cultivation of literature* with the *acquisition of science*. In the former, unless our models be defective, which is not attempted to be shewn.

the



the study of those models must be as beneficial now as ever. In the latter, the ancients are not made our guides. We study them for the facts, the reasonings, the descriptions, the characters and the sentiments, for the principles and the examples of pure taste, which they contain. These must ever be what they once were, and their relative importance must ever remain the same. It is not the discovery of neutral salts, or the decomposition of alkalis, that can alter the value of ancient literature—that can make eloquence less powerful, poetry less charming, historical example less forcible, or moral and political reflections less instructive. Where then is the wisdom of bringing into comparison things which have no common points of relation; which are in fact heterogeneous, and incommensurate with each other? Whatever may be the advancement later ages have made in the knowledge of the properties of bodies, the temper and constitution of the human mind cannot have changed; and the writers best adapted to make impression there, if we turn not stupidly and fullenly away, will perform their office now as heretofore.

Never let us believe that the improvement of chemical arts, however much it may tend to the augmentation of national riches, can supersede the use of that intellectual laboratory, where the sages of Greece explored the hidden elements of  
which

which man consists, and faithfully recorded all their discoveries. Never let us permit the volumes which inclose these early records, which present us with a distinct view, not only of the results, but of each varied process in all its stages; never let us permit them to moulder and perish as they lie, insensible of that kind Providence which preserved them through their long and dark voyage, and of those heroic efforts which baffled all the fury of ignorance, and enabled them to ride out the storm in safety. Some indeed have unhappily foundered in their course; but even of these, the scattered wreck has been washed in by the waves, and proves to us, while we gather along the shore its glittering fragments, how precious the lading was which has been cast away.

If, in the search for these dismembered parts, something more than sober reason would dictate has been felt, some devotional passion, as for "the torn body of a martyred saint," why should we scoff at the honest toil, and not rather admire and applaud the zeal which sustains it? As the feigned wandering of that Egyptian Queen for her lost Osiris, or, as the nobler fable tells, though born in later days<sup>a</sup>, of the Virgin Truth, whose lovely form, once so perfect and glorious to look upon, was by a race of wicked deceivers hewn into a

<sup>a</sup> See Milton's "Speech for the Liberty of unlicensed Printing," p. 317. 8vo.

thousand pieces, and scattered to the four winds ; so has it been with the body of ancient learning, mangled and dispersed as it was throughout the world. And it is only by long search and painful diligence, that limb after limb has been found, and restored in some measure to that form of perfect beauty which it once had. The service surely is entitled to our thanks and praise : and that enthusiasm, which magnifies the value even of the minutest relic, will meet with respect and forgiveness among liberal minds. Mockery we know will always be the engine of vulgar malice, to undermine that which overtops itself ; and envy will affect to despise what it does not and cannot possess. But from the more enlightened class, especially from those who hold up the torch of criticism, and pour its useful beams to the remote corners of our island, it is not too much to expect that the peaceful and inoffensive pursuits of learning may be shielded from scorn and calumny—that they will not at least themselves wantonly attack them with rude clamour or insulting sarcasm, and least of all *fabricate* abuses for the sake of venting their spleen, or displaying the vain talent of wit and raillery.

## CHAP. IV.

*Course of Studies pursued at Oxford.*

NOTHING seems less understood, or more industriously misrepresented, than the course of studies, which this University reformed and settled some years ago, and which is now pursued even more vigorously than at the time of its first institution. In the present chapter I propose to explain very minutely its several parts; and to throw in occasionally such remarks as seem necessary to meet the objections, which are now and then alledged by hasty and superficial observers. A plan of studies sketched on paper is, I am aware, often very fallacious: and nothing is more easy than to mislead the public by a fair and plausible statement of this kind. I have myself seen outlines drawn, divided into studies of the first year, of the second year, and so on, which appeared to comprehend almost all one could desire to learn either in literature or science: but the persons who execute this plan must be more fortunate than common, if the materials on which they operate are capable of bearing it. In a University

fity, one fourth part of which changes every year, the new comers differ so widely in age, in capacity, in disposition and turn of thought, in previous knowledge and attainments, that it seems inconceivable how they can be classified in this manner, without a sacrifice, not of extreme cases, (for that must happen in all comprehensive plans) but of something worth preserving and improving in all. The books and the portions of science allotted to the first year are such as many, by the most diligent study during four years, can never go beyond; while others come so ripe and forward as to be quite fit to begin where the former end. The facility, again, of learning, the rate of advancement varies in such wide proportions, that no fair classification can be founded on this basis. It is idle to think that any system of education can equalize the powers of different minds. The nominal rank and precedence of the student, like rank in all the liberal professions, must be determined chiefly, not by his merit, but by his standing: the habits of society, the mixed and entangled interests of life require it: but in obtaining this rank, it may be contrived (and it is the great secret of liberal education so to contrive it) that emulation shall be an active, steady, and commanding principle. Compulsion in such cases is ridiculous. It scarcely succeeds even in a nursery; and, as we advance in years, is less to be

wished for, and is in fact less practicable. Constant admonition, the consciousness of an over-seeing eye, the fear of reproof, and the hope of praise, are indeed of service, are even necessary to overcome the desultory habits of youth, to check its wanderings, to fix its resolutions, and keep it to its purpose. These however are secondary and incidental powers: they serve to refit and keep the machinery in order; but the great spring, which moves and invigorates the whole, is emulation.

According to the last regulations, the University Honours are obtained in the following manner.

As soon as the student enters on his third year, he is subject to a public examination, which admits him, not to the Degree of Batchelor of Arts, but to that intermediate step, which still retains its old title of *Sophista Generalis*. The old exercise was a logical disputation in the public Schools on three philosophical questions, which had long dwindled into an insignificant form, before the present exercise was substituted in its room. At this previous examination he is expected to construe accurately some one Greek and one Latin book at least: the most difficult works are not required or encouraged, as there is no competi-  
tion

tion between the candidates, 'and an accurate grammatical acquaintance with the structure of the two languages is the point chiefly inquired into. Xenophon, Homer, Herodotus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Demosthenes among the Greeks, and Virgil, Horace, Sallust, Livy, and Cicero, among the Latins, are the most usual books. Besides this, he is examined in some compendium of Logic, (generally Aldrich's,) which is never omitted, and in the elements of Geometry and Algebra, which are not held to be absolutely indispensable. All this is done in public. Eight candidates may be examined in one day, who are all present during the whole time; and there is commonly a numerous attendance of Junior Students. Indeed there must of necessity be an audience, because every candidate is bound to attend one examination before he is examined himself. The number however far exceeds what the Statute requires, and the School is often quite full. The Examiners are four in number, especially appointed by the University, and sworn to the faithful performance of their duty.

If the student fails on this occasion, it passes *sub silentio*. He does not receive his certificate at the close of the day; and he may present himself again the next term.

After having passed this Examination, his studies are directed more steadily to the other,

where the honour he acquires will depend entirely on his own exertions. He cannot present himself till after the third year is completed, and it is common to defer it till the end of the fourth year. He is then examined first in the rudiments of Religion : a passage in the Greek Testament is given him to construe, and he is tried, by questions arising out of it, whether he has a proper view of the Christian scheme, and of the outline of sacred history. He is expected to give some account of the evidences of Christianity, and to shew by his answers that he is acquainted with the thirty-nine Articles, and has read attentively some commentary upon them. He is examined again in Logic, the object being chiefly to see that he has just and firm conceptions of its leading principles ; and, on this occasion, selections from the Organon are often introduced.

The Examination then proceeds to Rhetoric and Ethics. Upon these subjects the celebrated treatises of Aristotle are chiefly used : and whoever is master of them knows what an exercise of the mind it is to acquire a thorough insight into the argument, and what a serious discipline the student must have undergone, who has accomplished this point. The accurate method observed in each treatise renders it not a perplexing, but merely an arduous task : the precision of the language, the close connection of the reasoning,



reasoning, the enlarged philosophical views, and the immense store of principles and maxims which they contain, point them out as the best calculated perhaps of any single works for bringing into play all the energies of the intellect, and for trying, not merely the diligence of the scholar, but the habit of discrimination which he has formed, the general accuracy of his thoughts, and the force and vigour of his mind. If it be at all of use to divide, to distinguish, and to define, to study clear arrangement and order, to discern connection, and to comprehend a plan composed of many widely-separated parts, hardly any works can be named, so well adapted to all these purposes. To these is often added, at the option of the student, the treatise on Politics, which is in fact a continuation and completion of the Ethical System.

Besides these treatises of Aristotle, Quintilian as belonging to Rhetoric, and the philosophical works of Cicero, especially that *De Officiis*, as belonging to Ethics, are admitted. And these last, as being of easier attainment, are of course the choice of many candidates. But neither of them are strictly indispensable.

In examining *viva voce* almost two hundred candidates every year, nearly in the same departments, much skill and care is requisite, lest a certain routine of questions be introduced, which a student may learn, and give to them some plausible answers,

answers, without having drawn his knowledge from the original source. Nothing but practice and constant vigilance, joined to a familiar acquaintance with the several books, can effectually guard against this abuse. And hence to a by-stander the Examination may often seem vague and desultory, when the design only is, to probe the candidate here and there, and ascertain that his reading has been serious, not loose or superficial, or, as might sometimes happen, none at all.

At this Examination the student presents what number of Classical Authors he pleases, provided they be not less than three, and those of the higher order, including both languages. It is not unusual for those who aim at the highest honours to mention Homer, Pindar, one, two, or three of the Greek Tragedians, and Aristophanes. Thucydides is seldom omitted. The other historians, and the orators, are also included, according as the student's line of reading has been. Of Latin Authors, besides the poets of the Augustan age, Livy, Tacitus, Cicero, Juvenal, and Lucretius, are the most usual. In the books that he names, he is expected to be well and accurately versed. And although great encouragement is given to an enlarged range, yet a hasty and unscholarlike manner of reading, however extensive it may be, will not obtain reward, and is in fact much discountenanced.

Besides

Besides the questions proposed *viva voce*, many others in the different branches of the Examination are put, and answered on paper, while other things are going on. And in this manner also the candidate's knowledge of Latinity is tried.

The Mathematical Examination is quite a distinct business. It is conducted indeed at the same time, but is chiefly done on paper, if the student has advanced far in those studies; although for every candidate who presents himself in Mathematics there is an oral examination, in which, with a table of diagrams before him, he is called upon, not to give full and long demonstrations, but, as the Examiner turns over a corresponding table, to answer questions relating to the properties of figures, and the mode of proving certain theorems. The soundness of his scientific studies is thus made known; and he has problems, which require time and close attention, to solve at his leisure on paper, while the examination passes on to others.

It must be well known to every one who has had experience in life, that, notwithstanding this formidable array of books and sciences, great numbers of candidates must be allowed to pass, whose attainments in both are, from various causes, very inconsiderable. Still if the system be so conducted as to encourage exertion, it would be absurd to reject those of the most moderate

derate pretensions, who have passed through their period of residence with good conduct, and a tolerably regular attention to the prescribed studies. Nothing but extreme incapacity, extraordinary want of school education, or gross idleness at the University, will absolutely exclude a student from his degree at the regular time. Of this description some few are found every year. But even these are not finally rejected; they may appear at the following Examination, and, unless the same insufficiency is again observed, generally pass.

Of those who are thought worthy of Honours, there are two classes in the branch of Literature, and two in that of Mathematical Sciences; and nothing hinders a candidate from being distinguished in each branch: indeed this double Honour is very frequent. The second Class of each department is divided into two parts, an upper and a lower; so that in fact there are three classes of Honours in Literature, and three in Mathematics. The individuals of each class are arranged among themselves, not according to merit, but in alphabetical order. It has usually happened, that above one third of the whole number of candidates have been placed in the list of honour: but of these by far the greater part are in the lower division of the second class. All these names are printed: the names of those who simply pass, and obtain no honour, are not printed.

If

If any candidate is rejected, it passes *sub silentio*. His certificate is not delivered to him.

The Examiners are sworn officers, appointed for two years; they are four in number, and must all be present, unless prevented by sickness or some very urgent cause. The School is in general much crowded during the Examination-weeks, especially when a candidate, who enjoys any previous reputation, is to appear. In such cases a strong interest is excited among all orders, and great attention is paid.

It will be evident, from the statement here given, that the students are prepared to pass this examination, not by solemn public lectures, delivered to a numerous class from a Professor's chair, but by private study in their respective Colleges. This method of study is the next thing which requires to be explained; for upon this point also the world are greatly, and in some instances purposely, misinformed.

The mode of instruction by College Lectures, which prevails at both the English Universities, is an innovation upon the original plan, which formerly obtained among them, and which is still practised in foreign universities, and I believe in those of Scotland. Some peculiar advantages there are attending each method, and the best method perhaps would be that which should unite both more completely than is the case with any

modern univerfity. If, however, they are compared one againft the other, as means of inftruction, the preference feems ftrongly due to that of College Lectures.

Under this fystem the pupils of one tutor are eafily clafled according to their capacities, and the flock of learning and fcience they bring with them. When formed into thefe fubdivifions, the choice of the lecture may be adapted to their peculiar wants, and the lecturer can perceive, individually as he goes along, how his inftruction is received. The heavinefs of folitary reading is relieved by the number which compofe a clafs: this number varies from three or four to ten or twelve: a fort of emulation is awakened in the pupil, and a degree of animation in the inftruftor, which cannot take place with a fingle pupil, and which approaches to the vivacity of a public fpeaker addreffing an audience. At the fame time he can addrefs himfelf to individuals, fatisfy their fcruples, correct their errors, and in fo doing, the fubject being thoroughly fifted and handled is feen in a variety of lights, and faftens more durably on the mind of thofe who are lifteners merely. Indeed, the impreffion thus made by theorems of fcience, and by proceffes of reasoning on every fubject, is fo much more vivid, and the means are at hand of afcertaining fo fatisfactorily how each pupil receives what he hears,

that

that the business of teaching is made less irksome and fatiguing to both parties; and in a few weeks the tutor is enabled to form a juster estimate of the abilities, and quickness, and mental habits, of his pupil, than any other system could explain to him in as many years.

In reading the principal Classic Authors also, which forms a great part of Oxford Education, the advantages of this method are not less conspicuous. A habit of accuracy, the last habit which a young man acquires by himself, is thus created. A thousand points are remarked as he goes along, which would have escaped a solitary student. Bad school-practices are corrected. Principles of taste and criticism are conveyed in the most striking manner, because they arise out of the occasion, and are taught with the example before him. Opinions of men and books, and whatever else is connected with the topics as they occur, are easily communicated. The scheme of literature is gradually unfolded to his mind, according as he is able to bear it, and to profit from it. In fact, there is no work of the class here alluded to, which may not serve as a text-book; with which information of every sort may, as the occasion requires, be interwoven; and the mode of imparting it may be adapted to the individual who is addressed. It is thus that the stores of one mind may most effectually be transfused into another,

whether concerning matters of literature, or philosophy, or religion, or the conduct of life. It is in these readings that the full merit of those ancient models is made prominent, and brought home to the feelings and apprehension of every one. They serve as specimens and exemplars, according to which private study may be formed and moulded; for in private study, after all, the great field of literature must be traversed. And hence is established that intercourse of mind, which, imperceptibly, gives a tincture even to the most thoughtless, and marks a lasting stamp on others, who are hardly conscious of the successive impulses, by which the impression is continually worn in.

In the more ambitious display of a public Lecture, there are, beyond a doubt, advantages which private instruction cannot have. The effort of the Lecturer is naturally greater, his matter more carefully prepared, his tone and diction more elevated and impressive. There are emotions which eloquence can raise, and which lead to loftier thoughts and nobler aspirations than commonly spring up in the private intercourse of men: when the latent flame of genius has been kindled by some transient ray, shot perhaps at random, and aimed least where it took the greatest effect, but which has set all the kindred sparks that lay there, in such a heat and stir, as that no torpid



torpid indolence, or low earthy-rooted cares, shall ever again smother or keep them down. From this high lineage may spring a never-failing race; few indeed, but more illustrious because they are few, through whom the royal blood of philosophy shall descend in its purest channels, but will hardly be brought down to mingle with the baser alloy of the unschooled multitude. It is not, it cannot be, the most effectual means by which instruction is to be conveyed to the minds of the great majority of students; and to do this, surely, is the prime object in any system of national education. The succession of illustrious names brought into notice by the other mode, is apt to cast a delusive splendour over the prominent masses which it illumines, and to withdraw our attention from the thousand inferior objects which are crowded in the back ground, less captivating, it is true, to the imagination, but equally entitled to the care of true philanthropy. I would not undervalue these higher doings; but we must be cautious how they lead us out of the track of plain and sober industry. A thirst for distinction may interfere with homely duties more really important to mankind. Our husbandry is truly on a large scale; but let us beware how we sacrifice, after the example of vain ostentatious breeders, the food of some twenty or thirty, for the sake of making a proud shew of one.

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Such produce is not the true or certain test of skilful management. If we send out into the world an annual supply of men, whose minds are imbued with literature according to their several measures of capacity, impressed with what we hold to be the soundest principles of policy and religion, grounded in the elements of science, and taught how they may best direct their efforts to farther attainments in that line; if, with this common stock, of which they all partake, they be encouraged afterwards to strike off into the several professions and employments of life, to engage in the public service of the state, or to watch over and manage the lesser circle of affairs, which the independent gentlemen of this country, and of this country only, conduct in their respective neighbourhoods; I think we do a greater and more solid good to the nation, than if we sought to extend over Europe the fame of a few exalted individuals, or to acquire renown by exploring untrodden regions, and by holding up to the world, ever ready to admire what is new, the fruits of our discovery.

Let not this be construed into an admission that speculation is discouraged. The fact is not so. But it is not, and it ought not to be the business of a body. It is for us to execute an established system; to teach and to recommend what is thoroughly approved. Individuals may  
engage

engage in the task of discovery; and they are better fitted for that task, if they be well informed in what is already known. In case they should be rewarded for their honourable search, "if truth shall have spoken to them before other men," let them in the name of truth not withhold the secret; it will be eagerly listened to here as elsewhere; and if, after due probation, it be found to be indeed the voice of truth which spake it, our system will thankfully receive the wholesome aliment. But to expect that every crude opinion or untried theory shall enter as soon as it demands admission, and take its place amongst us, while we rise up and make room to receive it, is against all reason and the analogy of things. Let the experiments be tried, and repeatedly tried, in some insignificant spot, some corner of the farm: but let us not risk the whole harvest of the year upon a doubtful project.

There is one province of education indeed, in which we are slow in believing that any discoveries can be made. The scheme of Revelation we think is closed, and we expect no new light on earth to break in upon us. The sacred volume we know has been abused, (as what gift of the Almighty has not been abused?) for the worst and wickedest ends. It has been hidden from the world, it has been corrupted, misinterpreted, and perverted, so as to become an engine of fraud and error,

error, and blind fanaticism. These arts and these acts of violence we hold it our especial duty to remedy and to guard against ; to keep strict watch round that sacred citadel, to deliver out in due measure and season the stores it contains, to make our countrymen look to it as a tower of strength, and to defend it against open and secret enemies. It stands conspicuous in all our streets : it catches the eye in every direction, and at every turning : and we should think all our views incomplete without it.

But I have, while pursuing these topics as they pressed upon my attention, left two or three points omitted, which belong to the detail of our proceedings.

Notwithstanding the high authorities quoted against the practice of composition, it forms part of the business of education in each College. These exercises however are all in prose, with the few exceptions before alluded to, and they are alternately English and Latin. In some Colleges a selection of the best is made every week, and read publicly before the College by the authors. In others they are collected at the end of each term, some judgment is pronounced upon them, and those who have written the best are thanked and commended.

It is also the practice of most Colleges (certainly of all the larger Colleges) to examine every student

student at the end of each term in the studies of the term. On this occasion he presents written notes and abridgments which he has formed, and gives an account of any other things he has read, connected with the main course of his studies.

There have also been for about forty years Prize Exercises, proposed by the Chancellor, in Latin Verse, and English Prose; to which our present Chancellor has added one, at his own suggestion, in Latin Prose. These are open to the whole University; and the successful compositions are recited in the Theatre in the most public manner at the annual Commemoration. The number of exercises usually given in is fifty or sixty: and occasionally a Prize in English Verse is added, which has brought forth poems of no common merit.

Such is the outline of the studies of this place: an outline, which I do not say is incapable of being improved and enlarged, but which does seem to comprehend all the leading objects of liberal education. In particular, it might, without danger of interfering too much with the more efficient studies of private colleges, admit of more frequent public lecturing than is at present practised. But to suppose that there is no such lecturing, is a great mistake. Besides a course, and sometimes two courses, in divinity,

I have already mentioned that lectures in this way are read by the several Professors in Natural Philosophy, Astronomy, Chemistry, Mineralogy, Botany, Anatomy, to classes drawn from different Colleges, at the option of the individuals, or under the advice of their tutors. Public lectures, which are rather detached dissertations, are also read, one in each term, to the whole University by the Professor of Poetry, and the Professor of Modern History. There is likewise a Course in Modern History often read to a select class, in which the doctrines of Political Economy have by the present Professor been much introduced and discussed.

That Political Economy therefore is unknown or discountenanced as a science, is equally wrong with many other imputations against us. The best works in that branch, as well as in the elements of Law and Politics, are in the hands of many students, with the full approbation of those who regulate their studies; although it is never forgotten that to lay a foundation of liberal literature, ancient and modern, before any particular pursuit absorbs the mind, is our main business. Any student also may obtain assistance from the Professors of Saxon and Oriental learning. But it is seldom that classes are formed in these branches. A few individuals, enough  
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to keep up the succession unbroken, have always made them their favourite study. But no account is taken of these matters at the Examinations for Degrees.

## CHAP. V.

*Of PLANS OF EDUCATION in general, and particularly of English Education.—Abuse of the term UTILITY.—Remarks on the Study of Political Economy and Moral Philosophy—Of some vulgar errors respecting Oxford—Conclusion.*

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PLANS of Education can never create great men. It is a weak and mistaken opinion one now and then meets with in the world; and all the testimony of history and experience will never wholly explode it. Native vigour and persevering exertion are the rare qualities, which lead to excellence of every kind. These qualities, it is true, may be aided, encouraged, and directed by method. Still it cannot happen that the method best adapted for the generality of cases will exactly suit each. The charge of education is a weighty one, and many interests are involved in it: it must be conducted with a view to the general benefit; and rules not always liked, not always profitable to individuals, must be enforced. Some perhaps will be impatient, and overshoot the

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the convoy, in hopes of making a better market. But it is at their own peril; and as the advantage is precarious, so is the failure unpitied, and without remedy.

There are again many who speak, there are some even who have written upon education, as if in its best form it were one continued system of restraint, of artificial guidance, and over-ruling inspection. The mind, they tell us, may be moulded like wax; and wax-work truly is all these plans will make of it. Such was the old Platonic reverie: such was the Jesuit scheme, the most perfect drill-training, perhaps, from the Centinel to the General, that ever was devised. Such in a great measure is the method of the modern Quakers. Heaven, and the guardian genius of English liberty, preserve us from this degrading process. We want not men who are clipped and espaliered into any form, which the whim of the gardener may dictate, or the narrow limits of his parterre require. Let our saplings take their full spread, and send forth their vigorous shoots in all the boldness and variety of nature. Their luxuriance must be pruned; their distortions rectified; the rust and canker and caterpillar of vice carefully kept from them: we must dig round them, and water them, and replenish the exhaustion of the soil by continual dressing. The  
sunbeams

sunbeams of heaven, and the elements of nature, will do the rest.

In the first stages indeed of infancy and boyhood, restraint must be continually practised, and liberty of action abridged. But, in proportion as reason is strengthened, freedom should be extended. At some of our public schools, it is said, this freedom is indulged to a dangerous extent. The charge may be just; and if so, the evil calls aloud for correction. But when a student is sent to the University, he ought to understand that he must think, in a great measure, and act, for himself. He is not to be for ever watched, and checked, and controlled, till he fancies that every thing is right which is not forbidden: as if there were no conscience within him, and no God above him, to whom he is accountable. Obedience is indeed a virtue even in man; but it is obedience founded in right reason, not in fear. Unless joined with this principle, virtue itself hardly deserves the name. Unless some choice be left it, some voluntary action to try its steadiness, how shall it approve itself to be virtue?

On this principle I rejoice to see a manly and generous discipline established among us—a discipline which enjoins nothing, which prohibits nothing, which punishes nothing, but what reason and common sense declare deserving of that treatment.

ment. There are decencies and formalities, indifferent perhaps in their own nature, which all well-ordered communities, especially if numerous, find it expedient to enforce by rules ; and which none but a depraved taste would disregard or habitually violate. But in all the great business of education, the student feels that what he does is his own doing ; the free working of his own will ; assisted certainly by counsel, by reproof, and by encouragement ; but springing principally from his own sense of what is fitting, virtuous, and honourable.

In the favourite studies of the place, they meet with nothing but what tends to breed and foster these noble sentiments ; to make them feel what they owe to their country in a land of freedom, and what their country expects from them. In the histories of Thucydides and Xenophon they see reflected all the great causes and motives, which can ever agitate and distract their own nation. They read, unmixed with the prejudiced and perverse clamours of party, the fatal consequences of misrule and anarchy, of wild democracy, of unlimited or unjust power. In these works, more especially in the former, is spread out before their eyes a crowded but not a confused picture of human affairs, exhibiting all the passions, both in their secret workings and in their fullest energy—all the difficulties and duties of a true patriot—all the virtues, the vices, the intrigues.

intrigues, the reciprocal interests, and the diversified fortunes of free states; and with the fullest and minutest detail of facts are interwoven such reflections and reasonings, as must for ever fix on that history the seal of political wisdom, and make it to be, what its author nobly and boldly foretold it would be, a standing monument of instruction to all times.

In the latter of these writers they will see how active patriotism and skill in affairs may be combined with the cultivation of letters and sound philosophy: while in his luminous narrative will occur to them such a lively and just account of things, such strong portraits starting, as it were, from the page in their native mien and features, as to carry almost all the distinctness, and more than all the authority, of living examples. And from no study can an Englishman acquire a better insight into the mechanism and temper of civil government: from none can he draw more instructive lessons, both of the danger of turbulent faction, and of corrupt oligarchy: from none can he better learn how to play skilfully upon, and how to keep in order, that finely-toned instrument, a free people.

To think that any student can peruse and understand these works without catching some portion of the generous spirit that breathes in them, is to argue an ignorance of the frame and constitution

stitution of man's nature; and many, we trust, there are, who, in the lofty language of Milton, "are led by them and drawn in willing obedience, "enflamed with the study of learning, and the "admiration of virtue; stirred up with high hopes "of living to be brave men, and worthy patriots, "dear to God, and famous to all ages."

So live they yet

Unchang'd by time, and hold their empire still  
 With noble minds : still lingering on the banks  
 Of Isis' silver stream, the Muse of Greece,  
 As by Ilissus once, her awful truths  
 Unfolds, and draws from many a record proud  
 The great example, not in vain address'd  
 To Britain's youth, that teaches how to prize  
 Their country's worth, and how to guard its weal  
 With virtue or with arms. Lo ! where she points  
 To Marathon's dread plain, and the rough shore  
 Of sea-beat Salamis, and bids them mark  
 How Heaven itself will arm, to aid the cause  
 Of virtuous freedom. From the mystic shrines  
 Of old Eleusis, and her dark abodes,  
 Went forth "The Mighty Mother," and in clouds  
 Hovering aloft o'er Persia's baffled host  
 Pour'd wild dismay, and on the Colian rock  
 Scatter'd the frequent wreck. Then while the flame  
 Glows in their youthful breasts, pausing awhile  
 The sweet instructress bids them mark again  
 How Athens rose to empire ; firm, and wise,

Resting her sway on lovely virtue rose ;  
 Till wealth and power prevail'd at length to taint  
 Her simple faith, and warp'd her from the line  
 Of equal rule : and the vile demagogue  
 Unfix'd the people's mind : and loosening first  
 The fence of law, that held him from his prey,  
 Chang'd them from what they were, from just and  
     mild  
 To fierce and cruel. Ponder th' eventful tale,  
 Ye rising hopes of Britain, for it speaks  
 With no light warning.

Such was the impression made by these studies on one, who had himself drank largely at the fountain of modern science as well as of ancient learning ; who lately shone a bright example among us, as the warm friend to merit of every kind ; who never ceased to encourage, to direct, and to assist those around him in every honourable pursuit ; and who is now wisely gone to enjoy the evening of life in repose, sweetened by the remembrance of having spent the day in useful and strenuous exertion.

It is not without reason then that we may think ourselves injured and insulted, when the world are told that we confine our instruction to the grammatical niceties of a dead language—that we repress all attempts at reasoning upon moral and political questions—that, “ by our miserable  
 “ jealousy and littleness, an infinite quantity of  
     “ talent

“talent is destroyed,”—that all the great topics, in which the mind of a public man should be well informed, are not only neglected, but discouraged or despised. The world in general cannot know, what the writer of this calumny most probably knew, that the charge is false. They will naturally be impressed by the daring look and menacing tone with which these positions are advanced: and, unless they read with sufficient attention to detect the ignorance and inconsistency of the writer, they will conclude, that, if not answered, they cannot be denied. In such a case indeed, where the charge is totally unsupported by proof, and by the authority of any name, a bare denial is in strict justice enough. No man can fairly be put on his defence, and expected to clear himself from loose accusations, without being even confronted with his accuser. But what could not in strict justice be demanded of us, it may still be wise and prudent to concede. A decent respect for public opinion, which every man and every society of men ought to entertain, makes it impossible to hear oneself openly and industriously defamed without some uneasiness, and without feeling some anxiety to give truth its fair chance against malice and defamation.

The words of this acrimonious invective I have not thought it always necessary to transcribe; but the substance of it will not be found, I trust,

unfairly stated, if compared with the extracts below<sup>a</sup>; which contain some of the noxious infusions in their most rectified and concentrated

▪ ‘ The English Clergy, in whose hands education entirely  
 ‘ rests, bring up the first young men of the country, as if they  
 ‘ were all to keep grammar schools in little country towns;  
 ‘ and a nobleman, upon whose knowledge and liberality the  
 ‘ honour and welfare of his country may depend, is diligently  
 ‘ worried, for half his life, with the small pedantry of longs  
 ‘ and shorts. . . . A genuine Oxford tutor would shudder  
 ‘ to hear his young men disputing upon moral and political  
 ‘ truth . . . . He would augur nothing from it, but impiety  
 ‘ to God, and treason to Kings. And yet, who vilifies both  
 ‘ more than the holy poltroon, who carefully averts from them  
 ‘ the searching eye of reason, and who knows no better method  
 ‘ of teaching the highest duties, than by extirpating the finest  
 ‘ qualities and habits of the mind? If our religion be a fable,  
 ‘ the sooner it is exploded the better. If our government is  
 ‘ bad, it should be amended.’ Edin. Rev. No. 29. p. 50.

‘ When an University has been doing *useless things* for a  
 ‘ long time, it appears at first degrading to them to be useful.  
 ‘ A set of lectures upon political economy would be discouraged  
 ‘ in Oxford, probably despised, probably not permitted. . . .  
 ‘ The Parr or the Bentley of his day would be scandalized in an  
 ‘ University, to be put on a level with the discoverer of a  
 ‘ neutral salt; and yet, *what other measure is there of dignity in*  
 ‘ *intellectual labour, but usefulness?* . . . . Nothing would so  
 ‘ much tend to bring classical literature within proper bounds,  
 ‘ as a steady and invariable *appeal to utility* in our appreciation  
 ‘ of all human knowledge. The puffed-up pedant would  
 ‘ collapse into his proper size, and the maker of verses, and the  
 ‘ rememberer of words, would soon assume that station which  
 ‘ is the lot of those who go up unbidden to the upper places of  
 ‘ the feast.’ Ibid. p. 51.

form.



form. There is however one ingredient carefully thrown in, with a view to render the rest more palatable—a plausible affectation of zeal for what is termed *Utility*.

Upon this subject I have already treated at some length in the third Chapter. But the fallacy is of such perpetual recurrence, that I must request a little farther attention while the solidity of this pretension is accurately examined. *Utility*, if it means any thing, means that which is conducive to some good end. Thus a thing may be useful which is not good in itself, provided it lead to what is good. It is the value of the end, which must determine the value of the means. And if a question arise concerning the comparative utility of two things, it can only be determined by considering the nature of the ends to which they respectively lead.

Now all those arts and studies which relate to the improvement of manufactures, and to the raising or multiplying the means of subsistence, terminate merely in the bodily wants of man. Our houses are better furnished, our table may be better supplied, our travelling more commodious; and all these are very desirable ends. But will any man who aspires to the name of philosopher maintain, that these are the principal ends of human life—that a rational being is most nobly occupied in supplying his bodily wants—in ministering

nistering to the caprices of fashion in dress, in building, in equipage, or in diet? There surely is some object paramount to all these, for which his faculties are fitted, and towards which they receive from nature some secret impulse and bias; an impulse which he is enabled to obey, in proportion as the pressure of those other motives is lessened, which are inferior in dignity, although prior in necessity. To make *necessity* the standard of what is praiseworthy or honourable, is against the uniform judgment of mankind. If that position were admitted, the lowest employments of life are unjustly depressed: for what services are more necessary than those which provide us with food and raiment? If the other wants and pleasures of life could not be consulted, without a sacrifice of these, no man could hesitate to which to give the preference. It is only on the presumption that these can be supplied by ordinary hands, and that there is time and labour enough at the disposal of society for other purposes, that we can at all justify those less necessary pursuits, which engage the attention of the higher departments in civilized life. This universal testimony of mankind, uncalled for and undesigned, appears to me the strongest evidence for the reasonableness of that distinction which every where prevails, and which admits only of such variations as local and accidental peculiarities naturally cause. The  
main

main principle is not only observable, but is prominent under all these variations, and has been so in all ages of the world.

Still we are continually reminded, that solid and useful attainments are preferable to those which are less necessary, and which adorn rather than support life. I readily grant that they are so: but only when brought into *competition* with each other. It is only when we are called upon to *make a choice between two*—when we cannot *have both*. We must build our house before we furnish it: but he who supplies the library and the pictures may surely be allowed to rank above the artificer that raised the walls and framed the roof.

Neither can any distinction be justly made between the case of *manual* and *intellectual* labour. They cannot indeed be altogether separated, even in the lowest occupations. And where the labour is purely intellectual, I do not see how its dignity can be measured by the tendency it has to satisfy the bodily wants of men. It is not, at least, a self-evident proposition; which this Reviewer presumes it to be. And if it be true, much more reason does there seem for measuring the mechanical and corporeal employments of life by that standard. But it is *not true*, and never will be *established* in the opinions of men. It may be brought forward upon occasion, like many other  
plausible

plausible deceptions, to serve a temporary purpose, to excite odium against one party, or to acquire popular favour for another ; and the mischief may be great for a time, although the delusion cannot be lasting.

There must be surely a cultivation of mind, which is itself a good : a good of the highest order ; without any immediate reference to bodily appetites, or wants of any kind. Of this cultivation I should say, as of many professions and trades, that it must not be allowed to *interfere* with duties of a plainer kind. If they cannot *both* be allowed in the same society, that which is least necessary must give way. But in the present case, such is not the question. No pretence is set up, that an undue proportion is withdrawn from the general population, and employed in these studies ; but that the *studies themselves* are frivolous, because they do not immediately tend to what is called *practical* good.

There are, it is true, emergencies of so imperious a nature, that they seem, while they last, to exalt the merit of him who relieves them, above that of every other service. An emergency of this kind is war. But no one surely can desire war on its own account. No sincere Christian, or friend to mankind, can with the profession of arms to be extended beyond the necessity of the case. The necessity may be lamented, but, after  
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the unvarying experience the world has had, it is the weak and visionary theorist only that can expect to see it altogether removed. And having this experience before us, any system of national education would be *wrong*, which unfitted men for that state of things—any system would be *imperfect*, which had not some tendency, direct or indirect, to fit them for it. And if Classical education be regarded in this light, there is none in which it will be found more faultless. A high sense of honour, a disdain of death in a good cause, a passionate devotion to the welfare of one's country, a love of enterprize, and a love of glory, are among the first sentiments, which those studies communicate to the mind. And as their efficacy is undoubted in correcting the narrow habits and prejudices to which the separation of the professions gives birth; so in the rough school of war is it more especially exemplified, in mitigating the tone of that severe instructor, and in softening some of his harshest features.

But I will not return, however attractive the theme, to a consideration of the merits of the best Classic writers. The praises we bestow upon them will be regarded by our adversaries, not as *proofs*, but as *encomiums*; and if what has been said is not sufficient, there is nothing, I believe, that can be said, to convince a hesitating and candid enquirer, how naturally they tend to inspire

just and elevated thoughts ; thoughts not merely adapted to solitude and contemplation, but to the intercourse of social life, and to the discharge of its most active duties.

Let me be permitted however, before I quit the subject, to transcribe a passage from the same Review ; written at a time when candour and liberal sentiment towards English Universities were not unknown to it.

“ It is the respect which men of rank in England usually pay to a Classical education, that drew from our Author the following compliment, in which we heartily join, in favour of our southern neighbours, and which is valuable, as coming from a man little accustomed to the complimentary style.”

‘ We ought to judge in matters of education, rather from experience than from mere reasoning. We should enquire what nation has produced the most active, and the greatest men ; not indeed the greatest number of compilers and of book makers, but of the most intrepid, the most acute, accomplished, and magnanimous characters ? This is very probably the English nation.’ *Edinburgh Review*, Number vi. p. 352. On *Lichtenberg’s Miscellaneous Works*.

If such be the advantages of a system founded in the study of ancient literature, it cannot be an object of indifference with the nation, to see it firmly established and well endowed. To preserve  
and

and uphold with due care this venerable edifice, a large appropriation both of the men and of the property of the country may well be made. Many there certainly ought to be, whose peculiar office should lead them to examine diligently all its parts, to bring together such materials as are necessary to counteract decay, to maintain its solidity, to cleanse, to improve and embellish it. But it is the *free communication of its use to the public*, which is their leading purpose; and, according as that duty is well or ill performed, the judgment of the public should be pronounced.

That some of its apartments might-not be arranged more commodiously, or furnished better, is more than I would presume to say. But on the subject of Political Economy, of which we now hear so much, I will venture a few observations in our defence.

This is, beyond a doubt, of all sciences relating to human interests, that in which the greatest progress has been made in modern times; and much honour is due to those writers who have let in light upon this hitherto obscure and unfrequented track. But the effect of novelty and discovery is to attract for a season an undue proportion of public favour. Such appears to me to have been the mistake with regard to Political Economy: and, in many instances, it has been a dangerous, if not a mischievous mistake: for

the attainment of this science seems almost to have supplanted all the other branches of knowledge requisite for a statesman; to have often narrowed his views, and to have made him regard every public measure simply in the relation it bears to national wealth. But this object, as I have already contended, and ever will contend, against the clamorous sciolists of the day, is not the prime business of true policy. However important and even necessary it may be, it is a subordinate and not a predominant concern in public affairs—not less than the management and improvement of an estate in private life is an inferior duty to the education of children, the maintenance of character, and the guidance of a house.

Still it cannot be disputed, that the science has a tendency, if rightly studied, to enlarge the mind, and that it will enable a man to perform many of the relative duties of life, both public and private, more correctly. On this account the introduction of it into the Lectures on Modern History has always appeared to me a great improvement; and the still farther extension of the same enquiry would, I am persuaded, be much approved.

Its great leading principles however are soon acquired: the ordinary reading of the day supplies them. And with the majority of students, the more accurate study and investigation of its the-



orems may well be reserved for those situations and occasions, in which many of them will be placed at some future season, and which afford ample time for the completion of such enquiries. When combined with practical exertions, and called forth by particular occasions, these studies gain a firmer hold, and are pursued with more eager interest. The mind should indeed be early disciplined and fitted for that work: but the work itself may be done when the time comes.

It is a folly to think that every thing which a man is to know must be taught him while young; as if he were to spring at once from College, and be intrusted with the immediate management of the world: as if life had no intervals for extending knowledge: as if intellectual exercise and the act of learning were unbecoming the state of manhood.

With regard to this science in particular, there are many points in it, which make me think it a fitter employment for the mind in an advanced period of life, than when the affections are young and growing, and liable to be cramped and flunted by the views of human nature which it continually presents. There is perhaps something in all theoretical views of society, which tends to harden the feelings, and to represent man as a blind part of a blind machine. The frame-work of that great structure must, we know, be put together upon such principles. And the more enlarged  
our

our sphere of action is, the more correct and luminous ought our notions to be of their relative power and importance. But by far the greater part of those who are educated for active professions have less occasion for contemplating these abstract notions, than for adapting themselves promptly to the limited relations of life in which they are placed; and in which the remedy of evils caused by the friction of the machine and by external accident, requires not that comprehensive view of its whole construction to be for ever present to the mind. It is not then that I would keep these truths out of sight; it is not that I would deny the utility of them in every sphere and condition: but where a choice is left us among many pursuits, all of which are in their several degrees beneficial, I would be very cautious how that was singled out and made predominant, which is so prone to usurp over the rest, and the abuse of which is not a laughable, but a serious evil.

Much we are told from day to day of the folly of pedantry. The folly is indeed ridiculous, and it is seldom spared. But the pedant in chemistry, or in physics, is at least as disagreeable an animal as the pedant in classical learning; and the pedant in political economy is not disagreeable only, but dangerous. And if a prospect were open to a young man of a period of leisure after his term of college-study should be expired, it seems more  
advisable

advisable to lay the foundation for this science by exercising his mind in sound Logic and in Mathematical reasoning, upon which any other system of close and severe reasoning may soon be built, than to run the risk of sacrificing that more generous discipline, which, if not imparted at an early period of life, is seldom acquired afterwards.

Never, while the world lasts, will it be wholly disabused of that specious error, that the more there is crammed into a young man's mind, whether it stays there or not, whether it is digested or not, still the wiser he is. And writings such as those which I have been examining, smart, witty, and confident, tend to confirm this diseased habit of thinking, and to spread the contagion. A half educated father hears that lectures are read in Chemistry, Botany, Mineralogy, &c. &c. at one place, and his son is learning nothing of this sort at school. Incapable of judging how mental powers are improved by continual exercise, and how the moral character is in a great measure formed by the study of good authors, he fancies that when the grammar of a language is learnt, all farther attention to that language is lost time—that there is nothing new gained, because there is no new name. If the boy is captivated by the novelty and variety of the studies which are presented to him, he seldom returns with any relish to philological pursuits. He may become a skilful agriculturist, an improver  
of

of manufactures, an useful inspector of roads, mines, and canals: but all that distinguishing grace, which a liberal education imparts, he foregoes for ever. It cannot be acquired in a later period of life, if the morning of his days have been occupied with other cares, and the intellectual habits already settled in different forms and postures. If, as too often happens, these matters are received into the ears, but take no possession of the mind, there is not only a moral blank, but an intellectual barrenness—a poverty of fancy and invention, a dearth of historical and poetical illustration, a want of all those ideas which decorate and enliven truth, which enable us to live over again the times that are past, to combine the produce of widely distant ages, and to multiply into one another the component parts of each. The experiment is a cruel one. I have seen it tried; and have witnessed the melancholy and irreparable result.

On the contrary, if this liberal instruction be first provided, and if the intellect be duly prepared by correct Logic, and pure Mathematical science, there is no analysis, which the business of life may afterwards call upon him to investigate, beyond the reach of a moderate understanding. The habit of discrimination, the power of stating a question distinctly, and of arguing with perspicuity, are of much greater importance than the hasty acquisition of miscellaneous knowledge. Not that I  
would

would be understood to exclude the study of those matters from an University. They are taught, and esteemed and encouraged here: but we do not deny that they are the subordinate, and not the leading, business of education: and (what I think should never be forgotten) they are much more easily attained by a well disciplined mind, after he enters into life, than the other studies upon which we lay the greatest stress.

If it be seriously complained of as a defect, that scepticism either in philosophy or religion is discountenanced, I can only pity the folly of the writer who could advance so untenable a position. If indeed the object of education be to distract the mind of the student, to make his opinions loose, wavering, and inconstant, instead of guiding his choice, assisting his judgment, and concentrating his powers, then we must admit that we are altogether under a mistake. If he was sent here, not to be fed with what we believed to be the most wholesome diet, but to be turned adrift amongst a medley of all sorts of food and all sorts of poison, and left to choose for himself, then indeed have we still to learn our duty, and to begin at that point where we have hitherto fancied education ought to end. But the wretched absurdity of this doctrine is too manifest to bear a question. It must seem like trifling to attempt its refutation. I will therefore proceed to notice

one topic more, on which I have heard the complaints of friends as well as enemies.

Much wonder has been sometimes expressed, that, in so important a science as Moral Philosophy, no more distinct provision should have been made in the English Universities, and that so much respect should still continue to be paid, more especially in Oxford, to the ancient heathen systems of Ethics, after so many corrections and improvements, with the light and authority of the Gospel to guide us.

To this objection the first answer which occurs is, that, in a Christian community, Ethics is much more included within the province of Religion than that of Philosophy. Without the sanction of Religion, the purest system of Ethics would be comparatively lifeless and unfruitful: and without ethical instruction, Religion itself is vapid, and even dangerous. They may be considered as inseparable ingredients of one compound; and the care of teaching both in the most effectual manner may well be intrusted to the same hands. It is then from the pulpit that we are to look for the fullest performance of this branch of education; and it is in this service that we see called forth amongst us the greatest efforts of moral and metaphysical reasoning.

The name of Sermon has with some people become synonymous with a trite superficial statement

ment of truths which no one combats. A volume of Sermons is too often regarded by the world in that light: and it is well known to be a most unpromising title to a work. Call the same composition, Lectures in Moral Philosophy, Dissertations on certain theorems in Ethics or Metaphysics, and they are immediately supposed to contain something profound—some display of acute and original reasoning—some new illustration or powerful vindication of established truths. And the same injustice is equally observable with regard to the unpublished arguments which are continually framed, and delivered from the pulpit. The instruction, however, thus conveyed is, for all practical purposes, and in a great degree also for intellectual exercise and improvement, the most solid and impressive.

Religion adapts itself to all conditions, to all occupations, whether of mind or body; and that form, in which its truths are best represented to a congregation of students and of educated men, is one which calls for a power of abstract reasoning, and for a knowledge of the best Ethical works, the matter of which, according to its worth, may be incorporated with religious discourse. Hardly any man but the Enthusiast contends that the Gospel was designed to supersede moral reasoning. It adds a sanction to Ethics, which the sublimest philosophy could never give: it corrects some

errors, into which the purest philosophy, without that guide, had fallen. But it displays no entire and systematic code, which renders the employment of our natural faculties in such an enquiry less needful: on the contrary, it affords a strong additional stimulus to exert them in this service. If therefore the whole of what we learnt in *Morals* were to be derived from one work, no Christian could hesitate between the system of Aristotle and the system of Paley. The latter work is well known here, and never mentioned without respect. But whether as an exercise of the reasoning faculty, or as exhibiting moral theorems in a more captivating and convincing shape, I cannot think it entitled to a decided preference. It may lead to a notion also, that it contains *all* we think well established in Christian Ethics: whereas the Greek Philosophy is always studied with a reserve in favour of Christianity, and an habitual reference is made to a more unerring standard, by which its soundness is to be tried. When we consider too how frequently, from the very nature of the case, a popular modern work in English will be read without much specific encouragement, while a foreign stimulus is almost always wanted to make an ancient treatise of any depth generally studied, the prudence of fixing on the latter as the object of reward and honour, supposing them nearly equal in value, cannot be questioned.



questioned. My own conviction, after much consideration of the matter, decidedly settled in that way : but I admit it to be a point, on which different opinions may well be entertained, even by people acquainted with the works of both classes.

In the view which has thus been given, and the defence which has been attempted, of Oxford Education, although I have not been able, nor indeed have I been willing, to suppress the strong affection which I feel for the place and for its peculiar studies ; yet nothing has been farther from my mind than to act the part of a professed advocate—to hide its defects—to exaggerate its merits—and to give a false complexion to the whole case. It is one of the marks either of extreme weakness, or of artful malignity, to draw an ideal picture of what a seminary of learning might be, or ought to be. A kind of intellectual paradise is delineated, from which human passions, prejudices, and interests are altogether excluded. Nothing is to occupy the mind but a never-failing and laborious attention to peculiar duties. No allowance is to be made for difference of bodily or mental constitution—none for occasional languor, or fluctuation of spirits—none for the avocations of business—for multiplied and entangled connections—for pursuits of private interest

interest and advancement; pursuits which are thought not only allowable, but laudable in every other department of life. And when this visionary scene has been exhibited to the fancy, what wonder if the reality shall be found homely and disappointing ! Where human beings are, human follies and interests will ever be found. The comparison ought not in candour to be made with a perfect standard ; but with that which seems fairly practicable, and reasonably to be expected in the present state of things. If there be any institution so pure, any body of individuals so devoted to the public good, that no other motive finds place in their minds, and no other view or inclination, from day to day, is harboured there, but the service of God and man, let *them*, (with solemn reverence and sincerity of heart I speak it,) let them cast the first stone at us. But these are not the men, from whom the language of insult and invective is heard. It is that many-tongued spirit of jealous discontent or political discord, which utters these jarring sounds ; which ever and anon flits across our path, and, occupying some sheltered nook or over-hanging eminence, derides us with fiendlike mockery, and points with a reproachful hand at each faltering step or accidental failure : while nothing seems to delight it more than to see its elish tricks imitated by an idle throng of spectators, or to hear an echo

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of laughter raised at the expence of silent and unpretending worth.

There are, moreover, some points in the constitution of this place, which are carefully kept out of sight by our revilers, but which ought to be known and well considered, before any comparison is made between what we are, and what we ought to be. *The University of Oxford is not a national foundation.* It is a congeries of foundations, originating some in royal munificence, but more in private piety and bounty. They are moulded indeed into one corporation; but each one of our twenty Colleges is a corporation by itself, and has its own peculiar statutes, not only regulating its internal affairs, but confining its benefits by a great variety of limitations. In this particular, I believe, we are much more restrained than the foundations in Cambridge, although in many cases the limitations bear a close resemblance. In most Colleges the fellowships are appropriated to certain Schools, Dioceses, Counties, and in some cases even to Parishes, with a preference given to the Founder's kindred for ever. Many qualifications, quite foreign to intellectual talents and learning, are thus enjoined by the Founders; and in very few instances is a free choice of candidates allowed to the Fellows of a College, upon any vacancy in their number. Merit therefore has not such provision made as the extent

tent of the endowments might seem to promise. Now it is certain, that each of these various constitutions cannot be the best. The best of them perhaps are those where an unrestrained choice is left among all candidates who have taken one degree. The worst are those which are appropriated to schools, from which boys of sixteen or seventeen are forwarded to a fixed station and emolument, which nothing can forfeit but flagrant misconduct, and which no exertion can render more valuable.

But what can be said to all this? Are the wills of private benefactors to be set aside, not because they contain provisions *injurious* to the public, (for in that case no one could question the propriety of interference in the Legislature,) but simply because these provisions are *not the best that might have been*? If the country were about to allot anew any portion of its wealth for the purpose of education, of course the plan would be uniform, and the regulations such as might seem best adapted, in every respect, to promote the desired end. But an English Legislature has always evinced, and I trust ever will evince, a tender regard for the authority of Wills, and the sacredness of private property. Whatever innovations may be made, no one can apprehend from such a Legislature, that any personal loss should be sustained by the present individuals. And whether even the  
maintenance

maintenance of a sacred principle be not a greater good than the mere *amelioration* of a system, ought to be, and would be, I am confident, well considered, before any change is made<sup>a</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> Mr. Cockburn, late Christian Advocate at Cambridge, has proposed a plan for limiting the duration of all fellowships to ten or twelve years, securing of course the present possessors from any loss or injury. Although I admire and applaud the zeal of this writer, and have no doubt of the purity and rectitude of his intentions, yet I cannot think his plan desirable, on several accounts. The hardship, which many individuals would *certainly* suffer, outweighs in my mind the value of any *incidental good* which might arise from this system. Besides, the great object proposed is, to send Fellows of Colleges into active employment. Now this purpose is already effected by the permission, universally granted, of non-residence. Not more than one sixth part, I believe, of the Fellows of Colleges in Oxford are resident; very few more than are engaged in the business of education. The rest are employed in the world in different ways. The system of non-residence is carried so far, as to have affected materially the aspect of the place, perhaps farther than in prudence it ought to be. Very few are there who are possessed of leisure to carry on learned works. And the consequence is, that the business of Authorship is often assumed by most incompetent hands; while abler men are occupied in the more useful but less showy task of tuition. On this subject I believe the public are much misinformed. The life of a College is far from being the life of a Cloyster. The character of a Fellow of a College, so often made the theme of satirical humour, like that of the Squire in country life, has nearly disappeared. The evil, if any, is now reversed. So far from a College being a drain upon the world, the world drains Colleges of their most efficient members; and, although the University thus becomes a more effectual engine of education, it loses much of that characteristic feature

In the mean time I never wish to see the University placed above responsibility to public opinion. I never wish to see her shielded from the fear of public censure, reposing securely on her endowments, and disregarding the clamours of the world around her. It is the terror of the public voice which keeps in awe our very Government, and all our public institutions: and when once that salutary check is removed, we know how soon every ill weed springs up and ripens in every quarter of the estate, and how indolent all its stewards and labourers become. To the voice of the public we ought always to answer with respect, and to render an account, if called upon, of our proceedings. And when that account is fairly given in, I do not fear that a judgment will be passed, upon the vain and ungenerous expectation of perfect virtue. If indeed the great purpose of national education were defeated or lightly regarded by us, if the life-blood of England, instead

it once had, as a residence of learned leisure, and an emporium of literature.

Having mentioned this pamphlet of Mr. Cockburn's, I cannot avoid repeating, that I admire the sincerity and benevolence of the Author, and that I enter warmly into his views of the danger to which the Church is exposed, not by the fear of Catholic Emancipation, as it is absurdly called, but by the subtle activity of its adversaries, and the supineness and indifference of those who ought to be its most energetic defenders.

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of being invigorated by healthy food, and quickened by pure patriotism, were sent back tainted and diseased, to circulate through her veins disloyalty, irreligion, or fanaticism, then indeed might we hang down our heads in shame, and shrink from that storm of obloquy which is gathering so thick around us. But if no such deadly mischief is suffered to lurk here; if, with the allowances candour will ever make for human frailty, we be found upon the whole to discharge our duty with discretion and fidelity; we need never scruple to meet our accusers with a clear and unabashed countenance; confident, as we well may be, that we shall continue to enjoy the protection of the government we live under, and the favour of that nation, whose best interests we serve.





## POSTSCRIPT.

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**I** WISHED, when it was too late, to introduce a note, or to make some alteration in one or two passages. E. g.

P. 60. l. 14. *QUOD* always has more or less the force of *BECAUSE*. This is not strictly true. It has the force also of *As to*; but this use of it was not the point in question: it may safely be said, that it *never* has the force of *UT*.

P. 67. Note. A further reason might be assigned for the doctrine respecting *scio quod*, notwithstanding the line in Plautus. A long parenthesis is often the cause of a little grammatical incongruity in the oldest writers: it is a kind of *disturbing force*, which affects the course of the sentence, although it does not extinguish its original character: such a sentence therefore is not a good authority for any unusual construction.

P. 90. l. 11. This statement may seem hardly reconcileable with the example from Livy, xxxi. 9. in the same page. It is certainly a general rule, that, to mark the *same relation* in Latin, the *same case*

*case* is required. But this rule is, like other grammatical rules, liable to variation, through the idioms and anomalies of language: of which variation the passage from Livy xxxi. 9. is one example.

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### ERRATA.

P. 8. l. 9. for *light* read *lit.*

P. 57. l. 6. for *ut* read *at.*

A  
SECOND REPLY  
TO THE  
EDINBURGH REVIEW.  
BY  
THE AUTHOR OF A REPLY  
TO  
THE CALUMNIES  
OF THAT REVIEW AGAINST OXFORD.

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“We cannot review the pamphlet before us, without either refuting the argument contained in it, or acknowledging the justice of its remarks.” *Edin. Rev. No. 31. p. 158.*

“Besides, leaving out the considerations of morality and religion, I am astonished, my good brethren, that you do not establish a character for telling truth, for your own advantage.” *Sermons by the Reverend Sydney Smith, vol. ii. p. 117.*

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OXFORD,

Printed for the Author; and sold by J. COOKE, and J. PARKER;  
J. MACKINLAY, J. MURRAY, and F. C. & J. RIVINGTON,  
London.  
1810.



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# REMARKS

UPON

*Article VII. in Number XXXI.*

OF THE

EDINBURGH REVIEW.

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BY treating this Article as the production of three different writers, each defending himself against the same adversary, and vindicating his former writings from the censures passed upon them, I am certainly putting the most candid construction upon it, which the nature of the case will bear.

It is possible indeed for great agitation of mind to betray an individual into language not only offensive and indecent, but hardly reconcileable with truth, because not consistent with itself; but in the instance before us the violation of consistency is so frequent and direct, and occurs in parts which give so little occasion for passion to operate, that I cannot refer it to any other cause than to that division of labour, which I doubt not is found

beneficial, upon the long run, in reviewing, as well as in the other useful arts. The particular examples of this failing will be noticed as we proceed. In the mean time, I cannot but contend, that, if well established, they must at least be allowed to divest the Review of all the authority which it is supposed to derive from numbers—from that imposing *plural* style which overawes the solitary reader, and gives to the dictates of a single writer the weight and efficacy of a legal sentence. Wherever this discrepancy can be discovered, not only is the authority of many reduced to that of one, but we can oppose to this one an authority of equal rank with his own; and all the claims to deference, which belong to him as one of a distinguished fraternity, are nullified by counteracting authority, which he must himself admit to be equally strong.

Some blame is perhaps in such cases due to the Conductor of a work of this nature, whose peculiar office seems to be, to make the parts of his machinery play well and smoothly into one another. He does not indeed seem to have been altogether indifferent to this object; for the introduction, as well as one or two connecting clauses, are evidently the work of his pen: but though they serve to give the whole piece a more finished appearance, they do in fact loosen and encumber what was rickety enough before. For one sen-

tence however of this introduction, which is manly and candid, I am ready to make my sincere acknowledgments. He is pleased to say, "We cannot review the pamphlet before us, without either *refuting the argument* contained in it, or *acknowledging the justness of its remarks.*" Now to this pledge I wish strictly to confine him. I have no other desire than that the question between us may fairly be brought to that issue. And I entreat those who have felt any interest in this dispute to examine the statement I am about to make with close attention; to compare it strictly with the Article in the Review, and to form their judgment, not from the tone of confidence which either party may assume, and the loose unsupported assertions which they may advance, but from the intrinsic force of the arguments and authorities respectively adduced. If, after making this impartial comparison, it shall appear that the writers have refuted any one of the leading propositions I maintained; if I am obliged to abandon any one of the critical opinions ventured in the Reply, or if I fail of demonstrating that, where my arguments could not be overthrown, they have been represented to be what they really were not, I will then patiently submit to the most insulting and abusive of those epithets which that Review has thought fit to bestow upon me. But if the result shall be the reverse of all

this, as I doubt not upon an accurate investigation, it will be found to be, few of my readers will deny, that the disgrace of that language is reflected entirely upon the authors of it; and not only that the charges are made good in their original force, which were at first laid against them, but that their guilt has been greatly aggravated by the manner in which they have conducted their defence.

I proceed now to make the proposed examination, only stopping for a few moments to remove an obstruction which lies at the very threshold.

In the first place then an exception is taken to the Title of the work reviewed, "A Reply to the *Calumnies* of the Edinburgh Review;" and we are told that a Calumny is "a fictitious recital made for the purpose of hurting the *moral* character of an individual, or a body of individuals:" from whence the Reviewer infers, that as no immorality was imputed to Oxford, the term *Calumny* is not applicable to their accusations, even supposing the *falsehood* of them to be proved.

This surely is at best but a piece of verbal criticism: and verbal criticism is in the same Article, p. 185. denominated "a silly art:" for it in no degree affects the case between us. All I con-



tend for is, that their charges against Oxford are *false*; and this point being once established, whatever satisfaction they can derive from reflecting that their *falsehoods* inferred no immorality, I am very ready to allow them. At the same time I must wait for authority very different from that of the Edinburgh Review before I confine the use of an English word to a narrower sense than I find it bear in the conversation and daily use of well educated men. “Any falsehood circulated injurious to the reputation of another,” is, according to my apprehension, a calumny; and although the Reviewer says, according to *our* apprehension it is necessarily an attack on the *moral* character, I wish he would inform us under what system of ethics the writing of barbarous Latin is deemed a *moral* offence. For be it observed, that in p. 176. of the same Article, the word *calumniator* is used in this very sense. The writer calls me a *libeller* of Oxford for exposing its bad Latin—‘he wishes ‘he could say *calumniator*;’ adding, in substance, that falsehood is the only ingredient wanting to make this libel of mine a *calumny*. But it is useless to dwell longer upon such a quibble. Not only the Edinburgh Reviewer, but the best writers of the language, use the word in the sense in which I have above explained it<sup>a</sup>. And till

<sup>a</sup> Mr. Burke, I know, when correcting the error, that the administration of affairs in Hanover was arbitrary, calls the

we have something better than a dogma from Edinburgh to guide us, we may continue to respect the authority of Dr. Johnson, who, without a hint of its being appropriated to offences of a *moral* nature, explains it to be "Slander; false charge; groundless accusation;" and one of the examples produced by him is from Sir W. Temple, which speaks of a *calumny* against our soil<sup>b</sup>.

It is at the same time worthy of notice, that the very Review in question accuses the Graduates of Oxford of not "possessing any knowledge or skill whatsoever in that art which they profess, and which they were chosen and appointed to practice for the benefit and instruction of the community." No. 28. p. 431. It declares that the University "acts with the minds of young men, as the Dutch did with their exuberant spices—that an infinite quantity of talent is annually destroyed by the miserable jealousy and littleness of its instructors." No. 29. p. 50. And in the same Number a *genuine Oxford Tutor* is

statement a *calumny*: but I cannot at this moment turn to the passage. The word is used every day in and out of Parliament for *false accusations of a political nature*.

<sup>b</sup> The authority quoted for the use of the word *calumniate* is still more to the point.

One trade or art, *even those that should be the most liberal*, shall make it their business to disdain and *calumniate* another.

SPRAT.

described as a *holy poltroon*, “ who vilifies God  
 “ and Kings, by carefully averting from them the  
 “ searching eye of reason, and who knows no bet-  
 “ ter method of teaching the highest duties, than  
 “ by extirpating the finest qualities and habits of  
 “ the mind.” Ibid.

All this the world are now told (I believe for  
 the first time) that, even if *false*, it is not *calum-  
 nious* : and that the accusation involves no moral  
 delinquency or defect whatever.

## PART I.

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Provok'd, the Juggler cried, 'tis done :  
*In Science I submit to none.*

Thus said, the cups and balls he play'd ;  
 By turns, this here, that there, convey'd ;  
 The cards, obedient to his words,  
 Are by a fillip turn'd to birds ;  
 His little boxes change the grain,  
 Trick after trick deludes the train.  
 He shakes his bag, he shews all fair,  
 His fingers spread, *and nothing there.*

GAY.

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THE ground being thus broken, the task of completing the first parallel is left to the Reviewer of La Place, a writer of whose ability and scientific attainments very respectful mention had been made. The passage extracted from his Review, as containing false and injurious assertions concerning Oxford, I think it best to print entire, not only because the reader will thus best be able to follow up the argument, but because the Reviewer has been so unfortunate, when defending himself, as to exhibit this passage, on which the whole question hinges, with a material change of expression. In No. 22. of the Edinburgh Review it stands thus ;

“ We believe, however, that it is chiefly in the public institutions of England that we are to seek for the cause of the deficiency here referred to, and particularly in the two great centres from which knowledge is supposed to radiate over all the rest of the island. In one of these, where the dictates of Aristotle are still listened to as infallible decrees, AND where the infancy of science is mistaken for its maturity, the mathematical sciences have never flourished; and the scholar has no means of advancing beyond the mere elements of geometry.” Edin. Rev. No. 22. p. 283.

Of this passage he observes, “ To the proposition, *which is the main scope of the sentence*, that the mathematical sciences *have never flourished at Oxford*,” I have been prudent enough not to make any reply. To this observation therefore, before I touch upon the three other propositions, which will be treated in exact order, I will now first direct my attention: and if the reader will examine what I say with patience, I have little doubt to which of us the compliment of prudence will appear to be most due; to me for having omitted to make any reply then, or to the Reviewer for having provoked one now.

It will be remembered then that the Reviewer is attempting to account for the *decline* of mathematical learning in England “ for almost a century past;” he is seeking “ to what cause we must ascribe the *dereliction* of a science, by what

“ may be regarded as its native country ;” and the principal cause suggested by himself is the system of education pursued in the two English Universities. Now if it be true that “ the mathematical sciences *never flourished* at Oxford ;” if this be not only his meaning, but “ the main scope “ of the whole sentence ;” and if by this he means to account for the *decay* of mathematical science among us in modern times ; I own I am at a loss to guess according to what system of dialectics his argument is framed. Let us but try the same process of reasoning in another case.

A great mortality has taken place *of late years* among our troops, and many causes may be assigned for this *increase* : but the principal cause is the unwholesomeness of our two chief military stations. One of these has *always been an unhealthy place*. And although the greatest objections to it have been long ago removed, yet there *still remains* much which is injurious to the health, &c. What should we think of a medical board whose report should commence with a reason of this kind ? To that profession indeed we are indebted for the Galenic figure, a very superfluous addition to the scheme of Aristotle ; but it was reserved for a later age, and a more enlightened philosopher, to enrich the art of reasoning with so ingenious a method of supporting falsehood as that just exhibited.

But, what is still more surprising, after having given me credit for *prudence* in not attempting any reply to the proposition, “that the mathematical sciences have never flourished at Oxford,” within a few pages this *prudent* writer proceeds as follows :

“The author seems, in his outset, to have chosen very unskilfully the ground on which his stand was to be made. In the warfare of the pen, no less than of the sword, it is a great error to attempt defending a place which is untenable; and from which, in spite of every effort, you must be forced to retire with loss. *To defend the mathematics and the sciences of Oxford*, was precisely an undertaking of this kind:—it was to defend the weakest point in the whole country, and that which a prudent commander would have immediately resolved to abandon. Our adversary, *by making choice of this disadvantageous position*, has committed an error that we should not have expected from one who had learnt his tactics in the school of Aristotle: he has taken post in a hollow way, where he is overlooked in all directions, and commanded by higher ground on every side to which he can possibly turn.” Edinb. Rev. No. 22. p. 168.

What other solution can be offered of this singular phænomenon than that before suggested? Surely never was man yet so blinded with passion or prejudice, as to be the author of both these sentences, and to utter them almost in the same

breath. But if this be indeed a touch from the master's pencil, one has only to lament that he should have thrown in his colours so carelessly, and have spoilt the effect of his composition, by aiming injudiciously at some partial beauties. As a general, indeed, he seems to have been guilty of a most signal mistake ; for, if I may be allowed to borrow the metaphor which his own rich fancy has created, ‘ in the warfare of the pen, no less ‘ than of the sword, it is a great error’ so to dispose our troops, that, when we think they are harassing the enemy, they are in fact keeping up a cross fire against themselves. Into this error the Editor of the Review seems to have been repeatedly betrayed : and he not only allows his several divisions to attack and impede each other, but he calls out his *corps de reserve* when matters come to extremity, and employs them in charging and routing his own army.

It may be as well however to state in plain language the reasons why so little notice was taken of the proposition above quoted. In the first place it is loosely expressed, and capable of so many interpretations, that, unless it was material to the case, it would have been merely a tedious incumbrance on the argument to discuss it at all. It was not the *historical fame*, but the *present character* of the University, which I undertook to vindicate : it was that character which the Re-



viewer attacked; and he represented it as one principal cause of the decline of mathematical science in this country, although he scruples not now to declare, that the “main scope of the sentence” in question was to state that our character in that respect has been always the same. To such miserable shifts is a man driven, who has perhaps the sense to see that he has advanced a false accusation, but not manliness or candour enough to retract it.

I shall now proceed to notice, in their order, the three following propositions, which constitute the whole of the original charge, which I thought it concerned me to notice.

I. That at Oxford the dictates of Aristotle are still listened to as infallible decrees.

II. That the infancy of Science is mistaken for its maturity.

III. That the scholar has no means of advancing beyond the mere elements of Geometry.

In support of the first article he says, that he never intended to charge us with teaching the Physics of Aristotle; “that what was said about the dictates of Aristotle was not meant of his Physics, but of his Logic and Metaphysics.” And, before he advances to the discussion of this topic, he gives us a specimen of his own logic in

a passage too remarkable to be omitted. Having produced an extract from the Reply respecting the progress of natural philosophy in the seventeenth century, he adds,

“ We will not at present dispute the correctness of this short account here given of the revolutions in Physics ; although we must remark, that if the artillery which dislodged the Aristotelian Physics had come from the arsenal of Bacon, the Cartesian never would have succeeded to them ; as no two plans of philosophising were ever more opposite than those of Bacon and Descartes.” Rev. p. 160.

Thus, if it was A that drove B out of his house, C could never have got in, because no people were ever more at variance than A and C. If it was the Presbyterian sect which shook the power of the crown in the reign of Charles I. the Independents would never have acquired the ascendancy, because their tenets were fundamentally different. If the Jacobins in France destroyed the monarchy, Buonaparte would never have succeeded to them, as no two plans of polity were ever more opposite than those of Buonaparte and the Jacobins. Admirable reasoner ! Is this then the ‘ inductive method,’ to which the logic of Aristotle is so hostile ? In order to overthrow a position relating to a matter of fact, he produces a theoretical principle of morals, by which he would have our belief respecting this

fact determined. A compendious road truly, which Aristotle never dreamt of; a road, which not only makes historical evidence superfluous, but which forbids us even to listen to it, when it militates against an abstract probability. Little did Lord Bacon imagine, when he wrote his 127th Aphorism, that, after the lapse of two centuries, a writer, who professes to be one of his greatest admirers, would evince so wanton a disregard of his leading principle.

The passage itself has little indeed, or rather nothing to do with the main argument: but it is a curious commentary upon the opinions of this assailant of Aristotle, and gives us some foretaste of the blessings which will be derived from a complete overthrow of the works of that mistaken philosopher. We shall soon have abundant proof of the inconvenience of other rules, by which he had the temerity to fetter down the human understanding; but from which, through the influence of the *Edinburgh Review*, especially if supported by the credit of the present writer, we may hope speedily to see mankind set at liberty.

Let us now resume the consideration of those dictates of Aristotle, which the Reviewer says are still held to be infallible at Oxford; contained, as he himself explains it, in his *Logic* and his *Metaphysics*. Now, whatever terrors may have haunted him with respect to the latter of these works, I

am happy in being able to release him at once from them all. The work forms no part of the system of education in this University. Whatever its merits may be, I can assure him the student is neither required, nor expected, nor advised to read it. The whole of the question then resolves itself into the Logic of Aristotle. And here, if it were not presumptuous to expect that an Edinburgh Reviewer should condescend to look at the book he is reviewing, I would venture to refer him to p. 22. of the 'Reply,' for a statement of the manner in which the Logic of Aristotle is now studied here. He will find, that the shortest Compendium extant, which contains all the essential principles of the art, is the text-book usually employed. If he consults that Compendium, he will find, that the method of induction is there accurately explained; and that the vulgar error, (*about which more will be said presently,*) by which people are led to *oppose* the Organon of Bacon to the Organon of Aristotle, is distinctly pointed out and refuted<sup>c</sup>. But of this I shall have occasion to speak more at large presently.

The Reviewer says,

"The Logic of Aristotle is particularly hostile to inductive science. By turning the mind to the syllogistic

<sup>c</sup> Longe alia Verulamio mens; cujus *Organon* cum Aristotelico nihil habet commune præter unum nomen. Ald. Art. Log. Comp. in Conclus. §. 6.

“ method, it becomes a very powerful obstruction to  
 “ that knowledge, which is derived, by induction, from  
 “ experience and observation. It is on this foundation  
 “ that the charge rests, which the author of the Reply  
 “ calls impudent and unfounded, that of mistaking the  
 “ infancy for the maturity of science.” Rev. p. 161.

He then produces the well known remark of Bacon, that the later times are in fact the *senium mundi*, as having the benefit of all former experience; and thence infers most sagaciously, that  
 “ we must not go back to the remote ages of antiquity for our knowledge concerning nature and its laws.” What the force or meaning of this remark is I cannot even guess, unless he would still insinuate, that the ancient *physics* are taught by us instead of the modern. But this meaning he himself disclaims. I must therefore leave the passage in all its obscurity, and proceed to his quotation from Dr. Reid, which immediately follows.

“ After men, says Dr. Reid, had laboured in the  
 “ search of truth near two thousand years, *by the help*  
 “ *of syllogisms*, Lord Bacon proposed the method of  
 “ induction as a more effectual engine for that purpose.  
 “ His *Novum Organum* gave a new turn to the thoughts  
 “ and labours of the inquisitive, more remarkable and  
 “ more useful than that which the *Organum* of Aristotle had given before: and may be considered as a second grand æra in the progress of human reason.”

“ *It is plain from this,*” that is, because Dr. Reid says so, observes the Reviewer; the same Reviewer who talks of the dictates of Aristotle being listened to as infallible decrees: “ it is plain “ from this, that where the Organum of Aristotle “ is appealed to once, the Organum of Bacon “ should be consulted a hundred times.” Rev. p. 162.

Now all this, and a great deal more of the same irrelevant matter, might have been saved, if the writer had only taken the precaution of refreshing his memory, or perhaps of reading for the first time a work, for which he professes an entire admiration. As he seems to have omitted this useful preliminary, he will, I trust, excuse me, if I attempt to clear the question of some difficulties, with which it is usually embarrassed in the hands of modern writers; and although it may seem to occupy some time in the outset, it will, I am sure, be found to be true economy in the end.

First then, it is a mistake widely spread, that the Organon of Bacon was designed by the author himself to supersede the Organon of Aristotle. The author himself professes no such design, nor can I discover the slightest intimation of it throughout the whole work. He complains indeed, and very justly, that the dogmas of the schools checked all free enquiry into the laws and

constitution of nature. He recommends earnestly and repeatedly, that we should throw off these slavish chains; that we should take nothing for granted, but what observation confirms; and that we should observe and enquire for ourselves, instead of blindly adopting opinions already received. His first book is occupied with a consideration of the causes which have retarded the progress of *natural philosophy*; and his second book contains a specimen of the new method of investigation which he proposes, in order to farther discoveries in that department. To this province of natural philosophy is the whole treatise exclusively confined. With this province the Logic of Aristotle has no necessary or natural connection.

Among the causes which have hindered the improvement of science, Bacon frequently notices the injurious effects of Aristotle's works. But his complaint is confined to two points: first, the corruption of physical science, by intermixing with it the doctrines and rules of Logic; and, secondly, the hasty assumption of physical principles, the truth of which was not afterwards allowed to be questioned.

The first of these complaints is made particularly in Aph. 62 and 63. Having divided false philosophy into three kinds, *sophistica*, *empirica*, and *superstitiosa*, he refers Aristotle's errors to the

first kind. “ Primi generis exemplum in Aristote-  
 “ tele maxime conspicuum est, qui *philosophiam*  
 “ *naturalem* dialectica sua corrumpit &c.” The  
 same charge is repeated nearly in the same words,  
 Aph. 96.

The substance of the second charge, *viz.* a precipitate assumption of first principles without sufficient investigation, and a dogmatical adherence to them, notwithstanding the discovery of new phænomena, is contained principally in Aph. 67 and 125. The whole of this latter aphorism is well worthy of attention, if any one would convince himself how entirely false the current notion is, that Bacon invented the method of Induction for arriving at those truths which Aristotle sought by means of Syllogism. In this Aphorism it is distinctly declared, that the *method* of acquiring first principles adopted by each is *in kind* the same. The defect however of the ancients was an impatient, scanty, and superficial observation of particulars, from which they mounted prematurely to the highest principles; whereas the advice of the modern philosopher is, to be cautious, slow, laborious, and persevering in experiment, before we venture to elicit *propositions*, out of which other truths are to be syllogistically inferred.

Having in the first book of the *Novum Organum* enumerated the several causes which seem to have obstructed the advancement of natural



science, (among which the syllogistic method of reasoning is not once mentioned,) he proceeds in the second book to give a specimen of that patient and methodical examination of particulars, out of which alone he justly observes that all further discoveries of the nature of things must arise. It is needless to give any fuller account of this book, which is strictly confined to the subject of natural philosophy; but I must be permitted to express a doubt, whether the writers, who are for ever founding in our ears the praises of this work, are really acquainted with its nature and principal contents. From the trite invectives they are continually pronouncing against the jargon of the schools, one would little expect to find in this favourite substitute of theirs, a technical vocabulary infinitely more unwieldy, fanciful, and uncouth, than any which accompanies the systems of Logic as they are now taught. Witness the several classes of experiments, into which the examination of natural bodies is divided; *instantiæ migrantes, liberatæ, prædominantes, constitutiæ sive manipulares, proportionatæ, monodicæ, limitanæ, decisorie, lampadis, evocantes, itinerantes, persecantes, &c. &c.* to the number of twenty-seven. If this Reviewer, or if any modern philosopher will affirm, that he has himself studied nature according to this example, or if he would seriously recommend a student to conduct and fort his experiments after

this manner, I am ready to acknowledge, that the method of teaching natural philosophy adopted by us is materially different from his. But even then the question will be, whether *we* have not got the start of *him*? whether he be not guilty of mistaking the infancy of science for its maturity, and of employing an engine in its rude primitive structure, after it has been simplified and improved by many succeeding artists?

There is in fact so much trick and juggle in the use which is made of Bacon's name, that I shall risk the imputation of prolixity, in order to expose, once for all, the shallow sophistry, to which writers of this description are for ever resorting. The Organon of Bacon has been already shewn to be confined to the department of physical science. It is indeed truly said to constitute a grand æra in the history of philosophy: but to propose it as a manual of instruction, or a guide for philosophical enquiries in the present age, is to mistake its real nature and design. The great author of that work had to explode inveterate prejudices; to awaken men from a stupid lethargy; to rouse them to action; to convince them that as yet they knew little of nature; and to set them an example, after which they might be enabled to learn more. These great purposes have been long ago answered: there is not one, I believe, of the *idola* which is now defended or cherished in any seat of learning, or

by any person of liberal education. The process of experiment has been unceasingly pursued, and is still hourly pursued, by persons who never read a line of Bacon, with more skill, sagacity, and success, than if they had learnt by heart all his twenty-seven *instantiæ*, and practised his *vindemiatio* upon them. Thus even the object which alone he had in view himself, that of promoting discovery, is better attained by this revolution which has taken place in the opinions and practice of philosophical enquirers, than it was by his own most sedulous endeavours: for it is somewhat remarkable, that the conclusion, to which he is led in the first exemplification of his method of enquiry, is found by later experiments to have been directly false; nearly one fourth of the second book being occupied with an investigation of the nature of heat, which is determined at length to be “*Motus expansivus, cohibitus, et nitens per partes minores.*” Lib. ii. Aph. 20.

Let me not be understood to speak disrespectfully of the greatest of modern philosophers, when I say this. My sole object is to shew, that an improper use is made of his authority. There is a spirit of party, as Professor Playfair informs us<sup>b</sup>, even among geometers; and this spirit has, I fear,

<sup>b</sup> Notes to Elements of Geometry, p. 427.

had more share, even than ignorance, in misrepresenting the question respecting ancient and modern philosophy. The Reviewer, who is perpetually exalting the latter above the former, seems to have derived all his knowledge of the works of Aristotle from Dr. Reid's *Analysis of the Organon*, a work which, whatever its merits may be, is certainly very defective, not only because the author, by his own confession, never read the treatise entirely through, of which he proposes to give a summary; but still more because he had hardly any acquaintance with the other writings of that Philosopher. This acquaintance is not only useful, but even indispensable in a writer, who would present a just exposition of any of his speculative works; and as the world have for some years been possessed of an accurate and clear analysis of these, to which easy access was open, I cannot acquit the Reviewer of most culpable negligence in venturing upon a condemnation of this philosophy, without availing himself of the means of information at hand.

If the passages above referred to in Bacon are not sufficient to prove that Syllogism and Induction are employed for different purposes, and that neither of them was unknown or disregarded by Aristotle, a few extracts from the learned and faithful *Analysis* of Dr. Gillies will, I hope, put

the matter beyond dispute, and will not be unacceptable perhaps even to those who never entertained any doubts concerning it.

“The patient examination of objects, and the accurate definition of terms, are continually employed by our philosopher, as the best means for arranging perceptions into science. These, and not syllogisms, are the sole instruments used by himself in the deepest and most various researches that ever exercised the ingenuity of man. Yet his art of syllogism (an art ignorantly depreciated in the present age, and more absurdly magnified in preceding times beyond its real worth) is not therefore useless, although its real uses, as will presently appear, are altogether different from the purposes to which it was long most injudiciously applied.” *New Analysis of Aristotle's Works*, p. 68.

After giving a just and truly philosophical view of the nature of syllogism, such as no man can collect from the *Analysis* of Dr. Reid, Dr. Gillies returns to the perversions and misrepresentations, with which the world is filled respecting the *Organon*. “Our acquaintance with the properties of things, Aristotle perpetually inculcates, must be acquired by patient observation, generalised by comparison and induction,” &c. p. 79. And in p. 81. is an admirable refutation of the cavil, so frequently repeated, that the treatise is conversant about *words* instead of *things*.

The most decisive authority, however, for it is one which this Anti-Aristotelian school cannot ob-

ject to themselves, is to be drawn from the works of Bacon. If the Reviewer ever glanced his eye over the Advancement of Learning, he probably met with the part which treats of the Art of Logic—its present condition, its use, its abuse, its imperfections, and its capacity of improvement. He observes, that Logic does not help towards the invention of arts and sciences, but only of arguments; that the induction, which logicians speak of, leads to the discovery of very few principles and axioms: but he admits, “that in sciences popular, as moralities, laws, and the like, yea, and divinity, that form [the form of syllogism] may have use, and in natural philosophy likewise, by way of argument, or satisfactory reason, *Quæ assensum parit, operis effecta est*: but the subtilty of nature and operations will not be inchained in those bonds.” Vol. I. p. 63. fol. ed.

The reasoning here is much the same with that of the *Novum Organon*, and the main tendency of all is to shew, that *discoveries* in natural philosophy are not likely to be promoted by this engine;—a proposition, which no one of the present day disputes; and which, when alledged by our adversaries as their chief objection to the study of logic, only proves, that they are ignorant of the subject about which they are speaking, and of the manner in which it is now taught.

Throughout this part the author of the *Advancement of Learning*, so far from holding the Aristotelian Logic useless, speaks of the additions and improvements, which he would wish to see grafted upon it. The abuses, of which he complains, have been long since remedied. The art is now confined within its proper limits, and is never suffered to impede the progress of free enquiry. The deficiencies, indeed, which he notes, are not yet supplied, although much has been done by different modern writers towards attaining that object; and perhaps out of these various materials a more complete system might now be moulded, and nearer to Bacon's own idea, than any which has yet appeared. But, whenever that is done, the study of it will certainly engage more time than is at present usually given to that branch of instruction, even where it is best understood, and most assiduously cultivated.

Having thus, I trust, made it appear, that the Reviewer, when he fancied that he was writing against Aristotle, was really writing against Bacon, I shall be content, for the present, to refer my readers to those parts of the works of Bacon already cited, for fuller proof of this point: at the same time professing, that if he should complain of partial or incorrect representations having been given, I shall be perfectly ready to meet him in a separate discussion, and have no doubt of being

able to vindicate all the positions, in still greater latitude than has been here maintained.

II. It is time now to notice the Second of those charges, which, instead of qualifying or retracting, he has thought fit to repeat against Oxford; viz. "That the infancy of science is mistaken for its maturity."

His support, indeed, of this charge is identified with his reasoning upon the former: and, according to his own statement, it is not a distinct article of accusation, but a kind of corollary upon the preceding. We are accused, [Rev. p. 161.] of teaching the Logic of Aristotle; and then he adds, "It is *upon this foundation* that the charge rests of mistaking the infancy of science for its maturity." This charge he twice says I have called "impudent and *unfounded*." When a writer thinks it worth while to notice the language of another, it is a convenient practice to look at the passage he professes to transcribe. Had he taken this obvious precaution, he would have found the word "unsupported" instead of "unfounded." The proposition was evidently *unsupported*; nor do I imagine, that the propriety of this epithet can be questioned even by himself. He has since, indeed, attempted to *support* it; but the attempt, I trust, has only proved the impossibility of the thing; and I may now be allowed to



employ a term, which, before the assertion was refuted, I never did employ, and call what was then termed only *unsupported*, incapable of support, or *unfounded*.

In order, however, to make some amends for the contemptuous mention of Oxford, “where the mathematical sciences never flourished, and where the infancy of science is mistaken for its maturity,” a note is inserted, p. 166. containing the names of three illustrious professors, who are exceptions from this general reproach; Wallis, Gregory, and Halley. Of these men he says, “Their writings instructed, and will for ever instruct, the scientific world.” But the impartial fit is soon over: in the same note he denies that Halley belonged originally to Oxford, although he obtained a Professor’s chair there. Now the truth is, that Halley entered, about the age of seventeen, at Queen’s College, Oxford; that he is reported by his biographer to have applied himself, while there, to practical and geometrical astronomy; and that he never studied at any other University. Of Wallis it is remarkable, that he wrote a complete and accurate treatise on Logic, strictly according to the Aristotelian method, which has been used very generally as the lecture-book in that department, and is still used by many in preference to Aldrich, which is more concise. This treatise was published, in the latter part of his life,

but half a century before the period began, to which the Reviewer assigns the decay of mathematical learning in England; and indeed he, as well as every one else, knows, that if the Aristotelian Logic were an hindrance to science, it had to contend with that obstacle during the seventeenth century, in a degree far beyond what could ever have been felt in the eighteenth. Thus then did this illustrious Professor not only himself *mistake the infancy of science for its maturity*, but he contributed to propagate that mistake, to the utmost of his power, in the University where he resided!

Perhaps while the Reviewer was apparently performing an act of candour to Oxford, by enumerating some of its distinguished professors, he might have found room for the insertion of the name of Bradley. Or is it possible that the fame of a man who discovered the Aberration of Light and the Nutation of the Earth's Axis, should not yet have reached the University of Edinburgh:—that University which he supposes ‘Oxford can no more rival in science and philosophy, than Edinburgh can rival Oxford in the antiquity, wealth, and splendour of its establishments?’

There is however a singular feature in this affair, which must not pass without notice, although I am not well able to conjecture from what cause it sprung.

The original charge [No. 22. of the Edinburgh Review] was expressed in the following words.

“ In one of these, where the dictates of Aristotle are still listened to as infallible decrees, *and* where the infancy of science is mistaken for its maturity,” &c.

This latter proposition I had called *unsupported*. When the writer undertakes to support it, he prints the passage thus.

“ In one of these, where the dictates of Aristotle are still listened to as infallible decrees, *or*, where the infancy of science” &c. Edin. Rev. No. 31. p. 159.

The change of *and* into *or* may on many occasions be immaterial: on the present, the *whole of his reasoning depends upon that change*. For he treats the latter proposition as an off-shoot merely of the former, and, when defending it, says, that it rests upon the former as its sole foundation. Why then did he not blame me for treating it as a separate proposition? The defence too is so futile, that it was hardly worth the expedient which was adopted, in order to bring it in. *Because the Logic of Aristotle is studied, therefore science is not studied*. Because Greek is studied, therefore Latin is neglected! Because the poets are read, therefore the historians and orators are despised! Such is the reasoning of this learned censor of English education.

If he contends that he has alledged other reasons, as that “ the Oxonian system has done an injury to science by not teaching any thing *at all* concerning Physics, and by turning its attention *entirely* to other objects,” [vid. Edin. Rev. No. 31. p. 160.] I answer, that he has shifted the ground of his defence, and that the charge does not rest, as he said it did rest, upon the foundation, of teaching the logic of Aristotle. He ought therefore to have been prepared to make good this accusation. He has failed of doing this; as every one must fail who combats the plain truth. There never has been a time within the memory of persons now living, when Oxford was open to this charge. The Examinations formerly were insignificant, but not less so in logic than in geometry; and few people will question the assertion I now make, that much less of logic was understood and taught twenty or thirty years ago in this place, than of geometry and natural philosophy. Rather therefore than relinquish an untenable post by honourable capitulation, he has suffered himself to be driven from it, after practising every stratagem, lawful and unlawful, without effect.

I must not dismiss the subject, without exhibiting what he seems to think his most triumphant argument, in his own words. The passage follows

immediately after that notable quotation from Dr. Reid, p. 162.

“ It is plain from this, that where the Organum of  
 “ Aristotle is appealed to once, the Organum of Bacon  
 “ should be consulted a hundred times. If therefore  
 “ there be any system of *literary* instruction in which  
 “ the former work is much studied, and the latter en-  
 “ tirely neglected, it is a system most undoubtedly  
 “ liable to the charge of mistaking the infancy of *science*  
 “ for its maturity. It is as much liable to that charge,  
 “ as the engineer would be, who, instead of erecting a  
 “ steam-engine according to the construction of Watt  
 “ and Bolton, should prefer one on the more ancient  
 “ plan of Savary or Beighton: or as much as a ma-  
 “ thematician, who, in order to instruct his pupil in the  
 “ higher geometry, would rather put into his hands  
 “ the Indivisibles of Cavalleri, than the Differential  
 “ Calculus of Euler. *We can perceive no difference in*  
 “ the three cases; and *we are persuaded*, that there is  
 “ no competent judge of the matter, that is to say, no  
 “ man versed, both in the principles and the history of  
 “ science, who would not pronounce the demerit to be  
 “ the same in them all.” Edin. Rev. No. 31. p. 162.

Fortunately for our credit, the present is a question to be determined not by the *perceptions* or the *persuasions* of this learned writer, but by authority of a more impartial kind. If indeed the end proposed in each of these works entitled *Organum* were the same, some ground might exist for his objection, and the comparison adduced might be thought a fair illustration of our error. But

by this time, I trust, it is become needless for me to say more on that subject. The nature and design of each treatise being *wholly different*<sup>c</sup>, there is no incongruity in adopting both, according to their several measures of utility: and thus the analogy, which he suggests to illustrate his reasoning, falls at once to the ground. The ridicule, indeed, properly belongs to him, who would have us neglect the one because we are in possession of the other: a folly not unlike to that of a man who would discard the windmill, because the steam-engine has been invented, or who laughs at the use made of the mariner's compass, since the introduction of gunpowder.

III. The third and last article of the charge, which remains to be considered, was expressed in these words: "The scholar has no means of advancing beyond the *mere* elements of geometry."

Under the influence of the same fatality which presided over his former quotations, when he enters upon his vindication, he prints it thus:

"The student has no means of going beyond the elements of geometry;" Rev. p. 163.

omitting the word *mere*, which is far from being without its force; since whatever variety of opi-

<sup>c</sup> *Sit denique alia scientias colendi, alia invenendi ratio*, are Bacon's own words in his Preface to the *Novum Organum*.

nions may be entertained of the meaning of the word *elements*, the epithet *mere* must be understood as restraining that term to its narrowest signification.

The author of the Reply, knowing that different senses are affixed to this term, instead of asserting positively that our system of instruction did advance beyond the elements, preferred the interrogatory form; and, by the questions he has put, the Reviewer observes that he has furnished a very unexpected *confirmation* of the charge.

The questions put were these: "Are Plane  
" and Spherical Trigonometry, are the properties  
" of Conic Sections, of Conchoids, Cycloids, the  
" Quadratrix, Spirals, &c. &c. the mere elements  
" of geometry? Is the method of Fluxions included  
" under the same appellation? On all these sub-  
" jects, lectures both public and private are given."  
Reply, p. 18.

Now if any *one* of these subjects exceeded the mere elements of geometry, the falsehood of the Reviewer's assertion was certainly established. It was perfectly immaterial whether one or several were *within* the elements, if any of them went *beyond*. The Reviewer, however, having thrown off the uneasy trammels of Logic, very complacently argues, that, because the two first are included under the head of elements, therefore his original assertion is *confirmed*. Thus if A reproaches B

with having read *none but* elementary school books, and B replies, I have read Phædrus, Sallust, Livy, Thucydides, and Plato, he *confirms* the assertion of A, provided Phædrus and Sallust are held to be elementary. Such is the process of reasoning which this formidable enemy of Aristotle pursues.

Let us now consider the soundness of his assertion, “that Plane and Spherical Trigonometry *most certainly* are the mere elements of geometry, “more especially Plane Trigonometry.”

If they are both *most certainly* the mere elements, how can one of them be *more especially* so? Does not this very distinction imply some doubt respecting the other? But the reason immediately assigned must of course remove all doubt upon the subject.

Plane Trigonometry, he observes, “arises from “the *union* of some of the simplest rules of *arithmetic*, with some of the simplest propositions of “*geometry*, and is the very first point in which “the sciences of number and extension come in “contact with one another.” This may be all very true: but it seems to me rather a novel way of proving a thing to be a *mere element* of one science, to say that it is an union of that science with some other.

The uses of the word *elements* are, I am aware, various; and as the proper use of it in geometry



is best settled by the authority of eminent mathematicians, to that standard I propose to refer the present question : and although I should be inclined, in any question of mathematical science, to pay great deference to the Reviewer of La Place, yet, if I can produce known and established authority of the most respectable kind against him, I trust it will not be deemed presumptuous in me to dispute a doctrine which he peremptorily maintains. In the first place, then, I find that Plane Trigonometry is expressly distinguished by PROFESSOR PLAYFAIR from the elements of geometry. The title of his work, well known in this University, is, *ELEMENTS OF GEOMETRY, containing the first six books of Euclid, with a Supplement on the Quadrature of the Circle, and the Geometry of Solids ; TO WHICH ARE ADDED, Elements of Plane and Spherical Trigonometry.* Left any doubt should be entertained of the Professor's meaning, as set forth in the title-page, it may be observed, that the running title, " Elements of Geometry," extends through about two thirds of the volume, covering the whole of the six books of Euclid, and the books of Solids ; and, when he passes on to the remainder of the work, a new title-page and a new running title are assumed, " Elements of Plane " and Spherical Trigonometry." If an objector should still suggest, that the latter part is only a member of the former, although it bears a new title, a thing which can hardly be suspected of so

accurate a writer as Profeffor Playfair, I would ftill farther refer him to the Preface of the work, in which fome account is given of the component parts of the volume. Having fpoken of the manner in which he has treated the firft fix books of Euclid, the Author proceeds to fay something of the Supplement, containing three books on Solids; and of the twenty-first propofition of the third book he fays, “ The comparifon of this laft folid  
 “ with the cylinder concludes the laft book of the  
 “ Supplement, and is a propofition that may not  
 “ improperly be confidered as terminating the ele-  
 “ mentary part of Geometry.” Pref. p. 12. edit. 2.

Now whatever may be the fcientific merits of this Reviewer, he cannot expect me to rate his authority fo high as that of the eminent mathematician juft quoted. *He* may, perhaps, confider himfelf entitled to an *equal* eftimation; but it would be indecorous in the higheft degree in me not to prefer this learned Profeffor to a namelefs writer: and when we reflect moreover on the exalted ftation he fills in the Univerfity of Edinburgh, I can hardly think it decent in the Editor of the Review, to insert an article fo difrefpectful to one of their brighteft ornaments. How difrefpectful and even infulting to him the paragraph is, may be collected from the following fentence:

“ It is hard to conceive in what fchool the author of  
 “ the Reply has ftudied mathematics, fo as to be unac-  
 “ quainted with the place which Plane Trigonometry

“ occupies in the arrangement of geometrical science.”  
 Rev. p. 164. ✓

Whatever disgrace, therefore, is intended for the author of the Reply, must evidently attach in an equal, if not a superior degree, to the Professor, whose arrangement he has adopted. And, if the single mistake of that author reflects discredit even on the University in which he has studied, if it indicate such ignorance as the Reviewer himself would hardly have credited on the testimony of a third person, [Vid. Rev. p. 164.] how much deeper must that University be implicated in the disgrace, over whose studies a Professor, guilty of the same mistake, continues to preside ?

The Reviewer then proceeds to express a doubt whether the author of the Reply “ has any *precise idea* of the boundary, which separates the “ parts of geometrical science that are elementary, “ from those that are not :” and very kindly offers him a criterion, in the following modest and humble phraseology.

“ We would therefore, if it were not an act of unpardonable presumption for Northern Critics like us “ to propose instructing a person who lives four degrees “ further to the South, take the liberty of suggesting “ a criterion, by which the question may always be resolved. Every property of lines of the first and second order, and of the figures composed from them, “ which, when translated into the language of Alge-

“bra, involves *nothing higher than a quadratic equation*, providing, at the same time, that it be a proposition of *very general application*, is to be accounted “elementary.”

According to this criterion he determines, that the properties of Conic Sections *are* elementary, but that Conchoids, Cycloids, &c. *are not* elementary. I think it right to notice the latter phrase, because the sentence containing this criterion is so worded, as to raise a doubt whether the writer intended it for a strict *definition*: that is, whether he meant it not only to declare what *is* elementary, but to exclude also what *is not*. Of this, however, we can now entertain no doubt, after the application he has himself made of his own language.

Now, if it were not an act of unpardonable presumption in a Southern critic to propose instructing a person who lives four degrees farther to the North in the first rudiments of logic, I would venture to suggest, that this criterion fails in every point, which is essential to a definition.

1st. It includes what does not belong to the thing defined.

2dly. It excludes what does belong to the thing defined.

3dly. It contains expressions more loose and indefinite than that which it proposes to limit and explain.

Upon the first point I should speak with much diffidence, if I did not find myself supported by authority, which, in matters of science, I never heard any one but this critic set at nought. The work, to which I am about to appeal, was certainly written nearly three degrees further to the South, even than Oxford; but that circumstance will not, I venture to hope, materially affect its credit. Thus, then, writes the author of the article *Géométrie*, in the *Encyclopédie des Sciences* :

“ On peut diviser la Géométrie de différentes manières. 1<sup>o</sup>. En *élémentaire* et en *transcendante*. La Géométrie *élémentaire* ne considère que les propriétés des lignes droites, des lignes circulaires, et des solides terminés par ces figures. *Le cercle est la seule figure curviligne dont on parle dans les élémens de Géométrie*,” &c.

“ La Géométrie *transcendante* est proprement celle qui a pour objet toutes les courbes différentes du cercle, comme les *sections coniques* et les courbes d’un genre plus élevé.” Ibid.

To these two parts a third is added, by the same writer, under the title “*Géométrie sublime* :” and the whole division is summed up in these words :

“ Par-là on auroit trois divisions de la Géométrie : *Géométrie élémentaire, ou des lignes droites et du cercle* ; *Géométrie transcendante, ou des courbes* ; et *Géométrie sublime, ou des nouveaux calculs*.”

The same article is repeated in the *Encyclopédie*

Méthodique; and, if any additional circumstance is wanting to give weight to the authority, it may be observed, that this article proceeded from the pen of D'Alembert, and is quoted as his by Professor Playfair, Elem. Geom. p. 418. Edit. 2. It is indeed fortunate for me, that in the present case I can call in northern as well as southern auxiliaries on my side. The work of Professor Playfair, before cited, adopts the same rule with the French academician, and declares the elementary part of Geometry to end with the doctrine of solids, whose boundaries are either circular curves, or straight lines. So that the sarcastic remark, with which the Reviewer's friendly offer of instruction is introduced, applies, in the first instance, to this Professor, who is, I am sure, too well able to defend himself, to require any aid from me.

Let us examine the definition then, with reference to the *second point*, and see whether it does not *exclude* something which properly belongs to the Elements.

By the terms of this definition all properties of figures are excluded, which, when translated into the language of Algebra, involve any thing *higher than a quadratic equation*. Now many of the propositions relating to solid figures, arranged by Professor Playfair under the head "Elements of Geometry," those, I mean, which speak of the contents of similar solids, when resolved, according

to the most natural and obvious method, into algebraic expression, involve *cubic equations*: some of them are capable, perhaps, of more circuitous solutions, by which cubic equations may be avoided; but I believe I may safely challenge the Reviewer to reduce the 11th proposition, for instance, of the third book of the Supplement, to a quadratic; in which it is stated, that “similar Solid Parallelepipeds are to one another in the triplicate ratio of their homologous sides.”

If, therefore, the Reviewer’s definition be correct, the Professor has erred in placing these propositions in a department of the science to which they do not belong: but, rather than adopt this conclusion, I would prefer the Professor’s authority to that of his anonymous adversary; and must therefore consider the definition as defective in a second point essential to all definition.

*Thirdly*, If the object of definition be to render that precise and evident, which before was indistinct and obscure, I cannot think we have gained much by being told, that that only is an *elementary* proposition, which is of *very general* application. If I were not afraid of offending the ears of modern philosophy with the jargon of the schools, I should not scruple to exclaim here, “*Ignotum per ignotias*.” Among all the phrases which the storehouse of language supplies, there is hardly one to be found more vague, more

floating, more loose, more directly opposed to every thing that is meant by *definition*, than this phrase “very general;” and the adoption of it on this occasion furnishes a happy specimen of the advantage to be derived from discarding all attention to logic in the course of scientific studies.

Having supplied us with this memorable criterion for determining the elementary part of Geometry, the critic endeavours to reply to my statement, ‘that lectures on the doctrine of Fluxions are read here, and that candidates for the degree of B.A. are examined twice every year in Newton’s Principia.’ If these things have been taught for more than four or five years, he admits that he has been in an error, and is ready to acknowledge it.

“But,” he adds, “if the date alluded to is actually as late as we suppose, we must consider our assertions as *perfectly just*, and as accurately describing the *only* state of things, by which our argument, concerning the decline of mathematical learning for the last seventy or eighty years, could possibly be affected.” Rev. p. 165.

And in the next page he says,

“The change, that had recently taken place in the Oxford examinations, was nothing to our argument. *On that account* we took no notice of it. It did not concern the subject in hand.” P. 166.

Now let me remind the reader, that the Re-



viewer's own words are, when speaking of Oxford, "Where the dictates of Aristotle *are still* listened to as infallible decrees, and where the infancy of science *is mistaken* for the maturity, the mathematical sciences have never flourished, and the scholar *has no means* of advancing beyond the mere elements of Geometry." In the passage then, just extracted from p. 166. of the Review, he admits that *he knew* his words were inapplicable to the *present* state of things, although he repeatedly uses the *present* tense; and yet *his assertions are perfectly just!* But he took no notice, it seems, of this recent change, because the subject in hand related to the *decline* of mathematical learning for the last seventy or eighty years. Strange forgetfulness! a few pages ago he told us, that "the mathematical sciences had *never* flourished at Oxford," and that this proposition was "the main scope of his argument."

Quo teneam vultus mutantem Protea nodo?

How shall I unravel sophistry so intricate? how fix the flittings of this subtle antagonist, who baffles all our vigilance, and eludes our grasp, just when we fancy him enclosed beyond the possibility of escape? I will endeavour, however, to collect under one view the several shapes which his reasoning has assumed, in order that we may form some judgment of its strength and solidity.

*First* then, he complains that mathematics have *declined* greatly within the last century in England, of which one principal cause is, that they *never* flourished at Oxford.

2dly. At Oxford the infancy of science is still mistaken for its maturity, because the Logic of Aristotle is still taught. Yet the principal exception to this reproach, the person of whom Oxford has an undoubted right to boast as an illustrious mathematician, as one “ whose writings instructed, and “ will for ever instruct, the *scientific* world,” is one, who not only carefully studied the Logic of Aristotle, and thus mistook the infancy for the maturity of science ; but who is famous for having recommended and written a treatise of that Logic, more copious and minute than the Compendium now usually employed.

3dly. An important change has of late years taken place in the studies of the University, and therefore it is *perfectly just* to say, that they *still* remain the same.

4thly. The properties of Conic Sections, and of the higher curves, together with the doctrine of Fluxions, and Newton's Principia, are regularly taught, and therefore it is *perfectly just* to say, that the student has no means of advancing beyond the mere elements of Geometry.

5thly. A writer, who combats this assertion,

really *confirms* it; because, when he says these things are taught, he places certain parts of mathematical science beyond the Elements, which M. D'Alembert and Professor Playfair have directed him to arrange in that manner.

Such, I conceive, to be a tolerable summary of the argument which this learned adversary of Oxford maintains. Now although it is quite immaterial to that argument how long ago the present system of studies was introduced, since he acknowledges himself that he knew it *was* introduced, but says, p. 165. he was silent about it because it did not concern his reasoning, yet in answer to his question, which is put with such a tone of confidence, I will tell him, that I *know* the subjects have been uniformly taught here for twenty years past, and, I *believe*, for more than double that period, which he affirms are not taught here; and that during the last ten years they have not only been taught, but have been made the subject matter of examinations for degrees.

It was far from my intention to induce any thing like a comparison between the merits or the fame of the universities of Oxford and Edinburgh. My object was to refute, not to recriminate: to vindicate this University, not to attack any other. I cannot conceive, therefore, what ground the Reviewer had for introducing the following sentence, unless it was with the view

of indulging a feeling which he professes not to entertain.

“We respect exceedingly the classical learning of Oxford ; and wish it to excite the emulation, not the envy, of our countrymen : but, as to science and philosophy, we do no more suppose that Oxford can rival Edinburgh, than that Edinburgh can rival Oxford in the antiquity, the wealth, or the splendour of its establishments.” p. 167.

In order fully to understand the value of this compliment to our classical learning, it is only necessary to read a few pages of the same article, which will furnish a pretty intelligible commentary upon it. If the author of this compliment really wished us to think him sincere in his professions, he might at least have stipulated, that they should not be closely linked, and, as it were, identified, with such company : nay, the Editor himself, perhaps, owed a little more respect to the public, as well as to the character of his own publication, than to present them with a compound, one half of which serves to neutralize the other<sup>e</sup>. Of the rest, I can only repeat, that the comparison between ourselves and Edinburgh formed no part of my purpose ; and, as I am possessed of no

<sup>e</sup> “Oxonian barbarisms,” “Oxonian Latinity,” &c. are among the most ordinary phrases of a writer permitted to insert his criticisms, not only in the same Review, but in the same article.

knowledge whatever of the *Examinations* required for the Honours of that University, I am as much destitute of the means as I am of the inclination to lessen the value of its degrees.

But when he talks in such unmeasured terms of the science and philosophy of Edinburgh, I should really esteem it a favour if he would point out upon what foundation their claims to pre-eminence in the former of these branches rest. Undoubtedly, if he means only that they possess able professors, who perform their duty in demonstrating to younger minds the truths they have learned themselves, and who are contented with that degree of reputation which belongs to such a service, no question can be made of the soundness of their pretensions; although I must be allowed to remind him, that this is by no means an exclusive, or a very remarkable distinction. But if any thing more than this is meant, if he would imply that mathematical science has been enriched by their discoveries, or its boundaries enlarged, I confess I have yet to learn to what members of that learned body within the last half century the world is so much indebted. Certainly it is not to the author of a work examined by the *Eclectic Review*, in the number for March 1810.

In page 167. is an extract from the Reply, which the Reviewer thinks proper to commend.

It is succeeded by some remarks upon the evils resulting from the constitution of this University, which are apparently suggested and supported by the extract which he has made. Upon this passage I should now be disposed to say a few words ; but I reserve the consideration of it till the third Part of this Pamphlet ; and that for reasons which I hope the reader will think, when he comes to the passage, quite sufficient.

At present then, I see nothing to detain me from entering upon the second part of my design, except it be to make a few observations on the style and temper with which I am accused of having defended my cause.

The Reviewer of *La Place* in particular blames the “heat and asperity” betrayed in every part of the chapter directed against him. He complains of “a strain of illiberality that does but ill become the champion of a learned body :” and in another place, he talks of the “insulting and ungentleman-like language in which he has been addressed.” In answer to all this I have to remark, that an anonymous writer, more especially a writer in a Review, is the last person entitled to exact a ceremonious and respectful address. He lies perfectly concealed from public view ; and even his private friends, unless it be his own choice to acquaint them, are ignorant of the person who is the object

of attack. The language employed against him may, it is true, be so coarse and vulgar as to disgrace the author who employs it : and in that case a retort is easy, by merely pointing out to public notice, and extracting the offensive passages. Again, the language, though not vulgar and indecent, yet may perhaps exceed in severity the just measure of the offence ; and then an appeal is open to the justice and good sense of unprejudiced readers, and the writer will most probably incur the blame which he deserves. But in no case has the anonymous critic any right to remonstrate, as if a personal injury had been done to himself ; to complain that *he* has been treated unfairly, that *his* feelings have been wounded, *his* dignity insulted, or *his* character traduced. Neither is the community, of which he boasts himself a member, entitled to any deference in its corporate capacity. As a body, it has no substantive form ; no ostensible existence ; it is *vox et præterea nihil*. It is seen by nobody, holds itself responsible to nobody, and in some cases, I am compelled to add, respects nobody. It cannot therefore, in its collective capacity, any more than in the persons of its several members, demand that civility and courtesy, which is imposed by custom upon the open intercourse between man and man.

If these positions be indisputable, even when the attack may be considered as unjust and unpro-

voked, they surely lose none of their force in a case where the Reviewer is the *aggressor*, and the asperity of language proceeds from the party who considers himself aggrieved. In the present instance it is needless for me to state, that the animadversions on this University were wholly irrelevant to the subject of the work under review. The opportunity was apparently sought after, or rather created: for, in truth, it requires much less ability than this writer is possessed of, to connect the merits of a seat of education with the consideration of any scientific or literary performance whatever. In the next place, the charges were expressed, not indeed with heat and asperity, (for how could that find place when there was no provocation?) but with a cool, sneering, sarcastic countenance, infinitely more insulting than the language and tone of passion. They were directed, not against an individual, but against a body of individuals, which is seldom addressed without some epithet of respect, and which is certainly entitled to respect in a degree far exceeding the claims of any single person composing that or any other learned society. They were besides injurious to its reputation in the highest degree, affecting particularly the very design and character of its institution. Lastly, and above all, they were, I do not say exaggerated and distorted, but directly and fundamentally *false*.



Under such circumstances is it to be expected that the injured party shall come forward with a humble remonstrance?—that he shall condescend to exculpate himself, and prove his innocence, to the satisfaction of his accuser, in order that he may, if it suit his good pleasure, let the world know that he had been *misinformed*? I confess, the person who stoops to that method of clearing himself, appears to me unworthy of enjoying the reputation, which he would make such sacrifices to preserve. Let the appeal be made to that authority before whom the accusation is brought; and, if any language is employed by either party unsuitable to the occasion, let the court, whose dignity is insulted, interfere. The Reviewer glories indeed in the epithet *NORTHERN*, as being synonymous with *FREE*; and prefers that distinction to “the riches, the dignities, or even the climate of the South.” But, like some passionate admirers of *freedom* of the modern school, he is jealous of any rivals in his affection, and seems disposed to have it all on his own side. He cannot bear to listen to home truths in plain language; and, after accusing us of the grossest ignorance and neglect of duty, is quite indignant at being told, that the assertion is “impudent and unsupported,” and that he has asserted as a thing known, what he really knew not. If to hear these truths is so very unpleasant to his feel-

ings, I can put him in a sure way of avoiding that inconvenience for the future. He need but abstain from causeless insult and detraction himself, and he may rest assured that no language will reach him from this quarter, but such as is due to his talents, and to the situation which he fills in society, however respectable it may be. For his talents I have always felt, and still feel, much reverence; although the singularly weak defence he has lately made compels me to reduce considerably the estimate I had once formed. But the person who has offered them the keenest insult is he, who has not scrupled to call them in to the furtherance of contumely and slander; and has even contaminated them by an association with a writer, who is fast filling up the measure of infamy, which he pretty well knows will sooner or later be his only share.

## PART II.

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Quam terfa omnia ! quam Latina ! quam Græca ! Athenis vivere hominem, non in villa putes. PLIN.

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THE author of the Reply is in the second place accused of laying aside “the scanty portion of civility and moderation with which he had covered his rancour in the preceding part,” and of charging the Reviewer of the Oxford edition of Strabo with “deliberate falsehood,” “misrepresentation,” and (what can hardly be credited of so profound a scholar) with “ignorance and presumption.” Accordingly this Gentleman now advances to the combat in vindication of his injured honour, and is pleased to inform his readers, that he shall confine himself, in a great degree, to what has been said against his “veracity and his knowledge.”

To the world at large it is at least a novel spectacle to see an Edinburgh Reviewer appear as plaintiff in a cause of this nature. Long have we been accustomed to the complaints of men, whose feelings have been wounded by the wanton severity of that publication, whose literary pretensions

have been treated with the most contemptuous ridicule, whose names have been studiously connected with every phrase expressive of scorn, whose veracity has been impeached without scruple, and who have been singled out and exposed, with malicious pleasure, as the object of indecent and scurrilous buffoonery. It cannot therefore be expected that much sympathy will be awakened by this appeal, in the breasts of those to whom the ordinary tone and temper of that Review is already known. Some people indeed may derive a little satisfaction from perceiving that this cruelty on their part did not proceed from utter apathy ; and a hope may arise, that, as their sensibility has been awakened to their own sufferings, a little regard may hereafter be shewn, if not from a sense of pity, yet from a motive of prudence, to those of others.

Since, however, the writer of this article has judged it expedient to mitigate the strain of invective which disgraced his former pages, there will not be much occasion for reverting to that topic now ; and I shall confine myself chiefly to the consideration of those points, which he very justly considers as affecting “ his veracity and his “ knowledge.” A steady and careful examination of the several points in question is indeed necessary, before any judgment can be safely pronounced ; and if I am favoured with this during

the philological minutiae which it is impossible to omit, I have no doubt of being able to prove *demonstratively*, that his claim to these attributes is small indeed.

But though I wish to give him all fair play, there is one screen, from the benefit of which I trust he will be deprived in the outset of the business. To impeach the veracity of another in private life is thought to be an infraction on the rules of society. But why is it so considered? Is it not because, if the accused party be guilty, he is unworthy of a place in that society? And the peace and comfort of the rest must be disturbed before any sufficient proof can be obtained of the matter. In the present case no such evil is to be apprehended, and no obstacle presents itself in the way of free enquiry. Again, however others may complain of the inconvenience and noise usually attending such disputes, the culprit himself cannot surely be allowed to make use of that plea, or *avail himself of his own wrong*. The accusation may indeed be preferred in language unnecessarily violent; and for this the accuser may be justly blamed; though not even then by the offending party, provided he makes good his charge. But if the offence has really been committed, permission ought surely to be given somewhere, to state it in terms which cannot be mistaken, and which, though not coarse or vulgar, are yet ex-

preffive of that indignation and abhorrence, which is naturally excited by such a practice.

The passages which justify the imputation against the *veracity* and the *knowledge* of the Reviewer are so intermixed, that it is not easy to separate them altogether; but as far as that is practicable it shall be done, beginning with those of the first kind. And as the charge is one of a serious nature, it will be the safest way to make entire extracts, whenever they materially affect the question. Thus then the Reviewer opens :

“ In the first place we are stated to have ‘ *intimated*,  
 “ that the late Mr. Tyrwhitt took no degree at Oxford,  
 “ and was not even a member of the University.’ In  
 “ answer to which we beg merely to refer the reader to  
 “ our words, which are, that Mr. Tyrwhitt resided in  
 “ London, in business and in society, and that his name  
 “ stands in the title-page plain Thomas Tyrwhitt, with-  
 “ out any decorative adjunct, or title of degree. (p. 431.)  
 “ This is all we say on the subject; and as all this is  
 “ correctly and confessedly true, we profess not to un-  
 “ derstand the grounds upon which this profound writer  
 “ assures his readers, ‘ that there is not *any truth*’ in  
 “ our *intimation* with respect to Mr. Tyrwhitt.” Rev.  
 No. 31. p. 169.

Although the Reviewer tells his readers this is *all* he said on the subject, I will present them with the following extract from what he *did say*, and will leave them to determine under what class of misdemeanors this offence is to be arranged.

“ Certain it is, that no such attempt has been made  
 “ since, except in the single and minute, but very suc-  
 “ cessful instance, of Aristotle’s Poetics; which was  
 “ produced by an *auxiliary volunteer*, residing in the  
 “ metropolis, engaged in business, and never secluded  
 “ from the avocations of society. By not enjoying the  
 “ leisure, perhaps he never contracted the indolence, of  
 “ a monk; but preserved the activity, even by the dis-  
 “ traction of his faculties. His name stands in the title-  
 “ page plain Thomas Tyrwhitt—*without any decorative*  
 “ *adjunct or title of degree—though it would have done*  
 “ *honour to the proudest* which the most exalted feat of  
 “ learning could bestow.” Rev. No. 28. p. 431.

Was I wrong in interpreting this passage as intended to inform the world that Tyrwhitt *took no degree at Oxford, and was not even a member of the University?* Are the words capable of any other signification? I replied, therefore, that he *was* a member of Oxford—that he was educated there—that he took his degrees there regularly—that he was for seven years a Fellow of a College; and that, after an interval of six years’ public employment, as Clerk to the House of Commons, he passed the remainder of his life (*eighteen years*) in the enjoyment of literary leisure. Yet the Reviewer, who read this answer of mine, when desirous of establishing his veracity, ventures to declare, that he does not understand the grounds upon which his intimation concerning Mr. Tyrwhitt was treated as untrue.

In that answer I told him, that Tyrwhitt's edition of Aristotle's Poetics was a posthumous publication from unfinished papers, and that the title-page was of course arranged by another hand; and yet, when speaking again of this subject, he says, "an university title, *which he did not think worth affixing to his name:*" that is, did not think worth after he was dead. He then adds, "but as we *asserted* nothing on this important subject, we think we might have escaped the charge of *misrepresentation.*" The only answer I make to this is, to desire the reader once more to peruse the extract, "Certain it is," &c.

The next charge against his veracity respected what he said of Mr. Falconer, the editor of Strabo; whom he had described as "a distinguished Graduate, selected from the whole body, at an advanced period of life, to conduct the greatest work that it had undertaken for more than a century preceding." Rev. p. 437.

To this it was replied,

"That the editor never was a Graduate;—that he was not a member of the University when he undertook the work;—that he was not then at an advanced period of life;—that he was not selected therefore from the whole body;—and that he was not selected by the University at all." Reply, p. 40.

The Reviewer now defends himself by saying, that in the title-page Mr. Falconer had announced



himself of a particular College. The description runs thus, “*Olim e Coll. Æn. Naf.*” Upon this foundation rests the whole of what is extracted above from page 437 of the Review: and if he can convince any human being that he believed what he was there asserting, in consequence of having read this description in the title-page, I must congratulate him on possessing powers of persuasion of no ordinary kind. He says, indeed, it is nothing “but ludicrous to represent so natural and almost unavoidable an error as either “calumnious or disgraceful:” but if this fact was so unimportant, why did he dwell with such earnestness upon it? Why did he colour and adorn it, and hold it up so anxiously to the notice of the public? Was it not evidently to point the disgrace more directly against the University, and for this purpose was not the circumstance of the degree *essential* to his argument? When that object was in view, it was material to shew that Tyrwhitt had no degree, and that Falconer had; but now that both of these assertions are proved to be false, he would fain pretend that the facts are unimportant, and not worth wasting a word about.

The next sentence relates to the text of the Oxford Homer and of the Oxford Strabo, and is as follows:

“When we mentioned the Oxford Homer as retain-

“ing *all* the errors of Clarke’s edition, and the Strabo  
 “*all* those of the Amsterdam edition, we distinctly  
 “stated, at the same time, that *we had not collated ei-*  
 “*ther*, and indeed *that we had examined only a few*  
 “*pages of the first*; an *intimation* which must have  
 “conveyed, to every candid mind, a sufficient qualifi-  
 “cation of the word *all*, to shew that it was applied  
 “*generally* with reference to the parts which we had  
 “collated, taken as a scale for the rest; and from  
 “those, we did certainly produce *examples sufficient to*  
 “*warrant such general inference.*” Rev. No. 31. p.  
 170.

Here again are assertions which I am unable to reconcile with the *veracity* of this anonymous critic: and, in order to shew that he did not “distinctly state that he had not collated the Oxford Homer, and indeed that he had examined only a few pages of it,” I will give *the whole* of what he said on that subject in the Article alluded to.

“Of the Homer, published under the patronage, and partly, we believe, at the expense of a noble and illustrious family, the editors appear to be, at least, half a century behind the rest of the world in critical knowledge; *they having religiously retained all the errors of Clarke’s edition*, even those introduced on the authority of mere conjecture, and in instances where the true reading had been twice before published on the authority of the Venetian manuscript. One of these so appalled us in the twentieth line of the first Iliad, as to deter us from all further *critical* examination: for, when a gross violation of idiom in

“ the use of the moods and voices, introduced arbitrarily to supply a defect in the metre, neither excited suspicion nor suggested inquiry, no one who values his time can think it worth while to go farther.”  
 Rev. No. 28. p. 431.

Where is it distinctly stated that he had *not collated the edition*? Where, that he had *examined only a few pages*? Does he mean that this is implied in the sentence respecting the twentieth line of the Iliad? If so, the defence of his *veracity* consists in this: that having examined only the first TWENTY LINES of a work containing above TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND, and having observed *one* error, he positively asserted and proclaimed to the world, that *all* the errors of Clarke's edition were *religiously* retained in it! If this be rightly termed *veracity*, it is a virtue against which the inexperienced part of mankind ought to be well upon their guard. Or is this given as a specimen of that new *Induction*, to which the Syllogistic method is so hostile? For it will be recollected, that in his defence he says, “ he produced *examples sufficient to warrant* such general inference.” Where, let me ask, are his examples? Not one is *produced*. There is simply a reference to a single line of the Iliad, which is said to contain one, although the reader is left to find out for himself in what word it consists.

If on the other hand he rejects this interpretation of the sentence respecting the twentieth

line of the Iliad, and bids us remark that he only says he was deterred from all further *critical* examination, what becomes of his assertion above quoted, that he “ distinctly stated he had not collated the Homer, and indeed that he had examined only a few pages of it?” For I affirm that there is not a syllable said of the Homer throughout the whole article, except in the passage above extracted.

Let us now see how far his declaration concerning the Strabo is supported. It is true that of this book he had said, “ We have not indeed, thought it a part of our duty to collate 1305 folio pages, in which nothing new was promised :” but he goes on to say, “ We have nevertheless *perused the whole attentively*, and can again assert, that the printers have done their duty in rendering very accurately that which was put before them.” And soon after, “ *Every error of the press, and usual inaccuracy of spelling, that had crept into the Amsterdam text, is religiously retained.*” Again, speaking of Casaubon’s text, he remarks, “ Errors have accumulated upon errors, which are *all carefully embalmed and preserved* in the splendid edition before us :” and this declaration he certainly follows up with a list of *nine* examples, occurring within the space of *One hundred and fifty* folio pages.

In his defence we are told, that the parts collated are to be taken as a *scale for the rest*, and this too after he had read a statement of a different kind, with all the examples specified, by which it appears, that no less than *fifty errors* of the Amsterdam edition had been corrected within the space of *one hundred pages* in this Oxford edition, without taking into the account a much more numerous list of accentual errors, in like manner corrected. He does not retract or alter a syllable of his statement, and yet he ventures to appeal to the decision of “every candid mind.” This, to be sure, is *modesty* as well as *veracity*.

The next topic in the Reviewer's defence regards the reading adopted by the Oxford editors in the 20th line of the first Iliad, viz. λύσασαιτε. Upon this single reading, according to his own defence, he had founded the charge of their having copied *all* Clarke's errors. When arguing the point of his veracity, therefore, I allowed him the advantage of considering this an error: it is now time to examine the question whether it be an *error*;— a question, which belongs to the second head of charges, or those which concern his “knowledge;” although I can assure him the first head is by no means yet exhausted.

Let us hear his own words:

“The direct charge of untruth, which follows, we directly retort; and assert, that λύσαιτε, taken and accented as the *second plural of the imperative, in the middle voice*, and followed by δεχέσθαι, is an arbitrary innovation, sanctioned by no authority.” Rev. No. 31. p. 170.

Λύσαιτε taken and accented as the *second plural of the imperative, in the middle voice*! It is necessary to pause a little here, and recollect somewhat of our boyish studies. Λύσαιτε in the *imperative middle*! I certainly never met with the word in that voice, nor do I conceive how it can be formed there. There is λύσαιτε in the *optative of the active voice*, a mood very frequently employed to express a wish or prayer, such as that which Chryses is here addressing to Agamemnon. But, “taken and accented as the *second plural of the imperative, in the middle voice*,” I do believe it is an innovation, and that it never entered the head of any man, but of a writer in the *Edinburgh Review*. Perhaps it would become me to speak with more respect of the whole fraternity, were I not countenanced by the authority of an eminent Greek scholar, who expresses his contempt of the *Edinburgh Reviewers* in the following terms:

“That such critics should know any thing of the distinct use of the articles in Homeric, Pindaric, and Attic composition, it would be absurd to expect.”

Analysis of Taste, by Richard Payne Knight, Esq.  
p. 258. 4th Edit.

Can it be necessary to dwell any longer upon this Gentleman's Greek criticisms? Instead of considering, as I did in the Reply, his language as affected, when he said that "he was appalled at the 20th line of the Iliad, and could go no farther:" I am now inclined to give him full credit for the assertion, and have only to express my surprise that he ever got so far. I will however repeat, that the Venetian MS. reads,

Παῖδα δ' ἐμοὶ λύσαιτε φίλην, τὰ δ' ἄποινα δέχεσθαι.

Upon which the Scholiast remarks, τὸ δὲ ΔΕ-  
ΧΕΣΘΑΙ ἀντὶ προστακτικοῦ ἀπαρεμφάτου, [qu.  
ἀπαρέμφατον], saying nothing of λύσαιτε, and  
therefore clearly implying that it was not to be  
read separately, λῦσαί τε. Now when δέχεσθαι (for  
which the Scholiast says δέχεσθαι is used) is found  
to be the reading of many good MSS. does not  
the union of it with λύσαιτε, which Clarke has  
adopted, form, as Heyné himself says, *lectio expe-*  
*ditissima*?

But however meanly we may think of his qualifications as a Greek critic, his intimate acquaintance with the Latin language is, I doubt not, generally allowed and dreaded. Perilous as the task may be, I venture upon it without much trem-

bling, and propose to examine *seriatim* every criticism he has advanced. This part of the Review, we are told, has been provoked by a “back-load” of dictionary learning” in the Reply, and by a display of “*very ordinary scholarship* through fifty “pages” of that work. Rev. p. 169. In the first place, then, let me remark, that the Reviewer contends that this “dictionary learning” is neither to be found in dictionaries, nor to be supported by them: and secondly, that the opinions of the author of the Reply are treated as *novel* and *dogmatical*; and therefore, if they contain a display of scholarship at all, I cannot conceive how that scholarship can be reckoned of the *ordinary* kind. All this however is between ourselves. The public are no otherwise concerned than as the critical opinions shall appear to be well founded or not.

He observes of the author of the Reply,

“In slowly and reluctantly admitting the validity of our objections to expressions, which *even he* does not venture to defend, he directs his attack to the principles on which they are founded, in two prolix digressions on ‘nescio quis’ and ‘quod.’” Rev. p. 170.

This slow and reluctant admission was expressed in the words, “I do not defend the phrase:” and the digression on ‘nescio quis’ was caused by a display of ignorance on his part, when he was desirous to shew his learning. All that I have said



on that subject remains unshaken ; and yet the Reviewer is so injudicious as to bring it again before the public, without acknowledging that he was wrong. The two passages which he now produces, p. 171. from Cicero de Inventione, and the three from his Epistles, have nothing whatever to do with that question. He is pleased indeed to say of me,

“ On the principle laid down by this dogmatical author, what would he make of such a passage as the following?—*Loci autem, qui ad quasque quæstiones accommodati sunt, deinceps videndum?* Cic. de Inv. l. 23.”

As I am unable to find this passage by his reference, it is impossible for me to say what may be made of it. How unsafe it is to trust to his quotation, the other passage, which I *can* find, informs me.

“ *Quæritur et quibuscum vivat.*” Cic. de Inv. ii. 9. Of this he observes, that if *technical accuracy*, and not *colloquial brevity*, were intended, it would have been written by Cicero, “ *Quæritur et qui sint, quibuscum vivat.*” Now the whole sentence, in which these words occur, is as follows:

‘ Et ex victu multæ trahuntur suspiciones, cum, quemadmodum, et apud quos, et a quibus educatus et eruditus sit, quæritur, et quibuscum vivat, qua ratione vitæ, quo more domestico vivat.’

Cicero is engaged in a *technical enumeration* of

the materials from which a pleader may impeach the credibility of a witness. For what purpose indeed these quotations are made, I cannot discover; nor in what way they militate against any position of mine. According to the principle laid down in the Reply, all the words in this passage which he seems to consider as Relatives, I take to be Indefinites; *quem, quos, quibus, quibuscum, qua, quo*; and the subjunctive mood is used with them, according to the same principle. That there may be, and often are, *ellipses* of *sit quod*, as well as of other phrases, I never denied, or even doubted: but to have recourse to an ellipsis, adapted arbitrarily to the case, *viz. qui sint, sit quod*, just as it may be wanted, seems to me an ignorant and awkward expedient, when a simple and satisfactory key of another kind is at hand. His own resolution, in fact, only supposes those indefinites to be *understood*, which I consider as really *expressed*.

Of the quotations from the Epistles to Atticus, the first I cannot find; the second is more easily accounted for as a colloquial anomaly, than by an ellipsis of *sit quod*.

Let me, however, be permitted to observe, that the principle laid down by the “dogmatical Author of the Reply,” of distinguishing between the Indefinite and the Relative, in order to determine the use of the subjunctive mood, is offered by him, not as one which will remove every diffi-

culty, but which will “serve greatly to simplify “the matter.” That the Reviewer, after having this pointed out to him, should still cling to his *ellipses*, I can only attribute to a moral constitution, celebrated even in the time of the Poet Hesiod :

‘Ὅς δέ κε μήτ’ αὐτὸς νοέη, μήτ’ ἄλλε ἀκέων  
 Ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὅδ’ αὖτ’ ἀχρήσιος ἀνὴρ.

I request the reader’s particular attention to the next paragraph, in which the Reviewer professes to clear himself from the charge of *falsehood*, for having said that Mr. Falconer *systematically* used *ut* with the indicative mood, when it ought to have the subjunctive. I accused him of having produced only *two* examples of this error out of two folio volumes, which was not sufficient to warrant the epithet *systematic*, in a word of such continual occurrence ; and I expressed a belief that he was not able to produce another. How does he reply to this charge ? He does not produce one more example ; but he tells his readers that he had already produced *three* : thus, according to approved usage, defending one false statement by advancing another. He *has not* produced *three* examples : and of those *two* which he has produced, *one* is very capable of another meaning. Upon this foundation still rests his charge of *systematic*, after having had three months interval to substantiate his accusation.

The passage in which *ut* is said to be *omitted* by Mr. Falconer is this:

“Paullo infra Caunum ex Idubeda emissus Orospecta  
“mollibus initio jugis vix assurgere videatur; sensim  
“tamen sese efferens Molinæ primum montes erigit  
“&c.” Strabo, p. 220.

Of this passage I said that *ut* was not omitted.  
“To place it where he proposes would make non-  
“sense. The meaning of *videatur* is, *may seem*.”  
Reply, p. 69. And I proceeded to paraphrase the  
sentence in order to shew that it could bear no  
other. “*To the eye* it may seem at first not to  
“rise, but, *in reality*, by degrees it swells into the  
“mountains of Molina, &c.” The phrases, *to the*  
*eye*, and *in reality*, were introduced as paraphrastic;  
and the Latin was given at the bottom of the  
page to prevent, as I thought, all possibility of  
cavil. He laughs indeed at this translation of *vi-*  
*deatur*, calling it “a subjunctive subjoined to no-  
“thing.” Why then is it a subjunctive? Why is  
it not a potential, like this of Cicero?

“Postremo, vix verisimile fortasse videatur, oderam  
“multo pejus hunc quam illum ipsum Clodium.” Ep.  
Fam. vii. 2.

If it were possible to suppress indignation at  
such practices as have been detected, nothing  
would be more amusing than the awkward at-  
tempts which this critic makes at merriment.

Let the following passage serve as a specimen, with which he points his censure of the expressions *according as*, *classified*, and *classification*:

“ We call them Oxonian barbarisms, because we know no other title descriptive of them. In milliners’ and barbers’ shops, indeed, they may possibly pass for Gallicisms; but if the revolution have tainted the French tongue with any such redundancies of anomalous jargon, it has not yet raised them into any more respectable circle of society.”  
Rev. p. 172.

The first of these phrases, *according as*, he is also pleased to style an “ ungrammatical vulgarism,” which the author of the Reply “ meant to be English.” It so happens that some other obscure writers *meant it to be English*; Dean Swift, for instance, Dr. Johnson, Mr. Dugald Stewart, and a few others, deceived, perhaps, by an ungrammatical book on English particles, written by one Wm. Walker, a man whose ignorance was privileged by his degree of B. D.

This mistaken Grammarian produces four sentences containing the phrase *according as*, and gives four different ways of turning it into Latin. What Dean Swift and Dr. Johnson<sup>f</sup> thought of it

<sup>f</sup> “ A man may with prudence and a good conscience approve of the professed principles of one party more than the other, *according as* he thinks they best promote the good of

may be seen by consulting the latter writer's Dictionary : and, when searching for the word *classification*, although not in the places where alone he thinks it is to be found, I luckily dipped upon this very vulgarism :

“ According as these words are comprehensive or limited in their signification, the conclusions we form will be more or less general.” Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, p. 209. 4to.

Whether the other words objected to belong to any respectable circle of society, some doubts may be entertained, since we find one of them, “ *classification*,” employed in this very article, p. 165. But the question, I trust, will be considered as tolerably settled when it is stated, that in one chapter [chap. 4.] of Mr. Stewart's Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, I have met with the word, upon a cursory glance, not less than *ten times*.

The next paragraph relates to the alteration of *constat* and *sequitur* into *constaret* and *sequebatur*, which the Reviewer had deemed necessary in order to make Mr. Falconer's Latin Roman Latin. His criticism was introduced in the following manner :

“ Church and State.” Swift, Sentiments of a Church of England Man.

“ The *tenfes*, in this Anglo-Latin dialect, are as licentiously and incongruously used as the *moods* : whence we have ‘ Neque hoc memoriæ lapsu Strabo scripsit; sed cum de Cyri rebus gestis vix aliquid certè constat, eam famam sequitur &c.’ Rev. No. 28. p. 436.

His former paragraph had related to what he called a wrong use of *moods*; and I naturally supposed, by his altering *constat*, not into *constet*, but *constaret*, and *sequitur* into *sequebatur*, that he meant to reconcile them with *scripsit*. Examples therefore were produced of similar transitions from the past to the present tense. He now pretends that all this was irrelevant, and asks,

“ Can a causal, which influenced Strabo in writing, be now expressed by an *indicative present* subjoined to the causal ‘ cum ? ’ If it can, let its defender boldly say so, and produce a single case in point.” Rev. No. 31. p. 172.

The *Indicative present* may be used no less than the *Subjunctive present*, if the present tense may be used at all. It is not very common, as I had remarked, and “ writers of Latin should be cautioned against it;” but it has, although very rarely, the sanction of Cicero. Among the few instances in which an *Indicative present* is used after the causal *cum*, not one perhaps is a case in point with this; i. e. where the *cause* is said to have influenced an author in writing. And he

might as well go on to ask for examples of a verb of the first conjugation, or of a compound of *sto* employed, conditions equally essential to the point in dispute with that which he has demanded. But that we *may* use the *present tense*, both when speaking of the *opinions* of a writer long since dead, and of the *cause* of those opinions, I think the following authority will prove:

“Cum igitur aliorum animantium ortus in terra *fit*,  
 “aliorum in aqua, in aëre aliorum: absurdum esse Ari-  
 “stoteli *videtur* in ea parte, quæ fit ad gignenda ani-  
 “malia aptissima, animal gigni nullum putare.” Cic.  
 de Nat. Deor. ii. 15.

For answers to the two next paragraphs in p. 172. I refer to the Reply, p. 73—79. They do not in the slightest degree invalidate, or attempt to invalidate, any thing contained in those pages. He repeats however his old cavil, again and again refuted, that the University are responsible for the correctness of every phrase printed at the Clarendon press.

It is idle to think of teaching a scholar that will not learn,

Occidit miseros crambe repetita magistros.

Let him read again what is said on this subject in pp. 31, 32, and 43, of the Reply; for it is really unfair to me and to my readers to require that the case be explained anew.



Entering now upon the defence of his own Latinity, he begins with his alteration of Mr. Falconer's sentence, "Tigranes post reges subditos" "rex regum appellatur," into "Tigranes postquam reges supradictos imperio subjecerat, rex regum appellatus est." He says, that the whole sentence was condemned by him as being "neither sense nor Latin;" because he *conceived* the writer meant to signify, "*That Tigranes had himself subdued those kings, and then assumed the title of king of kings.*" Observe now the candour of this critic. When he meets with a violation of Latin idiom in the notes of the editor, although the meaning is perfectly clear, especially to an English reader, he affects not to understand it: but when it suits his purpose, he *assumes* that the writer meant to express what his words do not convey according to *any* idiom, and what we have no reason to think he intended them to convey. The whole note is badly written; but the editor most probably meant, as the words quoted from him express, "that Tigranes, *after* the period when he subdued the kings, [and *not till then*,] is called in history king of kings." Thus on some of his coins the title of βασιλεὺς alone is found: on others βασιλεὺς βασιλέων &c. And how established it was at one time we learn from Plutarch,

who describes Lucullus as speaking of him in his absence by that title. Plut. in Lucull. c. 14. If this was the editor's meaning, nothing is more common than his use of the word *appellatur*<sup>h</sup>.

But the Reviewer fancies he has discovered another rule of Latinity. "*Post reges subactos,*" says he, "would not have signified *that Tigranes had himself subdued those kings.*" On this, as upon other occasions, I must beg to differ from him: for not only is this form of speaking used by good writers when *referring to an epoch*, but when describing *continued action*. E. g.

Qui post factam injuriam se expurget, parum mihi  
profit. Ter. Hec. v. 1. 15.

Post acceptam proximam pugnae cladem Veientes abstinuere acie. Liv. ii. 51.

He proceeds to assert, that his use of the tense "*competisset,*" which I had altered to *competeret* in the following passage, is strictly proper;—"Platæenses ad paludem olim habitasse, noster affirmat: in locum autem meliorem translatos novæ urbi nomen priscum continuasse, *situi* licet, ab aquis remoto, *haud diutius competisset.*" [Quoted in p. 83. of the Reply.]—giving as a reason this remarkable rule:

<sup>h</sup> Ex iis conclusionibus quas supra scripsi, prior quartus, posterior quintus a dialecticis modus *appellatur*. Cic. Topie. c. 14.

“ In an oblique narration, or statement in the person  
 “ of one who had long ceased to exist, events coexistent  
 “ with him are to be expressed in the *imperfect* : and  
 “ those preceding him, in the *pluperfect* tense subjunc-  
 “ tive.” Rev. p. 173.

Thus the *perfect* subjunctive is altogether excluded from a sentence of this kind! and we must alter some hundred sentences of Livy to make them Latin! But this is not the only novelty. He seems to have forgotten that there are *two* reasons for the use of the *imperfect subjunctive* : one, *when the clause is subordinate to a verb in the past time*; the other, *when the idea denoted by it requires continued time*. In the example he has produced from Livy xxv. 16. *redirent* depends on the first of these principles; *fieret* and *senesceret* on the second. On the latter account I had held *competeret* to be the right tense, as being equivalent to the following, and a hundred other examples of the same construction:

Atque illum, cum differendo par esse non *posset*, ad auctores confugisse, et id quod *diceret* . . . . scriptum protulisse. Cic. De Orat. i. 56.

Metum continuissè ad eam diem Hispanorum animos, quia procul Romani *abessent*. Liv. xxii. 22.

Consulem in Lucanos ostendisse iter, quum Picenum et Galliam *peteret* : castra relinquentem nulla alia re tutiora, quam errore hostis, qui ducem inde atque exercitus partem abisse *ignoraret*. Liv. xxvii. 44.

Quum signa portis prope inferri *cernerent*, neminem se movisse. Liv. xxxiv. 33.

In all these examples the obliquity of the structure corresponds with the sentence in which I would introduce *competeret*. The idea does not *precede* “continuâsse,” but is *concurrent* with it.

But the rule he lays down was perhaps chiefly intended to vindicate his use of *habuisset* and *occidisset* in this sentence :

“Nonne vult Pausanias Melanthum Andropompi filium e Nelei progenie *primum* fuisse, *qui* in Attica sedem *habuisset* ; atque ideo *eundem qui* Xanthum *occidisset*.” [Quoted Reply, p. 84.]

Of this I had said, “*Haberet* might do, as relating to continued time, but *habuerit* is the more usual form. Instead of *occidisset*, he should have said *occiderit*.” Reply, p. 91. A parallel was then produced from Cicero. “Publium etiam Scipionem Nasicam . . . habitum eloquentem *aiunt*, illius qui sacra *acceperit*, filium.” Clar. Orat. 20. He objects to this parallel, because, as he says, *occidisset* refers to the time of an intermediate person, between the writer and the event stated, whereas *acceperit* refers to the writer’s own time. To this it may be answered, that the persons meant by *aiunt* are probably intermediate between Cicero and the event stated, and in that case the parallel holds exactly. “*Aiunt*” in the one example seems to me perfectly equivalent to “Pausanias *vult*” in the other.

But the true principle, which governs the use of this tense in such cases, seems to have been quite overlooked or never known by this critic. If the leading word of the sentence be in the present tense, the *perfect* subjunctive is commonly used after it; if it be in a tense denoting past time, the *pluperfect* subjunctive, thus:

Nec *putant* ei nummos deesse posse, qui ex obsidione fœneratores *exemerit*. Cic. Ep. Fam. v. 6. *Velim* recordere, quæ ego de te in senatu *egerim*. Ibid. v. 2. Nec tamen *dubito* quin magnam vim semper *habuerit* oratio. Clar. Orat. 10. Etiam in scriptis *obliviscatur*, quid paulo ante *posuisset*. Clar. Orat. 60. Tamen quod memoria *tenebam*, cujusmodi ad me literas antea *misses*. Cic. Ep. Fam. v. 6. *Maluit*, longe omnium, non modo ejusdem ætatis, sed eorum etiam qui *fuiſſent*, in jure civili esse princeps. Clar. Orat. 41.

In one chapter of Livy the rule is remarkably exemplified. When the leading word is in the *present* tense, “ceperint” is employed; when in the *imperfect*, “cepissent.”

“Tribuni militum . . . . *jubent* &c. sicut *ceperint* [castra] posse capi.”

Soon after,

“L. Atilius tribunus primus secundæ legionis, non *hortabatur* modo milites, sed *docebat* etiam, Si victores Istri, quibus armis *cepissent* castra, iisdem capta retinere in animo haberent &c.” Liv xli. 3.

If these examples are not sufficient, others, illust-

trative of the same principle, will be found Cic. Ep. Fam. v. 12. v. 8. Clar. Orat. 7. 14. 36. 42. 51. 53. 69. 78. Liv. xxxii. c. 33, 34.

To the criticism respecting *primus qui* more than a page of the Review is devoted; nearly all of which turns against himself, and supports the objection I had made to the phrase. He produces five passages from Cicero, in every one of which the antecedent to *qui* is not *primus*, but some pronoun either expressed or understood<sup>i</sup>. He evidently mistakes the whole question. *Primum qui* was not condemned because *primum* went before *qui*, or because *qui* referred to the same subject of which *primum* was an epithet; but because

<sup>i</sup> Ex quo potest probabiliter confici, *eum* recte primum esse judicio suo, *qui* omnium cæterorum judicio sit secundus. Cic. Acad. fragm. Est enim [*illud*] primum, *quod* cernitur in universi generis humani societate. Id. de Off. i. 16. In quibus *hoc* primum est, in *quo* miror &c. Id. de Fin. 1. Polemoni—*ea* prima visa sunt, *quæ* paulo ante dixi. Ib. ii. 11. Si illud vere connectitur . . . . *primumque quod* est in connexo . . . . necessarium est &c. “If that which is first in the hypothetical proposition be necessary, the other part is necessary also.” That such is Cicero’s meaning is not only evident from the rules of Logic, according to which he is conducting the argument, but he proceeds, after a parenthesis, to *restate* the reasoning in that very form: “Si igitur quod primum in connexo est, necessarium est; fit etiam quod consequitur necessarium.” Cic. de Fato, c. 7.

the *priority* denoted by *primum* was made the *antecedent* to *qui*. Thus it is not against the idiom to say, *Primus Regum Romanorum, quem* Rhea natum et lupa nutritum ferunt, bella quamplurima cum finitimis urbibus gessit. But to say, “Ancus Martius *Primus Regum Romanorum* fuit *qui* civitatem Latinis dedit,” is against it: because *qui*, in this case, does not refer to the substantive implied in *primus*, but to the *priority* which that word denotes.

The next paragraph recriminates on me with great asperity. I had said, in reference to “*primus qui*,” that Cicero invariably avoids the phrase, although he has a hundred occasions for using it, if it were Latin. “In the treatise de Claris Oratoribus, *this idea occurs continually*; and the phrase employed is either ‘*primus*’ alone, or ‘*qui primus*,’ or the adverb ‘*primo*.’” Reply, p. 85.

The Reviewer, speaking of the same idea, writes thus :

“Our answerer, indeed, says there are *more than twenty* [occasions for it] in Cicero’s book de Claris Oratoribus, in all which he avoids it, and employs ‘*primus*,’ ‘*qui primus*,’ or the adverb ‘*primo*.’ This assertion is of a character—Cui non invenit ipsa nomina, et a nullo posuit natura metallo. *There is only one occasion for it* in the whole book; and there he does employ it.” Rev. p. 174.

It is somewhat strange, that, in order to con-

vict me of this offence without a name, he should condescend to be guilty of it himself—that he should invent a phrase which I never used, and coolly pronounce it mine. Or will he tell us in the next Review, that “*more than twenty*” is an error of the press for “*continually*?” In page 85. of the Reply I produced *four* examples from the first fourteen chapters of the book *De Claris Oratoribus*, in support of my assertion that the idea occurred *continually*; to which I can now add *eight* more<sup>1</sup>, all within the compass of the first thirty chapters, that is, within less than one third of the book. In all these passages the idea conveyed is that which in English might naturally be expressed by the phrase, “The first who:” and many of them would lose something of their force

<sup>1</sup> Quoniam longo intervallo modo *primum* animadverti paulo te hilariorum. c. 5. Qua in urbe *primum* se orator extulit. c. 7. Hæc igitur ætas *prima* Athenis oratorem prope perfectum tulit. c. 12. Atque hic Livius, *qui primus* fabulam docuit, &c. c. 18. And again, Cui si æqualis fuerit Livius, minor fuit aliquanto is *qui primus* fabulam dedit. Ibid. Et nimirum is *princeps* ex Latinis illa oratorum propria et quasi legitima opera tractavit. c. 21. Hoc in oratore Latino *primum* mihi videtur et lenitas apparuisse illa Græcorum &c. c. 25. Nam et quæstiones perpetuæ hoc adolescente constitutæ sunt, quæ antea nullæ fuerunt, (L. enim Piso, tribunus plebis legem *primus* de pecuniis repetundis, Censorino et Manilio consulibus, tulit, &c.) c. 27. See also Academ. i. 9. Nat. Deor. i. 20. Liv. vi. 37. vii. 22. and four times Quintil. iii. 1.



or exactness, if expressed in any other manner. They would, I am confident, be so rendered by any one who was anxious to give the *precise* meaning; especially in the four examples already quoted from chap. 8, 9, 11, 14. and not less so in those from chap. 12, 21, 25, 27. in the note below.

As to the single authority which he produces on his side, “*Quem vero existet, et de quo fit memoria proditum, eloquentem fuisse, et ita esse habitum, primus est M. C. Cethegus;*” if it is, as I really believe it to be, the only passage in that author of the same kind, it cannot surely be allowed to contradict an uniform stream of examples in a phrase of such continual occurrence. The inverted collocation of the sentence may well account for the anomaly. Many instances occur in the same author of grammatical incongruities arising from the same cause: a sentence is begun, perhaps, with the accusative case, and the construction suddenly changes, especially if several clauses have intervened, to the nominative: and if it were allowable to produce these as authorities, there would be an end not only of Latin idiom, but of Latin syntax. Some examples of equal inaccuracy are given in a note, where the construction appears to have been inadvertently changed *currente calamo*; from no one of which, as I apprehend, would a person be allowed to reason concerning a disputed point in

the Latin language. They are what the grammarians call ἀνακόλουθα<sup>m</sup>.

The reason for introducing the examples which follow, I profess not to understand. *Dignissimus qui*, or *dignus qui*, is good Latin; and no one, I believe, ever doubted of it<sup>n</sup>.

The other phrase which I had treated as a barbarism, is *eundem qui*. And here, as the Reviewer

<sup>m</sup> *Prætor* interea, ne pulchrum se ac beatum putaret, atque aliquid ipse sua sponte loqueretur, *ei* quoque carmen compositum est. Cic. pro Muren. c. 12. Nam *quoniam*, quidquid est quod in controversia aut in contentione versetur, in eo, aut sitne, aut quid sit, aut quale sit, quæritur: sitne, signis: quid sit, definitionibus: quale sit, recti pravique partibus: *quibus* ut uti possit orator, non ille vulgaris, sed hic excellens, a propriis personis et temporibus semper, si potest, advocat controversiam. Orat. c. 14. So, Etenim virtus omnis &c. De Off. ii. 5. Etenim si orationes quas nos &c. Tusc. ii. 1. An dubitas, quin præstans &c. Tusc. v. 15. Ex eodem hoc vetus illud &c. De Orat. ii. 64. Of the same kind are these: Nam *nos omnes*, quibus est alicunde aliquis objectus labos, Omne quod est interea tempus, prius quam id relatum est, *lucro est*. Ter. Hec. iii. 1. 6. *Hunc adolescentem* quem vides, malo astro *natus est*. Petron. Quas credis esse *bas*, non sunt veræ nuptiæ. Ter. And. i. 1. 20.

<sup>n</sup> If I understand him rightly in p. 174. "Where the predicate, &c." the single authority which he produces from Cic. de Clar. Orat. in support of his use of *primum qui*, is a violation of his own rule.

seems to triumph most, I must beg leave to repeat the words I used concerning it:

“ Is it credible, that if this mode of speaking were  
 “ correct, it should not be met with ten times in all  
 “ the purest writers? The idea is so common, and en-  
 “ ters inadvertently into so many sentences, that we  
 “ must pursue a very different rule of criticism, when  
 “ examining this, from what is usually adopted when  
 “ the genuineness of a single word is suspected. In the  
 “ present case I should not admit *three or four in-  
 “ stances*, out of the whole body of Latin authors, to  
 “ justify the use of it: but the fact, I believe, is, that  
 “ *in the way here employed* it does not occur *once*.”  
 Reply, p. 86.

It is necessary therefore to observe attentively in what way *it is employed* by the Reviewer, for upon this point the whole question between us turns.

The case is briefly this. Strabo relates, that Melanthus, a banished king from the Peloponnesus, and descendant of Neleus, settled in Attica; and, having slain Xanthus king of Bœotia in single combat, was chosen by the Athenians to be their king. Casaubon in his note observes, that this account differs from Pausanias, who says that Xanthus was slain by Andropompus, the father of Melanthus. Upon this Mr. Falconer remarks, that Pausanias is hardly consistent with himself; for that in another part of his work he had men-

tioned Melanthus as having obtained the kingdom of Athens, after dethroning the last of the race of Theseus. Did not Pausanias therefore mean that Melanthus was the first of his family that settled in Attica? and if so, HE, and not Andropompus, was certainly the person who slew Xanthus.

Such is the argument pursued by Mr. Falconer: which argument the Reviewer would express by, “Nonne vult Pausanias Melanthum Andropompi  
“filium e Nelei progenie primum fuisse, qui in  
“Attica sedem habuisset; atque ideo *eundem qui*  
“Xanthum occidisset.” As a better mode I had proposed, “Nonne vult Pausanias, primum ex  
“Nelei nepotibus Melanthum in Attica sedem  
“habuisse, ac proinde *eum esse qui* Xanthum occi-  
“derit?”

That *eundem qui* is a legitimate phrase when absolute *sameness* is predicated, I was so far from denying, that I even declared and proved it by examples. But I contended, and still contend, that to use it where *sameness* is not the leading idea meant to be conveyed, is against the genius of the Latin language. All the authorities now produced by the Reviewer are of this kind.

“Quid enim est tam repugnans, quam *eundem dicere*,  
“quod honestum sit, solum id bonum esse, *qui dicat*,  
“appetitionem rerum ad vivendum accommodatarum a  
“natura profectam?” Cic. de Fin. iv. 28. “Neglige,  
“inquit, *dolorem*. Quis hoc dicit? *Idem, qui dolorem*

“ summum malum.” Id. Tusc. ii. 19. “ Opus ipsa  
 “ suum *eadem*, quæ coagmentavit, natura dissolvit. Ut  
 “ navem, ut ædificium *idem* destruit facillime, qui con-  
 “ struxit; sic hominem *eadem* optime, quæ conglutina-  
 “ vit, natura dissolvit.” Id. De Senect. c. 20. “ Quæ-  
 “ ritur etiam nunc quis eum nuntium miserit? Nonne  
 “ perspicuum est, *eundem*, qui Ameriam?” Id. pro  
 Rosc. Amer. c. 37.

The news of the murder of Sex. Roscius had been carried both to Ameria and Volaterræ with wonderful speed: and Cicero is arguing, that *the same* person must have dispatched both messengers: no one else had any motive for such expedition. The other example from Cornelius Nepos relates to a *party* in Thasus, whose firm attachment to Athens Lyfander feared, because of their former resolute hostility to it<sup>n</sup>. “ Proinde ac si *iidem* fir-  
 “ missimi solerent esse amici, qui constantes fu-  
 “ issent inimici.” Corn. Nep. in Lyf. In this way *idem* is used as an epithet even to the name of an individual, if the writer wishes to draw attention to the *identity* of the person; as, *idem Cæsar*, [De Clar. Orat. c. 60.] where the whole stress of the sentence consists in his being *the same* man.

Having called my remark on this phrase “ a blunder, surpassing all that pride, engrafted on

<sup>n</sup> Such must be the meaning of the passage if this reading is kept. Vid. Var. Lect. Edit. Oxon. 1697.

“ ignorance, has hitherto committed,” he proceeds to vindicate his *Latinity* in “ *Luna sub deæ persona* “ *ab iis culta.*” This I had termed “ bald Latin ;” adding, that I doubted its purity. “ For the strict “ meaning of the phrase is, *under the assumed appearance, or character, of a goddess.*” Reply, p. 92. In order to defend it from this attack, he refers to a passage in Paterculus, where it is used *just as I have explained it.* The historian observes, that many writers call Theffaly by that name at a time when it did not belong to the district. “ *Quod cum alii faciant, Tragici frequentissime* “ *faciunt : quibus minime id concedendum est :* “ *nihil enim ex persona poetæ, sed omnia sub eo-* “ *rum, qui illo tempore vixerunt, dixerunt.*” Paterc. i. 3. Of the use of the word *persona* in the other passages referred to, I had never expressed or entertained any doubt.

“ *Straboni* is an error of the press for a *Strabone!*” Be it so. The pressmen at Oxford, though ignorant of the *DEUS LUNUS*, would hardly have made such a slip. ‘ BUT,’ we are told, *potuerit* in the following sentence is an *ELEGANCE* :

“ *Romanis enim Græcisque juxta ignorantibus quibus-* “ *nam deorum esset iste Menes, pro alio quam Luna,* “ *sub deæ persona ab iis culta, a Strabone vix haberi* “ *potuerit.*”

The meaning certainly is *potuit*, and I had re-

commended that word. Since however he calls it an elegance to use *potuerit*, it may not be amiss to examine the point a little more closely. It is then the substitution of the *perfect potential* for the *perfect indicative*. Where, let me ask, is this ever done when the assertion is absolute? The two examples he gives are quite irrelevant. *Hypothetical* cases are in them proposed, and it is merely stated what *would follow* from such a supposition. *Vix crediderim, vix dixerim* &c. are often indeed used absolutely, but never for *credidi, dixi*; they represent *credam, dicam, or crederem, dicerem*. See Liv. vi. 14. vii. 10. x. 9. Tac. Vit. Agric. 12. Cic. de Clar. Orat. 47. Even of this form, we have the opinion of a man generally supposed to know something of the Latin idiom, that it is *not more elegant* than the other. Scheller, vol. i. p. 178.

*Competo* was not rejected as a bad word; but *convenio* was proposed as a better. “*Haud diutius*” for *non amplius*, or *jam non*, is not indeed recommended by the Reviewer as an *elegance*, but as one of those phrases “which distinguish a learned man of *parts, taste, and discernment*, from the mechanic drudge of *memory*.” Rev. p. 176. Being classed myself under the latter description, I can only tell him that I never *remember* to have seen ‘*diutius*’ joined with a verb, except when that verb denoted some

duration or continued action. It may be otherwise; but the examples he has brought leave the thing just where it was.

Of the gross fabrication pointed out, p. 82. of the Reply, he had better have said nothing than what he has said. I leave the matter to be decided by any one who will turn to the passage, or to page 590. of the Strabo, and read the note of Palmerius, together with that of Mr. Falconer.

I come now to the last article of his defence—an article which I hope will be attentively examined, because it affords a striking specimen of the manner in which this Gentleman vindicates his character for veracity. He says,

“ Lastly, this acute detector is pleased to accuse us  
“ of one blunder, and three false propositions, in our  
“ remarks on the central map of Greece. The blunder  
“ is an *a* for the second *o* in Oropiæ.—The first false  
“ proposition is, that Histiaæa, the only name under  
“ which that place ever existed as a state or free city, is  
“ not in the map; *and it is not*. The other two are,  
“ that Erythræ in Bœotia, and Ægæ in Eubœa, are  
“ distinguished by coins still extant.” Rev. p. 177.

Let the reader peruse this passage carefully, and then compare it with the passage of which it professes to be a repetition. In p. 97. of the Reply, having extracted his paragraph respecting the maps, I added,



“ In this single paragraph there are three false propositions, *one misrepresentation*, and one blunder. The blunder is Orabiæ for Orobæ. *The misrepresentation is, that Histiaæ is not in the map.* Oreus, which in Strabo’s time was the name of Istiaæ, is in the map ; and it is difficult to conceive that he did not know it, because in D’Anville’s map it is called ‘ Oreus, prius Istiaæ.’ As for the *three false propositions* ; Erythræ in Bœotia had no coinage of its own : Ægæ in Eubœa had none of its own : *and the maps are not said in the Preface to have been formed on the best authorities.* All that is said of them is, that care was taken to adapt the last fourteen to the text of Strabo as closely as the three first. The adoption of the name of Oreus instead of Histiaæ is one proof of this.”

The last of the three false propositions he leaves unnoticed ; but, to cover the artifice, he treats *that* as the first of them, which I had called a *misrepresentation* : and which every one, I am sure, will call a most disgraceful one, after this deliberate repetition of it.

The only thing remaining for me is, to defend what was said about the coins. And here I beg it will be recollected that I stated this, not as from myself, but on the authority of Mr. Falconer’s letter, Gent. Mag. Oct. 1809. The words of that letter are ;

“ If the existence of coins is to determine the measure of this error, the omission of Erythræ in Bœotia, this place may be reserved for insertion till its mint be discovered. For the same reason, we may postpone

“ the addition of Ægæ in Eubœa. The Reviewer places  
 “ ancient mints at pleasure ; and he is equally indif-  
 “ ferent, whether at Erythræ in Bœotia, or Erythræ in  
 “ Ionia ; at Ægæ in Eubœa, or Ægæ in Æolia.” And  
 again, “ He has assigned to one place in Eubœa, and to  
 “ another in Bœotia, the dignity of a specific coinage,  
 “ unknown when they existed.”

Upon this authority, which I distinctly stated, the assertions respecting the coins were made ; for which he is pleased to call *me* “ a bold-faced as-  
 “ sertor of negatives ;” adding, that he is “ ready to  
 “ produce *undoubted coins* of both cities from col-  
 “ lections in London.” Notwithstanding this declaration, subsequent enquiry has led me to conclude that Mr. Falconer was perfectly justified in making that statement. No coins of Ægæ in Eubœa have ever been published ; and those few [two or three only] which have been attributed to Erythræ in Bœotia, are now generally admitted not to belong to that city, and are expressly assigned by Sestini to Pheræ in Thessaly. [Geograph. Numismat. part ii. p. 31.] Eckhel, indeed, who mentions them, says, that the only reason for assigning them to Erythræ in Bœotia is the difference of their fabric and impress from those of Erythræ in Ionia. Eckhel, vol. ii. p. 199. The inscription however which he read ΕΡΥΘ, is declared by Sestini to be ΦΕΡΑ. Those which bear ΕΡΥ with the head of Hercules, are referred by the same writer to Erythræ in Ionia. Geog. Numism. part i. p. 39.

What the Reviewer says about coins of Erythræ in private collections, may be true ; and if they bear the Bœotian shield, there can be no doubt to which Erythræ they belong : but it is quite ludicrous to expect that because they are “undoubted” by him, therefore they are to be undoubted by the world ; or that his anonymous unsupported assertion shall have any weight in a disputed point. According to the evidence hitherto produced, Mr. Falconer’s assertion is strictly proper. No coins of those cities have been published ; and therefore we have no grounds for saying that there ever were any.

Before we dismiss the subject, it may be as well to notice the stratagem by which he endeavours to persuade the world, that only *one* error had been proved in all his criticisms : *viz.* his censure of “majorem” as an epithet to “fidem.” This trick has been so long used in controversy, as to be almost worn out. It will not be forgotten then, that, besides the errors repeated in the last Review, and now again exposed, his ignorance of the use of *quod* was betrayed in condemning *quod subiere* &c ; he had confounded *relatives* with *indefinites* when speaking of the subjunctive mood ; he had misrepresented the passage containing *citius*, which he absurdly altered into *crebrius* ; he construed *versus Labicanam*, “to the Labican gate ;” he declared that no language on the con-

tinent had an idiom corresponding in expression with "give credit;" he enriched the Latin language with the word *fitui*, not inadvertently, but when correcting the Latin of another; he complained that Tyrwhitt's emendations had not been published separately; he selected *six* out of near two hundred, and blundered in speaking about *five* of them; he declared that Philip, the son of Demetrius, is *repeatedly* called Philip the Second by Mr. Falconer, whereas he is only so called *once*. Upon this single fact he founded a charge against the edition, of inaccuracy in history equal to its inaccuracy in grammar: and, to crown the whole, he informed us that there was a **DEUS LUNUS** at Rome.

All this however is nothing, either in kind or degree, when compared with the list which has been exhibited in the preceding pages; and I should not have thought the topics worth a second mention, had he not used an unfair expedient in order to conceal them from public notice. The vindication of his style from the charge of *virulence* and *scurrility* perhaps did not proceed from *his* pen. It is a sort of curiosity in its way: and I hope its beauties will not be overlooked. "We  
 " have carefully looked over the article, says this  
 " defender, to which so much *malice*, virulence,  
 " and *scurrility* is imputed, and cannot find a  
 " single epithet or expression that implies any

“ thing like *anger* or *violence*.” Of this it will be sufficient to say, that *no malice* was imputed to the writer, *no anger*, *no violence*: and, for a defendant to quit the real accusation, and prove himself innocent of things which were never laid against him, is usually interpreted into a confession of guilt. He was charged with *unprovoked insult*, with *deliberate misrepresentation*, and with *vulgar abuse*. If the reader should be of opinion that these charges have been proved, he will not condemn me for having replied with warmth and severity: for, unless the feeling of indignation is to be suppressed altogether, I know of no occasion on which it can be better justified, than when all these qualities are combined in a groundless attack, made in a work of high credit and popularity, with a view to degrade the character of a place of liberal education.

## PART III.

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Never was dash'd out, at one lucky hit,  
 A fool, so just a copy of a wit:  
 So like, that critics said, and courtiers swore,  
 A wit it was, and called the phantom More<sup>a</sup>.

DUNCIAD.

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THE third Part opens with a display of the Logic, adopted in the modern school. Speaking of the chapter in the Reply which falls to this Gentleman's share, he observes, "AS this part of the  
 " work is more remarkable than the rest for its  
 " ostentatious dulness, and its gross departure from  
 " the language and manners of a gentleman, we  
 " must be excused for bestowing on it a little more  
 " of our time than we are in the habit of wasting  
 " on such men, and such things."

That is, if I understand him rightly, *because* it possesses qualities which render a composition unworthy of notice, *therefore* I shall bestow more time upon it. He then charges me with two in-

<sup>a</sup> James More Smith was the real name, as the notes to the Dunciad inform us. Of this Mr. Smith it is said in the same place, that his whole misfortune " was too inordinate a passion  
 " to be thought a wit."

stances of deceit, of which it becomes me in the first place to clear myself.

One is, that when answering his first article of accusation, which I had expressed in these words, "That classical learning forms the sole business of English education," I omitted the exception in favour of Cambridge. This he calls a "low artifice." For what purpose I could be induced to practise this low artifice, is to me unintelligible. It does not assist the argument I maintained, nor does it affect it in the slightest manner. The exception was expressed in the form of a note. [Edin. Rev. No. 29. p. 45.] I quoted the passage of the text to which this note was appended; and proceeded to argue upon it strictly in the sense in which the author meant it, as a censure of Oxford education. Having made some remarks on the phrase "learning Latin and Greek," for a particular refutation of the charge itself, I referred to the chapter on *The Course of Studies pursued at Oxford*. Reply, p. 119. That pamphlet must have been worded with an accuracy more fortunate than common, if he is able to discover only two passages he can call deceitful, and this is one of them.

The other charge requires more illustration: because he has contrived to give it a greater air of plausibility. I hope therefore I shall be excused for stating the whole case in the fullest manner.

He produces a quotation of mine from the Edinburgh Review, ending with these words; "If our religion be a fable, the sooner it is exploded the better. If our government is bad, it should be amended." Upon this he observes,

"Here he stops his quotation; and the reader, who is obliged to stop along with him, is left of course to suppose, that the Reviewer was himself in a state of *extreme doubt and uncertainty*, whether the Christian religion was true or false, or the English government good or bad. In the Review, however, the following words come immediately after those which have just been cited; *but we have no doubt of the truth of the one, or of the excellence of the other: and are convinced that both will be placed on a firmer basis, in proportion as the minds of men are more trained to the investigation of truth.* On the meanness and malice of this suppression we shall make no comment." Rev. No. 31. p. 178.

Who that reads this would not imagine, that I had been impeaching or insinuating something against the *religious and political opinions* of the Reviewer—that I had produced this passage in support of my argument, to shew their dangerous tendency—and that I had omitted *part of a sentence* in order to give to the rest a force which did not belong to it? Such, I think, must be the impression made on a person unacquainted with the case; and whoever has been led to form that opinion, I entreat him to read p. 163. of the Reply.



He will find that the argument was not in the slightest degree connected either with political or religious tenets, but that it concerned merely the particular charges preferred against this University: namely,—“that our instruction was confined  
 “to the grammatical niceties of a dead language—  
 “that we repress all attempts at reasoning upon  
 “moral and political questions—that by our miserable jealousy and littleness an infinite quantity of talent is destroyed—that all the great  
 “topics, in which the mind of a public man  
 “should be well informed, are not only neglected,  
 “but discouraged or despised.” Having given this summary, I proceeded to say, “The words of this  
 “*acrimonious invective* I have not thought it always necessary to transcribe; but the substance  
 “of it will not be found, I trust, unfairly stated, *if*  
 “*compared with the extracts below.*” These extracts were given in a note, as authorities for the statement made in the text; which statement was immediately followed by a discussion of the term *Utility*.

It is impossible to conceive a case where ingenuity would be more tortured, in order to fasten a charge of dishonourable quotation. The clauses which finish the extract were almost necessary to shew the full extent of the phrases ‘moral and ‘political truth,’ as well as the precise meaning of the preceding sentence, “And yet, who vilifies

“both, &c.” They were introduced solely with that view. To have continued the extract would have been not only irrelevant, but *contrary* to the *professed* design of the note. We were condemned for suppressing all free discussion of those important topics, as if afraid that the truth might be against us. The Reviewer argues that the fear is unmanly, and that truth should be the object of our pursuit, to whatever conclusions it might lead. He thought proper to accompany this sentiment with a declaration of *his own* opinions on those subjects; and if those opinions had been at all the object of animadversion or dispute, it would have been unfair and indeed absurd in me to have kept the passage out of sight. But, *being totally foreign to the subject in hand*, it would have been equally trifling to insert it, in a note which professed only to give *abridged* extracts of the parts most intimately connected with the argument. However important his opinions in religion and politics may be to himself, or however important he may think them to the world, *upon this argument they had not the most distant bearing*. To have mentioned them would have been to digress and amplify, instead of to abridge<sup>b</sup>.

<sup>b</sup> Perhaps it may be the best way to produce the entire paragraph from which extracts were given in the Reply, as *specimens of acrimonious invective* against Oxford. The passages *not extracted* are printed in Italics. From this I trust it will ap-

To illustrate my *own case* more clearly, I would remind the reader of a topic mentioned in p. 49.

pear, that *compression* was the chief object; and that the last clauses extracted were introduced as *explanatory* of the foregoing passage about *moral* and political truth.

‘The English clergy, in whose hands education entirely  
 ‘rests, bring up the first young men of the country, as if they  
 ‘were all to keep grammar schools in little country towns;  
 ‘and a nobleman, upon whose knowledge and liberality the  
 ‘honour and welfare of his country may depend, is diligently  
 ‘worried, for half his life, with the small pedantry of longs  
 ‘and shorts. *There is a timid and absurd apprehension, on the*  
 ‘*part of ecclesiastical tutors, of letting out the minds of youth upon*  
 ‘*difficult and important subjects. They fancy that mental exertion*  
 ‘*must end in religious scepticism; and, to preserve the principles of*  
 ‘*their pupils, they confine them to the safe and elegant imbecility of*  
 ‘*classical learning.* A genuine Oxford tutor would shudder to  
 ‘hear his young men disputing upon moral and political truth,  
 ‘forming, and pulling down theories, and indulging in all the bold-  
 ‘ness of youthful discussion. He would augur nothing from it,  
 ‘but impiety to God, and treason to kings. And yet, who vili-  
 ‘fies both more than the holy poltroon, who carefully averts from  
 ‘them the searching eye of reason, and who knows no better  
 ‘method of teaching the highest duties, than by extirpating  
 ‘the finest qualities and habits of the mind? If our religion is  
 ‘a fable, the sooner it is exploded the better. If our govern-  
 ‘ment is bad, it should be amended. *But we have no doubt of*  
 ‘*the truth of the one, or of the excellence of the other; and are con-*  
 ‘*vinced that both will be placed on a firmer basis, in proportion as*  
 ‘*the minds of men are trained to the investigation of truth.*  
 ‘*At present we act with the minds of our young men, as the Dutch*  
 ‘*did with their exuberant spices. An infinite quantity of talent is*  
 ‘*annually destroyed by the miserable jealousy and littleness of ecclē-*

of this Pamphlet, and reserved for this purpose. The Reviewer produced [Rev. No. 31. p. 167.] the following extract from the Reply :

“ The Aristotelian Physics were interwoven with the  
 “ whole course of our studies and exercises ; and it was  
 “ not easy to reconcile the abandonment of them with  
 “ the language of the Statutes, which public officers  
 “ were bound to enforce. And thus, as in courts of  
 “ judicature, and other bodies of ancient standing,  
 “ many forms and practices continued to subsist, which  
 “ had lost their original force and meaning.” p. 16.

Here he stops his quotation ; and the reader, who is obliged to stop along with him, is not *left*, but *led* to conclude, by the remarks which follow, that this sufficiently accounts for the state of natural philosophy in Oxford during the last seventy or eighty years, which had been the object of his censure ; and that the same cause still operates against the admission of new truths. In the Reply, however, the following words come im-

*‘ classical instructors. It is in vain to say we have produced great  
 ‘ men under this system. We have produced great men under all  
 ‘ systems. Every Englishman must pass half his life in learning La-  
 ‘ tin and Greek ; and classical learning is supposed to have produced  
 ‘ the talents which it has not been able to extinguish. It is scarcely  
 ‘ possible to prevent great men from rising up under any system of  
 ‘ education, however bad. Teach men dæmonology or astrology,  
 ‘ and you will still have a certain portion of original genius, in  
 ‘ spite of these or any other branches of ignorance and folly.’* Edin.  
 Rev. No. 29. p. 50.

mediately after those which have just been cited :

“ Even after the new doctrines were received and taught, formal exercises continued to be performed according to the ancient regimen. How long this anomalous state of things lasted, I cannot exactly say; but it may safely be asserted, that, *for more than a century*, the physics of Aristotle have been set aside, &c.”

In this case the part omitted is *essential* to the main argument. In the other case, it only served to exculpate the Reviewer from a charge which was never brought against him<sup>c</sup>.

And here too it cannot but excite surprise, that all this quick sensibility should be betrayed by an unknown writer, at the fancied imputation of scepticism. When a divine of the Church of England is openly charged with having used language inconsistent with the creed of his church, it may be prudent and necessary to avow his belief in every *iota* of the articles to which he has subscribed : and such a declaration must for ever put to silence his accusers, and convince the most

<sup>c</sup> I cannot avoid noticing an honest expedient employed by this writer, who accuses me of ‘ low artifice.’ In order to persuade his readers that I had quoted *part of a sentence* instead of the whole, he begins the passage omitted with a small letter—“ *but we have no doubt, &c.*” For an answer to this I refer to the Edin. Rev. No. 29. p. 50. quoted in the last note.

incredulous that there was no ground for the cruel suspicion entertained against him. But even if this insinuation were intended in the case complained of, in what way was it to operate? How could the credit of a nameless member of a nameless community be at all affected by it? How could *his* feelings be wounded, or his reputation injured by any implied doubts concerning the purity of his faith? This over-anxious jealousy may indeed be construed into a consciousness of something not altogether right; and will be far from conveying to the world that entire satisfaction, which the pious profession above mentioned has universally produced. Nor can I conceive a more lively contrast than the serenity of mind from which alone that profession could take its rise, and the angry feverish inquietude which this querulous Reviewer indicates.

Of the argument maintained by him little can be said, because it is difficult to see where it lies. His images always run before his reasoning, and crowd so fast upon him, that he is at a loss how to find places for them all. To provide for this, seems to be the whole art of his composition. He invents a fable, and then seeks for a moral. If he can wind the argument round so as to bring it in, well: if not, rather than lose the metaphor, he makes a place to fix it in, and hesitates not to

purchase the laughter of a few careless readers, by incurring the serious reprobation of every man who will take the pains to examine the truth of what he reads.

In this Review he declares that his objection lay not to the study of Greek and Latin, but that, in reading the former language, “the attention  
“which should be given to things, is inevitably  
“distracted by words”—“that there is of course  
“less leisure for reflecting upon the opinions and  
“facts of an author, when the difficulty of the ex-  
“pression is first to be overcome.” Rev. No. 31. p. 179. Admitting that he said this, what is the inference? It is then a waste of time to study that language *thoroughly*. But, if this be true, much greater must the waste be to study it *partially*—to leave off just when the difficulty is conquered; when, according to his own metaphor, the husk and shell have been broken through, and the kernel is to be extracted. Yet “up to a certain  
“point he would educate every young man in  
“Latin and Greek; but to a point far short of  
“that to which this species of education is now  
“carried.” Rev. No. 29. p. 49. Thus he would have the language learnt, but not learnt so as for the student to become familiar with it; which, as he himself tells us, is the only way of making it at all useful.

He denies having said, that poetry only was

read in classical education. This he may safely deny, for it was never alledged against him. But he held an argument which rested solely on that supposition. Vid. Reply, p. 116. and 119. Of the loves of the heathen gods he now says, that “they  
 “are the principal subjects by which the attention  
 “of young men is engaged in *the first years* of  
 “education.” And this he would pass upon his readers as merely a repetition of what he had said before. “These facts the English youth get by  
 “heart the moment they quit the nursery; and  
 “are most sedulously and industriously instructed  
 “in them *till the best and most active part of life*  
 “*is passed away.*” Rev. No. 29. p. 46. The same paragraph explains this to be *till the age of twenty-four.*

The only remaining point of argument relates to the meaning of the word *Utility*. Of this word I had said, that a sophistical use is made. When writers of this description speak of the *uselessness* of classical learning, they confine the term to the popular sense; and regard those pursuits only as *useful* which minister to the bodily wants of man: whereas intellectual pleasure and improvement are objects not only of equal, but of greater utility, provided they do not interfere with or impede the other. The Reviewer, who complains of “base  
 “and dishonourable quotation,” represents me thus: “The *objections* which he makes to the



“ science of chemistry, are really curious—that  
 “ it raises and multiplies the means of subsistence,  
 “ and terminates merely in the bodily wants of  
 “ man :” and on this account, he says, “ I have  
 “ considered it as *undignified and degrading.*”

P. 185. He then proceeds to give, as decisive of the question, the following criterion : “ *Every branch of human knowledge is estimated in the mixt ratio of its utility and its difficulty.*” Thus, where the sole dispute was concerning the word *utility*, he proposes to determine it by a criterion which makes use of that word without explaining it. How utterly void of truth the whole statement of my reasoning is, will be seen immediately by a reference to page 167. of the Reply.

Having endeavoured to persuade us that all he meant by his long article in No. 29. was merely to shew that classical education was “ *not the only good,*” p. 180 ; and having in consequence enjoyed a very just triumph over writers who deal in ‘truisms,’ he still persecutes the system of school exercises with unrelenting rigour ; and speaks of “ *the horrible absurdity of verse-making*” with an aversion almost unaccountable. If a writer had suffered under that engine of satirical torture, one could easily understand his dislike of a thing from which others derive the most lively pleasure. The ingenious gentleman, for instance, of versatile ta-

lents, pourtrayed by Pope in a few lines of the *Dunciad*, might be indulged in that antipathy :

Oh ! great restorer of the good old stage,  
 Preacher at once, and zany of thy age !  
 Oh ! worthy thou of Egypt's wife abodes,  
 A decent priest, where monkeys were the gods !

But what motive the present critic can have for proscribing so elegant an exercise of one of our native faculties, I cannot conjecture, as he has not thought fit to accompany his prohibition with any reasons. And in this department, as I apprehend, it is not merely the excess which he would retrench, but he would explode the whole practice as being altogether a waste of time.

The rest, which is made up of mere abuse, will in general furnish the best answer to itself. He affects indeed to have been provoked to the employment of this language by what he calls “ Bil-linggate clamour,” “ vulgar and ignominious trash,” and a “ rage for personality and impertinence,” in the pamphlet he is reviewing ; all of which, he says, are most remarkable in the part concerning *Classical Education*. He exclaims, “ Why this hailstorm ? this frigid violence ? why this pelting with all the mud and filth he can get up in his hands ? ”

“Exit et obducto late tenet omnia limo?”

Rev. p. 184.

The reading of this passage brought to my recollection a story so well told by Addison, out of Tacitus, and so illustrative of the case, that I cannot forbear extracting it, although it is rather longer than I could wish. ‘When a great part of the  
 ‘Roman legions were in a disposition to mutiny,  
 ‘an impudent varlet, who was a private centinel,  
 ‘*being mounted upon the shoulders of his fellow-*  
 ‘*soldiers*, and resolved to try the power of his  
 ‘eloquence, addressed himself to the army in all  
 ‘the postures of an orator, after the following  
 ‘manner: “You have given liberty to these mi-  
 “ferable men,” (pointing to some criminals whom  
 they had rescued,) “but which of you can restore  
 “life to my brother? He was murdered no longer  
 “ago than last night, by the hands of those ruf-  
 “fians, who are entertained by the General to  
 “butcher the poor soldiery. Tell me, Blæsus,”  
 (addressing himself to the General,) “tell me,  
 “where hast thou cast his dead body? an enemy  
 “does not grudge the rites of burial. When I  
 “have tired myself with kissing his cold corpse,  
 “and weeping over it, order me to be slain upon  
 “it. All I ask of my fellow-soldiers, since we  
 “both die in their cause, is, that they would lay  
 “me in the same grave with my brother.” ‘The  
 ‘whole army was in an uproar at this moving

‘ speech, and resolved to do the speaker justice ;  
 ‘ when, upon enquiry, they found that he never  
 ‘ had a brother in his life, and that he had stirred  
 ‘ up the sedition only to shew his parts.’ Free-  
 holder, No. 17.

In like manner, I entreat those who have been moved by this impassioned appeal, to make diligent enquiry into the charge, and I will cheerfully abide their decision. It will be necessary to consult the book itself, for not a single phrase is extracted to support the accusation, nor is even a reference given to the page where any offensive language, too bad perhaps to be extracted, lies : so that one might be tempted to think that the Reviewer had never read the part himself ; that having been told of it by some gentleman or lady, he sat down to shew how undeserving he was of such treatment, and at the same time to set an example of writing “ modestly and like a gentleman.”

In the prosecution of this plan, he has not been able to repress that indignation which an accurate believer naturally feels at being suspected of a leaning towards scepticism. So far from being inclined that way, he would have “ young men be  
 “ disputing upon moral and political truth, forming and pulling down theories, and indulging  
 “ in all the boldness of youthful discussion.” This, according to him, is the true way to banish doubt and error from young minds. There are, it can-

not be denied, weak and narrow-minded writers, who have thought it best for us to learn something, before we dispute about every thing. But these are men of a “trumpery *local understanding*;<sup>c</sup>” they are mere depositaries of obsolete opinions, which are worn out every where else; they will never instruct a young man going into public life “to condemn the reputation of a great scholar;” to “*burst through the cant* of indiscriminate loyalty, and to know his sovereign *only* as he discharged those duties, and displayed those qualities, for which the blood and the treasure of his people are confided to his hands<sup>d</sup>.” Some of them even have gone so far, as to apprehend the most dreadful consequences to society, if ever the spirit of free discussion in religion should gain the ascendant: consequences which, though somewhat exaggerated, are even in prospect sufficiently alarming. “The danger is, (says a grave writer,) that, having escaped from one age of darkness, where nothing was called in question, we shall fall into another, where every thing is discussed; that the fires of persecution may be lighted up to support an orthodox pyrrhonism, and to check the he-refy of piety.” Sermons by the Reverend Sydney Smith, vol. i. p. 68.

<sup>c</sup> Edin. Rev. No. 31. p. 184.

<sup>d</sup> Ibid. No. 29. p. 52.

The same intrepid advocate declares, that “to neglect those floating imputations and popular calumnies, which are in circulation against any system either moral, religious, or political, is rather magnanimous than wise.” He feels himself “called upon by common sense, and by common spirit, to resist and to extinguish this dynasty of fools;” men who are possessed with “a madness of incredulity and lust of doubt.” Ibid. The whole sermon is an admirable specimen of ardent zeal, metaphysical acuteness, and fine writing.

To such a mind, how afflicting must it be to observe, year after year, anonymous writers of the proscribed dynasty, assuming his style and manner for the better concealment of their insidious designs, and industriously sapping the very principles which it has been the labour of his life to inculcate; addressing themselves more particularly to the young and thoughtless; amusing their fancy by unexpected combinations of things sacred with things ludicrous; weakening the natural and habitual reverence of men for the service of religion; and, though never venturing to disavow religion, yet painfully toiling to loosen all the secret filaments by which it winds round the heart, and can alone become instrumental to the attainment of any practical good. With these men it is common, after ten pages of satirical invective against *holy poltroons*, to insert a kind of *saving clause* of three

lines, professing their belief in revelation. They declaim in favour of public virtue, and have some swelling periods to convince the world of their moral principle. But the whole evaporates in these empty generalities. Whenever they come down to positive and particular duties, it is merely for the purpose of displaying some petulant or indecent wit. The more private and familiar the relations of life, out of which these duties spring, the better fitted they seem for materials of ridicule. They are dragged forth from the shelter and retirement, in which alone they appear graceful, and are exposed with a kind of heartless gaiety to the gaze of the multitude. And when, by a strain of ludicrous comparisons, a feeling of contempt has at length become associated with the mention of those subjects, the insult is pointed by a pretended esteem for some general quality, which never can have real existence, except in the shape of one or other of those duties which are thus derided.

Nothing, according to my own judgment, is more pernicious than such preachers of morality. Nothing is more likely to corrupt, not merely the taste, but the principles and affections, of those who hear them. And to the writer whose sentiments have just been quoted, what can be more painful than to behold this artful adversary counteracting all his serious endeavours? It is a mortification which good men alone are fit to meet; and which

must call for all that *piety* to withstand it, which, though now his chief solace, may, as he seems to fear, one day become the object of still keener persecution.

That it has been my lot to provoke the malice of such an adversary, cannot excite wonder, when the nature of the cause, in defence of which I wrote, is recollected. In that cause is included what an enemy to virtue and religion would most seek to depreciate : and since it is now too late to think of gaining that point by open violence, no method seems to promise better, than the subtle insidious approaches, which this writer so well knows how to practise. If once he can succeed in making people ashamed of partial affections, and of the obscurer class of relative duties ; if he can substitute high sounding declamation for active and diligent performance ; his purpose is in a great measure effected. This is the way in which the great masters of the same school have trod before him. Demolish the outworks, and the citadel will soon fall. Teach men to talk of virtue in lofty phrases when it is an abstract name, and to laugh at it when exemplified in specific conduct. Let them profess to love and revere their country in theory, but despise every separate part of which the aggregate is composed. It was in reference to some tenets of this nature Mr. Burke observed, that “ to be attached to the subdivision—to love the



“ little platoon we belong to in society, is the first  
 “ principle, the germ, as it were, of public affec-  
 “ tion: it is the first link in the series, by which  
 “ we ascend afterwards to a love of our country,  
 “ and of mankind.” But, among the disciples of  
 this school, we are taught to believe that the fruit  
 has ripened to perfection, although the first germ  
 was always wanting. With them, *patria est ubi-  
 cunque bene est*. Their patriotism is so capacious  
 as to have swallowed up every local and limited  
 attachment. Affection to scenes endeared by  
 friendship, by learning, by religion, by the image  
 of antiquity, and the memory of great names, is  
 not merely an agreeable illusion, but, according to  
 their own phraseology, “ a trumpery feeling,” a  
 degrading prejudice. If it does not awaken their  
 invectives, it is usually chosen as the provocative  
 of wit ; as a thing to be spurned and ridiculed, if  
 not seriously detested.

The writer, who has most distinguished himself  
 by railing at all we value and cherish in this place,  
 seems to have once belonged to it himself, and to  
 be nettled at some reflections, which he supposes  
 on that account to be directed against him. Safe  
 however in his anonymous disguise, he tells us,  
 that what other people think of him ‘ he nei-  
 ‘ ther knows nor cares ; but says what he has to  
 ‘ say after his own manner.’ At the same time he  
 recommends to his adversary a similar conceal-

ment of his name. I have to thank him for the advice, but to assure him, that that name will be forthcoming whenever he thinks proper to require it, or whenever it may be necessary to substantiate any assertions relating to matters of fact. If I am not greatly mistaken, the publication of *his* would have saved me some trouble. It would have been the best refutation of all his calumnies against the University; and for myself, I should have felt satisfied that his keenest reproaches, provided that name were coupled with them, would only tend to raise me in the estimation of all men, whose good opinion is worth preserving.

THE END.

## CORRIGENDA.

P. 16. l. 18. Dele *about which more will be said presently*

43. l. 27. for *ignotias* read *ignotius*

67. l. 12. The Greek line should have been printed without the accents.



A

THIRD REPLY

TO THE

EDINBURGH REVIEW.



A  
THIRD REPLY  
TO THE  
EDINBURGH REVIEW,  
BY  
THE AUTHOR OF A REPLY  
TO  
THE CALUMNIES  
OF THAT REVIEW AGAINST OXFORD.

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OXFORD,

Printed for the Author; and sold by J. COOKE, and J. PARKER;  
J. MACKINLAY, J. MURRAY, and F. C. & J. RIVINGTON,  
London.

1811.





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Rides? Quid mea cum pugnat sententia secum?  
Quod petiit, *spernit* ; repetit quod nuper omisit ;  
Diruit, ædificat, *mulat quadrata rotundis?* HOR.

---

HAVING been led to entertain the hope that a controversy excited by the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review against Oxford was now closed, and that each party might be allowed to return to that temper of mind and to those peaceful occupations which had been for some time interrupted, I was much concerned to see a disposition manifested in the last number of that Review to resume the subject. The recurrence to it was a needless digression from the writer's argument : and it was accompanied with language so contemptuous, and, as I conceive, so unjust, that I cannot abstain from offering a vindication of myself ; and from pointing out the fallacy, by which the writer endeavours to defend his former error. For this purpose it will be necessary to present my readers with a brief summary of the whole question.

It will be remembered then, that the Edinburgh Reviewer proposed the following rule, *as a criterion by which it might always be determined what parts of Geometrical science are elementary*

*and what not.* “ Every property of lines of the  
 “ first and second order, and of the figures com-  
 “ posed from them, which, when translated into  
 “ the language of Algebra, involves nothing  
 “ higher than a quadratic equation, providing, at  
 “ the same time, that it be a proposition of very  
 “ general application, is to be accounted elemen-  
 “ tary.”

To this rule, or definition, it was objected by the Author of a Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review, that it was defective in three essential points.

1st, That it *includes* what is not elementary.

2dly, That it *excludes* what is elementary.

3dly, That it is loosely and indefinitely worded.

In the Review of Woodhouse's Trigonometry, No. 33. p. 125, the critic adverts to these objections, and, leaving the first and third unanswered, proceeds to defend the definition against the second. In support of this second objection it had been observed, that many of the propositions arranged by Professor Playfair under the head of Elements, if resolved algebraically, would involve *cubic equations*: and one was singled out as an example, viz: the 11th of the 3d Book of his Supplement, which is the same as the 33d of the 11th Book of Euclid. “ Similar Solid Parallele-  
 “ pipeds are to one another in the triplicate ratio  
 “ of their homologous sides.”

The Reviewer in defence of his definition says,  
 “ Let us take the proposition here given, and  
 “ translate it directly into the language of Alge-  
 “ bra. Because the object of the theorem is to  
 “ express the ratio of two solids by means of the  
 “ sides of the solids, we must consider the solids  
 “ as the *unknown*, and their sides as the *known*  
 “ quantities. Call the solids therefore  $x$  and  $y$ ,  
 “ and their homologous sides  $a$  and  $b$ ; then the  
 “ proposition *affirms*, that  $x$  is to  $y$  as  $a^3$  to  $b^3$ :  
 “ therefore  $\frac{x}{y} = \frac{a^3}{b^3}$ . But this is strictly and li-  
 “ terally a Simple Equation.” Edin. Rev. No. 33.  
 p. 126.

He then proceeds to remark, that the error of his opponent is so gross, that it is unaccountable on any supposition, except that of extreme ignorance of the principles both of geometry and algebra.

This reproach might perhaps have come with a better grace from one who had proved himself free from error in that department of science. My readers however will bear in mind, that expressions of exactly the same import were lately used by him, because I considered certain parts of Geometrical science to be more than Elementary, which M. D'Alembert and Professor Playfair had taught me to arrange in that manner. He could not conceive in what school I had learnt Mathe-

matics, in order to be capable of such a mistake : and he produced it as a proof, that the whole University in which I had studied were as ignorant as he had before pronounced them to be. If an indifferent person had told him that such an opinion prevailed at Oxford, he would hardly have believed it—and he assured his readers, that he never said any thing half so severe against Oxford, as what was implied in that opinion.

Yet after I had made it appear that this opinion was sanctioned by the most eminent Mathematicians—that M. D'Alembert and Professor Playfair had expressly held the same doctrine—I might have expected some little concession on his part, if ever he should again be led to mention the same subject. In particular I think I had a right to draw from him an acknowledgment, not only that D'Alembert, but that a celebrated writer and countryman of his own, had held the very same language, which he represented as a proof of consummate ignorance in me. Nay, after having admitted that this definition was at variance with D'Alembert's doctrine, he insinuates that it is nevertheless defensible, and that he still adheres to it; but adds, "*It is needless to give in this place our reasons for extending our definition farther than the geometer above named had chosen to do.*" Why only the *geometer above named*? Was there not another *geometer* also named, who in 1804

declared the same opinion? And would he insinuate that this geometer has changed his opinion? Or that his authority is inconsiderable? Or that he is at this moment<sup>a</sup> one of his opponents, though he does not think him worth naming? Or, in short, that what was elementary then, has, in consequence of the rapid advancement of Science in the last six years, ceased to be elementary now? Of all these hypotheses indeed the last is by far the most improbable; especially when we recollect that the writer is himself one who laments the decline of Mathematical science in this country during the last 80 years.

Whatever the case may be, it certainly is neither decent nor discreet in the Reviewer thus to slide over the subject without any notice of that Professor, whose authority had been quoted by name against him. It may be harmless, as I doubt not it is highly amusing, to him and to his friends to attack my credit, or that of any nameless writer; and some indulgence perhaps is due to a propensity at once so amiable and entertaining. But when he shews so little regard for well known and distinguished characters, I confess I cannot so easily forgive him. To me at least it seems to be no light affair: and however contemptuously he may think himself entitled to treat that most respect-

<sup>a</sup> See the motto

able writer, I trust that I, for one, shall never be found wanting in due respect for his authority, and in tenderness for his well-earned reputation.

It is in vindication of that writer's method that I now again venture to oppose this anonymous critic, and undertake to prove that his criterion would exclude from the Elements some propositions which Professor Playfair has placed among them. But I must in the first place complain that an attempt is made to withdraw the reader's mind from the true state of the question : and on that account I request him to read over the Reviewer's words once more, and to take particular notice of the clause, ' providing it be a proposition of very ' *general application.*'

" Every property of lines of the first and second  
 " order, and of the figures composed from them,  
 " which, when translated into the language of  
 " Algebra, involves nothing higher than a qua-  
 " dratic equation, providing, at the same time, *that*  
 " *it be a proposition of very general application,*  
 " is to be accounted elementary." " The simpli-  
 " city that must always be reckoned essential to  
 " elementary science, is secured by the first of the  
 " two conditions just mentioned, *and the useful-*  
 " *ness* by the second."

It is my own belief that, when framing this criterion, he was thinking only of *curves*, and that the properties of solids were not at that time

within his contemplation. This however, if true, it would have been too humiliating to confess. He proceeds therefore to prove that the 33d of the 11th of Euclid falls within his definition, because, truly, what the Proposition *affirms* may be expressed algebraically without involving a Cubic Equation. But can it always be so *applied*? And is it not the *application* of the proposition which, according to his own rule, is to determine whether it be elementary or not? If one of the sides of those solids should be an unknown quantity, will he deny that we must proceed, in the algebraical investigation of it, by means of a cubic equation?

There is however a confusion in the whole statement, into which I cannot conceive it possible that so profound a Mathematician would have fallen, if he had not been concerned to vindicate a former error. He seems to consider the demonstration of a Geometrical *theorem* and the solution of an algebraical problem as the same thing. He talks of the solids, in prop. 33d of the 11th of Euclid, as being *unknown* quantities, and the sides of those solids as being *known*. In comparing the language of Geometry with that of Algebra, I have always been accustomed to consider the term *given* as equivalent to *known*, and *undetermined* as equivalent to *unknown*. If we adopt this phraseology, the Sides in that proposition are not more

known than the Solids are known. All the terms are equally known : and the object of the theorem is to demonstrate the mutual relation which subsists between them. This relation being once established as an universal truth, whenever a problem comes before us, to which that truth is *applicable*, we proceed to investigate the *unknown quantity of that problem* by means of the relation which, as Geometry has taught us, subsists between it and the known quantities. If, in order to *apply* that Geometrical truth, we must make use of a cubic equation, the Geometrical truth lies beyond the limits which, as I conceive, the Edinburgh Reviewer had prescribed for the Elements of that Science.

That a problem may be given, the solution of which depends upon the 33d of the 11th of Euclid, but in which, when translated into the language of Algebra, a cubic equation is necessary, I presume he will not deny. Indeed when I recollect the professions of esteem for classical literature which fell from this learned writer, I make no doubt but he is familiar with a celebrated problem of antiquity, said to have been delivered as a response from the oracle of Delphi, and to have acquired the name of the Delian problem, because it directed the Athenians to double the altar of Apollo at Delos, the shape of which was a cube. After having condescended to notice one *defiance* of so



ignorant a writer as myself, he will not perhaps disdain to accept a second—which is, to solve this problem algebraically without a cubic equation.

Till this is done, my objection to his rule, “that “ it excludes from the Elements what properly “ belongs to them,” will, I trust, be allowed to stand. For he will not, I hope, carry his contempt of Logic so far as to shelter himself under the defence, that this proposition *may* be applied in some cases where cubic equations are not involved, since that would be allowing the same proposition to be both elementary, and not elementary—and would carry with it such defiance not only of Logic but of common sense, as was not practised by all the Scoffers and Sophists of antiquity.

As this is probably the last opportunity I shall have of addressing my opponent, he will, it is hoped, allow me to add a few words in reply to the concluding sentence of his digression. Not content with the reproach already noticed, he closes with an insinuation, which, if just, (however incredible or inconceivable the feeling may be to him,) would be, I can assure him, in my own estimation more disgraceful than that ‘ extreme ignorance’ so courteously alledged against me. “ We have done more,” he says, “ than we were “ challenged to do; but it may not, for all that,

“ be out of the power of quibble and conceit to  
 “ dispute the victory.”

Where, let me ask, does he discover those symptoms of ‘quibble and conceit,’ which, as he thinks proper to imply, are the only weapons now left to his antagonist? Is there one among the many arguments maintained against him, which is conducted in such a manner as to deserve that character? If so, he might have referred or alluded to it at least, instead of dealing out a general sarcasm, for which there exists no real foundation. When I challenged him to reduce the proposition in question to a *quadratic*, I adopted his own term, and meant no more than to express the extreme limit of the definition which he had drawn. And if any impartial reader of the argument I have just stated shall determine that the proposition has been reduced by him within that limit, whether it be to a quadratic or a simple equation, I will make no attempt to dispute the victory. But this, I am confident, can never be so determined, except by means of that perversion of language, which alone deserves the name of *quibbling*. It cannot be, without giving to words a different sense from that which they were designed to bear. The whole of my language shewed that I was speaking of something to be *solved*—not something to be *affirmed*: and the whole of the Reviewer’s language shews that he had the same

meaning, till the vindication of one error tempted him incautiously to commit a greater.

If however the term *quibbling* was introduced merely to express his contempt of that logical method in which my reasoning was conveyed, I have only to lament that a writer of such ability should still countenance the popular, but mistaken notion, which in a former publication I endeavoured to correct. If he will deign to devote some portion of his time to that much neglected art, he will, I am persuaded, discover that one of its greatest advantages is, the quick perception which it breeds of unsound reasoning under all its disguises; and, instead of confounding the use with the abuse of it, he may learn hereafter to transfer his contempt to those artifices, which it is the business of Logic to detect and to render of no avail.

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*Note.* Since the publication of the Second Reply, I discovered that the life of Dr. Matthew Stewart, whom I by no means intended to exclude from the number of persons to whom Mathematical Science is greatly indebted, came within the period specified in page 49, as unproductive of such characters.

*Ibid.* Page 70. "That there may be, and often are, "ellipses of *fit quod*, as well as of other phrases, I never "denied, nor even doubted." This is not consistent

with the opinion given, p. 57. of the First Reply; which opinion I still retain, although it was out of my recollection at the time this passage was written.

*Ibid.* Page 73. In the latter editions of Johnson's Dictionary a doubt is expressed about the propriety of the phrase *according as*: it is however sanctioned not only by the authors named in this page, but by Locke, Saunderson, Priestley, and by the Author of the Wealth of Nations almost in every page.

THE END.

## APPENDIX.

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Sit denique alia scientias colendi, alia inveniendi ratio.

*Præf. Nov. Org.*

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AFTER these pages were printed, Mr. Drummond's *Observations on the Strictures of the Edinburgh Review upon Oxford, and on the Two Replies*, came to my hands: and as a considerable part of that pamphlet is directed against some positions of mine respecting Aristotle's Logic and the Novum Organum, I will not omit this opportunity of defending them, and of explaining more particularly than before what I conceive to be the cause of a very general misapprehension upon both those subjects. Many of these objections I had anticipated as probable, and declared myself ready to meet my antagonist upon this ground in a separate discussion. Others again are of such a nature, that it would never have occurred to me to expect them, or to guard against them. They are however all conveyed in a tone so much more friendly than that to which we have been of late accustomed, that the task of answering them is much lightened: and I trust, that whatever freedom may be shewn in examining Mr. Drummond's statements, will not be interpreted into any resentment at the manner in which he has thought fit to convey his censure, although the censure itself I feel to be without any solid foundation.

The first error into which Mr. Drummond supposes me to have fallen is one, which, if it be an error, can-

not at all affect the question concerning the relative utility of Aristotle and Bacon; namely, that the *Novum Organum* is confined to the province of the *material world*. Such must be his interpretation of my phrase, ‘physical science,’ when he blames me for narrowing the scope of Bacon’s philosophy to that department. Now to shorten the dispute I will at once admit, that the science of mind, as well as the science of matter, ought to be understood under that appellation. I shall forbear entering at length into a subject which has been of late thoroughly \* discussed, and content myself with subscribing to Mr. Stewart’s doctrine in its fullest extent, wishing at the same time that the term *Metaphysics*, which is now commonly employed to denote the science of mind, were recalled to its primitive acceptance. There is, however, quite enough, both in the language and in the subject-matter of Bacon’s works, to justify the opinion, that the knowledge of the material world was his main object, and enough perhaps to excuse the error, that it was his only object; but it is sufficient for the Author of the Reply to shew, that upon his argument this point had no bearing. His purpose was to explain, that the *Organon*, as it has been called in the Schools, of Aristotle, if rightly understood, has an object totally different from the *Organon* of Bacon; and that it is absurd to set up the one against the other, or to regard the latter as a substitute for the former.

Mr. Drummond therefore has fallen into an error more material to the argument, when he represents me as ‘not having spoken the whole truth,’ and as implying, that Lord Bacon allows discoveries of any sort may be made by syllogisms. I never thought or said or implied any such thing. The proper extent of the term *physical science*, or *natural philosophy*, was not then present

\* See Stewart’s Essays, chap. 2.

to my mind; and whether my reasoning was right or wrong, it could not be affected by that circumstance.

The title of Lord Bacon's treatise, as every one knows, is "Novum Organum sive indicia vera de Interpretatione Naturæ;" and this phrase, *interpretatio naturæ*, occurs continually as descriptive of its great and only employment. That its purpose was essentially different from that of Aristotle's Logic (which Lord Bacon always speaks of by the name *Logica Vulgaris*) is so plainly set forth by himself, that one can only attribute to the unfortunate use of the same name for different things the confusion now so widely prevalent.

"Atque est ea, quam adducimus ars (quam *Interpretationem Naturæ* appellare consuevimus) ex genere *Logicæ*: licet plurimum atque adeo immensum quiddam intersit. Nam et ipsa illa *Logica vulgaris* auxilia et præsidia intellectui moliri ac parare profitetur: et in hoc uno consentiunt. Differt autem plane a vulgari, rebus præcipue tribus: viz. *ipso fine*, ordine demonstrandi, et inquirendi initiis."

My admiration of the profound and original views of this philosopher cannot be exceeded by Mr. Drummond's; and yet I am tempted to suspect that our notion of their nature and ultimate design does not exactly coincide. However that may be, my own shall be stated very briefly, as it may tend to account for the opinions which I have already published, and am now about to repeat, of the utility of that treatise as a branch of Academical study.

The first part of the *Instauratio magna* consists of a survey of the state of the arts and sciences as they were in the author's time. The defects and errors of the several systems are demonstrated, and hints are given for the supply of what is wanting, as well as for the remedy of what is wrong in each. The point, however,

which he labours to establish, and which draws forth all the power of his comprehensive mind, is, that all these arts and sciences are branches of one parent stock; and that if severed from this stock, they wither and become comparatively unproductive. In the *NATURE OF THINGS*, he reminds us, they are all founded. They may be practised with success by those who have no knowledge or thought of this connection; but they cannot be improved, nor can their fundamental defects be remedied, except by reverting to that *nature of things* out of which they are formed, and by enlarging our acquaintance with its laws. The *method of inquiry* into this nature, which alone can extend and correct our knowledge of principles, is declared to be not that of *sylogism*, but of *induction*. And this method is most accurately and elaborately explained in the second part of the *Instauratio magna*, called the *Novum Organum*.

This celebrated work first enumerates the several causes which have heretofore checked the progress of knowledge, among which Aristotle's works are often mentioned; and the charge against that philosopher is, that he corrupted and fettered *natural philosophy*, or the enquiry into the nature of things, by the rules of his Logic. This Logic (or Dialectic, as I should wish to have it called) he allows to be useful in the invention of arguments, in the communication of thoughts and reasonings, in exhibiting truth clearly to the understanding, and in procuring its assent: but it is barren of that invention which he has in view, the invention of arts and sciences; and this can be effected only by means of discovering new facts and principles, which have hitherto been hid from the eyes of men. The superior dignity of such a pursuit cannot bear a question. In the vastness of its aim, and in its ultimate utility, which extends through all ages, and to the whole human race, it far



surpasses the cultivation of any single art, however necessary or useful to the society in which we are placed.

When I use the term *ultimate* utility, my wish is to mark out the true character and drift of this philosophy, which seems to me to be greatly misunderstood. The additional knowledge thus acquired, Lord Bacon often speaks of as so much acquired *power*. It furnishes man with the means of extending his dominion over the world which he inhabits; that is, of making it subservient to his own wants and pleasures, whether of mind or body. But it is not the *immediate* effect of that knowledge thus to extend his dominion. It is through the medium of the several arts and sciences, by giving rise to the improvement of some, and to the original invention of others, that the truths thus acquired are brought down to use, and applied to the various purposes of life. Those Arts are, as it were, the instruments by which the sovereign and supreme philosophy exercises her sway, and subjects all the powers of nature to our will; and it is honour enough for most men to wield any one of these instruments skilfully in her service. They are represented again as the channels through which the fountain of knowledge is widely distributed. It is within the compass of very moderate powers to manage, or even to improve these in their interior structure and contrivance: but the streams which flow through them must all be derived from a higher origin; and it is only by opening new and undiscovered springs that we can expect to improve them, or to increase their quantity.

That the discovery of truth will sooner or later be of practical utility, Lord Bacon uniformly maintains. And although he contends for the value and importance of these discoveries, even in their unproductive state, as mere *pignora veritatis*, yet it is by their adoption into some art or system that they become subservient to hu-

man purposes, and are means of *power*. The task of applying them to such purposes is totally distinct from that of making the first discovery; it is not unfrequently the result of accident or conjecture; whereas the discovery itself is the fruit of long, earnest, and methodical enquiry: and although the application may not be soon obvious, he bids us by no means be disheartened or discouraged on that account. The world is in possession of a new truth, and some good we may rest assured will in time arise, from the action of many minds upon it. Indeed he frequently reproves that premature anxiety to apply practically what we have discovered, by a beautiful allusion to the fable of Atalanta, as likely to stop us in the course we are running, and draw us aside after a prize of much inferior value.

Having thus endeavoured to give an exposition of this great author's views, which I hope, however imperfect, will not be thought irrelevant, for a further confirmation of the argument in the Second Reply, I will appeal to the very Aphorism which Mr. Drummond produces as most at variance with my doctrine.

“ Etiam dubitabit quispiam potius quam objiciet ;  
 “ utrum nos de Naturali tantum Philosophia, an etiam  
 “ *de Scientiis reliquis, Logicis, Ethicis, Politicis, secundum*  
 “ *viam nostram perficiendis* loquamur. At nos certe de  
 “ universis hæc, quæ dicta sunt, intelligimus : atque  
 “ quemadmodum vulgaris Logica, quæ regit res per Syl-  
 “ logismum, non tantum ad Naturales sed ad omnes sci-  
 “ entias pertinet ; ita et nostra, quæ procedit per Indu-  
 “ ctionem, omnia complectitur.” Aph. 127.

If Mr. Drummond, who seems to think that this Aphorism had escaped my notice, will take the trouble of turning to page 15 of the Second Reply, he will find express reference there made to it, for the purpose of marking my surprise, that a professed admirer of Lord

Bacon should have adopted a *new process of reasoning* directly at variance with his leading principle. At the same time it affords a pointed refutation of the error, that the *Novum Organum* is meant as a substitute for the Logic now in use, or that it has any closer connection with that Logic, than it has with *every* other art and science; to all of which some benefit may be derived from pursuing steadily this new method of enquiry. It must indeed be obvious to every reader, that the *Novum Organum* may, for any thing contained in this Aphorism, just as well be called a system of *ethics* or of *politics*, as of *logic*; because it equally holds out the prospect of affording materials for improving each one of those sciences.

The Aphorism is produced indeed by Mr. Drummond in order to contrast it with an assertion of mine, that Lord Bacon's treatise is strictly confined to the province of natural philosophy. This is simply an *argumentum ad hominem*, not *ad rem*. At the utmost it only convicts me of an inaccurate use of words, and leaves my reasoning just where it was. Lord Bacon himself, as we have seen, continually calls his work "*Interpretatio Naturæ*," including mind as well as matter; and although in this Aphorism he evidently uses the phrase *naturalis philosophia* in its popular acceptation, as confined to matter, yet in the same passage the phrase *rerum natura* is twice used so as to include the province of mind. If it would afford him any satisfaction, I could produce various passages from the same author's writings, in which *philosophia* is used in different senses; but this species of verbal criticism I am sure Mr. Drummond would despise as well as myself, when it tends to throw no light upon the argument. I may be permitted however to remark upon one sentence containing this word, because I am apprehensive, from the manner in which he has himself

quoted the passage, that its force was not exactly understood.

“ Illud vero monendum, nos in hoc nostro Organo (in “ opposition, says Mr. Drummond, to that of Aristotle) “ tractare logicam non philosophiam \*.” I see no ground for supposing that this is Lord Bacon’s meaning, or that any emphasis resides in the word *nostro*. This indeed would imply, that Aristotle had called *his* Organon philosophy, and not logic, a charge which I never heard alleged against him. The stress, as I apprehend, lies in the word *organo*. “ In this second part of the *Instauratio magna*, “ my logic, or method of enquiry, is explained; being in- “ strumental only to that philosophy, which is the object “ of the whole work.” Let me observe too, as we are now on the subject of the use of words, that the term *Logica* itself is used by Lord Bacon in different senses—one where it stands, as here, for *his method of enquiry*; another, as in Aphorism 127, where it means *Dialectica*, or the art of Logic then in use, derived from Aristotle, and which he commonly calls *Logica vulgaris*.

That this art is very capable of improvement, and that we have in the present age the fairest prospect of such improvement from the success with which the inductive science of mind has been cultivated, no one is more ready than myself to allow. But I must think it a most unreasonable and unphilosophical perversion of Lord Bacon’s labours to teach, that till that improvement is obtained, the art is to *stand still*, and be neglected. And I think too, that every attentive observer of mankind must perceive it to be one of the most efficient of those agents, by which the *power* that knowledge gives is exercised; for, if rightly understood as an art of language, it regulates the universal machinery by means

of which the understanding of one man acts upon that of another. As such I have always looked upon it to be an essential, and even indispensable part of liberal education. As such it is adopted into our system of studies, not as the road to fame or distinction, but as the *grammar* of reasoning by means of words, the humble but necessary foundation on which every solid intellectual fabric must be raised.

Mr. Drummond has expressed a doubt whether my attention was ever given to this subject before the present controversy. I can assure him it is one of the earliest which ever much exercised my mind: and when more than ten years ago, upon the projected reform of our Examinations, I heard sensible men talk of substituting the *Novum Organum* for the *Logic of Aristotle*, an opinion so strange induced me to examine that work again with peculiar attention. The result of my enquiry was a conviction, which every year's experience has since confirmed, that the recommendation proceeded from an ignorance of the true nature of each treatise. And as often as I hear the students of this University reproached with preferring one to the other, my endeavours shall not be wanting to point out to them this fundamental error; an error upon which our revilers not only ground their favourite accusation of us, but, with a blindness truly disgraceful, place their own claims to superiority.

At the time when Lord Bacon wrote, the abuses of Scholastic Logic were so many, its pretensions so extravagant, the use made of it so pedantic and futile, that some asperity might be justified in those who were conscious they had valuable truth to communicate, but who felt this art operate as an hindrance to its reception. But since these abuses have been remedied, and the art has been confined within its proper limits, I can see no excuse for the contemptuous and angry language in which

some people are at present apt to express their hostility, except in a radical misapprehension of its real object \*. It professes only to give us a command over our own knowledge, and to enable us to convey our reasoning in the clearest and most correct manner; and while performing this office it exercises and improves the mental faculties so employed, gives them a facility of action, and guards them against sophistry and imposture.

The next of Mr. Drummond's strictures regards what I said of Induction, and of the mistaken opinion, that Lord Bacon was the sole inventor of this mode of enquiry. I was indeed startled at the first passage which I read on this subject, not only by the extensive acquaintance which it implied with Aristotle's works, an acquaintance far exceeding that which I have any right to boast, but by the assertion itself, which I thought even my own limited reading would enable me to disprove. The assertion was this: "Now whatever be the merit of Aristotle, it must be admitted, that of *Induction* there is nothing to be found in his writings." p. 38. It immediately occurred to me, that Lord Kames had long ago stripped the philosopher of every 'attempt to apply his *sylogistic* mode of reasoning to any subject handled by 'himself;' and I was at a loss to conceive what portion or what kind of reasoning it was intended, after these successive defalcations, to leave in his possession: for it

\* The complaints we hear of the barrenness of Logic, and of the expectation which it raises and disappoints, bear a strong analogy to a story which Bishop Warburton somewhere tells in his *Divine Legation*, in order to expose a ludicrous mistake of his adversary. A person entered the shop of a toyman at Bath, and asked for a reading-glass, which was one among the many articles in which he dealt. Having tried several without finding them answer his purpose, and at length growing out of humour, the toyman was induced to ask him, "Sir, have you ever learnt to read?" To which the other angrily replied, "Sir, if I had, why should I come here for a reading-glass?"

seemed to me, that if both these positions were true, his works must consist of a series of disjointed propositions; a light in which, however interesting and instructive, I confess I had never been accustomed to view them.

A few pages after, indeed, my perplexity was somewhat relieved, by an explanation of the foregoing passage. "When I said above, that in Aristotle's writings there is nothing of Induction, I only meant to contend, that he no where treats of it, or recommends its adoption, and that he was as ignorant of it as the unlettered savage is of the law of gravitation." p. 50.

Before I came to this passage, it was my intention to have pointed out whole chapters both of his Ethics and his Rhetoric, which had always struck me as beautiful illustrations of the method of Induction; in particular those relating to the moral habits, to friendship, to justice, and above all to the passions. In all of these the principal object of investigation seemed to be attained by that *abscissio infiniti*, those successive limitations and distinctions, which at length disclosed and *enucleated*, as it were, its genuine form and essence. But the explanation given in page 50 restrains me to another mode of proceeding.

There are then several passages, which I have had the good fortune to meet with, in which Induction is treated of and its adoption recommended, although they are such as, in that wider survey of his whole works, may well have escaped a reader's recollection.

In the Ethics, b. vi. c. 3. I find it expressly said, with a reference to his Analytics, that Induction is the method by which first principles are to be acquired. And in the second book of the Posterior Analytics the doctrine of Induction is handled at some length, both as it relates to the acquisition of principles, and the definition of terms. Mr. Drummond will recollect, that it is,

for both these purposes, not only for the discovery of *axiomata*, but also *ad notiones terminandas*, that Lord Bacon urges its adoption. In the latter use I admit it is much more frequently employed by Aristotle, and under that view it is largely considered in this book of the *Analytics*: but as a form of demonstration also, as *inverting* the accustomed order, and eliciting general truths out of particular examples, it is accurately explained in his *Prior Analytics*, b. ii. c. 23. and again in the first book of the *Topics*. The fault of the ancients however was, as I have elsewhere observed, a scanty imperfect examination of particulars, and an eagerness to mount prematurely to the highest principles, impatient of that gradual but sure ascent, which Lord Bacon has so admirably taught and illustrated.

It is needless I trust to remind my readers, that the professed design of what is called Aristotle's *Organon* being the art of effecting conviction, not of acquiring knowledge, the process of Induction there described is adapted to its appropriate end, and of course, in point of accuracy, fulness, and variety, falls far short of that which is requisite for the investigation of nature: yet even of this the 14th chapter of the second book of the *Posterior Analytics* will afford no unfavourable specimen.

But, after all, Mr. Drummond will say, 'he is by no means convinced that this *παράγωγη* has much resemblance to the Baconian Induction.' For he informs us, "The word is derived from *παράγω*, *infero*." Thus far we are perfectly agreed. But when he proceeds to say, "and it would be much more correctly rendered *inference*, or *deduction*," not only my logical prejudices, but my regard for the *Latin* \* as well as the Greek language,

\* In the passage quoted by Mr. Drummond from Quintilian, *infererat* means only *brought in*: its union with *novissime* proves, that the other



forbid me to follow him. The word, both according to its etymology and its use, signifies *bringing in*. A general proposition may be proved either by shewing its dependence upon some other acknowledged proposition, or by *bringing in several particulars* sufficient to warrant that proposition, that is, to make it probable, or even morally certain. In like manner, when the true nature of any thing is to be defined, we are directed to *bring in* particulars one after the other, and carefully compare them with the thing in question, especially those which most resemble it; and to proceed in this comparison till we have distinguished that thing from all other things, and ascertained its exact character and dimensions.

Although I am by no means desirous of repeating my opinion concerning Lord Kames's works in general, especially as it seems to have given great offence, yet I cannot consent to retract or modify it in the slightest degree with regard to the passage in question; and I will even venture to exhibit that passage again, without any comment, as a full justification of my remark. "Aristotle never attempts to apply his syllogistic mode of rea-

things had been *brought in* as well as this: and every one who has read Plato's Dialogues is aware of the manner of Socrates, not to deduce conclusions himself, but, after having obtained concessions upon several analogous points, to *bring in* at last [novissime] the point he had in view, and draw a similar concession from his opponent upon that. But the use which Rhetoricians made of the term is not now the question. It is by them borrowed from Logic; and, although extended in its application, it still bears an obvious affinity to its original meaning. The *ἐπαγωγή* of the Topics comes very near to that of Rhetoric. And I have little doubt but the subsequent extension of the term *infero* to the sense of 'draw a conclusion,' is to be assigned to this favourite rhetorical practice. The genuine sense of *infero*, its affinity with *induco*, and the first symptoms of its subsequent extension to the meaning of *infer*, may be seen in Cic. de Inventionibus; particularly in chapters 34, 40, 45, 47. *Inductio* is clearly explained in chapter 31. of the same work.

“soning to any subject handled by himself: on ethics, on rhetoric, and on poetry, he *argues* like a rational being, without once putting in practice any of his own rules.”

Mr. Drummond indeed says, that the exercise of reducing the *truths* which his treatises contain to the syllogistic form, “if there be any justice in *the definition*, that every sentence must contain a proposition, is not more appropriate to the writings of the Greek philosopher than to any other work which may exhibit a due proportion of *self-evident truths*.” p. 53. Does he then suppose that I meant to reduce self-evident truths to a syllogistic form? Either he or I have been guilty of a strange mistake. My meaning and I believe my words were, that Aristotle’s *arguments* in those treatises are easily reduced to the syllogistic form, and are striking examples of the force and accuracy of his logical system.

In adverting to some minor topics of accusation, it gives me no little concern to notice what I must call a degree of unfairness, and want of candour, in a person for whom I entertain much respect, and to whom I am indebted for many handsome and even flattering expressions.

The first instance is, his stating that I have applied the epithet ‘*flippancy*’ to Lord Bacon, which ‘most inappropriate appellation’ he ascribes to the ‘influence of inveterate prejudice;’ and he proceeds to say, “The charge of ‘*flippancy*’ against Bacon is founded upon the comparison of the ancient philosopher’s ambition to that of his royal pupil, the justness of which has rendered it almost proverbial.” p. 55. This interpretation of my language is, I must be allowed to say, in every sense of the word, a specimen of *mala inductio*: and in order to refute it I will produce the single passage

upon which the unfair representation rests. "It has been a current charge against Aristotle, that he mediated the same thralldom over the minds of men, which his pupil Alexander endeavoured to effect over their bodies and fortunes. A charge which, from its flippancy, one might suspect to be of a very different growth, but which had its origin with no less a name than Bacon."

*First Reply*, p. 20. If this passage can be construed into any disrespect of that philosopher, if it indicate any prejudice against him, or if the tenor of my language, whenever I have occasion to mention him, does not always bespeak admiration and esteem, I will submit without a murmur to Mr. Drummond's reproof. That the charge against Aristotle is altogether groundless, notwithstanding the high authority by which it has very recently been sanctioned, I am firmly convinced: and I feel that indignation at hearing it, which is always allowable when the character of an illustrious person, the fruits of whose labours mankind still enjoy, is unjustly aspersed.

Mr. Drummond, however, thinks himself entitled to affirm; 'It is in vain to dispute the justice of Dr. Reid's remarks upon Aristotle's want of candour, either as to the bounds of his own knowledge, or the merits of his predecessors. Of the former the Author of the *Replies* himself affords the strongest confirmation, when he admires his "entire systems moulded into a full and perfect shape; buildings planned and raised from their foundation by the same hand, and carefully *finished in all their parts*;" a praise,' Mr. Drummond continues, 'which no panegyrist would have offered, and which no philosopher would have claimed, who entertained just views of the human mind.' p. 55. I must here beg my readers to bear in mind the occasion of my panegyric, which will be the best commentary on the candour of this interpretation. I was contrasting the labours of

Aristotle with those *detached essays and dissertations*, which, however useful or ingenious, demand neither the effort nor the talent requisite for framing *an entire system*. Aristotle engaged in this more arduous office: and the more I become acquainted with his works, the greater astonishment do I feel at the intellectual powers which they display. The epithets *perfect*, and *finished*, which I had applied to the nature of the composition, and had used in opposition to *partial*, and *unfinished*, Mr. Drummond most unaccountably represents as proofs *that I thought the systems incapable of improvement*: a representation to which no other answer is necessary than the reference above made to the context.

I come now to the position which, though not the most important, strikes me as by far the most extraordinary in the whole pamphlet. ‘When the Author of the ‘Reply observes, that “the syllogistic method of reasoning is not once mentioned, in the first book of the Novum Organum, among the causes which seem to have “obstructed the advancement of natural science,” he can ‘only be understood to mean, *that no mention whatever of ‘syllogism occurs in that part of the work.*’ p. 56. He then informs his readers, that the very second page contains four consecutive aphorisms, in which syllogism is mentioned, as *useless* in the discovery of every species of knowledge; and this he would advance as completely contradicting my assertion. Mr Drummond elsewhere talks of the ‘wretched outlines of Logic,’ which are found sufficient to qualify a candidate for Examination. What these outlines are I cannot even guess; but of this I am sure, that if a candidate were to give the proposition above quoted from his pamphlet as *contradictory* to my assertion, he would be required to produce other evidence of his skill in Logic, before he would be allowed to

assume even the humble appendage of B. A. to his name.

This wrong interpretation of my words *against* me is the more remarkable, when compared with his *favourable* interpretation of my adversary's words, about the dictates of Aristotle being received at Oxford as infallible decrees. These dictates my adversary had himself explained to be 'The Logic and Metaphysics' of that philosopher. But when he is informed that the *Metaphysics* are not read here, how does the 'impartial hearer of both sides' determine the question? Not by declaring that the charge has been refuted, but that my adversary must '*be understood to mean such metaphysical doctrines as are contained in the Ethics and Rhetoric.*' p. 36. Why he must be understood to mean this, or why *I* must be understood to mean that a thing is not mentioned *at all*, because I say it is not mentioned as an *obstruction*, is to me quite unintelligible: and I cannot but suspect that Mr. Drummond, while he wrote these passages, had forgotten for a moment the office which his motto implies, and that we must look a little higher in his title-page for the character which alone can justify such a mode of proceeding.

It is not my design to enter into the examination of Mr. Drummond's strictures on the late proceedings in this University, or of the further reforms which he proposes; although I cannot withhold my tribute of respect for the candour and ability which he has displayed in discussing those subjects. He will, however, permit me to observe, that some of his information is altogether of a novel kind, even to myself, who have been no inattentive observer of all the recent changes. In particular, when he remarks, with reference to Oxford, "that any system of University education must be deemed faulty and incomplete, in

“ which the inductive method of intellectual philosophy “ *is utterly proscribed,*” [p. 58.] it seems not improper to guard his readers against a most egregious mistake. As well might it be said, that the study of Oriental literature, of political economy, of the English Classics, of Antiquities, of the Saxon or the modern languages, in short, of one half of the things which are studied here, is *proscribed*, as the philosophy which he mentions. The grounds for each of these assertions are in this respect precisely equal, that they are not required of a candidate for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts. Mr. Drummond has himself given the history of the abolition of the Examination for the Degree of Master of Arts; a measure upon which different opinions were strongly entertained at the time; but I believe it never occurred either to the friends or to the opposers of that measure to suspect, that a single individual in the whole University would therefore imagine the studies formerly directed for that Degree to be *proscribed*.

If he would recommend the addition of that study to the other branches required for the first Degree, I must beg leave to dissent entirely from his opinion. If any alteration is made, I would rather indeed see the field contracted than enlarged. The prevailing fault even of diligent students is to pass over the ground of their studies too rapidly; and the business of the instructor, which requires most skill and effort, is, to *detain* the mind upon the several principles he is teaching till they are thoroughly worn in, to present these principles in a variety of lights, and to check that ambitious pursuit of higher objects, till it can be indulged without prejudice to more solid and necessary attainments. It is this disposition to slight the ordinary track of study, aided by what Lord Bacon emphatically calls “ the canker of epitomes,” which, instead of increasing real knowledge, and forming

accurate thinkers, fills the world with so many empty talkers. *Ista adcolatio ad generalissima*, to use the great philosopher's own words, *perdidit omnia*. Nor can I imagine a more crude and preposterous misconception of the nature of his labours, than to fancy that a young man's mind is to be employed in the cultivation of the *prima philosophia*, that is in quest of discoveries by which new ARTS may be invented and old ones improved, before he has yet learnt any one of those ARTS in its present form and condition.

But upon this subject I will now say no more. What I have said has occupied more space than I had intended ; although the magnitude and wide prevalence of the error which I have endeavoured to correct might well excuse a much longer discussion. The view thus given of Lord Bacon's philosophy is either altogether wrong, or it must be useful. And on that account I solicit the close attention of younger students to it, in order that they may be proof against those groundless imputations which our enemies have lately circulated, if any attempt should ever again be made to repeat them.

To the Edinburgh Reviewers indeed Mr. Drummond thinks ' that every impartial person must feel considerably indebted,' for having brought these subjects into notice. On their motives he does not venture to form any decision ; although I am glad to see that of one of those writers his opinion does not appear to differ widely from mine. My own, expressed as it was without reserve in the Second Reply, is founded solely upon a consideration of that Reviewer's writings ; which appear to me to indicate an absence not only of generous and manly feeling, but of moral principle : and as I find this to be a very general persuasion, I have good reason to think, that, whatever opinions or scurrilities he might think proper to publish, they would soon be perfectly harmless, if they

were not anonymous. But (leaving this writer to the benefit of his own reflections) of the rest I must say, that, whatever good may have arisen from the discussion, I should have thought the praise belonged least of all to the authors of the evil out of which it sprung. That it is beneficial to the public to have the truth vindicated, and to repel calumny, cannot be doubted; but I confess, that, till now, I was not aware of the merit of those who give occasion for this duty, nor of the gratitude which is due to false accusers.

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## POSTSCRIPT.

SOME variation in the use of the phrase *Naturalis philosophia* occurs even in the *Novum Organum*; but it is not such as to cause any embarrassment to the reader, or even to excite any notice, had not the full extent of Lord Bacon's design been called in question. In Aph. 127, it is clearly used, as we use the phrase *natural philosophy*, for one of those sciences which are to be enriched and improved by his method of investigation. "Utrum nos  
"de naturali tantum philosophia, an etiam de *scientiis*  
"*reliquis*, logicis, ethicis, politicis &c." In this sense it resembles what he elsewhere calls *historia naturalis*, as in Aph. 98. "Alia enim est ratio naturalis historię,  
"quę propter se confecta est; alia ejus, quę collecta  
"est ad informandum intellectum in ordine ad conden-  
"dam philosophiam." That Lord Bacon thought but little of the philosophy of mind throughout the *Novum Organum*, and the succeeding parts of his *Instauratio magna*, every candid reader must allow. It is only here and there that we are reminded *obiter*, of the application of his method of enquiry to this purpose. In the beginning of the 80th Aphorism the term *naturalis philosophia* will be found used in its limited sense, as is evident from the degrading service in which he complains that it is employed. But as he proceeds, the larger and more comprehensive meaning opens upon us. I cannot perhaps do better than extract the remainder of this Aphorism entire; because it is not only decisive of the question, whether his work embraces the science of mind, but it likewise concentrates almost every thing

I have endeavoured to demonstrate of the real scope of his philosophy.

“ Interim nemo expectet magnum progressum in scientiis (præsertim in parte earum operativa) nisi philosophia naturalis ad scientias particulares producta fuerit, et scientiæ particulares rursus ad naturalem philosophiam reductæ. Hinc enim fit, ut astronomia, optica, musica, plurimæ artes mechanicæ, atque ipsa medicina, atque (*quod quis magis miretur*) *philosophia moralis et civilis, et scientiæ logicæ* nil fere habeant altitudinis in profundo; sed per superficiem et varietatem rerum tantum labantur: quia postquam particulares istæ scientiæ dispersitæ et constitutæ fuerint, *et philosophia naturali non amplius aluntur*; quæ ex fontibus et veris contemplationibus motuum, radiorum, sonorum, texturæ et schematismi corporum, *affectuum, et prehensionum intellectualium*, novas vires et augmenta illis impertiri potuerit. Itaque minime mirum est, si scientiæ *non crescant*, cum a radicibus suis sint separatæ.”

THE END.







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